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The mighty Saturn V which put Neil Armstrong and his crew on the moon can 
be described as a rocket or, alternatively, as a transportation vehicle. 
This is not a question of semantics, but one of perception. 
To a military observer, the rocket symbolizes security concepts such as power, 
agression, self-defense, victory, defeat, in other words a weapon. In the eyes 
of his civilian colleague, that same rocket is primarily a means of 
transportation of passengers and cargo. 
Both observers are right, as the actual use of the rocket shows. Depending on 
that use, we call the rocket a missile (when it is meant to carry bombs) or an 
expendable launch vehicle (when it performs civilian tasks). 
Similar diverging perceptions, based on actual or potential uses, will apply to 
other modes of transport, like trucks and aircraft. Trucks may carry military 
personnel; their civilian versions are used as moving vans or schoolbusses. A 
B-52 aircraft carries bombs, a B-747 carries passengers and cargo. 
Space transportation/launching has a military-strategic origin. Though the 
Wright brothers were not developing warplanes, aviation does have a similar 
background. 
In the course of about three quarters of a century, air transport has shed most 
of its military- strategic beginnings. Put more precisely, the two uses/users 
have 'split up', resulting in both a specialized military aircraft catering to 
military needs, and a worldwide commercial air transport service industry, 
using dedicated aircraft, in which hundreds of airlines from virtually all 
sovereign states participate. 
The term service industry is used here intentionally. Airlines serve their 
customers wordwide by providing transportation. These customers have 
requirements and those requirements have to be met, both by each individual 
airline (lest the customers go to a competitor) and by the whole world airline 
industry, because the world economy can not do without international air 
transport. 
International air transport today is considered a commercial activity which is 
vital for world trade and the global economy, not as an activity involving the 
use of military modes of transport. 
For that reason, regulatory intervention, based on military-strategic/security 
considerations, is for all practical purposes absent in this service industry. 
As we will see in this study, the space launch industry has not reached that 
stage yet. Its military-strategic and national security background is still an 
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the other hand, the commercial use of launchers, the trade in launch services, 
is growing substantially, and the requirements of economically powerful private 
customers are increasingly driving the development of this service industry. 
In other words, the international space launch industry is at a cross-roads: for 
the sake of its clients, it has to perform like a 'normal' service industry, but 
in practice it is not yet allowed to do so. 
That conflict, between national security and international trade, and the way 
it affects the development of the international trade in launch services, is the 
central theme of this study. 
The central player is undoubtedly the Unites States. Not so much because of 
the size, scope and importance of its civil and military space industry in 
general and of its launch industry in particular, impressive as these may be. 
But rather because of the effect U.S.laws, policies and practices have on the 
development of other countries' commercial launch activities. 
This brings us to the starting point and the rationale for this study. 
The commercial satellite launch market, that is the number of satellites 
awaiting launch into orbit, including forecasts of future demand, shows a 
healthy growth for years to come. That trend is in particular built on projects 
in the field of global commercial communications, and to a lesser extent on 
other satellite-supported activities such as meteorology, earth resources 
surveying, astronomical and other research. All in all, at least some hundred 
non-governmental satellites per year will have to be transported into space. 
One would assume that, in view of the size of that market, an equally healthy 
number of competing launch companies would be ready to conclude lucrative 
contracts with the respective satellite manufacturers and/or prospective owners 
for the launch of those satellites. 
In fact, though there are indeed a number of countries with indigenous launch 
companies and a variety of launch vehicles, on closer inspection the suggested 
competiton - and thus the choice for customers - is limited in a number of 
ways. The U.S., Europe, Russia, China, Ukraine, Japan, India, Israel, and 
Brazil all have launch vehicles to offer to the market. And the U.S. and Russia 
have a number of launch 'families' and launch sites from which the customers 
may chose the right combination, depending, inter alia, on the size, weight 
and intended orbit of the satellite and the cost involved. And the geographic 
and socio-political variety and spread of the above 'launching states' also 
provides choice for similarly varied customers. 
But why are these the only countries providing launch services? 
Where are the competitive launch service providers of countries like South 
Africa, Argentina, Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Australia? 
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And why is it that the U.S., with Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and Europe, 
with Arianespace, dominate the launch market, while Russia and China, though 
possessing all the necessary technical capabilities, trail behind, with Ukraine 
and Japan hardly started, India succesful, but not established in the market, 
Israel established in the market but not yet succesful and Brazil still trying to 
prove its expertise in this field? 
Where are the newcomers and where is the innovation (particularly outside the 
U.S)? And what about international mergers and acquisitions c.q. the 
international alliances in this service industry? 
In the field of international aviation, one is accustomed to the phenomenon that 
every state feels incomplete without its own national airline. Arguments for 
promoting the start of a national airline range from military-strategic 
(emergency airlift) to purely commercial and economic reasons, with national 
prestige, 'guaranteed access to the outside world' and other, more mundane, 
motivations (fun, power) also playing a role. A prospective airline-operator, 
whether government-sponsored or private entrepreneur, and regardless of his 
motivation, will buy or lease the necessary aircraft, hire the pilots, engineers 
and sales staff, fit an airport, and apply for permission from foreign aviation 
authorities to start operations to the respective desired foreign destinations. 
In international air transport, it is in particular the latter, regulatory aspect 
which may stand in the way of a successful entry and access to the market. 
Barriers to entry and restrictions on the extent to which the market may be 
'conquered' may be the impediments which first have to be addressed before 
the flying and selling - and the competition- may truly get off the ground. And 
the more vital, strategic or otherwise valuable the industry is in the perception 
of a country or its government, the more it will try to guarantee its survival 
in the face of threatening competitors from abroad. (Of course such efforts may 
in a way be self-defeating: protection as such will seldom create the 'fittest' 
in the Darwinian sense of the word). 
With this background, and with the United States as the most influential player 
in the field of satellite manufacturing and launch services, it was relatively easy 
to formulate the aim of this study. First, to find out whether and, if so, to what 
extent U.S. laws, policies and practices have had, and continue to have, an 
effect on the development of the international trade in launch services, in 
particular in the sense of creating impediments to market entry and market 
access to foreign launch companies. Second, to 'take sides' in the sense of 
determining whether and, if so, to what extent the result of these U.S. actions 
provides an acceptable regulatory environment for the international launch 
industry and its global customers. And, third, to make recommendations with 
respect to the U.S. approach where appropriate. 
The aim of the study calls first for an analysis of the global market in which 
the launch companies presently operate, a description of the companies which 
manufacture satellites and of the satellite owners and operators. Against the 
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background of these customers, we review the performance and the 
development plans of the various launch companies, as they try to cater to 
future launch demands created by the introduction of next generation satellites. 
These include a number of international cooperative projects (with the U.S. 
launch companies taking the lead). 
Chapter 1 deals with this topic and concludes with the listing of a number of 
possible practical barriers which prevent launch 'have nots', i.e. countries 
without a launch industry, as well as launch 'haves', i.e. countries which do 
possess a launch industry, from starting such a business or from turning an 
existing one into a commercial success. 
Here, the concept of regulatory impedimentsis introduced and the stage is set 
for a mostly chronological review and analysis, in Chapter 2, of the U.S. 
laws, policies and practices applied to the development of its own private 
launch industry and, successively - and increasingly - , to the launch activities 
of other countries. 
Noteworthy in this connection is the shift from NASA and Defense Department 
launches, with launch vehicles procured from U.S. private industry for the 
Government's own civil and military programs in the 1960's and 1970's, to 
the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles in the 1980's. As we will 
show, the policy change to promote U.S. private enterprise launch services 
was not only filosophically unavoidable, it was also brought about by the space 
shuttle Challenger disaster in early 1986. Where assured access to space 
continued to be the primary paradigm, based on requirements of national 
security and foreign policy, at least part of that access should, in the view of 
the U.S. government, be guaranteed by stimulating domestic private enterprise 
launch services. 
To give private enterprise a fair chance, NASA and the Department of Defense 
were ordered to not compete with private industry for the same commercial 
customers, whether domestic or foreign, and to make launch site facilities 
available for the companies. 
It is at this stage that the U.S. private launch industry, still in its infancy but 
freed from 'unfair' domestic competition, met foreign competition in the form 
of Europe's Arianespace. The Chapter discusses a number of U. S. Government 
measures with which it strengthened the position of the U. S. launch providers 
in the face of foreign competition. 
Important for understanding the evolving views of the Government on the 
domestic launch industry is an analysis of the various policy directives and 
pieces of legislation which were successively adopted and a review of the 
sometimes heated discussions in the framework of Congressional hearings on 
the subject. As we will illustrate, three trends are particularly noticable: the 
overriding importance attached to national security (in the safeguarding of 
which a healthy U.S. private launch industry should play a role) and foreign 
policy, second, the complicated relationship between the Administration and 
Congress, whose often divergent priorities and agendas affect both the 
domestic launch industry and U .S. relations with foreign countries in this field. 
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And third, the conflicting requirements of the U.S. launch service providers 
and the satellite manufacturers. 
Chapter 2 is also where the U.S. export controls are scrutinized. The 
legislation governing the export of arms or munitions and of so-called sensitive 
'dual-use' goods and technologies, and the way these rules are being applied 
to the sale of U. S. launch vehicle technology and satellites to foreign countries, 
turn out to have a decisive influence on the well-being of most of the players 
introduced in Chapter 1 , in particular the U. S. satellite manufacturing and 
launch industry and foreign launch providers. 
The battle between the national security establishment and those defending 
international trade interests is fought in Congress as well as between Congress 
and the Administration, and affects the development and application of 
domestic legislation and the U.S. position in the international fora where the 
export controls are multilateralized. 
Chapter 2, finally, deals with the changes in both U. S. and international export 
controls resulting from the end of the cold war, and describes the relatively 
modest liberalization of these controls and the effect this has had on the launch 
and satellite manufacturing industry. 
In summary, this Chapter investigates, on the basis of an analysis of the 
pertinent laws, policies and multilateral arrangements on the subject, including 
their application, to what extent launch 'have nots' face regulatory hurdles 
when trying to join the club of launch service providers, how international 
cooperation in this field is being affected, and to what extent U. S. laws and 
policies influence foreign launch providers market access. 
Chapter 3 continues to deal with the themes developed in the previous 
Chapter, but focuses primarily on the relations ofthe U.S. with specific launch 
'haves', namely China, Russia, Ukraine and Europe. This Chapter explores 
in detail the U.S. policies and practices as applied in particular to China and 
Russia, when they sought entry into the international commercial launch 
market, and the domestic decision making process, with U.S. satellite 
manufacturers and launch providers at opposing ends. It describes the 
developments preceding the bilateral agreements the U.S. Administration 
concluded with these countries on the basis of the U.S. export control laws 
applicable to U.S. satellites and components, and analyzes the restrictions on 
market access these agreements contain. 
Political aspects, including diverging views of Congress and the Administration 
on the weapons proliferation behavior, peaceful intentions or human rights 
score of these countries, and the pros and cons of U.S. 'engagement' policies 
in this connection, play an important role. The aftermath of Tiananmen shows 
the power of Congress to legislate the sanctions it deems fit, confronting the 
statutory authority of the President to set and execute policies in the field of 
national security and foreign policy. This confrontation produces an element 
of unpredictability for the Chinese and Russian launch companies and their 
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customers, which, as we will see in this Chapter, may discourage customers 
from buying U.S. satellites if they prefer to use a foreign launch company for 
the actual launch. Also here the national security vs. trade dilemma will be 
reviewed by looking at the practice of domestic policy making and the resulting 
Government actions vis-a-vis these two countries. 
Special attention will be paid to Europe, both a U.S. ally and the U.S. launch 
industry's first and foremost competitor. The background and development of 
an independent launch services industry in Europe and the reaction of the U.S. 
thereto (already briefly reviewed in Chapter 2) precede a discussion of the 
European launcher policy and of the efforts of the European Space Agency and 
Arianespace to reserve ESA and national government launches for their own 
launch industry. We will introduce and discuss here another regulatory 
impediment the international launch industry faces, namely the 'fly U.S.' laws 
and policies, and compare the effects thereof to those resulting from the 'fly 
Europe' policy. 
Additionally, attention will be paid to the efforts of the U.S. and Europe to 
agree on common 'rules of the road' governing their respective behavior in 
the marketplace, and possibly including such aspects as subsidization and entry 
into the respective government markets. 
The Chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. Administration's 
stated goal since 1990 to achieve "free and fair trade in commercial launch 
services", and to that end, to abolish the launch trade agreements concluded 
with China, Russia and Ukraine. The chances for this goal to be met at the 
expiration of the current agreements are evaluated in the light of the so-called 
'China affair' of 1998, involving unauthorized transfer of sensitive 'missile-
relevant' U.S. technology to the Chinese launch industry. 
The concluding part of Chapter 3 sets the stage for a discussion, in Chapter 
4, of the U.S. concept of "free and fair trade in launch services". To what 
extent does the present regime satisfy the requirements of the parties in this 
respect and what should the concept mean according to the various U.S. 
domestic and foreign players? 
In this connection, special attention is given to the more recent views and 
actions of the Administration and Congress. 
As for the Administration, we will again look into its approach towards 
Europe, a party with which competition has not been regulated in the way 
reserved for the above three 'non-market economies'. Taking the actions of 
the two parties in the field of GA TS as a starting point, we will discuss the 
chances of having GATS applied to the trade in launch services and briefly 
look at the implications for the launch industries concerned. 
Congressional action, both in the form of the imposition of sanctions in 
general, and of the adoption of recent legislation aimed at launches by, and 
trade with, China in particular, is the subject of further scrutiny, with the aim 
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of determining its impact on the launch trade now and of evaluating the 
prospects for a 'free and fair trade in launch services' in the future. 
Finally, in this Chapter, we will survey the possibilities for the affected 
industries to seek remedies against the effects of the U.S. controls as outlined 
in the previous chapters. Two options are reviewed, U.S. law and space law. 
Under the latter heading, the provisions of the Space Treaty of 1967 and the 
"Outer Space benefits declaration" of 1996 are weighed as to the obligations 
they may have created for a spacefaring country to share its launch technology 
with other countries' industries, to permit other countries to launch its satellites 
or to permit foreign launch providers to use its spaceports. 
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations resulting from this 
study. It looks at the role of the United States as a guardian of national and 
global security and recalls the actions the U.S. has taken to serve that worthy 
goal. It concludes that, as a result of these actions, the trade in launch services, 
including cooperation, competition and innovation in the field of launch 
technology and launch services, has suffered, and provides recommendations 
which address, and may contribute to the solution of, the 'national security 
versus international trade' dilemma. 
Important in this connection is the aim to give national and global security its 
proper place and attention, including the necessary multilateral support for 
arrangements in this field, by striving for a clear distinction between real and 
serious security concerns on the one hand and matters of legitimate 
international trade on the other hand. 
After all, an important goal of this study is to contribute to the 'normalization' 
of the international trade in launch services. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The global satellite launch market 
and the launch companies 
1.1 The global satellite launch market 
The trade in launch services is part of a booming, multi-billion dollar industry. 
An authoritative report published in 1997 estimates that global space industry 
revenues in 1996 totalled about USD 77 billion, and are expected to exceed 
USD 121 billion annually by the year 2000. 
The two largest sectors of the industry are infrastructure and 
telecommunications. Infrastructure, which in the above report includes satellite-
manufacturing, ground installations and operations, spaceports, launch 
vehicles, the space station, and related science and R&D represented 61 
percent or USD 47 billion in 1996, and will increase to USD 59 billion, 
representing 49 percent of global space revenues, in 2000. 
Telecommunications services provided by/through satellites will surge from 
USD 23 billion in 1996 (30%) to USD 46 billion annually by the year 2000 
(38%). 1 
The manufacture, launch and use of communications satellites is 'big business' 
indeed. 
I. See State of the space industry - 1997 outlook, published by Space Vest, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, Space Publications and Centre for Wireless Communications, hereinafter referred 
to as State of the space industry, at 9. The report distinguishes four categories of activities 
or sectors: infrastructure, telecommunications, support services (engineering, technical 
support, business consulting, fmancial and legal services, and space insurance) and emerging 
applications (remote sensing, geographical information services, global positioning systems 
and services, and materials processing). Support services totalled $3 billion (4%) in 1996 
and will remain at the same level in 2000 (2%), whereas emerging applications will grow 
from $4 billion (5%) in 1996 to $13 billion (11%) in the year 2000. The report also 
observes that commercial utilization of space hardware in 1996 represented approximately 
53% of the industry, the first year on record that commercial revenues surpassed 
government expenditures. This percentage is likely to increase as, according to the report 
(and supported by developments in 1997 and 1998), the industry is continuing its evolution 
from a government-driven, project-defined industry to one in which the government plays a 
lesser role and commercial forces predominantly dictate growth, see id., at 10. 
1 
Chapter 1 
A distinction can be made between the Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) 
market on the one hand and the combined Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium 
Earth Orbit (MEO) markets on the other hand. 
A 1997 market overview forecasts that, from 1997 through the year 2006, a 
total of 273 commercial communications satellites will be launched into GEO 
orbit, with a total value of about USD 37.8 billion (excluding launch cost).2 
The same market overview forecasts that over the same period a total of 1, 062 
commercial communications satellites will be launched into either LEO or 
MEO orbits, with a total value of just under USD 11.2 billion (excluding 
launch cost). 3 
A more recent study, produced by the U.S. FAA's Associate Administrator 
for Commercial Space Transportation, forecasts the following global demand 
for commercial launch services for the period 1999-2010 (in average number 





Total launches per year: 
Total launches in 
12 years period: 
25 launches of medium-to-heavy launch vehicles 
15 launches of medium-to-heavy launch vehicles 
11 launches of small launch vehicles 
51 (+40%) 
610, for a total of 1369 satellites.3a 
2. See World space systems briefing, Teal Group Corporation (1997), hereinafter referred to as 
1997 Teal Group briefmg. The GEO/LEO/MEO market development data which follow are 
derived from this market study, unless indicated otherwise. Though, in its 1998 update, the 
aerospace and defense analysis group scaled back its assessment of the world market for 
commercial satellites for the years 1999 to 2008 in view of both the Asian economic crisis 
and recent launch failures which affect the start-up/completion dates of a number of satellite 
constellations, it continues to forecast a bright commercial and financial future for, in 
particular, space-based communications (notwithstanding these 'short-term' setbacks), and is 
joined in this positive long-term view by Merri!I Lynch analysts of the industry, see 2 (16) 
International Space Industry Report (Sep 28, 1998), hereinafter referred to as ISIR, at 1, 4. 
3. Another figure, provided in the State of the space industry, supra note 1, at 24, quoting Via 
Satellite, puts total sales of all GEO/LEO commercial communications satellites in the 
period 1996-2000 at USD 54 billion. Other figures in the same report show a rather stable 
international government (gov) demand for satellites, and an increasing commercial (corn) 
market: (in approx. $billions) 1996: gov 6, corn 3; 1997: gov 6, corn 4; 1998: gov 6, corn 
5; 1999: gov 6, corn 6,5;2000: gov 6, corn 8,5, see id., at 25. 
3.a See 1999 Commercial space transportation forecasts, FAA's Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and the Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) (May 1999). 
2 
The global satellite launch market and the launch companies 
A private market research firm gives the following forecast for the years 1999-
2008, a 10-year period, including an approximate total value of the satellites 
concerned: 
commercial communications 





40-50 (value: USD 3.5 billion) 
305 (value: USD 35.1 billion)3b 
In the GEO market, the customers, i.e. the buyers and users of the satellites, 
consist of government agencies, private telecommunications entities and 
companies, international global and regional organizations, who use the 
satellites and satellite systems for such programs as telecommunications/tv 
broadcasting, direct-to-home tv, broadband multimedia and mobile 
communications. 
- The U.S. customers, such as PanAmSat, Loralsat, Lockheed Martin's 
Astrolink and Hughes Communications' Spaceway, are expected to buy 101 
satellites, for some 26 of the above programs. Together with a small 
number of Canadian orders, this represents about USD 17.3 billion and 39 
percent of the worldmarket of GEO satellites launched; 
- Asia and the Pacific Rim will buy 78 satellites at approximately USD 10.3 
billion; 
- Nine European countries and the European Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (Eutelsat) will together obtain 32 satellites with a value of 
approximately USD 5.1 billion; 
- Africa and the Middle East, made up of four customer countries and the 
Arab Satellite Communications Organization (Arabsat) will spend 
approximately USD 1. 3 billion for 8 satellites; 
- Intelsat and Inmarsat, the two global communications organizations will buy 
12 and 6 satellites respectively at a total value of close to USD 1.9 billion; 
- Latin America and the Caribbean account for 10 satellites at approximately 
USD 1.1 billion, with Brazil dominating that regional market with 6 
satellites; and, finally, 
- Russia is expected to acquire 20 GEO satellites for close to USD 1 billion. 
3. b See Satcom market buffeted by economic uncertainties, Marco Antonio Caceres, Teal Group 
Corp. (January 11, 1999), Aviation Week & Space Technology Online 
<http://www .aviationweek.com/aviation/sourcebook/99satel.htm > The military forecast is 
based on an estimated 15 satellites per year launched by the Russians, and 10-11 per year 




The satellite manufacturers most likely to produce the large majority of the 
above satellites are three U.S. and two French companies, namely: 
Hughes Space and Communications (48 satellites (sats) at USD 8.4 billion), 
Lockheed Martin Telecommunications (36 sats, at USD 5.2 billion), 
Space Systems/Loral (27 sats at USD 3.6 billion), 
Matra Marconi (13 sats at USD 2.1 billion), and 
Aerospatiale (14 sats at USD 1. 6 billion). 4 
LEO/MEO market 
A plethora of satellite programs for at least three different applications will 
make use of LEO/MEO satellites: systems will be dedicated to broadband 
multimedia (fixed, high-powered digital voice, data and video services), mobile 
(hand-held) voice and data communications (faxing, paging, messaging and 
positioning), and mobile data communications (regional or global data relay, 
faxing, etc.) 
Broadband multimedia systems, such as the U.S. Teledesic and M-Star and 
the French Skybridge will use a total of 458 0.6 to 4 ton satellites, with a start 
of launches in 2001. A shortage of sufficient launchers could delay the entry 
into service of these systems by a few years. An estimated 5 mobile voice and 
data systems, among which Globalstar, ICO, Iridium and Odyssey will consist 
of 374 satellites, with the LEO systems (Globalstar and Iridium) using small 
satellites of less than 1 ton, and the MEO programs using satellites of 2 to 3 
tons in weight. Finally, mobile data systems such as Orbcomm and Starsys will 
need some 230 small to very small (less than 100 kilo) satellites. 
Even more so than in the GEO market, U.S. customers will dominate this 
market, with 85 percent of the satellites destined for U.S. systems, such as 
Globalstar, Iridium, Orbcomm and Teledesic. They are followed by European 
programs such as Alcatel's Skybridge, Belgian IRIS and Matra Marconi's 
WEST, taking 10.5 percent of the satellites. ICO owned by Global 
Communications, a subsidiary of Inmarsat, and two Russian systems will also 
operate in this market segment. 
The satellite manufacturers which will produce and sell the great majority of 
these satellites will be: 
Motorola, which early in 1998 replaced Boeing Defense and Space as designer 
and builder of about 325 Teledesic satellites (at almost USD 3.3 billion), 
4. Via Satellite gives the following market shares of communications satellites in orbit as of 
January 1997: Hughes 36%, Lockheed Martin 17%, Space Systems/Loral 13%, Matra 
Marconi 8%, Aerospatiale 8%, other 18%. For communications satellites under 
construction, the following market shares are given: Hughes 29%, Space Systems/Loral 
18%, Lockheed Martin 17%, Aerospatiale 14%, Matra Marconi 10%, Alcatel 4%, other 
8%, as quoted in State of the space industry, supra note 1, at 26, 27. 
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Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space (168 Iridium satellites for USD 1 billion), 
Space Systems/Loral (116 Globalstar satellites at USD 290 million), 
Alcatel Espace (112 satellites for Skybridge and Starsys at approximately USD 
784 million), and Orbital Sciences which will build 92 satellites for its own 
Orbcomm system (USD 132 million). 
The above commercial communications satellites represent approximately 70 
percent of the total of all payloads to be launched. The remaining 30 percent 
cover such other categories as civil and military government satellites, earth 
imaging and meteorological satellites, scientific and technology development 
satellites. Civil satellites, i.e. all government satellites which are not military, 
make up about 13 percent (scientific, earth observation, meteorological, 
communications and technology development satellites), while military 
satellites (inter alia communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, 
meteorological satellites) are expected to account for approximately 9 percent 
of worldwide payloads to be launched in the years to come. 
One may conclude that the space industry in general and the satellite 
manufacturing industry in particular (and the U.S. companies concerned) are 
extremely healthy, poised for further growth and, as a consequence, employing 
an increasing number of people around the globe.5 
5. Worldwide, some 800,000 people are actively employed in the space industry. The 
commercial sector is creating over 70,000 new jobs per year, see State of the space 
industry, supra note 1, at 10. According to William A. Reinsch, U.S. Under Secretary for 
Export Administration, Dept of Commerce, "U.S. [satellite manufacturing] industry 
revenues last year were $23.1 billion, a 15% increase from the previous year. Employment 
in 1997 was over 100,000, a 10% increase from the previous year.", see The adequacy of 
Commerce Department satellite export controls, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
international security, proliferation and federal services (Jun 18, 1998) 
<http:/lwww.bxa.doc.gov/press/98/sattest.htm>; also Gary R. Bachula, Acting Under 
Secretary for Technology, Dept of Commerce: "[t]he Satellite Industry Association estimates 
that the worldwide commercial satellite industry already represents a $44 billion industry, 
providing over 150,000 high-wage, high-tech jobs. Roughly half of those revenues and jobs 
are in the United States. Annual growth in this area was over 14% in 1997, and is projected 
to remain strong as the global demand for satellite services expands,", see Remarks on 
commercial space transportation, Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee, 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Connnittee, U.S. Senate (Sep 23, 1998) 
<http://www .ogc.doc.gov /ogc/legreg/testimonlcommerce.052/bach0923 .htm > 
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1.2 The launch companies and the spaceports 
1. 2.1 The launch companies 
A report of the U.S. FAA Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation covering 1997 worldwide launch activity, listed a total of 89 
orbital launches involving 150 payloads (satellites) performed in that year for 
commercial, civil and military purposes. 6 
Of these 89launches worldwide, 35 were considered commercial, i.e. launches 
which were in principle open to international competition. 
The launch companies concerned had revenues exceeding USD 2. 4 billion. The 
U.S. launch companies in the same year earned a total revenue (for 
commercial launches) of close to USD 1.0 billion. Arianespace, with sales of 
FF 6.6 billion (about USD 1.1 billion), earned slightly more. 7 
Those amounts will grow substantially in the coming years thanks to the 
explosive expansion of satellite systems, particularly in Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO). On the other hand, the international government launch market, though 
still the largest in overall revenues, is not expected to show any substantial 
growth in the next few years. A 1997 study of historic and forecasted launch 
revenues produced the following picture: 8 
Launch Vehicle Revenues ($ Millions) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Caqnnl 
(F) (F) (F) (F) Growth 
Expendable Launch Vehicles 1325 1811 2214 2400 2594 2700 49% 
- Commercial 
Expendable Launch Vehicles 3101 3143 3143 3220 3215 3205 2% 
- Government 
Total 4426 4954 5348 5620 5809 5905 19% 
Where the actual worldwide commercial launch revenues as reported c.q. 
forecasted by the FAA for the years 1997 and 1998, i.e. USD 2.4 and 3.0 
billion respectively, are higher than the above figures, the difference in growth 
6. See Commercial Space Transportation: 1997 Year in review, Department of Transportation 
(DOT}, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Associate Administrator for Connnercial 
Space Transportation (AST) (Jan 1998) hereinafter referred to as AST Report 1997, at 3. 
7. See Arianespace - Espace Newsletter No.134 (Jul/Aug 1998) hereinafter referred to as 
Espace newsletter 134 <http://www .arianespace.cornlenglish/news _letter.htrnl > . 
8. See State of the space industry, supra note 1, at 34. 
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percentages becomes only bigger and the gap between the two markets 
smaller. 9 
Only 4 'launching states', (groups of) countries whose companies perform 
these launches, were involved in the above commercial launches: U.S (14), 
Russia (7), Europe (11) and China (3). 
The launch providers of these states also performed non-commercial, mostly 
government-launches, and were, in those latter activities, joined by 3 other 
states, Japan (2), India (1) and Brazil (1). 
The U.S., Russia, Europe and China are the main players, which dominate 
the international commercial launch market. Of these, only the U. S. and Russia 
also have a sizable non-commercial, i.e. mainly government (civil and 
military), launch manifest: in 1997, the U.S. performed 24 such launches, and 
Russia 22. 
The list of active launch companies per country is not a very long one as yet: 
In the U.S., 2 major companies and one smaller enterprise performed the 
commercial launches in 1997: 
- Lockheed Martin, operating the Atlas family of launchers and a new small 
launch vehicle, the Athena 1, launched once in 1997. 
- Boeing, operating the (formerly McDonnell Douglas) Delta, and 
- Orbital Sciences, operating the small, air-launched Pegasus. 
The three companies use and plan to employ additional launch vehicles, either 
developed within the company or through arrangements with other launch 
companies (see below). 
(The U.S. government also makes use of the above companies for its launch 
needs, and has, in addition, NASA's Space Shuttle and the Air Force's Titan 
IV, for its various civil and military government missions. The latter two do 
not operate in the commercial market) 
Russia employs a wide range of launch vehicles, and increasingly offers its 
launch services with those vehicles through a number of (semi-) governmental 
companies on the international market. 
In 1997, it was primarily the Proton heavy-lift vehicle which was used for 
commercial launches. The commercial debut of the small Start vehicle, a 
refurbished missile, also occurred in 1997. Other launch vehicles, so far only 
used for domestic (government-) missions are the Cosmos, Cyclone (Tsyklon), 
9. The 1998 figure is mentioned in Commercial Space Transportation, 3rd Quarter 1998, DOT, 
FAA, AST (Jul 31, 1998), hereinafter referred to as AST Report 1998 (3d Q), at 12. Proton 
and Delta 3 failures kept launchers on the ground resulting in fewer 1998 launches than 
originally foreseen actually taking place and in 1998 total launch revenues reaching an 
estimated USD 2.1 billion, see infra. 
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Molniya, Soyuz and Zenit, some of which form the subject of international 
cooperation with European and American companies (see below). 
China's Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) employs and sells the Long 
March family of launchers. Of its 6 launches in 1997, 3 were commercial, the 
other 3 non-commercial. 
The European Space Agency (ESA) financed the development of the Ariane 
launch vehicle, successfully sold by Arianespace on the international 
commercial launch market. (Until 1997, Arianespace traditionally performed 
the majority of the world's commercial launches, but a record number of U.S. 
launches for LEO satellite constellations in 1997 reduced the European share 
to 31 percent, lower, for the first time in close to a decade, than the U.S. 
(40 percent). This trend will continue in 1998. 
Arianespace performed only one launch of a non-commercial nature, a second 
test flight of the new Ariane 5. ESA, in the light of the stormy LEO 
developments, also sees the need for a small European-built launch vehicle. 
Japan's first indigenously built launch vehicle, the H2, was first launched in 
1994. This was followed in 1997 by the MS, a much smaller vehicle carrying 
a scientific satellite. In 1997 each of the vehicles was launched once, both for 
non-commercial purposes. The hopes of Japan's (future) international launch 
clients with large satellites are pinned on a heavier-lift version of the H2, the 
H2A, which is not yet operational. 
India is one of the most experienced new entrants into the exclusive club of 
commercial launching states. In 1980 it performed its first successful launch 
with an indigenous launch vehicle, thus becoming the seventh launch nation. 
Though the launch capability now provided by its Polar Satellite Launch 
Vehicle (PSLV), first successfully launched in October 1994, is primarily used 
for domestic needs, such as the launch of Indian Remote-sensing Satellites 
(IRS), the PSLV is also marketed for commercial launches. The one launch 
performed in September 1997 was a non-commercial one. The next launch will 
take place in late 1998 and will carry both an IRS and a small Korean scientific 
satellite, the latter under a commercial contract. The Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO) proposes to build 5 more PSLV's in the next 5 years to 
carry IRS spacecraft. 10 In July 1998, Antrix Corporation, the commercial 
wing of India's Department of Space, signed on behalf of ISRO its third 
commercial contract for the launch of a Belgian microsatellite; the satellite will 
share space with an IRS on the PSL V. 11 
10. See Space News Online (Jun 8, 1998) at 1 ("India increases space funding by 52 
percent/largest budget hike ever targets comrnumcatlons, launch vehicles") 
<http://www.spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0608q.htm>, hereinafter referred to as 
India space funding). 
11. See Space News Online (Jut 13, 1998) at 38 
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Israel, though it did not perform any launch in 1997, should be introduced 
here, because, in 1988, it became the eighth member of the space launch club 
with the launch of the small Shavit launch vehicle. It has not yet made a 
commercial launch but an upgraded version called LK-l!Next is being 
developed for commercial use, in close cooperation with a U.S. and a French 
aerospace firm (see below). Israel's special handicap is its small territory 
surrounded by less than launch-friendly neighbours, which severely limits 
trajectories available for launches. For that reason, a determined effort is being 
made to get U.S. government permission for launches from U.S. bases. 
Brazil has been working for some years on the development of the Veiculo 
Lancador de Satellites (VLS), designed to place small satellites into equatorial 
low earth orbit. So far the test flights, including one in 1997, have not been 
successful. Nevertheless, Brazil has the ambition to market the VLS 
commercially once it is operational. 
Ukraine, not included in the above F AA report because it did not perform any 
commercial launches in 1997, needs to be mentioned here nonetheless as the 
manufacturer of the well-proven Tsyklon (Cyclone) and Zenit launchers. In 
its ambition to commercialize these vehicles, its space industry has concluded 
an agreement with Boeing for the sale of an advanced version of the Zenit, and 
the government has entered into a launch trade agreement with the U.S. which 
makes commercial Zenit launches of Western satellites possible. 
1998 developments 
FAA reports on 1998 worldwide launch events show little change in the above 
picture of launch service providers and launch vehicles: 
In the first two quarters of the year, the launch companies of the U. S., Europe, 
Russia, China, Japan and Israel performed together 39launches (through the 
launch companies and with the launch vehicles mentioned above), 20 of which 
were commercial ones. 12 
New were the launch of U.S.' Orbital Sciences other small vehicle, the Taurus 
and Lockheed Martin's successful launch of another version of the Athena, the 
Athena 2. 
<http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0713j.htm >. 
12. The U.S. was responsible for a total of 20 launches, 13 of which were of a commercial 
nature, Europe took care of 4 launches (3 commercial), Russia 11 (3 commercial), China 3 
(2 commercial), and Japan's H2 and Israel's Shavit were each launched once (both were 
non-commercial and failed), see AST Report 1998 (3d Q) supra note 9, at 3, 8 and similar 
report for the second Quarter (Apr 27, 1998) hereinafter referred to as AST Report 1998 (2d 
Q), at 3, 8. 
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In July 1998, the Russian Shtil rocket entered the commercial launch market. 
The Shtil, which carried two small Tubsat satellites of the Technical University 
of Berlin into low Earth orbit, is a converted missile launched from a 
submarine located about 30 meters beneath the sea surface. With Russia's 
impressive missile inventory now in principle available for commercial 
purposes, the small satellite owners have an additional low-cost launch option 
for their missions. 13 
Later in 1998, Ukraine's entry into the international commercial launch 
market, based on a 1995 contract with Globalstar to perform three Zenit 
launches carrying 12 satellites each, was dealt a serious blow with the failure 
of the first launch on September 10, 1998, which destroyed the 12 Globalstar 
satellites and resulted in the remaining two Zenit launches being cancelled. 14 
Apart from affecting the reputation of the Zenit (and increasing insurance cost 
for the launcher), it was not immediately clear to what extent this failure would 
affect the U.S.-Ukrainian Sea Launch project, which uses a more powerful 
version of the vehicle (See infra). 
Finally, in October 1998, the third and final testflight of the Ariane 5 heavy-
lift European launcher took place. The new vehicle performed as planned, thus 
paving the way for commercial operations starting in 1999. 
The worldwide totals for 1998 as reported by the FAA were as follows: 14a 
13. See Space News Online (Sep 21, 1998) hereinafter referred to as Space News Online 0921, 
at 1 ("Small satellite makers seek first-class rides into space"), 
<http://www .spacenews ... members/sarchlsarch98/sn0921m.htm >) 
14. Loral Space and Communications in the mean time used existing options on the Russian 
Soyuz vehicle and the U .S. Delta 2 to carry the satellites - with a costly delay - into orbit, 
see Space News Online (Sep 14, 1998) at 1 ("Globalstar shifts launchers after failure of 
Zenit/Mishap will cost $100 million"). 
<http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0914bg .htm > 
14.a See Commercial space transportation: 1998 Year in review, FAA Associate Administrator 
for Commercial Space Transportation (AST) (Jan 1999) hereinafter referred to as AST 
Report 1998, at 3, 4. For purposes of this report, a "commercial launch" is defmed as a 
launch that is internationally competed, i.e. available in principle to international launch 
providers, or whose primary payload is commercial in nature. U.S Government launches 
procured commercially are considered to be government launches. The term "commercial 
payload"refers to a spacecraft which serves a commercial function or is operated by a 
commercial entity, without regard to how it was launched. For this report, communications 
satellites launched for international consortia such as Intelsat are considered commercial, see 
id. , notes 1 and 3. 
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launches performed: 
commercial non-commercial total 
launches launches 
U.S. 17 19 36 
Russia 5 19 24 
Europe 9 2 11 
China 4 2 6 
Japan 0 2 2 
Ukraine 1 0 1 
Israel 0 1 1 
North Korea 0 1 1 
TOTAL 36 46 82 
payloads (spacecraft) launched: 
commercial non-commercial total 
pay loads pay loads 
u.s. 59 21 80 
Russia 12 33 45 
Europe 13 3 16 
China 8 2 10 
Ukraine 12 0 12 
Japan 0 2 2 
Israel 0 1 1 
North Korea 0 1 1 
TOTAL 104 63 167 
The above report notes that, out of the above 104 commercial payloads, 78 
were spacecraft destined for the Iridium, Globalstar and Orbcomm LEO 
telecommunications constellations alone, which continued a trend started in 
1997. European Arianespace did not participate in the LEO launches, but 
launched 13 telecommunications satellites into GEO orbit. 
Launch failures at the end of 1997 and in 1998 and the resulting temporary 
grounding of the respective launch vehicles led to a lower number of launches 
than originally foreseen and lower revenues than previously predicted. 
According to the F AA report, revenues from the 36 commercial launches 
conducted globally reached an estimated USD 2.1 billion, with the U.S. 
companies earning USD 911 million, followed by Europe (763), Russia (313), 




International launch ventures 
The Sea Launch project is a joint venture of Boeing Commercial Space 
Company, KB Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash of Ukraine, RSC Energia of Russia 
and Kvaerner Maritime a.s. of Norway. The partners will operate the 
Ukrainian Zenit launch vehicle from a self-propelled, semi-submersible launch 
platform, the Odyssey, a former North Sea oil-drilling rig, with Boeing 
operating the Sea Launch Home Port at Long Beach, California and acting as 
overall project manager. The Russian firm will contribute the Block DM-SL 
upper stage and be responsible for Sea Launch vehicle integration, launch 
operations and range services, and Kvaerner, which modified the platform and 
was responsible for the design and manufacture of the Assembly and Command 
Ship, the Sea Launch Commander, a floating mission control centre and 
rocket-assembly plant. 15 
Sea Launch will offer (geographically) flexible launch services and, thanks to 
its possibility to move the launch platform to near the equator, will be able to 
put heavy satellites into geostationary orbit, and has thus the potential to 
become a formidable competitor for both Arianespace and another international 
venture, International Launch Services. 16 
Sea Launch's first commercial customer is Hughes Space and Communications, 
whose Galaxy XI communications satellite is slated for launch from the Pacific 
Ocean in August 1999. (Sea Launch in the meantime acquired a package of 
13 firm launch orders from Hughes and 5 from Loral Space and 
Communications), and performed a successful inaugural flight on March 27, 
1999 (without commercial payload). 
A second international venture, International Launch Services (ILS), preceded 
Sea Launch. It was formed in 1995 when Lockheed Martin Commercial 
Launch Services and Lockheed Khrunichev Energia International (LKEI) joined 
forces to market two launch vehicles, the U.S. Atlas and the Russian-built 
Proton. (LKEI itself was formed in 1992, when Lockheed, a major U.S. 
defense company without a launch vehicle of its own, concluded a joint 
marketing agreement with the two Russian manufacturers of the Proton, 
Khrunichev Enterprise and NPO Energia of Kaliningrad, and created a new 
company LKE International, headquartered in California, to sell the Proton 
launcher internationally). The merger of Lockheed with Martin Marietta 
(builder of the Titan and - since 1994 - owner of General Dynamics, the 
manufacturer of the Atlas) brought the international sale of the Proton and the 
15. See Sea Launch, <http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/sealaunch/>. The shares in 
Sea Launch are distributed as follows: Boeing 40%, Energia 25%, Kvaemer 20%, 
Yuzhnoye 15%. 
16. On the U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral launch trade agreement, by virtue of which Ukraine, both 
independently and through Sea Launch, offers its launch services on the international 
market, see infra, Chapter 3.3. 
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Atlas launch vehicles into one hand, to the benefit of both the U.S. and 
Russian partners. 17 
The above U.S.-ledjoint ventures give the two U.S. aerospace giants powerful 
additional tools to compete with Arianespace and CGWIC in the market of 
medium to heavy payload launches. To partially answer that competitive 
challenge, Arianespace, together with the French aerospace company 
Aerospatiale, in August 1996, teamed up with the Russian Space Agency 
(RKA) and the Russian Samara Space Centre to form Starsem, a company 
which is to sell commercial launch services using the Soyuz launch vehicle 
family (which includes the four-stage Molniya launcher) for low and medium 
Earth orbit missions. Where the Ariane 5, once operational, will easily 
accommodate 10 LEO satellites at one time, the Soyuz will take care of smaller 
numbers (at lower prices). By 1996, Starsem had signed three contracts with 
Loral Space and Communications for the launch of 12 Globalstar constellation 
satellites, and is scheduled in 2000 to launch ESA's four scientific Cluster 
satellites, two per Soyuz. 18 
Arianespace took another step to cater for the (very) small satellite launch 
market, by signing an agreement with Antrix Corporation, the commercial 
wing of India's Department of Space/ISRO to jointly market the Indian Polar 
Satellite Launch Vehicle and Arianespace's Ariane 5 for the launch of auxiliary 
payloads in the weight class of up to 100 kilograms. 19 
This may be only the beginning of an important 'alliance' between an 
established launch provider and a newcomer in the international commercial 
launch market. 
In 1995, German DASA (Daimler-Benz Aerospace) and Russian Khrunichev 
jointly created a company, Eurockot Launch Services GmbH of Bremen, with 
the aim to market refurbished Russian SS-19 ICBM's ("Rockots") for small 
LEO satellite launches. In September 1998, Eurockot was reported to be close 
to signing firm contracts for two commercial launches of the Rockot in late 
17. See e.g. Lockheed Martin Today- August 1998 ('Progressive partners -cooperative 
ventures with Russia grow business and build cultural bridges'). 
<http://www .Jmco .com/files3/lmtoday /9808/progressive.html > 
18. See Loral Press Release (Dec 5, 1996) ("Space Systems/Loral signs an agreement with 
Starsem to launch 12 Globalstar satellites") 
<http://www.Joral.com/starsemagreement.html>. As we saw earlier, the September 1998 
Zenit failure resulted in Globalstar's affirming the Starsem launch contract reservations. The 
first such launch -of 4 Globalstars- took place on Feb 8, 1999. The shares in Starsem, 
which is led by a French chairman and CEO and a Russian COO, are distributed as follows: 
Aerospatiale 35%, Arianespace 15%, RKA and Samara 25% each. For further info on 
Starsem, see Starsem brochure (1997) and Espace newsletter 134, supra note 7, at 4-6. 
19. See Arianespace News & Information (Jun 10, 1998) ("ISRO and Arianespace to jointly 
market launch services for small satellites"). 
<http://www .arianespace.com/english/news _ news.html > 
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1999. These contracts would come on top of the 10 launches U.S. 
communications company Motorola has booked for future replenishment of 
the Iridium LEO constellation and of 2 E-sat messaging satellite launches. In 
addition, Eurockot has also collected reservations from undisclosed customers 
for 12 more flights. 20 
Cosmos International ORB-System GmbH of Bremen is mentioned in the trade 
press as the Western company marketing the small Russian Cosmos launcher. 
The company is reported to have three firm contracts for the launch of small 
satellites (up to 1,300 kg) into LE0. 21 
The Russian-U.S. company Cosmos USA, a joint venture of AKO Polyot of 
Omsk, Russia and the American company Assured Space Access has also been 
promoting the Cosmos for launching small satellites. 22 
In the small launch services market at least one other international venture will 
compete with OSC' s Pegasus and Lockheed Martin's Athena, i.e., the LeoLink 
Consortium, set up by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) with Coleman Research 
Corporation (CRC) of Florida. CRC attempts to sell the LK-1, a launcher 
developed on the basis of the design of the Israeli Shavit, but with sufficient 
U.S. content to qualify for U.S. government launch contracts. 23 
20. Space News (Jan 25, 1999) reports, at 8, that Eurockot had signed a contract for the launch 
of 2 Iridium satellites in Dec 1999. "The contract also includes an option for 12 more 
launches of Iridium satellites". Eurockot will operate from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, but 
may also use Baikonur, Russia's main launch base in Kazakhstan. 
See also Space News (Feb 20, 1995) at 3: Khrunichev is shareholder in the Iridium venture, 
whereas DASA has purchased a stake in the Loral-led Globalstar network; both are LEO 
constellations, for which Eurockot offers its launch capabilities. Eurockot 's first 
demonstration launch is now scheduled for October 1999, see Space News Online 0921, 
supra note 13. Also, see ISIR supra note 2, at 1, 17 ("Eurockot prepares for first flight with 
launch commitments"). DASA was also reported to be working on an arrangement with the 
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau of Dnieprpetrovsk, Ukraine, to operate the latter's Cyclone rocket 
from the Guyana Space Centre in Kourou, French Guyana). 
21. See Space News Online (Mar 9), 1998, at 10 ("Russian rockets factor heavily in strategy"), 
hereinafter referred to as Space News Russian rockets, 
<http://www. spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0309l.htrnl > 
22. See Liudmila Bzhilianskaya, Russian launch vehicles on the world 11Ulrket: a case study of 
international joint ventures, 13 (4) Space Policy 323-338 (1997) hereinafter referred to as 
Bzhilianskaya, at 332-333. Prominent advertising by Cosmos USA (Assured Space Access 
Inc.) appears to show Western competition in exercising sales rights pertaining to the same 
Russian launcher, see State of the space industry, supra note 1, at 35 (ad), 36. 
23. For that purpose, the main stages have to be US-built. In Oct 1998, NASA did select the 
launcher as one of the two candiates for contracts under its Small Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Services 2 (SELVS 2) program of 16 small payload launches, valued at about USD 
400 million, see Space News (Nov 2, 1998) at 1. Matra Marconi of France, the third 
partner, provides i.a. the fourth stage, see ISIR, supra note 2, at 16; on the 'fly US' policy, 
see Chapter 3.4.4 infra. On CRC's efforts to be selected by NASA for government launches 
under the SELVS 2 program, see Space News Online (Jul 27, 1998) at 6 ("Unproven 
launcher in running for NASA payloads"). 
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(Other) launch vehicle development plans and projects 
Where in the past the size of commercial satellites was limited by the capability 
of the available launchers which had been designed and built for government 
payloads, this trend has now reversed. Commercial requirements increasingly 
determine the design and development of the launchers. 
As a consequence, both the existing launch companies and new enterprises are 
developing more powerful and increasingly sophisticated upgrades of current 
vehicles. New launchers are also being designed to cater to the expanding 
satellite launch market and meet specific demands of their customers, the 
satellite manufacturers and satellite owners/operators, with respect to capacity, 
flexibility, reliability and cost. (Noteworthy in this connection is that the large 
(GEO) satellites become larger and the small (LEO) satellites become smaller.) 
U. S. projects 
Boeing 
The Delta II, Boeing's reliable 'workhorse' which has been in operation since 
1989, launching medium weight satellites (with a maximum of 4,120 lb/1,860 
kg) into GTO, has been joined by the Delta Ill, developed by Boeing to 
compete with the Ariane and Proton heavy lift launchers, with a GTO 
capability of 8,400 lb/3,810 kg, i.e. twice the payload of the Delta Il. 
Delta Ill's maiden flight took place on August 26, 1998, but one minute after 
ignition the vehicle lost control and had to be destroyed. The payload, a 
Galaxy 10 communications satellite owned by PanAmSat, was destroyed as 
well, bringing the total loss of vehicle and payload (including insurance) to 
USD 225 million. 24 
Notwithstanding this loss, Boeing will forge ahead with the Delta Ill and is 
expected to have this new and powerful launch vehicle in operation for the 
commercial launches it is committed to. In June 1998, Boeing reported to have 
contracts for 18 launches, 13 for Hughes and 5 for Space Systems/Loral. 25 
Lockheed Martin 
Like Boeing, Lockheed Martin in 1995 initiated a new program to be able to 
carry the larger satellites being developed by Hughes and other satellite 
<http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0727as.htm > 
24. See NYT (Aug 26, 1998) at 1; also "Boeing begins investigation into rocket failure", 
Boeing (Aug 27, 1998) <http:/www.boeing.com/defense-
space/space/delta/delta3/d3invest.htm > and Boeing, Delta Ill inaugural flight (Aug 28, 
1998) ("Boeing rocket investigation focuses on control system") 
<http://www. boeing.com/news/feature/delta3webcast/ > . 
25. See Boeing Space systems, Delta expendable launch vehicles, 
< http:/www. hoeing .com/defense-space/space/delta/deltahome.htm > 
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manufacturing companies. The Atlas 2AR, and its larger 'cousin', Atlas 
2ARC, recently renamed Atlas 3A and Atlas 3B respectively, and both 
powered by Russian-designed RD-180 first-stage engines, will have a slightly 
larger capacity than the Delta Ill: the Atlas 3A, expected to have its maiden 
flight with a commercial payload around June 1999, will be capable of 
launching 4,055 kg satellites into GTO, whereas the Atlas 3B, offered for 
launches in mid-2000, can lift 4,500 kg. (this is not sufficient capacity to 
accommodate the latest Hughes HS 702 communications satellites of up to 
5,200 kg/11,464 lb in weight). 
A U. S. government initiated launch vehicle modernization plan called EEL V 
(evolved expendable launch vehicle) will, in the years to come, result in a new 
generation of medium to heavy-lift launchers. Built by the two above 
companies, it will be used for both government (USAF) and commercial 
launches, thus strengthening the competitive position of the U.S. launch 
industry. 
For an initial investment of about USD 2 billion, the goal of the EEL V system 
is to reduce the costs for the government of launching its satellites into space 
by at least 25 percent compared to using the existing vehicles, Delta, Atlas and 
Titan. The current vehicles, which are acquired by DOD, are used for a 
variety of national security and civil government missions. Not only do they 
operate at or near their maximum performance capability, but they (in 
particular the Titan IV) are also considered by DOD and congressional sources 
to be very costly to produce and launch. Since 1987, the government has made 
various efforts to develop a new, more efficient and less costly launch vehicle 
system, but none of these projects got off the ground, either because of funding 
issues, changing requirements, or controversy regarding the best way to meet 
these requirements. In 1994, DOD was directed by Congress to develop a 
launch vehicle modernization plan, which led to the present EEL V system 
program. Fierce competition for the contract between Lockheed Martin and 
McDonnell Douglas (later Boeing) was resolved in November 1997, when the 
Air Force, in stead of choosing for one specific company's rocket, decided that 
the two companies would share the contract. The USAF' s change in plans 
came after a six month review of the commercial launch market which 
confirmed that that market was growing much faster than originally forecast. 26 
Instead of giving one company an unchallengeable lead over the other as far 
as governmental launches are concerned, the two companies would both profit 
from this government investment in upgraded technology and would both enjoy 
an enhanced competitive position in the international commercial launch 
market. They would produce more launchers for the commercial market also, 
resulting in recurring cost reductions by virtue of a significantly larger 
26. See News release, USAF (Nov 6, 1997) ("New acquisition strategy for evolved expendable 
launch vehicle") hereinafter referred to as USAF News release 
<http://www .laafb .af.mil/SMC/P A/Releases/eelvchng.htm > 
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customer base (government and commercial). DOD has a clear interest in 
seeing that EEL V is used for commercial purposes in order to lower the cost 
per launch (particularly if the companies, in view of these important 
commercial spin-offs, also make private investments in the EELV 
development). 27 The shared contract approach was reported to help USAF 
to save between USD 5 and 10 billion in program costs through the year 
2020. 28 
EELV is intended to be the federal government's only medium-, intermediate 
and heavy-lift expendable space transportation capability for several years after 
the beginning of the 21st century. It is supposed to take care of- in early 1997 
estimates- 193 government launches for fiscal years 2002 through 2020, 177 
for defense and intelligence purposes and 16 for NASA. 29 To prepare for 
their EELV launch activities, both Lockheed Martin and Boeing in the 
meantime announced plans to upgrade/build new launch facilities at Cape 
Canaveral, in Florida, and at Vandenberg AFB in California. 
The U.S. government sponsors another program of new launch vehicles, that 
of the reusable launch vehicles or RLV's. The only RLV now in operation is 
the space shuttle, which is managed, for NASA, by the United Space Alliance 
(USA), a joint venture of- again- Boeing and Lockheed Martin. 30 The space 
shuttle is, as a rule, not available for the commercial satellite launch market. 
One of NASA's goals is that of providing, and in casu assisting in the 
development of, low-cost reliable access to space. 31 Its 1993 "Access-to-
space" study concluded that the best opportunity to reduce launch costs, and 
improve safety and reliability, was to develop a fully reusable single-stage-to-
orbit vehicle capable of delivering 25,000 lb to the International Space Station. 
This required a focused technology development program and, since NASA 
27. See GAO's report Access to Space: Issues associated with DOD's evolved expendable launch 
vehicle program, Letter report, GAO/NSIAD-97-130 (Jun 24, 1997) <http://www.access. 
gpo/cgi-binl getdoc.cgi?dbname = gao&docid = f:ns97130. txt > 
28. See Boeing, Lockheed to share EELV contract, Florida today space online (Nov 7, 1997) 
<http://www .flatoday .cornlspace/explore/stories/1997b/110797f.htm>; also USAF News 
release, supra note 26: "Pentagon and Air Force officials see this as an opportunity to 
partner with industry, and develop a national launch system supporting both govermnent and 
commercial requirements. This will reduce the Govermnent's overall launch costs by more 
than 25 percent. This also supports the Air Force goal of saving between $5 billion and $10 
billion in program life-cycle costs through the year 2020." 
29. More recent estimates are lower, about 165 in total, and involving smaller military satellites 
which reduces the USAF need for the EELV successor of the heavy-lift Titan IV and thus 
also results in substantially smaller cost savings from using that EEL V successor. 
30. In Sep 1996, USA and NASA signed the Space Flight Operations Contract, which 
designated USA as the prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations and gave USA 
authority to proceed with full operation of the contract effective Oct 1, 1996. 
31. See, also for the informations which follows, Powell, Lockwood and Cook, NASA, The 
road from the NASA Access-to-space study to a reusable launch vehicle, IAF-98-V.4.02, 
49th International Astronautical Congress (Sep 28-0ct 2, 1998), Melbourne, Australia, 
hereinafter referred to as IAF Melbourne Congress. 
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would henceforth purchase future launch services in stead of operate the space 
shuttle, a commercial entity which would develop and market the new vehicle. 
As NASA realized that no private U.S. company would commit to the costly 
and highly complicated development, it decided to aid in the maturation of the 
required technologies and, to that end, NASA entered into a cooperative 
agreement with Lockheed Martin to develop the X-33, a half-scale 
demonstrator of a single-stage-to-orbit, all rocket-powered vehicle. The 
development of the X-33, together with some other related NASA test 
programs and design studies, will provide the necessary information to 
determine, by the year 2000, the viability of a commercially developed launch 
vehicle. The project should result in airplane-like operations at significantly 
lower cost: the goal is to reduce the cost to deliver payload to low earth orbit 
from the current estimated USD 10,000 per pound to USD 1,000 per pound. 
Lockheed Martin calls its commercial X-33 based RLV system, which should 
be operational and on the market by 2005, VentureStarY 
Independent from the above NASA-sponsored RLV project, a private U.S. 
company, Kistler Aerospace Corporation, is building its own RL V, the K-1, 
"the world's first fully reusable aerospace vehicle". 33 
Kistler plans to build a fleet of K -1 vehicles with a capacity of 100 flights per 
year (at USD 17 million per flight). It aims particularly at the growing LEO 
communications satellite constellations market. By late 1999, Kistler plans to 
start commercial operations from the W oomera launch site in South Australia, 
but will also (later) use launch facilities in southern Nevada, U.S. The use of 
two launch sites and a fleet of 5 vehicles will, in Kistler' s view provide a 
unique launch scheduling flexibility for its customers. Kistler has in the 
32. See on the VentureStar project, Sumrall (NASA), Lane and Cusic (Lockheed Martin Skunk 
Works), VentureStar-Reaping the benefits of the X-33 program, IAF-98-V.3.03, IAF 
Melbourne Congress. Another part of NASA's efforts to reduce the cost of access to space 
is the X-34 program. The X-34 is a reusable suborbital rocketplane, which, like the 
Pegasus, is carried by a Lockheed L-1 011 aircraft to a specific height in airspace before 
'taking off' as a launch vehicle. The X-34 program's general goals are two-fold: to provide 
a testbed vehicle capable of demonstrating key RL V technologies as well as operational 
systems and techniques that will enable a dramatic reduction in the cost of space access, and 
to provide a testbed vehicle capable of carrying a variety of experiments supporting the 
needs of the aeronautical sciences community. Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), 
contracted by NASA on Aug 23, 1996 to develop the X-34, sees the vehicle as a precursor 
for the development of a fully reusable, liquid propellant replacement for its Pegasus 
expendable launch vehicle. The first flight is scheduled for 1999, see London Ill and Lyles 
(NASA), X-34 program status, IAF-98-V.4.04, lAP Melbourne Congress, supra note 31. 
33. The above and following information on the K-1 is based on two papers presented at the 
IAF Melbourne Congress by Kistler Aerospace Corporation officials, Mueller, Brandenstein, 
Cuzzupolli and Kohrs, The K-1 commercial reusable aerospace vehicle, IAF-98-V.l.01, and 
Wang, Mueller, Brandenstein, Lepore, The K-1 reusable aerospace vehicle: Meeting the 
demand for LEO satellite delivery services, IAA-98-IAA.1.2.03. The two articles also 
provide detailed vehicle designs and market forecasts, 
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meantime entered into a contract with Space Systems/Loral for 10 K-1 
launches. 
Other private RLV manufacturers, poised to bring their own launch vehicles 
on the promising LEO satellite launch market are Kelly Space & Technology, 
which is developing the air-launched, piloted Eclipse Astroliner (and has 
already signed a launch services contract with Motorola for 10 flights to carry 
20 Iridium satellites into LEO), Rotary Rocket Co., which is testing its 
vertical-lift, vertical-landing Roton space helicopter, and Pioneer Rocketplane, 
developing the piloted, partially reusable Pathfinder spaceplane. All companies 
concerned are in various stages of raising the capital required to get their 
vehicles 'of the ground', but, given Wall Street's interest, spurred by the 
successful financing of the commercial satellite constellations such as Iridium, 
PanAmSat and Globalstar and (forecasts of) a booming satellite market, 
financing appears to be quite feasible for the most promising of these new 
transportation companies. 34 
The U.S. government shows a keen interest in promoting research and 
development (R&D) in the small launcher (technology) field, witness a NASA 
program, Bantam, originally aimed at funding the development of low-cost 
launchers for light-weight scientific satellites built by universities, and a more 
recent USAF small launcher procurement program, which, through a 
competitive bidding process aimed at small launcher companies such as Orbital 
Sciences and Kelly Space & Technology, should result in new, low-cost 
launchers becoming available for USAF needs. 35 
34. See Space News Online (Jan 19, 1998) at 6 ("Rlv firms scramble to finance systems") 
<http://www .spacenews.cornlspacenews/members/sarch/sarch98/sn0119cr.htm> and Space 
News Online (Mar 23, 1998) at 16 ("Wall Street warms up to new rocket firms") 
<http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0323p.htm >. 
35. See Space News Online (Jan 19, 1998) at 10 ("Bantam under fire by commercial launch 
firms") <http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn01119dg.htm > and Space 
News Online (Jul 20, 1998) at 6 ("Usaf to open small launcher competition") <http://www. 
spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0720x.htm>. In the latter article, OSC's Pegasus and 
Taurus and Lockheed Martin's Athena are mentioned as the only proven launchers in the 
size class sought by the Air Force. Apart from these programs, OSC has a contract with 
USAF to develop a small launcher based on the Minuteman 2 ballistic missile and including 
Pegasus components, dubbed the Minotaur, which will be capable of launching small 
payloads for 30% less than the air-launched Pegasus. The same article reports that, after 
complaints from the private industry ("the government should buy launch services rather 
than fund selected rocket development efforts"), NASA recently restructured the Bantam 




With the successful third and final qualification flight of the Ariane 5 on 
October 21, 1998 this new heavy-lift launch vehicle is now ready for 
commercial service. The first commercial flight is scheduled for July 1999, 
and will possibly be followed by 3 more in the same year. Compared with the 
Ariane 4, capacity has increased considerably: Where Ariane 4 has the power 
to lift a satellite of approximately 4,900 kg (9,965 lb) into GTO, thereby 
surpassing all its foreign commercial competitors except for the Proton (12, 100 
lb), the Ariane 5 offers a capacity of 6,700 kg (15,000 lb) for a single launch 
and 5,970 kg (13,134 lb) for a dual launch (i.e. two spacecraft on the same 
launch), thereby exceeding not only the Proton's performance, but also the 
capacity of the (non-commercial) space shuttle (13,000 lb), and thus trailing 
only the U.S. military Titan 4 (19,000 lb). 
For the period 2000-2010, the launch service market, as forecast by 
Arianespace, presents two major characteristics, (1) a further increase in the 
mass of geostationary satellites, which should still represent the majority of 
launches (an estimated 30-35 satellites per year), and (2) a diversification of 
space applications, with particular focus on the LEO satellite constellation 
market segment. Arianespace therefore sees the need for higher performance 
GEO/GTO launch vehicles and is in the process of further upgrading the 
Ariane 5 to that end (more than 9,000 kg/19,800 lb in 2001 up to a GTO 
capacity of more than 11,000 kg/24,200 lb by 2005-2006!); flexibility should 
also be increased to cater to LEO missions with diverse orbital 
characteristics. 36 
At its June 23-24, 1998 meeting in Brussels, the ESA Council approved 
funding for initial studies for the Vega small launch vehicle, an Italian-backed 
development project that should produce a commercially usable small launcher 
(in 2002) designed for launching small (700-1,000 kg) scientific, Earth-
observation and military satellites into low Earth orbit. Available ESA 
documents estimate a market of six launches per year; whether the ESA 
Council of Ministers, meeting in 1999, will give a go-ahead to the program, 
is a matter of debate. 37 
36. See Espace Newsletter 134, supra note 7. Also, Astorg, Ruault (CNES), Durand (ESA), 
Bartholomey (Arianespace) and Dutheil (DASA), The Ariane 5 launcher and its future, 1AF-
98-V.l.03, IAF Melbourne Congress, supra note 31. The latter base the Ariane 5 capacity 
requirements on the following satellite mass predictions: "[t]oday, the average 
communication satellite mass is around 3000 kg. In 2002 -according to the most recent 
market analysis- 60% of the satellites will have a mass between 3000 and 5000 kg, and in 
2005 around 50% will have a mass over 4000 kg." With a preference for dual launches this 
translates into the capacities as given in the text. 
37. See Space News Online (Jun 22, 1998) at 3 
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Japanese projects 
With the H-2, operational since early 1994,38 both too expensive for the 
market and with insufficient lift (approximately 4,000 kg/8,800 lb) for the 
larger GEO satellites now being built and planned, NASDA, the National 
Space Development Agency of Japan, is developing a new family of launchers 
under the name H-2A. Considerable cost reductions have been obtained 
through the use of American solid-rocket motors and fuel tanks. The H-2A will 
come in three models: the H-2A-202 (standard version) with about the same 
capacity as the H-2, which is expected to fly in mid-2000, an augmented 
version, the H-2A-212, planned to be available a few years later (maiden flight 
in 2002?), with a capacity of up to 7,500 kg, and a possible future version that 
could reach a capacity of 9,500 kg. Rocket System Corporation, the private 
company selling Japanese launch services worldwide, in 1996, concluded 
contracts with both Hughes Space and Communications and Space 
Systems/Loral for 10 H-2A launches each. 39 
NASDA has also developed the smaller J-1launcher, capable of putting about 
1,000 kg into low Earth orbit; its first test flight in 1996 was a success, and 
will be followed by a second flight in 2001. The J-1 is primarily built for 
domestic (NASDA) requirements (which does not exclude commercial uses at 
a later stage). 
For scientific research experiments and programs, including planetary missions 
and astronomical research, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science 
(ISAS), an interuniversity research organization falling under the Japanese 
ministry of Education, science, sports and culture, has developed its own M-
series of launchers. An enhanced version, the M-5 performed its first launch 
in July 1998, putting a scientific satellite into an elliptical orbit. 
Finally, NASDA' s plans include a step-by-step development of reusable launch 
vehicles, a project which has a 2000-2030 timeframe. 40 
<http://spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0622g.htm> and Space News Online (Jun 
29, 1998) at 1 <http://www.spacenews ... members/sarch!sarch98/sn0629ak.htm> 
38. The maiden flight of the H-2 took place in february 1994. Since then, the vehicle has been 
launched six times, five of which were successful. The sixth flight, on Feb 21, 1998 failed. 
Altogether eight spacecraft have been launched, but with an excessive price tag of USD 140-
160 million, the H-2 had no chance to compete in the international market. 
39. See, on the H-2A program, Watanabe and Hirata (NSDA), H2-H2A redesign for more 
efficient and active space development- enhanced capability and reduced launch cost, IAA-
98-IAA.l.l.Ol, IAF Melbourne Congress, supra note 31. 
40. For further info on these programs, see Shigeaki Nomura (NASDA), Japanese activities for 




The growing size and weight of satellites also forces China to upgrade its 
launch vehicles to meet its customers' needs. The two launch vehicles presently 
employed by Great Wall Industries, the Long March 2E (LM-2E) and the 3B 
version (LM-3B), will both be upgraded, resulting in a payload capacity of the 
new LM-2E(A) of 5,000-6,000 kg available for the market in the year 2000. 
And, if the same performance measures are applied to the LM-3B, the latter's 
capacity, now 4,500 kg/9,900 lb, could be raised to close to 7,000 kg/15,400 
lb.41 
Russian projects 
Russia's 'workhorse' the Proton-K/Block DM, the most powerful commercial 
launcher until the advent of the Ariane 5, with a lift of between 4,800-5,500 
kg (10,560-12,100 lb), will be upgraded through the replacement of the 
Energia Block DM fourth stage with a newly developed Khrunichev "Breeze" 
upper stage. This new Proton-M will ultimately be capable of launching up 
to 7, 800 kg/17, 160 lb to GTO. Further plans involve the capability of 
launching heavy dual payloads like the upgraded Ariane-5. 42 
Indian projects 
In the years to come, India plans to enhance the capability and reliability of 
the PSLV for mainly domestic payloads. 
One of the more ambitious projects undertaken by ISRO, however, is the 
development of a launch vehicle for geostationary launches, the Geostationary 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-Mk1), which uses a Russian cryogenic upper 
stage. With tests having progressed in 1997, a first flight is being planned for 
early 1999. Though this launch vehicle is primarily developed for India's own 
'independent access to space', with one flight per year in the coming five years 
for domestic (communications) satellite launch needs, commercialization, on 
a limited scale, is not excluded. 43 
Between mid-1998 and 2003, 11 indigenous launch vehicle missions are 
planned, further enhancing India's experience in this field. 44 
41. See Hatfield and Middleton, Implications for Asia Pacific launchers of the global GEO 
launch market after 2000, IAA-98-IAA.l.2.07, id. 
42. See ibid. 
43. See Space News Online (Jan 26, 1998) at 22 ("Krisnaswamy Kasturirangan!Chairman, 
Indian Space Research Organization")< http://www .spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/ 
sn0126ae.htm>. 
44. See India space funding, supra note 10. 
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Over the horizon is the Indian A V AT AR project to build a miniature, reusable, 
single-stage-to-orbit, hydrogen-fueled space plane, for small satellite launches 
into LEO. India's own substantial aerospace technology expertise will, 
however, have to be supplemented by that of other countries to turn this 10-
year plan into a reality. 45 
Though the above review of present and prospective launch providers and 
launch vehicles may not do justice to plans and projects of all countries or 
companies aspiring to become involved in the (commercial) launch trade, it 
is suggested that it nevertheless gives a fair picture of the relatively limited 
number and the type of 'players' most active in the field. In the following 
chapters, other (former/would-be) launch participants may be reviewed in the 
context of specific issues dealt with therein. 
1. 2. 2 The spaceports 
United States spaceports 
Since the 1950's, the U.S. government has built, operated and maintained a 
space launch infrastructure for its military and civil launches. The most 
frequently used of these government-operated launch sites were, and still are, 
Cape Canaveral Air Station in Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California. 
Since the early 1980's, these ranges have increasingly also accommodated 
commercial launch activities. Gradually, the launch infrastructure has followed 
the launch services industry in commercializing its activities. This has led to 
Federal government agencies paying more attention to meeting commercial 
launch needs through modernization and upgrading of the launch ranges. 
Pressure of commercial users has also resulted in a move towards 
commercially operated, non-governmental launch sites or spaceports catering 
in particular to private launch companies' requirements. 
The following is a brief description of the main federal and 'private' launch 
sites now actively wooing (commercial) customers among the above present 
and prospective launch providers. 46 
45. See Space News Online (May 18, 1998) at 15 ("India sees bright skies for space plane") 
<http://www.spacenews ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0518u.htm> 
46. See e.g. Six states in contention for launches- investing in spaceports seen as way to attract 
spinoff businesses, jobs, Florida Today (Dec 1997) 
<http://www .flatoday .com/space/explore/spaciallfloridasfuture/pg08 .htm > The information 
on spaceports which follows is to a large extent derived from An overview of the U.S. 
commercial space launch infrastructure, Special Report, AST Report 1998 (3d Q), supra 




- Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) in Florida, in operation since 1950; 
operated by the USAF; launch complexes 17 and 36, available for Delta 
and Atlas launches respectively. Also supports launches of Athena, Titan 
and Pegasus vehicles and, in the future, EELV's and RLV's (all orbits); 
- V andenberg Air Force Base (V AFB) in California, in operation since 1958; 
operated by the USAF; available for LEO launches by all types of launch 
vehicles; 
- Kennedy Space Centre (adjacent to CCAS) in Florida, in operation since 
1964; operated by NASA; originally created for the Apollo program, it is 
now exclusively used for space shuttle launches (to all orbits); 
- Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia, in operation since 1945; operated by 
NASA; used for Pegasus LEO launches and, in the future, for converted 
Minuteman missile launches. 
Other Federal (mostly military) launch sites offering their services for 
commercial launches, include Barking Sands (Hawaii), operated by the U.S. 
Navy, White Sands Missile Range (New Mexico), operated by DOD, Edwards 
Air Force Base (California), the U.S. Army's Kwajalein Missile Range 
(Marshall Islands, near the Equator), Poker Flat Research Range (Alaska), 
operated by NASA and the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site. 
The latter has in principle been made available to Kistler for the launch of its 
K-1 reusable launch vehicle (Kistler awaits FAA-AST approval for its 
operations). 
Commercial 
- California Spaceport, at V AFB, operated by Spaceport Systems International 
(SSI), a private company; not in use yet, but available for LEO launchers 
such as Athena, Taurus, Minotaur and various RLV's. SSI was the first 
private operator to be granted a commercial launch site operator's license 
by DOT's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST), in 
September 19, 1996; 
- Spaceport Florida, at CCAS, Launch Complex 46, operated by the Florida 
Spaceport Authority, a public transportation authority; in use by Athena and 
available for all orbital launches; the second operator to receive a licence, 
on May 22, 1997; 
- Virginia Space Flight Centre, on Wallops Island, operated by Virginia 
Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), a public organization, which 
was awarded a commercial launch site operator's license by FAA-AST on 
December 19, 1997. Also in 1997, the VCSFA signed an agreement with 
NASA to use the latter's facilities at Wallops on a cost reimbursement basis; 
to be used for LEO launches by Athena, Taurus, and various RLV's. 
- Kodiak Launch Complex (Alaska), operated by the Alaska Aerospace 
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Development Corporation (AADC), a public corporation founded by the 
Alaska State government; for suborbital and LEO launches (Athena, Taurus, 
various RLV's). AADC obtained its launch site operator's license on 
September 24, 1998. The first commercial launch, for the USAF, took place 
in early 1999. In Apri11999 NASA awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin 
for the Athena 1 launch of a scientific satellite; this will be the first LEO 
launch from the Alaska facility. 
In addition, proposals to develop commercial spaceports involve at least one 
additional candidate: 
- Southwest Regional Spaceport, adjacent to White Sands Missile Range (New 
Mexico), to be operated by the New Mexico Office of Space 
Commercialization, State of Mexico; for various RLV's. 
Two U.S. launch systems are special in this connection, Sea Launch and 
Orbital Sciences' Pegasus. The Sea Launch partners perform launches from 
their own mobile, floating launch platform in the Pacific Ocean, along the 
equator, about 1,400 miles from Hawaii. 
The Pegasus is air-launched from underneath an aircraft (L-1011), which can 
take off from any launch site/spaceport fit for aircraft operations: one such 
launch started from a base on the Spanish Canary Islands. 
Europe 
Both Norway and Sweden have sounding rocket ranges (Andoya Rocket Range 
and Esrange respectively), both in operation since the 1960's and used by ESA 
and ESA member states for suborbital launches. 
Additionally, Italy owns and operates the San Marco launch platform, located 
4,8 km off the coast of Kenya. The facility, situated conveniently close to the 
equator, has been used between 1967 and 1988 for (U.S.-built) Scout launches. 
Italy's sponsorship of the, yet to be developed, European small launcher Vega, 
based on an upgraded San Marco Scout launcher, may bring new operations 
to the platform. 
The launch base for all Ariane launches is the Guyana Space Centre, at 
Kourou, French Guyana. The centre has been operational since 1968. On the 
basis of a contract between ESA and the French Space Agency, CNES, the 
latter manages the Centre. It has two launch pads, ELA-2 and now ELA-3, 
built more recently for the Ariane 5. The Centre's ideal (near-equatorial) 
geographic location translates into substantial fuel and - thus - cost savings for 
launches with a GEO destination. 47 Some consideration has been given to 
47. Compared to launches from Cape Canaveral, those from Kourou require approximately 15-
17% less fuel to deploy a payload into GEO, see 1997 Teal Group briefmg, supra note 2. 
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making the facility available for use by non-European launch vehicles. One 
would assume that, for competitive reasons, this would only make sense if 
done within the framework of a strategic alliance with the launch provider 
concerned. 
Russia 
Baikonur is Russia's prime 'cosmodrome', until 1991 the site of some 40 to 
50 - mostly military - launches per year. The demise of the Soviet Union and 
the economic problems that have since plagued Russia, including its space 
programs, has reduced the number to some 28 per year. All Russian manned 
space flights (on Soyuz vehicles), Zenit and Proton launches take place from 
this spaceport. The launch site is based in the former Soviet republic 
Kazakhstan and Russia rents the site for USD 115 million per year. Though 
the income derived from commercial launches with the Proton (acquired 
through ILS) is of vital importance to Russia, government (military and civil) 
launches continue to have priority use of the launch vehicle. The Ministry of 
Defense' s control of the launch site is reported to be transferred to the Russian 
Space Agency by the year 2000.48 
The Plesetsk cosmodrome, located near Archangelsk in Rusia, is the country's 
second spaceport, with a rich history of Soviet launches for also mainly 
military purposes. Eurockot's Rockot launch vehicle will use this launch base, 
and probably also the Start and Cosmos launchers. 
A third launch site, currently unused, is Svobodny, a military base, close to 
the Russian-Chinese border in Khabarovsk, formerly used for ballistic missile 
launches. 
By virtue of a Presidential decree of December 1997, the control over the 
above spaceports will be transferred from the Russian Ministry of Defense to 
the Russian Space Agency by the year 2000 (which will presumably also bring 
the revenues earned by the use of the facilities into civil rather than military 
hands). 
China 
CGWIC uses three satellite launch centers for operating the various Long 
March launch vehicles: 
- Xichang, in the southwest China Sichuan province, primarily for the heavy-
lift LM-3B; 
48. For this and other information on Baikonur and the other Russian launch sites, see e.g. 
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- Taiyuan, in the Shanxi province, for the medium-lift LM-2C and -4launch 
vehicles, and 
- Jiuquan, 1,600 km west of Beijing, in the Kansu province, also for the 
medium-lift LM 2C and 2D. At the latter site, a new launch pad is being 
constructed. 
Japan 
Both the H-2 and the J-1 make use of the Tanegashima Space Centre on 
Tanegashima Island in the South of Japan. The Centre is operated by NASDA. 
A new launch pad is being constructed for the H-2A. Until1997, an agreement 
with the local fishing community limited launchings to two 45-day periods per 
year, which made it in practice impossible to have more than two launches per 
year. A new agreement reached in June 1997 expanded this allotment to 190 
days per year, which, depending on the amount of reduction in preparation 
time at the launch pad, may result in 4 to 8 launches per year. 49 The M-5 was 
launched from the Kagoshima launch site. 
Brazil 
The Instituto de Aeronautica e Espaco is responsible for operations at the 
Alcantara Launch Centre, located on the Atlantic coast near the equator. The 
Centre is available for the indigenous VLS launches. 
In 1994, the Centre's launch pads were used by NASA for sounding rocket 
launches. And a number of other foreign launch providers, including the 
Chinese, Russians and Ukranians, have in the meantime shown interest in 
using Alcantara for GEO launches. 50 
India 
Sriharikota, India's spaceport, located on an island on the east coast, provides 
launch services for ISRO's Rohini sounding rockets and the PSLV, and is 
being modified for the first launch of the GSLV in 1999. 
49. The Teal Group anticipates Tanegashima will start averaging about 4-5 launches annually 
early in the next decade (for both H-2 and J-1 launches), see 1997 Teal Group briefmg, 
supra note 2; a NASDA official more recently stated that, as a result of the new agreement, 
"NASDA can at maximum launch eight H-IlA launch vehicles annually if it can cut down 
preparation period at the launch pad from 90 days to 20 days.", see Masahiko Sato, The 
Japanese legal framework: third party liability resulting from NASDA launch activities, IISL-
98-IISL.2.05, IAF Melbourne Congress, supra note 31. 




The Woomera Prohibited Area, north of Adelaide, was originally a missile test 
facility. In the 1960-?0s, the facilities were used extensively for sounding 
rocket launches by Europe, the U.S. and other countries. The Australian 
government now offers W oomera as a space launch centre to commercial 
users. As a result, agreements have been concluded with a number of 
countries, reportedly including the Russians and the Japanese, to develop space 
launch service facilities in the area. 51 
Kistler Australia has also concluded an agreement for the use of W oomera, 
for operations of its K-1 RLV. 
1.3 Factors affecting the development of the (free) trade in launch 
services 
The international commercial launch market is - at present - essentially 
dominated by the U. S. firms Boeing and Lockheed Martin and the European 
firm Arianespace. Although China, Russia and Ukraine have considerable 
capabilities in this field, with a long-time experience in domestic government 
launch activities, in practice they have yet to establish themselves as full-
fledged members of the club of international launch service providers. In the 
meantime, Russia and Ukraine sell their services primarily through joint 
ventures with Western companies, and the three launch providers concerned 
have the relative luxury of eager (GEO and LEO) satellite manufacturers and 
operators clamouring for launch vehicles: it is, and is expected to remain for 
years to come, a seller's market. 
Japan is late in entering the commercial launch market, and India will not 
make a competitive impact for years to come. 
Altogether, there are only a few serious players in the market, and innovation, 
in the sense of new companies with new products, appear to be almost all of 
American nationality. 
Obviously, there are some serious handicaps and barriers which prevent other 
countries and their companies from joining the 'club' of launching states. 
A number of practical barriers for these launch 'have-nots' are obvious: 
Technology 
The manufacture of indigenous launch vehicles is a high tech activity requiring 
extremely sophisticated expertise which either has to be developed from scratch 
51. Ibid. 
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or borrowed from a full-fledged domestic military missile industry (which uses 
virtually identical technologies). For example, Japan, with little or no missile 
expertise to speak of, has been building sounding rockets since the mid-1950s 
and, since approximately 1969, developing launchers on the basis of imported 
U.S. Delta hardware and technology. Its decision to build its own, 100% 
Japanese, launcher started a 10 year effort which NASDA describes as follows: 
"The H-II rocket was entirely different to the H-1 rocket, developed in a completely 
different way. The new [first stage] engine, LE-7, was extremely difficult to develop and 
it failed at test firing several times. In an effort to reduce weight and thus improve 
efficiency, and to increase tolerance to vibration, noise and high temperatures, developers 
encountered numerous difficulties. But developers' enthusiasm helped them to overcome 
these difficulties and in February 1994- two years later than originally planned -the first 
rocket made entirely in Japan was launched. The successful launch represented the 
culmination of 10 years o[f] gruelling effort". 52 
And it took the collective European expertise in and knowledge of rocketry 
(primarily available in France, U.K and Germany) 7 years, from decision in 
1972 to first launch in 1979, to get the first Ariane successfully into space. 
The Ariane 5 took some 10 years of development before the first flight could 
take place. 
Proof that this is indeed a 'high tech, high risk' industrial activity may also 
- and even more conclusively - be found in launch failures suffered by both 
established and new launch service providers. For example, in 1996, a Chinese 
Long March 3 and a 3b, a European Ariane 5 and a Russian Soyuz 
malfunctioned; in 1997, a U.S. Delta 2, a Russian Proton and a Brazilian VLS 
failed, followed in 1998 by a Japanese H-2, an Israeli Shavit, a U.S. Titan 4 
and Delta 3, and a Ukrainian Zenit 2. In the first half of 1999, the U.S. 
experienced four launch failures, two Titan 4, one Delta 3 and one Athena 2. 
A private industry database on all spaceflights performed shows 60 significant 
launch failures since 1990.53 
52. See - H-II- an entirely Japanese-made rocket, History of Japanese rocket development (5), 
Online space notes/launch vehicles 
< http://spaceboy .nasda.go.jp/note/Rocket!E/roc105 _hisS_ e.html > 
53. U.S.-based Aerospace Corporation, as quoted in NYT (May 12, 1999) at 1 ("Series of 
rocket failures unnerves U.S. space launching industry"). In the same article a U.S. space 
program expert, John Pike, is quoted: "[s]pace launch vehicles are inherently unreliable and 
people should understand that is still a risky business". 
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Development cost and commercial prospects 
Building a launch vehicle, including the necessary infrastructure, from scratch 
is a costly affair: The Ariane 5 development price tag up to mid-1996 had 
reached USD 8.5 billion. 
The cost of upgrading existing (families of) launch vehicles also gives an 
indication. 
The partners in Arianespace, for example, will spend some USD 1, 3 billion 
to give the Ariane 5 its two satellites/11 ,000 kg lift capacity by the year 2006. 
Close to that same figure will be spent in USAF funding on the EELV program 
of Atlas, Titan and Delta modernization and upgrading. But the companies at 
the receiving end will also have to invest several hundreds of millions USD, 
before the upgraded products actually become available. 
The price per launch also illustrates (to some extent) the amounts involved in 
the manufacture of the respective vehicle. The FAA gives the following 
approximate 1998 figures (in USD millions) for a number of medium-to-heavy 
lift GEO/GTO launchers:54 
- Ariane 5: 115-143; Ariane 4 (depending on the 'intermediate' version used): 
75-110 
- Long March 3B: 60-70, the medium-lift versions 2C and 4: 20-30 
- Titan 4: 240-270, the medium-lift Titan2: 41-47 
- Proton: 50-70 
- Sea Launch (Zenit 3): 90-100 
- Zenit 2: 25-40 
In the same "intermediate" class of launchers as the Ariane 4, the Atlas 2A 
will command a price of USD 65-80 million with its stronger version, the 
Atlas 2AS is worth USD 90-100 million, and its colleague, the Delta 3 USD 
55-60 million. 
The "medium" class Delta 2 costs USD 45-50 million per launch, and the 
Japanese M-5 USD 41-47 million. 
The above '10 years gruelling effort' to build the Japanese H-2 brought the 
launch price of that indigenous heavy-lift vehicle to a hefty USD 182-201 
million. 55 
The development cost of the smaller launch vehicles is understandably lower, 
partly because of the technology base already available through the earlier 
manufacture of the above larger launchers, partly because of other power, 
endurance and material parameters and requirements. 
One recent example is the Italian-French Vega, with a projected development 
cost of approximately USD 360 million and a tentative launch price of USD 
54. See: AST Report 1998 (3d Q), supra note 9 at B-1-2 ("Characteristics of cited vehicles"). 
55. See AST Report 1998 (2nd Q), supra note 12, at B-2. 
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20 million. The Vega will compete with the following small LEO launchers 
(price in USD millions): 
- Athena 1: 14-16 
- Athena 2: 19-21 
- Pegasus XL: 12-14 
- Taurus 1: 18-20 
- Start 1: 5-10 
- Rockot: 5-8 
- Shavit: 12-1856 
Of course the above cost, even for the heavy lift launchers, is far from 
insurmountable for both Western and Asian industrialized countries. But the 
question will then be two-fold: how much time and (high tech) energy will it 
take to build a new indigenous launcher and will it be worth the effort. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether all present launch operators consistently 
make a profit in the business they are in. But more important from the 
newcomers' perspective is the fact that the 'incumbents' are there, that the 
U.S. government and, since the early to mid-1980s, the U.S. and European 
companies have been dominating the market, and that the above launch 
companies and their colleagues, individually and collectively, through various 
development and modernization plans and (joint) projects, seem determined 
to keep, or increase their grip on all segments of the market. Various forms 
of direct and indirect subsidization and support on the part of the governments 
concerned have helped to turn the established launch providers into formidable 
competitors, now and in the future, with the financial, technological and sales 
power to meet any newcomer head-on, in whatever segment or niche of the 
market the latter would wish to start doing business. Not a very attractive 
prospect! 
And then, the long term development of the satellite launch market is not one 
that can be easily predicted or foreseen: by the time the launch vehicle is 
operational and the development money has been spent, a 'dip' in the market 
combined with an oversupply of competitors' proven launch vehicles may be 
the end of the new entrant's dream of capturing a part of the market that 
appeared promising many years earlier. 
But a country may have other than commercial reasons to enter the launch 
market, either internal (high tech spin-off's (new industries), national economy, 
jobs etc.) or external (international cooperation, enhanced position in 
international, space-related organizations, regional dominance, prestige, etc). 
Or the commercial aspect may be only the by-product of what is essentially 
56. See ibid. 
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the geopolitical or national development-inspired need for independent access 
to space. 
The fact is that some countries, irrespective of the above practical barriers, 
want to 'join the club' anyhow. So they simply buy the launch vehicles, have 
somebody build a launch site, hire the engineers, technicians, managers and 
salesmen, and start the business of providing launch services for domestic and 
foreign clients? They do not. Because they can not. 
Regulatory impediments 
This is where other impediments come into the picture, namely those of a 
regulatory nature: barriers which have proven to be rather effective in 
preventing or discouraging the acquisition of these launch vehicles and the 
related technology by countries with space launch aspirations. 
Not only the 'have-nots' are faced with barriers. The countries which possess 
a missile and/ or launch industry and have the ability to provide launch services 
for domestic and international purposes, i.e. the 'haves', also have encountered 
difficulties in entering the market. 
China and the (former) Soviet Union/Russia are prime examples of this 
category. For many years these countries, with of course the Soviet Union as 
the most successful and prominent performer since the dawn of spaceflight, 
launched domestic military and civil satellites and showed they had all the 
operational capabilities for making an impact on the international commercial 
launch market. 
Of course they had certain handicaps of a practical nature, one of which being 
the secrecy with which their launch industries had been operating for many 
years (a fact which inspired little confidence on the part of their commercial 
satellite clients and the space insurance community). 
Other problems were related to their non-market economy status and limited 
marketing expertise in this new and sophisticated business. 
No handicaps or problems, however, that cannot be addressed and overcome. 
Still, it took the Chinese until 1988 before they were able to conclude their 
first launch contract with a Western customer, and Russia followed in 1992. 
And, although in the mean time their presence in the commercial market has 
become a fact of which the satellite manufacturers and owners are well aware, 
their actual impact on the market, in the sense of actual launches performed 
and contracts signed, lags considerably behind their Western competitors. 
As in the case of the launch 'have-nots', (other) regulatory barriers prove to 
be the main stumbling blocks for market entry and, additionally, for full access 
to the market. 
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As most of these barriers had (and have) their origin in c.q. are based on U.S. 
laws, policies and practices, particularly in the field of national security and 
foreign policy, these will be reviewed and analyzed in the following Chapters, 
and their impact on the international trade in launch services will be 
determined. 
The U.S. government's attitude towards, and its role in the emergence of, the 
U.S. private launch industry is the most suitable starting point for what is 
essentially a critical assessment of the U.S. government's behaviour vis-a-vis 




United States law, policies and practices 
2.1 The emergence of the US private launch industry 
2.1.1 Law, policies and practices in the pre-space shuttle era (1961-1982) 
2.1.1.1 Launch vehicle development in the 1960s: DOD, NASA and the 
private manufacturers 
President Eisenhower's military experience in World War II and his perception 
of the intentions of the Soviet Union in the post-war period made him a firm 
supporter of the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) 
which could act as a deterrent to nuclear attack through its promise to deliver 
warheads to targets thousands of miles away. He also supported the 
development of reconnaissance satellites which would make the U. S. safe from 
surprise attacks. 
Thus, in the years after his inauguration in 1952 the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
developed the first ICBM, the Atlas (testfired in 1955 and operational in 1959). 
The Titan and -medium range- Thor missiles followed in the early sixties. At 
the Army's weapons development and missile center, Redstone Arsenal in 
Alabama, Wernher von Braun and his team of mostly German engineers 
developed a missile, based on World War II V2 technology, later called the 
Jupiter. And the Navy, in 1956, developed the Polaris, a solid-fueled IRBM 
for its submarines. Finally, the USAF was allowed to develop the Minuteman, 
a light, solid-fueled ICBM. 
At the same time, the attractive concept of having reconnaissance satellites in 
low earth orbit led to a highly secret development program, consisting of the 
manufacture by Lockheed of a satellite armed with cameras, and of a two-stage 
rocket, known as the Agena. 1 
Separate from these military efforts, the US government approved a civilian 
project to study the upper atmosphere with a scientific satellite, to be launched 
1. See Roger D. Launius, NASA: A history of the U.S. civil space program, USA (1994) 
hereinafter referred to as Launius, Chapter 1, passim. 
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by the non-military Viking rocket. Project 'Vanguard', as it was known, the 
U. S. contribution to the International Geophysical Year 1957 I 1958 of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions, 2 was meant to enhance national 
prestige, not by its scientific performance, but simply by its mere presence in 
orbit. 
(An important additional goal for the U.S. government was the establishment 
of the precedent of free access to space, a prerequisite for having 
reconnaissance satellites in orbit without the risk of legal or military challenges 
on the part of the Soviet Union. To minimize the risk of such a challenge at 
the outset, it was important to have a non-threatening civil satellite in orbit 
first. The alternative, the Explorer proposal, submitted by the Army's Redstone 
Arsenal, would have involved an adapted ballistic missile launch vehicle, the 
Reds tone or Jupiter. This was not acceptable). 3 
In the mean time, the Russians, with the assistance of their 'own' German V2 
engineers, had also embarked upon the development of missiles. Unlike the 
Americans they concentrated their efforts immediately after the war on 
increasing the power and range of the rockets; this determination paid off and 
brought them ahead of their American competitors in the ICBM/long-range 
missile field. 4 
The two American projects (secret reconnaissance and public Vanguard) did 
not get off the ground, at least not before Sputnik I shook U.S. confidence in 
its technological superiority. There was a lack of focus, a lack of urgency and 
therefore a lack of money to really get things moving the way Eisenhower had 
planned it. 
Sputnik I had a 'Pearl Harbor effect'5 on American public opinion, not the 
least because of the apparent disparity of launch capabilities between the Soviet 
Union, which was able to launch nearly 200 pounds into orbit, and the U.S., 
planning to lift 3. 5 pounds with the Vanguard program. 6 For people around 
the world, as one commentator observed, Sputnik epitomized the double nature 
of launchers: the same vehicle which had put a scientific satellite in orbit 
could, with some technical modifications and if associated with nuclear 
warheads, become the focus of a new and revulutionary weapon system. 7 
2. In 1952, the ICSU had decided to expand a polar research project to encompass a study of 
the upper atmosphere with the help of rockets with instrument packages attached; and in 
October 1954 the Council had adopted a resolution calling for the launch of artificial 
satellites during the IGY to help map the earth's surface. 
3. See Launius, supra note 1, at 22-23. 
4. See John Krige & Arturo Russo, Europe in space 1960- 1973, ESA SP-1172, Netherlands 
(1994}, hereinafter referred to as ESA SP-1172, at 6-8. 
5. See Launius, supra note 1, at 25. 
6. Sputnik II, launched on November 3, 1957, which carried Laika, a dog, into space, weighed 
even 1.120 pounds and stayed in orbit for almost 200 days, ibid. 
7. See Lorenza Sebesta, The availability of American launchers and Europe's decision 'to go-it-
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The good thing about the event was that it "created an illusion of a 
technological gap and provided the impetus for increased spending for 
aerospace endeavors, technical and scientific programs, and the chartering of 
new federal agencies to manage air and space research and development. "8 
In other words, the crisis brought urgency, focus and money to the U.S. space 
effort. And it led to the creation of NASA as the agency that would coordinate 
U.S. civilian space activities. 
An additional positive side effect was of a legal/political nature. The fact that 
Sputnik I (and II) had orbited the earth, overflying the territories of many 
sovereign nations without provoking a single protest, had, in the U.S. view, 
established the legal precedent for free access to and freedom of space which 
the U.S. administration had sought to obtain for its reconnaissance satellites. 9 
The Soviet launch thus cleared the way for the previously rejected Army 
project, and in January 1958 a four-stage launch vehicle, the Juno 1, developed 
by the team of Wernher von Braun on the basis of a modified ballistic missile, 
placed Explorer! in orbit. And Vanguard 1 followed less than 2 months later. 
NASA's charter gave the agency both a research job and operational 
responsibilities. It would not only design and build launch vehicles and 
satellites, but it would also launch them, track them, acquire data from them, 
and interpret the data. 10 The first NASA 10-year plan was presented to 
Congress in 1960. It called for a greatly expanded program: manned flight, 
scientific satellites, lunar probes, and, for the launch of all these spacecraft, 
a family of launch vehicles, including very large ones to cater for the heavier 
payloads. In addition to the existing Redstone, Thor and Atlas vehicles, NASA 
plans included (further) development of the Scout booster for smaller pay loads, 
Centaur (originally a Department of Defense project), an upper stage for lunar 
and planetary missions, and Saturn, also for bigger pay loads. Where the Scout 
became a highly reliable small booster11 it was particularly in the area of 
heavy lift vehicles that the U. S. felt the need to catch up with the Soviet 
Union. 
The efforts of the NASA engineers in the early sixties brought modifications 
to existing missile derived boosters such as the Thor-Agena which could launch 
a 2,200 pound satellite into orbit, the Delta, a very successful family of launch 
vehicles for various medium-sized payloads, and the Titan, developed in the 
alone', ESA HSR-18, Netherlands (1996), hereinafter referred to as ESA HSR-18, at 8. 
8. See Launius, supra note 1, at 25. 
9. Id. at 27-28. 
10. See Frank W. Anderson, Orders of Magnitude- A history of NACA and NASA, 1915-1980, 
(The NASA History Series, NASA SP-4403) USA (1981), hereinafter referred to as Orders 
of Magnitude, at 22. 
11. It was first launched on July 1, 1960, and soon became a 'workhorse', which could place a 
330 pound satellite into earth orbit; by the end of 1968 it had a launch success rate of 85%, 
see Launius, supra note 1, at 44. 
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mid-sixties as the heavy-lift launcher of choice. (The Saturn would be 
developed by the von Braun team exclusively for the Apollo project) 
At the same time the reliability of the launchers needed to be improved: by 
December 1959, of the 37 satellite launches attempted, less than one- third had 
actually attained orbit. So NASA imposed new and rigorous standards on all 
of its products and got DOD, whose vehicles they used, to impose those same 
standards on all contractors and component manufacturers. 12 
By the end of the 1960s, the U.S. had developed several sufficiently reliable 
and proven launch vehicle families, capable of meeting basically all the launch 
needs of the Government, both military and civilian: 
- Scout, built by LTV Aerospace, with the launch-program managed by the 
Navy, 
- Atlas, built by General Dynamics, and managed by the Air Force, 
- Titan, built by Martin Marietta, and also managed by the Air Force, 
- Delta, built by McDonnell Douglas, and managed by NASA, 
- Saturn 1B, built by Chrysler and McDonnell Douglas, and managed by 
NASA and 
- Saturn V, purpose-built for the manned lunar missions by Boeing, Rockwell 
and McDonnell Douglas and also managed by NASA, but out of production 
by the time of the first lunar landing. 
The launch process was simple: NASA and the U.S. Air Force/Department 
of Defense, after having obtained the necessary Congressional authorization 
and appropriation of the required amounts, would procure the launch vehicles, 
built according to their specifications, from one of the above launcher 
manufacturing companies. 13 The launch would be performed at government 
launch facilities by the government agency concerned, with assistance 
(arranged under separate contract) from the manufacturer. 14 Both the civil 
and military satellite telecommunications and reconnaissance needs through the 
years produced a steady stream of government purchases of launch vehicles. 
Long term, future-oriented research and development of launchers was not 
encouraged at this time. Congressional budgetary approval procedures would 
result in yearly authorization and appropriation battles often complicated by 
such factors as lack of local interest in a specific program or other political 
or budgetary priorities. In the absence of certainty and predictability of 'market 
12. See Orders of Magnitude, supra note 10, at 24. 
13. See Allen D. Webber, Launching the rocket industry in the United States: domestic 
regulation of private expendable launch vehicles, 50(1) J. Air L. & Corn. 1-67 (1984}, 
hereinafter referred to as Webber 1984, at 1, note 2. 
14. See Edward A. Frankle, Commercial ELV services and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: Concord or discord?, Proceed. 30th Colloq. L. Outer Space 216-223 (1987) 
herinafter referred to as Frankle: Concord or discord, at 219. 
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demand' and lack of foreign competition, there was little inclination to invest 
in new technology. 15 
The roles were thus quite clear: the industry, as government contractor, 
delivered the hardware and the government used that hardware to produce the 
launch service both for its own needs and for those of its partners in 
cooperative projects, such as individual countries and international 
organizations such as Europe's Space Research Organization (ESRO). 
One of the programs undertaken by the U.S. in this period, namely that of 
communications satellites, is of particular note because of the major role it 
played in policy discussions both within the U.S. and Europe and between 
them on (the U.S. reaction to) the need for Europe to have access to space for 
its own communications satellites. 
In 1960 NASA launched the experimental Echo satellite, a plastic balloon 
coated with aluminium, which was used as a passive reflector of telephone 
signals. It was followed in 1962 by Telstar, the first satellite which relayed 
live broadcast of television images across the Atlantic. Its handicap of limited 
visibility to the groundstations (because of the low earth orbit used) was not 
shared by its successor, Syncom, launched by NASA in 1963 into 
geostationary orbit (36.000 km. high): with its fixed position vis-a-vis the earth 
it was permanently visible and thus useable by earth stations on at least 
one-third of the earth's surface. 
This experimental phase was concluded with the launch, in April 1965, of 
Early Bird, later renamed Intelsat I, which would inaugurate commercial 
communications satellite services between the U.S. and Europe. 
The U.S. government had foreseen the enormous potential of the commercial 
use of communications satellites, and had entrusted the task of developing an 
international satellite system to Communications Satellite Corporation 
(Comsat), created in 1962. Comsat was a private company, with members of 
the Board of Directors appointed by the President, regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and supervised by the State Department. 
Together with the U.S. government, Comsat was instrumental in getting the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, Intelsat, established, 
based on 'interim agreements' signed in August 1964 by 13 states plus Vatican 
City. 
With the shares (and the concomitant voting power) apportioned on the basis 
of projected use of the system, the U.S., through Comsat, obtained a dominant 
position in the new organization. Comsat's role as manager of the system (no 
other person or entity at the time had the required know-how or experience 
in this field), its majority share and de facto veto power further strengthened 
the U.S. position. All satellite technology used was of American origin. The 
main U.S. communications firms, such as ITT and AT & T and the large U.S 
15. See infra para 2.1.1.2 and Chapter 4 for the (lack ot) European competition. 
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aerospace companies were influential shareholders of Comsat. And the new 
satellites, Intelsat 11 and Ill, orbited in 1967 and 1969 respectively, were 
-almost by definition- U.S.-made and launched. It is not surprising that the 
European members of Intelsat, some of whom did cherish the small consolation 
of having groundstations on their territory, felt less than comfortable with such 
U.S. dominance in this technologically, strategically and commercially 
important field. However, the existing technology gap between Europe and the 
U.S. was of such magnitude that the Europeans, in the mid-sixties, could not 
offer any viable alternative either in the field of communications satellite 
(component) technology or launch facilities. And with no concerted action on 
the scale of the American military and civil space research and development, 
there was little chance for Europe to soon have substantial influence on policy, 
become a -more or less- equal partner of the U.S., or get a fair share of the 
contracts awarded by the Consortium, let alone become an independent actor 
in this 'high tech' field. 16 
That is why in the years following the establishment of the Consortium, during 
which the parties prepared themselves for the negotiations (in 1969) on 
definitive arrangements creating the Intelsat Organization, relations between 
the U. S. and Europe were less than cordial. 
2.1.1. 2 Early U. S. launch policy vis-a-vis Europe 
U.S.-European cooperation in space since the late fifties had consisted mainly 
of the U.S.Government/NASA offering space on board its satellites for 
European scientific experiments or providing launch services for European 
scientific payloads. 
The U.S. strategy with respect to space cooperation with its European allies 
was based on the following 'pillar': 
"demonstrating and reaffirming US political leadership among its allies by engaging them 
in cooperative ventures in which the US served mainly as the provider of launching facilities 
... Launching services were intended to demonstrate, at a low price, US benevolence and 
advance with regards to her European counterparts and, at the very least, were to symbolize 
the benefits of a technologically oriented democratic society" (sic.') 17 
Such ventures, undertaken on a project-by-project basis were of a strictly 
scientific nature and each nation had to fund its own activities; thus no 
'giveaways' and no exchanges of funds. 18 To that end, bilateral agreements 
16. See ESA SP-1172, supra note 4, at 55-57; also, on the technology gap and the US reaction 
thereto, Lorenza Sebesta, United States -European cooperation in space during the sixties, 
ESA HSR-14, Netherlands (1994), hereinafter referred to as ESA HSR-14, at 19-21. 
17. See ESA HSR-14, supra note 16, at 7. 
18. Id., at 8. 
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were signed throughout the sixties with such countries as the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Germany and other European (and non-European) countries. 
They would, for instance, arrange for the inclusion of national experiments 
in NASA programs, or involve launch arrangements for national satellites. The 
first in the latter category was the British Ariel 1 satellite, launched on April 
26, 1962 from Cape Canaveral by Thor-Delta launch vehicle. Canadian, 
British, French and Italian satellite launches would follow, all based on 
bilateral cooperation agreements with NASA. 19 
With the birth of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and of 
the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), both in 1964,20 
NASA had found European counterparts to deal with. In that same year a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed concerning the launch by NASA 
of ESRO' s first two satellites, (still) free of charge, in exchange for free access 
to all scientific data thus obtained. 21 
It was only in 1966, at the time of both intra-European discussions on the 
(further) development of an autonomous launch and independent space research 
capability and of internal debate in the U.S. on the advisability of assisting 
Europe in this endeavor, that the character of the above U.S.-European launch 
relationship changed from one of cooperation and free scientific exchange into 
one based on 'purchase of launch services'. In that year, NASA and ESRO 
signed an M.o. U. on reimbursable launchings, the first such agreement 
concluded by NASA in deviation of its 'no exchange of funds' policy.22 
19. On September 29, 1962 the first Canadian satellite Alouette 1, was launched from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base by a Thor-Agena rocket, followed by, a.o., the second British 
Ariel launch on March 27, 1964 (by a Scout from Wallops Island, US East Coast), the 
Italian San Marco on December 15, 1964 (also by Scout from the same base), and a French 
scientific satellite on December 6, 1965 (by Scout from Vandenberg AF Base). In an 
interesting reversal of roles the French in 1963 accepted NASA experiments to be flown on 
French sounding rockets: the launchings took place in 1964 from a French base in the 
Algerian Sahara and involved two Dragon and two Centaure rockets supplied by CNES, the 
French Space Agency. See ibid. The following year, the French launched their own satellite, 
Asterix 1, thus becoming the third 'space country' after the Soviet Union and the USA. 
20. See, for history of ESRO and ELDO, infra Chapter 4. 
21. Para. 9 of the M.o.U. provided that "ESRO and NASA will exchange all scientific 
information resulting from this cooperative program and make the results freely available to 
the world scientific community." For the full text of the M.o.U, see ESA HSR-14, supra 
note 16, at 41-43. 
22. Memorandum of Understanding between the European Space Research Organisation and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration concerning the furnishing of satellite 
launching and associated services of December 30, 1966, reproduced as ESRO/C/198, rev.1 
of 6 January 1967 in ESA HSR-14, supra note 16, at 45-51; see also NASA News Release 
No 66-332 of January 4, 1967. NASA News Release 67-48 of March 8, 1967 refers to six 
previous launches of foreign satellites conducted by NASA under cooperative agreements 
with no exchange of funds. As noted in ESA HSR-14, at 13-14, this new 'buyer-seller' 
-relationship did not diminish NASA's insistence on 'automatic' full and free access to all 
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The M.o. U. provided that ESRO would furnish flight-ready scientific 
spacecraft and that NASA would provide the launch vehicle, range and 
launching facilities and other support. The M.o. U. provided further that ESRO 
would pay NASA for the launch vehicles and for all identifiable direct costs 
of equipment and services furnished by or through NASA, plus certain indirect 
costs agreed upon. Separate contracts, setting forth detailed arrangements and 
the responsibilities of the agencies involved, would be drawn up for each 
proposed launching. 
The first such contract concerned the 1968 launch from Cape Kennedy, by 
Delta launch vehicle, of ESRO's HEOS-A scientific satellite for an estimated 
USD 4 million. 23 
The Soviet Union began to make overtures to Europe in the field of space 
research cooperation. These overtures were taken up by France, which, under 
President de Gaulle, had put a great deal of energy into an independent 
security policy, including the development of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems. 24 Perhaps in response to this Soviet initiative the U.S. and a number 
of European countries, in the period 1965-1967, held discussions on the 
question of the space technology gap and the type of cooperation that could 
assist Europe in catching up with the Americans. 
President Johnson personally supported this idea, as such cooperation would 
contribute to closer overall (including economic and security) ties between the 
U.S. and Europe. 
The original plan was to limit this cooperation to the field of spacecraft 
development and space exploration, an approach perceived by the Europeans 
not as a help to foster space development, but as a way to "divert Europe from 
the essential economic benefits to be derived from space through the 
exploration of communications satellites. "25 This perception was not without 
foundation as the U.S. offer resulted from a rather restrictive policy, approved 
by the U.S. president in 1965, concerning assistance in the development of 
data obtained by the satellites, a demand ESRO was not prepared to meet, inter alia to 
safeguard intellectual property right of the Organization and its researchers. As NASA was 
required to be able to answer any Congressional question with respect to the data "acquired 
by any satellite launched from United States' territory" a compromise was reached which 
obliged ESRO to provide NASA with the satellite data, "upon NASA's request and at 
NASA's expense", while use of such data would be subject to prior permission of ESRO 
and subject to its rules relating to intellectual property rights, see art. N of the M.o.U., at 
51. One can safely assume that the experience with these American demands strengthened 
the position of those ESRO members who sought to establish an independent European 
launch capability. 
23. See NASA News Release 67-48 of March 8, 1967. 
24. The French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and its first nuclear ballistic missile tests in 
1967 showed an independence of thinking which was worrysome to the U.S. govermnent, 
see ESA HSR-18, supra note 7, at 10. 
25. See ESA HSR-18, supra note 7, at 16. 
42 
United States law, policies and practices 
foreign communications satellite capabilities. The three principles which 
formed the core of that policy were the following: 
"The United States should refrain from providing direct assistance to other countries which 
would significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications satellite 
systems. 
The United States should not consider requests for launch services or other assistance in 
the development of communications satellites ... for commercial purposes except for use 
in connection with the single global system established under the 1964 Agreements ... 
All transactions involving technological assistance on satellites or launcher technology 
"should be conditioned upon express written assurances "by the foreign nation(s) that the 
technology and assistance obtained would be used only within framework of lntelsat and 
arrangements to which the US was participant and should not be transmitted to third 
countries prior to US authorization. "26 
For the above reasons, ESRO declined the above proposal (the project would 
eventually become the subject of U.S. - German cooperation). 
European unhappiness with this hegemonistic approach taken by the U.S. 
coincided with realization on the U.S. side that it was in their strategic and 
economic interest to have more or less 'equal partners' in Europe. Also, the 
U.S. was concerned with the threat of national proliferation of civilian and 
(more difficult to detect) military (read: French) launchers if ELDO was not 
assisted with its launcher program and the rigid approach of the 
communications satellites policy was maintained. Additionally, the U.S. 
authorities were aware of a joint Franco-German communications satellite 
programme, Symphonie, conceived for the purpose of obtaining know-how 
(and a better negotiating position within Intelsat) in this field, and "to test, as 
it did, American willingness to launch European commercial satellites. "27 
There was in fact every reason for the U. S. to believe that continued 
'obstructionism' on their part would lead to an uncontrolled development of 
competitive space capabilities (on top of exacerbating U.S. - European 
relations). 28 
26. Policy concerning US assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite 
capabilities, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 338 of September 1965, id. 
27. Id. 
28. NASA administrator Webb expressed the view that "neither communication spacecraft 
development ... , ELDO launch vehicle development, nor the Guyana [European equatorial 
launch] range can any longer be delayed by US export restrictions. By the completion of the 
range in 1969-70, the European nations could, if they wish, be in a position to place in 
synchronous orbit an operable comsat spacecraft.", remarks quoted in ESA HSR-18, supra 
note 7, at 18. Thus, according to the American Ambassador in France, the US government 
would have more to gain in the role of a helpful partner vis-a-vis France and Europe than as 
a stem competitor, id. at 18-19. 
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The U.S. dilemma was, then, to assist Europe sufficiently so as not to 
antagonize and loose (control over) their 'ally', without being so efficient or 
generous that it would turn Europe into a serious (commercial) competitor in 
the field of the manufacture, launch and operation of communications satellites, 
to the possible detriment of the Intelsat/Comsat 'single global system'. 
Moreover, too little or too much help could also turn Europe, and France in 
particular, into an independent nuclear delivery system owner/operator, a 
serious non-proliferation worry of the U.S. 
Hence a series of decisions and policies on the part of the U.S. with varying 
emphases depending on the fear of the day or the (lobbying) strengths of the 
Departments and industries concerned. 
In 1966, a Presidential Directive called for positive support of, and assistance 
to, ELDO, subject to the condition that the launcher vehicles, components and 
technology provided by the U.S. should not be used: 
"1. for improving communication satellite capability other than a. To permit participation 
in the National Defense Communication Satellite System; b. In accordance with the Intelsat 
agreements regulating (civilian) telecommunication satellite policy, 
2. for improving nuclear missile delivery capability, 
3. for transmittal to third countries."29 
In accordance with this Directive, the U.S. offered both hardware (components 
and launchers) and know-how to ELDO, and also joint development of a new 
upper stage. Some useful and informative discussions between NASA and 
ELDO experts were the short term result. 
A revised U.S. NSAM 338 saw the light in July 1967. The most important 
change was to be found in the spirit of the new Memorandum. Where 
originally the U.S. position was based on development and protection of one 
single global communications satellite system, the new text reflected American 
acceptance of the inevitability of the development of new regional systems, and 
attempted to guarantee an integration or at least an association of these new 
systems with Intelsat: if you can't beat them, have them join (and conform). 30 
Here, a crucial provision kept the parties apart for a considerable length of 
time. Draft article XIV of the agreement created the possibility in principle 
to set up a regional satellite system separate from Intelsat provided technical 
compatibility with the Intelsat space segment was ensured and significant 
29. US cooperation with the European Launcher Organization ELDO, National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM) 354, ESA HSR-18, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
30. An 'accommodative' attitude would also support the continuity of Intelsat at the 1969 
negotiations; as a NASA paper put it, "The health of Intelsat is assured in part by the 
feeling of the major Intelsat partners that they are indeed partners and not puppets in an 
organization dominated by the US.", see ESA HSR-18, supra note 7, at 22. 
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economic harm to the latter system was avoided. It was up to the highest organ 
of the organization, the Assembly of Parties, to express its findings on that 
issue in the form of recommendations. 
The U.S. position on the majority needed to have a satellite (system) approved 
by the Assembly would determine Europe's fate as to U.S. launcher 
availability for its satellites. Clarity thereon was not easily obtained. Where 
originally, in U.S. thinking, a two thirds vote against the satellite was required 
to defeat it (and Comsat in the new set up had lost its veto power), in 1971 
the U.S. position was that two thirds of the votes was necesssary to get a 
satellite system approved. 31 The fact that the U.S. was prepared to give 
advance indications of its voting behaviour within Intelsat on specific, well-
defined European system proposals, was hardly a consolation: its qualified 
support, depending on the number of countries in the geographical area 
covered by the proposed system, and thus on the competitive reach of the 
system, was another demonstration of the grip the U.S. had on - future-
European space telecommunications through its launch monopoly. 32 
In 1971 the 77 Intelsat parties came to a final agreement on the governance 
of the new permanent organization. And in January 1972 President Nixon 
announced his decision to develop the space shuttle. His administration's 
inclination to please or appease the Europeans with a liberal launch policy was, 
for various reasons, limited. (One reason, apart from a change in political 
priorities of his administration, may have been the fact that the French had 
continued to vigorously develop and test the main elements of their 'force de 
frappe' and were not to be distracted from their goal of nuclear missile 
independence: the American non-proliferation goal of US-European space 
cooperation had apparently not been attained) 
A new "United States Policy governing the provision of launch assistance", 
addressed to interested countries and international organizations, was 
promulgated on October 9, 1972. It confirmed the restrictive, Intelsat 
monopoly-oriented character of the U.S. views and basically told Europe to 
accept U.S. conditions or look for launch vehicles elsewhere: 
31. See letter from Jolmson, Under-Secretary of State, of Februari 5, 1971, reprinted in ESA 
HSR-18, supra note 7, Annexes. The US position had apparently hardened both because of 
pressure from Comsat and the aerospace industry which had benefitted greatly - in terms of 
contracts received from Intelsat- from the old Comsat-oriented voting-system. Moreover, a 
new Office of Telecommunication Policy reporting directly to the President had been very 
critical of "attempts by NASA and the State Department to endanger US monopoly in 
telecommunication satellites on the base of uncertain political returns,", id. at 25. 
32. As Belgian minister Lefevre on behalf of the European countries concerned noted, with 
some bitterness, in his response to Johnson: "To sum up, we are obliged to note that, 
although the present state of the discussions offers some prospect of our launching our 
immediate projects within the framework of our collaboration in the post-Apollo 
programme, it does not enable us to embark on any medium or long-term progranuning of 
our space activities." id., Annexes). 
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"With respect to satellites intended to provide international public telecommunications 
services: 1. [t]he United States will provide appropriate launch assistance for those satellite 
systems on which Intelsat makes a favorable recommendation in accordance with Article 
XIV of its definitive arrangements ... "33 
Other aspects of the launch policy covered conditions with respect to the place 
of launch. Where a U. S launch site was envisaged, the arrangement would 
involve the acquisition of U.S. launch services on a cooperative or 
reimbursable basis; in the latter case European users would be charged on the 
same basis as comparable non-U.S. Government domestic users. And with 
respect to the priority and scheduling for launching European payloads, the 
U.S. would deal with these launchings "on the same basis as our own". 
In the case of preference for the use of foreign launch sites, the arrangements 
called for the purchase of a U.S. launch vehicle only and the assurance on the 
part of the buyer that the launch vehicle would not be made available to third 
parties without prior agreement of the U.S. Launch assistance would in all 
cases be subject to U.S. laws, which included export control regulations. 34 
Nothing in the text of the launch policy, although promulgated at a time when 
the space shuttle was only on the drawing board, prevented it from being 
equally applicable to the provision of shuttle launch services to foreign 
countries, though only with respect to launches from U.S. territory. 
It must be assumed that the European space authorities were less than 
impressed by the text accompanying this launch assurance policy: 
"In establishing today a global launch assurance policy, the President affirms the need for 
a dependable capability which would make it possible for nations to have access under equal 
conditions to the advantages which accrue through space applications" (emph. add.).35 
The fact is that they saw the policy as reaffirming the de facto binding 
character of Intelsat (article XIV) recommendations, in conformity with the 
U. S. views on the matter. In the same vain, the launch of Symphonie could 
only be agreed upon (in 1974), subject to confirmation that the project would 
be of an experimental nature only. The possibility to transform it into an 
operational system was included in the agreement, but again subject to the 
above Intelsat-related conditions. The Symphonie-Directors had no choice but 
to grudgingly accept. 36 As we will see in Chapter 4 the above experience with 
33. See, the White House Fact Sheet of above title and date, reproduced in ESA HSR-18, supra 
note 7, Annexes; also in US Dept of State Bull, Nov 6, 1972, at 533-534). 
34. See ibid. 
35. See ibid. 
36. Launching of French-German Symphonie Communications Satellites, Agreement effected by 
exchange of notes, signed at Washington June 21 and 24, 1974; e.i.f. June 24, 1974, see 
ibid. (Annexes); the alternative, a launch provided by the Soviet Union, was in principle 
available but not within the planned timeframe, see id., at 28. 
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U.S. launch policies created a definite need on the part of Europe 'to go-it-
alone'. 
2.1.1. 3 The decision to develop the space shuttle 
Nix on's decision, in 1972, to proceed with the development of the shuttle was 
preceded by 3 years of not only dramatic moon-landings but also political 
debate in both the administration and Congress about possible programs for 
the period after the completion of the Apollo program. Where both NASA and 
-posthumously- President Kennedy got well-deserved praise for this inspiring 
and highly successful venture, it was again NASA and the new president who, 
for different reasons, needed a new project of equally dramatic proportions. 
The geo-political situation was of course quite different from the one in which 
Kennedy could take his historical decision. The cold war plus the perceived 
threat of Soviet military-strategic dominance in space had been replaced by a 
much milder and less antagonistic atmosphere: after all, U.S. superiority in 
space exploration had been established, the crisis was over, the race had been 
won. How then to fire the imagination of people (and make them pay the bill)? 
In 1963 the officials in the Kennedy administration had begun to consider 
possible programs to be undertaken by NASA after the completion of Apollo. 
Under his successor Johnson, NASA was asked to identify future objectives 
for the civilian space program. NASA's study, reported in January 1965, 
provided an overview of the capabilities it was developing and the uses to 
which these might be applied, but, in the absence of clear political support for 
any specific direction, did not (dare to) identify any single area of space 
development "which appears to require an overriding emphasis or a crash 
effort". 37 
When Nixon first took office in January 1969 he appointed a Space Task 
Group to study post-Apollo plans and make recommendations. Strongly 
influenced by NASA, the Group's report of September 1969 (the Eagle had 
landed in the meantime!) included a manned orbital space station and, to 
support the station a..11d its subsequent additions, an efficient, low-cost and 
flexible 'airline-type' earth-to-orbit transportation system, the shuttle. A key 
element of the system was its reusability. 38 
Studies conducted by NASA in the mid-sixties had found that reusable space 
transport was technically feasible and could yield a substantial reduction in 
operations cost. And it would certainly be more cost effective than the use of 
large expendable vehicles like the Saturn. (Some NASA officials compared the 
37. See Launius, supra note l, at 197. 
38. See, id. 
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methods of launching into orbit used on project Apollo to operating a railroad 
and throwing away the locomotive after every trip!). 39 
The administration's decision, for budgetary reasons, to terminate the Saturn 
V heavy lift booster production line in mid-1968 made the shuttle the only 
hope for continuation of human (American) presence in space. 
And the shuttle - in NASA's plan- would be flexible enough to provide all 
orbital services required by users, including the transportation of scientific and 
applications satellites. 
With the support of Nixon, NASA administrator Paine, in 1969, tried to get 
foreign partners interested in this Post-Apollo programme. Only Europe was 
interested, particularly in another part of the project, the space 'tug', a vehicle 
that was to transfer payloads from the shuttle's orbit into higher orbits. 
Development of the tug and cooperation in the development of the shuttle 
would provide Europe with interesting and useful know-how on propulsion and 
transport technology. 40 However both internal disagreement on the preferred 
European course and, partly as a consequence, complicated discussions with 
the Americans on the exact contents and cost of the participation and the extent 
of the transfer of know-how, made a firm agreement difficult to reach. In 
1971, with the Nixon administration, the American attitude had changed from 
a cooperative into a 'go-it-alone' mood. They found the Europeans too 
demanding and the programme, which had been under attack, inter alia for 
budgetary reasons, had been reduced in size and scope. The above question 
of availability of launchers and/or transfer of launcher technology did not 
improve the cooperative atmosphere. Moreover Nixon had priorities other than 
strengthening space cooperation with Europe, i.e. a special relationship, 
including space cooperation, with the Soviet Union. In 1972, a State 
Department official informed the European space authorities that both the space 
shuttle and the 'tug' had been withdrawn as candidates for cooperation, and 
that "Europe's further involvement in the post-Apollo program was not of any 
commercial or technical importance to his government". 41 
A memo of NASA administrator Fletcher to President Nixon in November 
1971 listed the following reasons for approving shuttle development: 
- the U.S. cannot forego manned space flight 
- the space shuttle is the only meaningful new manned space flight program 
that can be accomplished on a modest budget 
- the space shuttle is a necessary next step for the practical use of space 
39. See, id. at 107. 
40. In fact, an internal European working group suggested that the tug become the"essential 
nucleus of European participation", see ESA SP-1172, supra note 4, at 88. 
41. Id., at 89; some of the unofficial reasons, apart from "European indecisiveness", were 
doubts that Europe's industry was up to the task, reluctance to transfer sensitive technology 
and US military interest in taking control over the tug, see ibid. 
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- the cost of today's shuttle is about one-half of what it was six months ago 
(i.e. USD 5.5 billion in stead of the original 10-15 billion) 
- starting the shuttle now will have a significant positive effect on aerospace 
employment. Not starting would be a serious blow to both the morale and 
health of the [U.S.] Aerospace Industry. 42 
Which of the above justifications prompted Nixon to give the project his go-
ahead is not certain. One author mentions his fascination with astronauts and 
the fact that the bulk of the space shuttle's contract work would go to his home 
state of California. 43 NASA historian Launius mentions a memo written by 
Casper Weinberger, then Deputy Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, to the president, in which he described a reduction of the NASA 
budget as confirming a "belief gaining credence at home and abroad: [t]hat 
our best years are behind us, that we are ... voluntarily starting to give up our 
super power status, and our desire to maintain world superiority. "44 The 
above justifications, Weinberger's views and the desire to start a new 
aerospace program that would avoid unemployment in critical states in the 
1972 election year "ultimately proved decisive", according to Launius. And, 
to the extent one subscribes to the guidelines as to the motivations of a 
president when deciding on matters of policy as provided by another author 
(i.e. any president's three major goals are reelection, good policy, and 
historical achievement), 45 the shuttle could certainly also satisfy the latter of 
the three presidential goals. 
On January 5, 1972, President Nixon announced his decision "that the United 
States should proceed at once with the development of an entirely new type 
of space transportation system designed to help transform the space frontier 
of the 1970s into familiar territory, easily accessible for human endeavor in 
the 1980s and 90s . . . It will revolutionize transportation into near space, by 
routinizing it. "46 
NASA's plan originally had been to build a fully reusable omni-purpose space 
truck cum laboratory capable of performing all possible space transportation 
tasks for the government and for commercial purposes. A large fleet of those 
shuttles would conduct an estimated 50-60 flights per year. As we saw, NASA 
estimated development costs at approximately USD 15 billion over 10 years. 47 
42. Launius, supra note 1, at 109-110. 
43. See James A. Vedda, Evolution of executive branch space policy making, 12 (3) Space 
Policy 177-192 ( 1996) hereinafter referred to as V edda, at 179. 
44. Launius, supra note 1, at 109. 
45. Paul C. Light, The President's Agenda, USA (1983), as quoted by Vedda, supra note 43, at 
177. 
46. See The White House, Statement by the President, 5 January 1972, reprinted in Launius, 
supra note 1, at 232. 
47. See Vedda, supra note 43, at 181. 
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In the absence of an inspiring cause or national security threat however, the 
political mood was one of spending less on space and demanding more in 
return. An additional handicap was that the Defense Department, though 
having some military uses in mind, saw the shuttle more as a convenience than 
as an essential system. 48 Nevertheless, in order to get both the White House 
and Congressional approval to develop the shuttle, a DOD commitment to use 
the system for all its launches was essential. For that purpose the vehicle had 
to meet all possible DOD requirements, which made it heavier, more 
complicated and more costly. 
Thus, NASA was forced to go back to the drawing board and, nolens volens 
assisted by a critical Office of Management and Budget, had to review a 
number of alternatives to its original design. The project finally chosen in 
1972, consisting of a total of 5 partially reusable shuttles, had to be completed 
by the end of the seventies at a cost of not more than USD 5.5 billion. 49 
And, more important for our discussion, the shuttle had to pay its way by 
showing economic returns, "the first time the space agency had been subjected 
to cost-effectiveness criteria in one of its programs. "50 
That requirement could only be met by giving the shuttle a space transport 
monopoly at the expense of the existing expendable launch vehicle fleet. That 
monopoly, in turn, to be effective, had to include all military and intelligence 
payloads, calculated at about one-third of all future space traffic. The Air 
Force, at first, was adamant in its view that it would have to continue to 
develop and purchase its own expendable (Titan and Atlas) boosters, and would 
only contribute to the cost of the shuttle by building a launch complex at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base. In 1971 they finally agreed not to develop any 
new boosters, although they would continue to purchase existing designs. 51 
So NASA, in the end, was committed to both cut the cost of shuttle operation, 
use the shuttle for all governmental and commercial payloads, and eliminate 
the (use of the) entire fleet of U.S. expendable launch vehicles. 
Although, for many years to come, nothing would change in practice (as it 
took a long time before the shuttle became operational), there is no doubt that, 
given the specialized technology, high cost and long lead times associated with 
the manufacture of (new) launch vehicles, this policy proved to be a serious 
and -in the long run- costly setback for the ELV industry's research and 
development efforts. After all, there is hardly shareholders value in investing 
48. Id., at 180. 
49. Id., at 181. 
50. Ibid. This requirement also influenced the technical specifications; as Vedda observes "[i]f 
the objective was manned orbital flight with a reusable spacecraft, then the technical path 
was clear, but if the objective included low cost access to orbit, economic payback, and a 
high flight rate, then the technical approach was not so well defined." id., at 180. 
51. See Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle - The history of developing the national space 
transportation system, USA (1996) hereinafter referred to as Space Shuttle 1996, at 75. 
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in new technology if there are officially no future launch needs to be met and 
thus no profits to be made therewith. 
In the years after the shuttle decision, the U. S. EL V and missile industry 
continued to produce large numbers of launch vehicles and missiles for both 
civil (NASA) and military (DOD) needs respectively, though- understandably -
space shuttle related procurement by NASA would increase more impressively 
through the years: from 1973 to 1976 the latter figures would increase rapidly 
from USD 199 million (1973) and USD 475 million (1974) to USD 797 million 
in 1975 and approximately USD 1,2 billion in 1976.52 The original shuttle 
development planning foresaw a phasing in of the shuttle (and a phasing out 
of the ELY's) in 1977 or 1978. As it turned out, technical and financial 
problems delayed the first launch until 1981, and it wasnot until July 1982 that 
the shuttle was declared operationalY 
In the mean time, obviously, the U.S. government (NASA) could not 
discontinue the expendable option. NASA's launch vehicles in the 1970s 
therefore continued to be the Atlas and Delta, for the launch of commercial 
or scientific satellites into geostationary orbit, and the Scout for smaller 
payloads destined for lower earth orbits, whereas the Titan would remain the 
launch vehicle preferred by DOD for military payloads; and U.S. industry 
continued to keep their assembly lines running for their valued customers. 54 
But with his Presidential Directive of 1978, Carter had reconfirmed the role 
the shuttle was going to play in meeting the space transportation needs of the 
U.S.: 
"The United States will develop, manage, and operate a fully operational Space 
Transportation System (STS) through NASA, in cooperation with the Department of 
Defense. The STS will service all authorized space users- domestic and foreign commercial 
and governmental - and will provide launch priority and necessary security to national 
52. In the same years NASA's launch vehicle (ELV) procurement would, in USD millions, 
amount to 221, 178, 140 and 166 respectively, whereas DOD procured missiles for the 
following amounts: USD 3.023 million (1973), 2.981 (1974) and 2.889 (1975). Overall 
sales of space vehicle systems, incl. engines and propulsion units, by the US aerospace 
industry to US and foreign customers amounted to: 
1973: USD 2.117 million (military 1.509, non-mil. 608), 1974: USD 2.402 (military 1.577, 
non-mil. 825), and 1975: 2.812 (military 1.766, non-mil. 1.046), see Aerospace Facts and 
Figures 1974175 (23d ed.) and 1975176 (24th ed.), Aerospace Industries Association of 
America Inc. AIA(A), Washington D.C., passim. It should be noted that both in 1974 (with 
a double-digit inflation percentage) and in 1975 (less inflation and a better economy) the 
above - latter - figures, if adjusted for inflation, saw an actual decrease in constant dollar 
sales in 1974 and at most a status quo in 1975, see Foreword President AlA in both issues. 
53. On the occasion of the return to earth of Space Shuttle Columbia, on July 4, 1982 (the 
fourth flight of the shuttle), President Reagan declared the US Space Transportation System 
(STS) operational. 




security missions while recognizing the essentially open character of the civil space 
program. "55 
2.2 The commercialization of expendable launch vehicles in the 1980's 
2. 2.1 ELV regulation prior to the Commercial Space Launch Act 
When, on July 4, 1982, President Reagan finally declared the shuttle 
operational, he also announced an updated U.S. Space Policy. Apart from 
addressing all other aspects of U.S. civil and military space activities and 
advocating a strong private sector involvement and investment in U.S. space 
programs, it re-confirmed the status of the shuttle as the future "primary space 
launch system", and added a number of requirements for the shuttle system 
which would effectively end the dominance of the ELY's: 
"-... The first priority ofthe STS program is to make the system fully operational and cost-
effective in providing routine access to space ... 
-United States Government spacecraft should be designed to take advantage of the unique 
capabilities of the STS. The completion of transition to the shuttle should occur as 
expeditiously as practical. 
-NASA will assure the shuttle's utility to the civil users. In coordination with NASA, the 
DOD will assure the shuttle's utility to national defense and integrate national security 
missions into the shuttle system. Launch priority will be provided for national security 
missions. 
-Expendable launch vehicle operations will be continued by the United States government 
until the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and obligations. Unique 
national security considerations may dictate developing special-purpose launch 
capabilities. "56 
Although the above text still left some time and opportunities for the 
established ELV manufacturers to sell their products, 57 competition with the 
space shuttle was already a fact, and the requirement for government spacecraft 
to be made fit for shuttle launch would seriously affect any future possibility 
55. See Civil and Further National Space Policy, Presidential Directive/ NSC-42 of October 10, 
1978, White House Press Release (Description of a Presidential Directive on national space 
policy), The White House, June 20, 1978, reprinted inS. Gorove, United States Space Law, 
national & international regulation, hereinafter referred to as Gorove US Space Law, at 
national regulation, I.A.4 (1989).The Fact Sheet of October 11, 1978 accompanying the 
above press release, added a.o. that "[o]ur space policy will reflect a balanced strategy of 
applications, science and technology development containing essential key elements that will: 
... [t]ake advantage of the flexibility of the Space Shuttle to reduce the cost of operating in 
space over the next two decades to meet national needs." ... 
56. National Space Policy, Presidential Directive/NSC-42, 18 Weekly Comp.Pres.Docs 894-898 
(1982). 
57. NASA funding for ELY's would cease at the end of fiscal year 1984. 
52 
United States law, policies and practices 
for EL V' s to be a viable alternative for shuttle launches in that highly lucrative 
and stable market. Hence a "fury of activity in the aerospace community", as 
one author describes their reaction, aimed at keeping the assembly line and the 
launch orders coming.58 At the same time, and separate from the efforts of 
the established aerospace industry to maintain its position of launch vehicle 
provider to NASA and DOD, numerous smaller aerospace firms showed 
interest in establishing private commercial EL V operations by obtaining the 
right from these manufacturers to market their products to the satellite 
customers in lieu of NASA. 59 
This clear interest on the part of the U.S. private sector to venture into the 
risky business of selling ELV services (and developing new vehicles) had 
already led to applications on the part of some companies for government 
approval of intended private launches. One of these start up companies was 
Space Services Inc (SSI). The processing of its applications showed clearly that 
the government was not yet prepared for these private space launch activities. 
Federal regulation dealing with the matter was absent or at best scattered 
through the various regulatory agencies. Thus, when SSI, a Texas corporation 
run by ex-NASA astronaut 'Deke' Slayton, in 1981 sought approval for the 
test-launch - from its own launching facilities - of a liquid-fuelled Percheron 
rocket, it approached not only the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 
State Department ( State), NASA and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), but had to submit its plans to more than 15 other federal 
agencies as well (such as DOD, Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard, the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Internal Revenue Service to name 
a few). 60 
58. See Nathan C. Goldman, Space Commerce -free enterprise on the high frontier, USA 
(1985), hereinafter referred to as Goldman Space Commerce, at 41; the author refers to the 
announcement by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, General 
Abrahamson, in late 1982, to phase out the expendables, "because the refitting of a satellite 
for launch on an expendable was more expensive and time-consuming than waiting for the 
next available shuttle flight", as setting off this fury of activity. 
59. See id., at 44; also Grier C. Raclin, Going to work in space: a survey of presently available 
launch systems in: American enterprise, the law and the commercial use of space 30-
72,USA (1986) hereinafter referred to as Raclin, at 53. 
60. See Raclin, supra note 59, at note 91; for the regulatory approval of its second launch, the 
solid-fuel rocket 'Conestoga 1 ', SSI spent over 6 months of efforts and $250,000, see ibid. 
As SSI sought to import rockets from West Germany for use in calibrating its radar, it 
required a license for importation of firearms from the above Bureau! See E. Jason Steptoe, 
United States government licensing of commercial space activities by private enterprise, 
Proceed. 27th Coli.L.Outer Space 191-196 (1984) hereinafter referred to as Steptoe 1984, at 
193. Also Webber 1984, supra note 13, quoting statements made in a Congressional hearing 
on the subject, "... various government agencies with relevant interests to protect have 
interjected a hodgepodge of uncoordinated licenses and legal requirements that make private 
launchings a procedural nightmare.", at 5. 
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The F AA' s authority was based on the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and its 
implementing regulations, the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's). 61 In 
1981, the only FAR's found applicable were contained in Part 101, sub-part 
C, dealing with 'unmanned rockets', and adopted in 1963 to ensure that small 
rockets launched by hobbyists and scientists would not endanger air traffic. 62 
Sub-part C did not apply to rockets operated within restricted areas, such as 
the government launch bases, where NASA or DOD would be the responsible 
agencies supervising the launch. 63 
The main provision making an FAA waiver necessary read as follows: "No 
person may operate an unmanned rocket ... (b) in controlled airspace ... "64 
A launch from U.S. territory would invariable involve entry into such air 
space, so ISS requested and obtained a waiver from this prohibition, though, 
in order to avoid additional regulatory complications, limited to a launch within 
U.S. territorial waters. The launch failed. ISS' second launch, of the 
'Conestoga 1' rocket, took place one year later and involved similar 
administrative processes. It also received launch clearance from the FAA and 
the other agencies involved. The additional complication to be dealt with was 
the fact that the launch would involve a 'splash-down' in the international 
waters of the Gulf of Mexico thus turning it into an 'export' involving State 
Department licensing procedures. 65 With this latter- successful - launch, SSI 
would become the first American company launching a rocket into space. 
Among the agencies playing a role in the licensing were, as indicated above, 
NASA, FCC and DOD. 66 
NASA disclaimed any regulatory authority for these private commercial space 
activities. However, as the only expert in this field they were asked by the 
F AA and the other agencies involved to review all aspects concerning the 
technical safety of the launches. In the Conestoga case this was the more 
appropriate as NASA provided the Minuteman rocket engine used by the 
Conestoga. 67 
61. See 49 USC paras 1341-1359 and 14 CFR parts 1-99 respectively. 
62. Reprinted in Gorove US Space Law, supra note 55, at I.A.3. The FAA, when granting 
permission for the launch did not refer to any other regulations, see James R. Myers, 
Federal government regulation of commercial operations using expendable launch vehicles, 
12 (1) J. Space L. 40-51 (1984), hereinafter referred to as Myers 1984, at 43-44. The 
author further notes that Part 101, sub-part C was not designed to regulate commercial sub-
orbital and orbital rocket launches. 
63. The FAA did not have jurisdiction over ELY's used by NASA or DOD because 'public 
aircraft' were exempted from its regulatory powers; the FAA also exempted the space 
shuttle from the coverage of the Act, see Webber 1984, supra note 13, at 9, 10). 
64. Part 101.23; additionally, Part 101.25 specifies the information to be given to the nearest 
F AA Air Traffic Control Facility. 
65. See Chapter 2.3.1. infra. 
66. For a more detailed account of the administrative process SSI was subjected to, see Webber 
1984, supra note 13. 
67. See Myers 1984, supra note 62, at 46. 
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The FCC's federally mandated role in all communications issues made the 
agency responsible for frequency-licensing. ISS requested- and received -an 
experimental radio license granting the right to use frequencies for its tracking 
and control communications with the rocket. 
DOD, through the U.S. Air Force, would monitor the national security aspects 
of private launches. In the ISS case they were also involved in the safety aspect 
of possible collisions with other orbiting satellites; for that purpose, 
NORAD/Space Command made the necessary calculations of available and 
used orbits before clearing the launch in that respect. 68 
In the absence of an agency with a clear mandate for licensing all aspects of 
private launches, companies had no choice but to go through the above 
cumbersome, labour-intensive and expensive multi-agency approval process, 
with all the concomitant uncertainties. And pressure grew within the 
government to have a more professional licensing process and a specific 
agency taking care of all licensing aspects. This made sense where the 1982 
National Space Policy had clearly opted for a strong private sector 
involvement, which in turn required such governmental regulations and 
procedures as would actually promote the active participation of U.S. 
enterpreneurs in the exploitation of space. The above space policy directive 
had also created the Senior Inter-agency Group on Space (SIG-Space) to 
implement its policies and principles. 69 And SIG-Space, as one of its agenda 
items, addressed the issues of the phasing out of governmental EL V operations 
and of both an increasing private sector interest in continuing these EL V 
systems and the emergence of new enterprises, established with the express 
purpose of developing commercial space launch capabilities, all this in the light 
of the absence of adequate regulation of such private operations. The 4-month 
interagency study concluded that a viable commercial EL V industry would add 
to the general economic vitality of the U.S. and provide the U.S. with a more 
robust space launch capability. More specifically, the following economic 
benefits were identified: 
- a commercial EL V industry would maintain a high technology industrial base 
- it would provide jobs for thousands of workers (and increase federal and state 
tax revenues!) 
68. Id. at 50. 
69. SIG (Space) was chaired by the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs; other 
members included the Deputy Secretaries of Defense, Commerce and State, Director of the 
CIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, the NASA Administrator and others. Its task was to provide a forum to all federal 
agencies for their policy views, to review and advise on proposed changes to national space 
policy, and to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space issues to the President for 
decisions as necessary, see Remarks on the completion of the Fourth mission of the Space 
Shuttle Columbia, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 869-875 (1982) Note the strong 
representation of national security interests). 
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- "each commercial launch conducted in the U.S., rather than by foreign 
competitors, would strengthen our economy and improve our international 
balance of payments." (emph. add.) 
- it would spawn numerous spinoffs and supporting activities and strenghten 
the U.S. position in a growing market. 
In addition to these general economic benefits, the study saw the advantages 
for both NASA and DOD of having a domestic backup for the shuttle at 
essentially no extra cost for the government. 
Not only would the private sector bear the cost of ELY production, but there 
would also be a market for U. S. government facilities and equipment that 
would otherwise be underutilized or no longer required. In summary, the 
report said, this partnership between the U.S. private sector and the 
government "will strengthen the U.S. space launch capability, develop a major 
new industry, contribute favorably to the U.S. economy and maintain U.S. 
leadership in space transportation. "70 
The result was a recommendation which found its way into a Presidential 
Directive on Commercialization of Expendable Launch Vehicles, of May 26 
1983, initiating a (transition-) period of uneasy competition between the infant 
private commercial launch industry's ELY's and NASA's space shuttle. The 
U.S. government fully endorsed and would facilitate the commercialization of 
ELY's through various measures, such as minimal regulatory constraints, and 
the availability of government launch ranges, facilities and services at prices 
"consistent with the goal of encouraging viable commercial ELY launch 
activities". The U.S. government would continue to make the space shuttle 
available for all authorized users, domestic and foreign, commercial and 
governmental. 71 In other words, the government would henceforth support 
two competing U.S. systems, one of which (see above emphasis) was also 
supposed to take on Arianespace, the European competitor which, in 1983, 
though having performed a limited number of successful launches, was seen 
as qualified and determined to firmly establish itself in the international 
commercial launch market. 72 The Directive also established a 'working group 
on commercial launch operations' within SIG (Space), including the FAA and 
FCC, with the task to (a) streamline the procedures used in the interim to 
implement existing licensing authority (b )develop and coordinate the 
requirements and process for the licensing, supervision, and/or regulations 
applicable to routine commercial launch operations from commercial ranges, 
and (c) recommend the appropriate lead agency within the U.S. government 
to be responsible for commercial launch activities. (Until final selection of the 
70. See Commercialization of expendable launch vehicles, NSDD 94, Announcement of United 
States government support for private sector commercial operations of expendable launch 
vehicles (May 16, 1983) 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 712-714, (721-722) hereinafter 
referred to as ELY Commercialization Directive, at 714 ('Background'). 
71. See id., at 712. 
72. See infra Chapter 3.4. 
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latter, the State Department would serve as the focal point for all relevant 
requests and applications). 73 After, what some commentators call "extensive 
and intense lobbying by interest groups in the private sector, by the Congress, 
and by the Administration itself" ,74 President Reagan, in November 1983, 
chose the Department of Transportation and not its main competitor the 
Department of Commerce as the lead agency. 75 
DOT Secretary Dole acted swiftly and, in the same month, the Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST or the Office) established within the 
Office of the Secretary, started to carry out its new responsibilities. It could 
immediately assist Starstruck Inc. , another private operator, in getting 
permission for the launch of its prototype Dolphin rocket from a Pacific Ocean 
platform. Though the same plethora of departments and agencies were 
involved, now OCST provided Starstruck with the single governmental contact 
point SSI did not have; as a result, the regulatory process for the former 
proved far less cumbersome than the latter had to endure. 76 In his State of 
the Union address of January 25, 1984, which was primarily devoted to the 
announcement of the space station project, President Reagan directed DOT to 
assist providers of EL V services in their dealings with the Federal 
GovernmenC7 and one month later, by Executive Order (E.O.), he formalized 
this new role of DOT and gave specific directions as to the (licensing) 
functions the Department would perform: 
73. See ELV Commercialization Directive, supra note 70, at 713. 
74. See George S. Robinson & Pamela L. Meredith, Domestic commercialization of space: the 
current political atmosphere in: American enterprise, the law and the commercial use of 
space 1-29 USA (1986) hereinafter referred to as Robinson & Meredith, at 3. For a review 
of some of the candidates, such as Commerce, FAA, State, NASA and DOD, see Webber 
1984, supra note 13, at 46-50. 
75. See DOT will be lead agency for expendable launch vehicles in space, Press release DOT 
98-83 of November 17, 1983. Secretary of Transport Dole was quoted as stating that "the 
objective [was] to try to create an environment as regulation-free as safely possible for 
private companies to supply the '[ELY's]' ... getting government out of the way of 
America's innovators and entrepreneurs ... We don't want the progress of this growth 
industry to be handicapped by t.l-te regulatory restraints that have restricted other 
transportation industries." Dole, in her last sentence, obviously referred to air transport 
which had suffered domestically, until deregulation in the mid-1970's, and continued to 
suffer internationally under excessive government interference. 
76. See Michael S. Straubel, The Commercial Space Launch Act: The regulation of private space 
transportation, 52 J. Air L. & Corn. 941-969 ( 1987), hereinafter referred to as Straubel 
1987, at 947; also Raclin, supra note 59, at 60-61, where the author notes that OCST, in its 
coordinating role, worked with the agencies that reviewed Starstruck's request to set 
priorities, coordinated their activities, and expedited the licensing process. "For example, 
when Starstruck encountered difficulties with local officials who objected to Starstruck's 
proposed method of transporting its vehicle to the launch site, OCST worked with the 
Materials Transportation Board and the U.S. Coast Guard to alleviate the concerns of these 
officials." 
77. See 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 61. 
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" ... The Secretary of Transportation shall ... perform the following functions: 
(a) act as a focal point within the Federal government for private sector space launch 
contacts related to commercial EL V operations; 
(b) promote and encourage commercial ELV operations in the same manner that other 
private United States commercial enterprises are promoted by United States agencies; 
(c) provide leadership in the establishment, within affected departments and agencies, of 
procedures that expedite the processing of private sector requests to obtain licenses 
necessary for commercial EL V launches and the establishment and operation of commercial 
launch ranges; 
(d) consult with other affected agencies to promote consistent application of EL V licensing 
requirements for the private sector and assure fair and equitable treatment for all private 
sector applicants; 
(e) serve as a single point of contact for collection and dissemination of documentation 
related to commercial EL V licensing applications; 
(t) make recommendations to affected agencies and, as appropriate, to the President, 
concerning administrative measures to streamline Federal government procedures for 
licensing of commercial EL V activities; 
(g) identify Federal statutes, treaties, regulations and policies, which may have an adverse 
impact on EL V commercialization efforts and recommend appropriate changed to affected 
agencies and, as appropriaten to the President; and 
(h) conduct appropriate planning regarding long-term effects of Federal activities related 
to EL V commercialization. "78 
The powers thus granted to the DOT Secretary did not diminish or abrogate 
any statutory or operational authority exercised by other Federal agencies. So 
the FCC remained responsible for radio frequency assignments, DOD for 
national security and the State Department for foreign policy aspects, and 
NASA and USAF for the use of their launch ranges, where appropriate. But 
the agencies concerned were ordered to assist the DOT in carrying out its 
above tasks by providing information on their own regulatory actions in this 
field, by eliminating unnecessary regulation, by efficiently administering the 
remaining essential regulations and procedures, and by expeditiously handling 
their side of the licensing process. 79 According to its first Director the 
primary goal of OCST was to establish an efficient regulatory framework 
which addressed public safety needs as well as foreign policy and national 
78. See Sec. 2, Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle Activities, Executive Order 12465 of 
February 24, 1984, 49 FR 721, herinafter referred to as ELV Executive Order. In his 
remarks on signing the executive order, President Reagan declared that "[u]ntil today, 
private industries interested in ELV's have had to deal with 17 Government agancies. From 
now on, they'll only get in touch with the [DOT], and the Department will clear away what 
Secretary Dole has called "the thicket of clearances, licenses, and regulations that keep 
industrial space vehicles tethered to their pads." With Elizabeth and her team in charge, 
private enterprises interested in space won't see red tape; they'll see blue sky." 20 Weekly 
Comp. Pres. Doe. 263 (Feb. 24, 1984), reprinted in Gorove US Space Law, supra note 55. 
79. See Sec. 4 of the ELV Executive Order, supra note 78. 
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security safeguards, while at the same time providing predictability for the 
industry without stifling it. 
In fact, in the view of that official, the problem was not so much the 
coordination of the other agencies involved, but the almost complete absence 
of government processes designed to address the wide range of issues and 
unique needs of private sector ELV launches. 80 
To assist the DOT in the performance of it new responsibilities, the above 
Executive Order also established an interagency working group chaired by the 
Secretary of DOT and composed of representatives from the Departments of 
State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission 
and NASA. Apart from that working group the Department itself, in 1984, 
established the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, 
COMSTAC, to provide information, advice and recommendations to the 
Secretary on matters relating to all aspects of the commercialization of 
ELV's. 81 
COMSTAC's membership reflected the scope of its activities: its up to 25 
members were appointed after consultations with government agencies, 
industry and business organizations, the scientific community and public 
interest groups. In practice, executives from the private launch industry and 
the satellite manufacturers as well as representatives of the financial and 
insurance community would provide the much-needed high level expert advice, 
both in the full committee and in specific working groups established later, 
such as the Technology and Innovation Working Group and the International 
Competition Working Group. 82 
80. See Steptoe 1984, supra note 60 at 194. The above 'official' position of DOT (not to be 
overly worried about its coordinating task amidst the multitude of government agencies and 
thus not to aim for a DOT role as a single regulatory agency implementing a single set of 
all-encompassing regulations) met with criticism as this advisory or at most coordinating and 
facilitating role would not decrease interdepartmental jealousies and conflicts, and would 
stand in the way of an effective "one stop shopping" procedure as envisaged by the 
Secretary, see Webber 1984, supra note 13, at 52-53. 
81. To that end, COMSTAC was authorized to: "A.Undertake such information gathering 
activities as necessary to define issues for consideration by the Committee, develop positions 
on those issues, and communicate the Committee's position thereon to the Secretary of 
Transportation. B. Evaluate economic, technological, and institutional developments relating 
to commercial space transportation and communicate to the Secretary recommendations on 
promising new ideas and approaches for Federal policies and programs. C. Serve as a forum 
for the discussion of problems involving the relationship between industry activities and 
government requirements. Seek, where possible, to resolve such problems without resort to 
formal Departmental intervention", Establishment of Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Committee, Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Notice No. 84-
5, 49 FR 14621 (Apr 12, 1984). 
82. One of the first chairmen of Comstac, for instance, was Steven D Dorfman, President & 
CEO, Hughes Space & Communications Company. 
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2.2.2 The responsibilities of DOT under the Commercial Space Launch Act 
of 1984 
By January 1983 the U.S. Congress, and more specifically the House of 
Representatives' Committee on Science and Technology and its Subcommittee 
on Space Science and Applications, had shown a keen interest in an orderly 
commercialization of ELV's. Draft legislation introduced in that month 
provided for the designation of Commerce as the lead agency with the 
responsibility to issue commercial launch licenses and to oversee and promote 
such operations. Both the private sector interest at the time (SSI!) and the 
apparent absence of a proper regulatory framework were matters that, 
Congress felt, had to be addressed. 
Though the Committee was therefore happy with the Presidential directives 
as laid down in the E.O. of 1983, it saw this measure only as a beginning as, 
in its view, and following hearings, study and analysis, the simple 
administrative designation of a lead agency could prove inadequate since its 
responsibilities would not be underpinned by legislative authority. The result, 
it was felt, could inhibit decisionmaking and interagency coordination and 
allow the existing inefficient approaches to commercial launch approvals to 
persist. Put differently, to leave the future of this industry to Presidential 
policies was tantamount to creating only temporary regulatory certainties, an 
unacceptable oxymoron for an infant industry. Hence, the determined 
Congressional efforts in 1983 and 1984 to draft legislation which would 
"facilitate the establishment of a stable regulatory climate, reducing uncertainty 
and investment risk". 83 The result of this legislative work was the 
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, which made the Secretary of 
Transportation responsible for carrying out the Act, with the specific task to 
" ... (1) encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches by the private sector; 
and (2) consult with other agencies to provide consistent application of licensing 
requirements under this Act and to ensure fair and equitable treatment for all license 
applicants. "84 
It is important to note at the outset that the Committee, under the heading 
"Findings" in the Act, declared that the private launching services, which were 
the (only) subject of the Act, would complement the available government 
launch services, thereby accepting the primary role of the space shuttle. Also, 
the Committee found that the development of commercial launch services 
83. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Report 98-816 (to accompany H.R. 3942), House 
Comm. On Science and Teclmology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 31, 1984), hereinafter 
referred to as House Launch Act Report. 
84. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. 98-575, 49 U.S.C. 2601-2623 (Oct 30, 1984), 
hereinafter referred to as CSLA or the Act (of 1984) at Sec.5 (2604(a). The Act was 
subsequently codified as 49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701 "Commercial Space Launch 
Activities". 
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would enable the U.S. to retain its competitive position internationally, a clear 
reference to both existing (Arianespace) and future (Russian, Chinese and 
Japanese) launch competitors and the role which ELY's in particular were 
supposed to play in this respect. 85 
Not surprisingly, Congress found that the provision of launch services by the 
private sector as such served U.S. national security and foreign policy 
interests: after all, it meant a further guarantee of 'assured access to space', 
for both military and civil space programs, with strategic gains in both fields 
vis-a-vis other countries. 
Important for the interpretation and application of the Act and its ensuing 
regulations were the pro-industry, pro-deregulation concepts included in the 
final paragraphs of the findings: 
"(6) provision of launch services by the private sector ... would be facilitated by stable, 
minimal, and appropriate regulatory guidelines that are fairly and expeditiously applied; 
and 
(7) the [U.S.] should encourage private sector launches and associated services and, only 
to the extent necessary, regulate such launches and services in order to ensure compliance 
with international obligations of the [U .S.] and to provide for the national security, foreign 
policy, and public safety interests of the [U.S.]. "86 
The 'core' provisions of the Act are contained in Sec.6 (2605), which 
establishes the requirement of a DOT license for private space launch 
operations, i.e. a launch authorization and a - separate- payload 'approval' 
regime: 
(a)(l) No person shall launch a launch vehicle or operate a launch site within the [U.S.] 
unless authorized by a license issued or transferred under this Act. 
(b)(l) The holder of a launch license under this Act shall not launch a payload unless that 
payload complies with all requirements of Federal law that relate to the launch of a payload. 
The Secretary shall ascertain whether any license, authorization, or other permit required 
by Federal law for a payload which is to be launched has been obtained. 
(2) If no payload license, authorization, or permit is required by any Federal law, the 
Secretary may take such action under this Act as the Secretary deems necessary to prevent 
the launch of a pay load by a holder of a license under this Act if the Secretary determines 
that the launch of such payload would jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of 
property or any national security interest or foreign policy interest of the [U.S.]. 
85. The Committee in its Report, under the heading "[n]eed for legislation", anticipated "that 
world market demand for launch services will increase and that expansion of U.S. 
commercial launch services is desirable to enhance domestic economic activity and U.S. 
competitiveness in capturing the space launch market.", see House Launch Act Report, 
supra note 83, at 8. 
86. See Sec.2 (2601) of the Act. 
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(c)(1) Except as provided in this Act, no person shall be required to obtain from any agency 
a licence, approval, waiver, or exemption for the launch of a launch vehicle or the operation 
of a launch site. 
(2) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority of the Federal Communications Commission 
under the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.151 et seq.) or the authority of the 
Secretary of Commerce under the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 
(15 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.). 
The distinction between launch authority, i.e. permission to operate the launch 
vehicle, which is the Secretary's exclusive authority, and a payload license or 
authority which, in most cases, will be a matter of other agencies concerned, 
was made because, in cases where a complete (i.e. including review of public 
interest, foreign policy and national security concerns) and effective regulatory 
process with respect to specific satellites already existed, a duplicative process 
exercised by DOT would be unnecessary and unjustified. Hence the above 
exceptions for communications and remote sensing satellites: an FCC or DOC-
NOAA license would thus not be further reviewed by DOT, other than to 
assure the proper integration of the respective payload with the launch vehicle 
and its launch into orbit. 87 For all other satellites/pay loads DOT, in the view 
of the Committee, would perform a function analogous to that performed by 
NASA in overseeing payloads carried on the space shuttle. This includes a 
procedure to ensure safety to the launch vehicle, and an evaluation, in 
consultation with the Department of State and DOD, of the mission purpose 
of a payload to ascertain foreign policy and national security implications 
respectively. The latter DOT task is specifically dealt with in the Act, in a 
provision which appears to leave the final determination in such matters to the 
expert departments concerned. 88 
National security or foreign policy considerations may also cause the DOT 
Secretary to suspend or revoke a license issued under the Act or to terminate, 
prohibit or suspend immediately an actual launch. Although the roles of State 
or DOD in respect of such decisions have not been addressed in the Act, it 
must be assumed that these actions would, in practice, be taken on the 
initiative of one of (or both) the departments concerned or following a 
Presidential decision. 89 A few known instances of such cases, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, support that assumption. They also show that the 
national security /foreign policy criteria applied to all stages of the decision 
making process, though not a new phenomenon (NASA and its space shuttle 
clients could not escape this test either), introduced an element of uncertainty 
and unpredictability, which private enterprise, working in a competitive 
87. See House Launch Act Report, supra note 83, at 19. 
88. See Sec. 20 (2619) of the Act. 
89. See Sec.10 and 11 (2609 & 2610 resp.) of the Act. For the licensee or license applicant thus 
affected, Sec.12 (2611) provides for both administrative and judicial review. 
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environment, was particularly allergic to. And the ELV industry and its clients 
would make their views abundantly clear!90 
The OCST Licensing regulations 
A number of articles in the Act presuppose or explicitly refer to more specific 
regulations governing the various aspects of the licensing process, and detailing 
the right and obligations of the parties concerned. 91 Soon after the signing 
into law of the Act, DOT announced a licensing policy, which, pending the 
release of more definitive regulations, outlined the major components of the 
launch license required by the Act and described the Federal interagency 
process for evaluating license applications. The two were clearly interrelated, 
for, as DOT explained, its experience in assisting a launch applicant to obtain 
Federal approval for its first launch from a site in the Pacific Ocean (i.e. 
Starstruck Corporation's second launch) "amply demonstrated that the very 
nature of the consultative approach to licensing [i.e. relying on the existing 
expertise and specialized policy perspective of other Federal agencies] creates 
a compelling need for a carefully structured and effectively coordinated 
licensing process. "92 The above DOT Policy Statement, following the purpose 
and system of the Act, divided the licensing process into two distinct 
components: a Mission Review and a Launch Safety Review, and gave details 
on the aspects that would be addressed in each case, before mission approval 
and launch safety approval would be granted. These approvals formed the basis 
for the issuance of the Launch License, incorporating such conditions as 
adherence to applicable range safety requirements, airspace restrictions, third 
party liability insurance levels and federal inspection, verification and 
enforcement requirements. The DOT policy on interagency consultation in the 
same document outlined the Department's views on the way it would fulfill 
its statutory role as a focal point for launch licensing amongst all Federal 
agencies concerned. One of its main tasks, derived from the Act and 
90. When discussion took place on the scope and contents of the implementing regulations (see 
infra), concern to that effect was expressed through COMSTAC. DOT, in its reaction, 
stressed that one of OCST's major goals had been to encourage and promote the industry 
through carefully considered policies and procedures designed to eliminate, wherever 
possible, regulatory uncertainties, and concluded: "[t]hus, the Office wishes to emphasize 
that it views the exercise of this authority as an extraordinary measure to be relied upon in 
truly emergency circumstances." See 14 CFR Ch.III Commercial space transportation; 
licensing regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 6870 (Feb 26, 1986), hereinafter referred to as (OCST) 
Interim Regulations, Supplementary information, Section-by-section analysis, ad Part 405. 
The industry, although possibly to some extent reassured, would probably have preferred a 
joint statement of the three departments concerned. 
91. See Sec. 7 (2606), 9 (2608) and 13 (2612) of the Act. 
92. See Commercial space transportation; licensing process for commercial space launch 
activities, notice of policy and request for comments, DOT, Office of the Secretary, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 7714 (Feb. 25, 1985), hereinafter referred to as DOT Policy Statement. 
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highlighted by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, was to review the requirements of existing applicable laws and 
determine, in consultation with the appropriate agencies, 
"whether any requirement of Federal law that would otherwise apply to such activities is 
not necessary to protect public health and safety, the safety of property, and national 
security and foreign policy interests of the United States, and to eliminate, by regulation, 
such requirements as a requirement for a license under the Act." 
In other words, it was to streamline the licensing process and to eliminate any 
duplicative or unnecessary requirements for the launch of a launch vehicle or 
the operation of a launch site. DOT promised in this connection to eliminate, 
wherever possible, the timeconsuming sequential reviews which characterized 
the experience of private launch applicants before passage of the Act, to 
specify, in consultation with each agency involved, the scope of that agency's 
review, to notify the applicant concerning the agencies to which the application 
had been forwarded, and to keep the applicant informed of the progress of the 
review93 DOT did indeed live up to its promise: in early 1985, OCST 
referred a request of SSI for approval to launch a series of payloads 
(containing cremated human remains or "cremains") to DOD, State 
Department and NASA for mission review, with each agency being directed 
to address specific issues in its own review. OCST remained in control of the 
process and was SSI' s only point of contact. In remarkable contrast to previous 
cases, SSI received a favourable response on its request from OCST in just 
40 days. 94 The Act required the Secretary to issue regulations implementing 
the provisions of the Act. DOT regarded the above Policy as only the 
foundation for a more detailed regulatory structure to come, and promised 
further regulatory documents on areas of priority, such as launch license 
regulations (containing the more specific regulatory requirements), insurance 
regulations (detailing the Department's role in establishing third party liability 
insurance requirements) and national range use (informing the private launch 
operators on available government launch range facilities, including costs of 
service and special requirements, on the understanding that the regulation of 
the use of private launch sites - "unchartered waters in terms of both 
93. See DOT Policy Statement, supra note 92, at paras. 5.A and B. 
94. See Raclin, supra note 59, at 61-62. According to the author, DOD was asked to determine 
whether the launches would conflict with any existing [military] space program, the State 
Dept was instructed to evaluate the foreign policy implications, and NASA was asked to 
ensure that the proposed orbit would not interfere with any existing or proposed [civil] space 
program. The proposal, to launch 60 domestic and foreign payloads over a 10-year period, 
apparently did not raise any concerns on the part of the above agencies. But the State of 
Florida, home of the morticians whose idea it was, blocked the effort because, according to 
state Jaw, a cemetery had to be connected by road to the municipal area it served!, see 
Lilian M. Trippett, Legislative initiatives to encourage private activity, 4 (1) J.L. & Tech 
49-57 (1989) hereinafter referred to as Trippett, at 49. 
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Government and industry experience" - would be the subject of further 
evaluation). 95 
The (OCST) Interim Regulations which were promulgated in February1986 
gave the promised detailed policies, procedures, standards and requirements 
for launch license applications. 96 Though formally still of a temporary 
character, these regulations and the policies and procedures articulated therein 
provided the necessary guidance to the launch industry for the years to come 
and were generally supported by all concerned. 97 
Some of these policies and procedures will be reviewed hereafter, in order to 
illustrate the regulatory environment in which the U.S. ELV industry had to 
work. 
The Interim Regulations took from the Act and from the DOT Policy Statement 
the distinction between Mission review and approval and Safety review and 
approval. 
The Mission Review focuses on such factors as the purpose and character of 
the proposed launch, the nature of the payload and the impact of the launch 
or payload on existing uses of space. This review is intended as the mechanism 
for addressing the U.S.' international obligations under, for instance, the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention (see infra), as well as national 
security and foreign policy implications of a launch. This review would 
determine whether the payload interfered with other spacecraft or endangered 
other nations or (otherwise) would conflict with vital national interests. The 
review, by its nature, would involve close consultation with the Departments 
of State and Defense, and possibly NASA and other agencies, as appropriate. 
As indicated above, where another agency was in charge of licensing, such as 
the FCC for U.S. communications satellites and Commerce (NOAA) for U.S. 
remote sensing satellites, DOT would simply accept those licenses as satisfying 
the requirements of mission review pertaining to the payload. 98 
95. See DOT Policy Statement, supra note 92, at para. 6. 
96. See (OCST) Interim Regulations, supra note 90. 
97. See Commercial space transportation; licensing regulations, 14 CFR Ch. !!!, OCST, DOT 
(Docket No. 43810), Final rule (April 4, 1988), hereinafter referred to as the OCST 
Licensing Regulations, Supplementary information, 'Comments on the Interim Regulations'. 
98. The Office received 22 comments on the DOT Policy Statement, 14 submitted by private 
individuals, three from launch companies, two from trade associations, one from a rocket 
motor manufacturer, one from a Federal agency and one from a trade newsletter. Most 
comments addressed the Mission Review, and more in particular the vagueness of the 
recurring phrase (in the Act) "national security interests and foreign policy interests", the 
possibility that an agency (NASA?) could misuse the interagency review process to protect 
its own commercial space activities, or that routine launches would (still) be subject to 
separate repetitive payload reviews. DOT's response was basically the same in each case: 
don't worry, the spirit of the Act is to have as little regulatory interference and as much 
predictability and certainty for private industry as possible, see (OCST) Interim Regulations, 
supra note 90, Supplementary information, ("comments on the policy statement"). 
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Part 411. 7(a) of the Interim Regulations reflects the pro-approval presumption 
already embodied in the Act and confirmed by Congress (i.e. private 
commercial launches are, as a general matter, consistent with U.S. national 
security and foreign policy interests): 
"Mission approval will be granted absent clear evidence that some aspect of the proposed 
launch poses a threat to distinct U .S. national security or foreign policy interests, constitutes 
a hazard to public health and safety or safety of property, or is inconsistent with 
international obligations of the United States." 
As indicated above, each Federal agency reviews its own payload, and OCST 
will not duplicate the substance of such reviews but only ascertain that it has 
indeed taken place. Foreign telecommunications or remote sensing 
satellites/pay loads will be reviewed by OCST, in consultation with DOD and 
State. For foreign or domestic payloads not covered by any existing Federal 
regulatory regime OCST will perform a full review itself, in consultation with 
other appropriate Federal agencies. 
The (Launch) Safety Review is a technical review which focuses only on an 
applicant's proposed safety operations. The Office noted that, both at the time 
of the announcement of the DOT Policy Statement (early 1985) and when the 
Interim Regulations were established (early 1986), the only published safety 
standards or requirements in force were those applicable to safety operations 
conducted at Federal (i.e. NASA and Air Force operated) launch ranges. (As 
the launch vehicle operator must obtain a launch safety approval from the 
range operator, OCST, in order to avoid confusion renamed its own review 
Safety Review). No such standards existed yet for private launch ranges. The 
Act, also for that reason, encouraged the use of established Federal launch 
ranges. It simplified the safety review to the extent that the safety requirements 
imposed by the range operator were supposed to cover all launch site related 
safety concerns OCST might have. To determine the level of safety in case of 
the use of a private launch site, the Office would request detailed information 
on such matters as site location, operating procedures, personnel and 
equipment, and rely heavily on the expertise available within NASA and 
USAF. 99 
99. See Part 411.5 and 415.11-19, Interim Regulations, supra note 90. 
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2. 2. 2.1 Liability and Insurance 
Traditionally, the State Department's foreign policy concerns would include 
the question of adherence to the bilateral and multilateral treaties to which the 
U. S. is a party. In the early stages of the space effort, as we saw in the first 
paragraph of this Chapter, this also involved such selection of experimental 
space projects as would support - or at least not endanger - the adoption of the 
concept of freedom of outer space, including the freedom of 'overflight', by 
the community of states, preferably through the U.N., and more in particular 
by the Soviet Union. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, drafted and finalized 
by the (Legal Subcommittee of the) United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) now contains that basic concept. 100 The 
Treaty also provides for 'State responsibility' and 'State liability' .The first 
concept was a compromise between two conflicting politico-legal philosophies, 
the U.S. approach to space exploration as an activity that may also (or even 
primarily) be undertaken by private enterprise and the Soviet view that the use 
of space should not be perverted by capitalist practices and space activities 
should thus remain a State's prerogative only. With the establishment of 
Comsat Corporation in August 1962, U.S. private enterprise had 'entered' 
outer space, so for the U.S. the Soviet view was, also from a practical point 
of view, not an acceptable proposition. The compromise, i.e. private space 
activities are permitted, but subject to "authorization and continuing 
supervision by the appropriate State party to the Treaty", made the State 
responsible for the proper behaviour, i.e. behaviour in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty, of the individual or company concerned. 101 
By virtue of this provision, U.S. government supervision of ELV operations 
was called for: the Commercial Space Launch Act and its ensuing regulations 
give the DOT the power, in consultation with State, to ensure that the 
100. See art. 1, "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality 
and in accordance with international law ... ", and art. 2, "Outer space ... is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.", Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and 
use of outer space, including t.~e moon and other celectial bodies, signed at Washington, 
London and Moscow on January 27, 1967, ratified by the U.S. May 24, 1967, proclaimed 
by the US President October 10, 1967, e.i.f. October 10, 1967, 18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347. 
101. See full text of art.VI of the Outer Space Treaty: "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear 
international responsibility for for national activities in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by govermnental agencies or by 
non-govermnental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in 
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-
govermnental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. 
When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be 
borne by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating 
in such organization." 
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Government's obligations under the Outer Space Treaty are met. 102 Hence 
the Act's broad jurisdiction which requires a launch license of every person 
who launches a launch vehicle or operates a launch site within the U.S. and 
of every U.S. citizen launching or operating a launch site outside the U.S. 103 
Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty made a state that launches or procures 
the launching of an object into outer space and each state from whose territory 
or facility an object is launched internationally liable for damage caused 
therewith to another party or to its natural or juridical persons. 104 In other 
words a private ELV launch from U.S. territory, causing damage to another 
state or its nationals would make the U.S. liable. 
The question of liability for space launch damage was addressed in more detail 
in a special Space Liability Convention, also drafted and finalized by 
UNCOPUOS, which became effective in 1972. 105 The core provision of that 
Convention, creating state liability (also) for private launch activities from a 
state's territory or facility, led the drafts men of the Commercial Space Launch 
Act to introduce a provision requiring licensees under the Act to have liability 
insurance in an amount determined by the Secretary which would be sufficient 
to satisfy possible obligations of the U.S. under the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Space Liability Convention. 106 
102. This is not to say that, prior to the enactment of the CSLA, such "continuing supervision" 
was absent: as we saw above, various departments, including the State Department, felt 
authorized to review private launch operations and did so in practice. The CSLA streamlined 
the process and put this role into the hands of one department. 
103. See Sec. 6 (2605); U.S. citizen is defmed as follows: "(A) Any individual who is a citizen 
of the [U.S.]; (B) any corporation partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity 
organized or existing under the laws of the [U.S.] or any State; and (C) any corporation, 
partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity which is organized or exists under the 
laws of a foreign nation, if the controlling interest (as defined by the Secretary in 
regulations) in such entity is held by an individual or entity as described in subparagraph (A) 
or (B)", see Sec.4 (11) (2603)(11), redesignated (12) in 1988 by virtue of the Conunercial 
Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.100-657, Nov. 15, 1988, 102 Stat. 3900, 
hereinafter referred to as CSLA Amendments 1988, Sec 3(2), (3)). 
104. Art. VII; the full text reads as follows: "Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or 
procures t.'Je launching of an object illto outer space, including t.IIe moon and ot.her celestial 
bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is 
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or 
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies". 
105. See Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects, signed at 
Washington, London and Moscow March 29, 1972, ratified by the U.S. May 18, 1973, 
proclaimed by the US President November 21, 1973, e.i.f. October 9, 1973, 24 UST 2389; 
TIAS 7762. 
106. See Sec. 16 (2615), which reads in full: "Each person who launches a launch vehicle or 
operates a launch site under a license issued or transferred under this Act shall have in effect 
liability insurance at least in such amount as is considered by the Secretary to be necessary 
for such launch or operation, considering the international obligations of the [US]. The 
Secretary shall prescribe such amount after consultation with the Attorney General and other 
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The DOT Launch Policy of 1985 translated the above provision into a 
condition included in any launch license issued which would determine the 
required level of third party liability insurance. An Insurance Regulation 
providing guidance on the Department's role in establishing such third party 
liability insurance requirements was to be developed and published shortly. 
DOT, in the same year, made some suggestions to that effect, inter alia on 
methods to assess the appropriate level of insurance, and requested comments 
thereon. 107 One of the methods DOT submitted was that the launch firm 
would purchase the maximum level of insurance commercially available at 
reasonable rates. The second method would set an appropriate level based upon 
an analysis of the risks of the launch. As one author observes, either method 
had its downside: the maximum level method would not necessarily produce 
an adequate coverage or one at a too high price, whereas the risk analysis 
method would be difficult to apply in case of new firms or new technology 
entering the market. 108 In this connection it is important to recall that the 
Space Liability Convention adopted the -'victim- oriented' - concept of absolute 
and unlimited launching state liability for damage caused to third parties on 
the ground or to aircraft in flight. 109 The potential exposure of the launching 
state, launch firm and insurance firm could therefore be of nightmarish 
proportions. The Government was understandably inclined to shift this burden 
to private enterprise by requesting the launch firm to purchase adequate 
commercial insurance naming apart from the purchaser also the U. S. 
Government as beneficiary of the policy. On the other hand, exposing the 
infant commercial EL V industry accustomed, in the role of government 
contractors, to government protection against such hazards to the cold wind 
of unlimited liability or sky-high insurance premiums could hardly be 
reconciled with the lofty ELV privatization/commercialization principles of 
both the President and Congress. 
The space insurance industry's experience with launch activities until the mid-
1980s was at the same time far from encouraging, partly because of the novelty 
appropriate agencies." This provision should be distinguished from Sec. 15. (c) (2614.(c)) 
which deals wit.l: liability insurance in con11ection with the use of government property, e.g. 
a Government launch site, services and/or personnel: "The Secretary may establish 
requirements for liability insurance, hold harmless agreements, proof of fmancial 
responsibility, and such other assurances as may be needed to protect the [US] and its 
agencies and personnel from liability, loss, or injury as a result of a launch or operation of a 
launch site involving Government facilities or personnel". 
107. On May 7, 1985, DOT issued the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ANPRM, 
Commercial space transponation; third party liability insurance for commercial space launch 
activities; requests for public comment, 50 Fed. Reg. 19280 (May 7, 1985). 
108. See Raclin, supra note 59, at 60. 
109. See, for a detailed study of the (background and meaning of the) Space Liability 
Convention, H. Peter van Fenema, The 1972 Convention on international liability for 




and therefore the unpredictability of the risks attached to launching, partly 
because of the very limited number of insured launches, 110 and thus also a 
thin spreading of the risks, and of course mainly because of the high failure 
rate itself. One satellite manufacturer's analysis put the total revenue in launch 
insurance for the period 1977-1985 at USD 450 million and the total of claims 
paidatUSD900million, a so-called 'ratio' of200%. For 1984-1985, the loss 
ratio was even 330%. 111 Though none of these launch failures resulted in 
claims from third parties, their occurrence had an understandable effect on 
both the level of insurance available and the premiums charged. 
For commercial launches on the shuttle, NASA required its customers to 
purchase USD 500 million of third party liability insurance for any single 
payload (and a joint maximum of USD 750 million, paid for proportionally 
by all customers, in case of multiple pay loads on one shuttle flight) and include 
the Government as named insured in the policy at no cost. In return, NASA 
indemnified the user (i.e. covered the cost of damages) above that leve/. 112 
110. In the insurance industry, large numbers of events are needed to increase the statistical 
validity of predictions. In space launches, the numbers were rather insignificant, thus 
making it very difficult to accurately measure risks per launch vehicle. One industry expert 
called for some 600 flights per type of launch vehicle. In reality, these numbers were 
substantially less: between 1960 and 1988, the Delta vehicle was used 182 times, of which 
only 48 times in the last 10 years (with changing technology and power through the years); 
in 1988, the Ariane had flown 24 times, 4 of which ended in failure. The risks connected 
with this small number of events was moreover shared by a very limited number of 
insurance companies, see Insurance and the U.S. commercial space launch industry, Report 
100-112, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (July 1988) hereinafter referred to as Senate launch insurance report 1988, at 7-8. 
111. See id. at 9-10. The ratio in 1982 was 120%; 1983 was a successful year for satellite 
launches, but 1984 a bad one: the underwriters' combined ratio went from 90% (i.e. a 10% 
profit) at the beginning of 1984 to 180% (i.e. a loss of 80%) by June 1984: During a 1984 
shuttle launch two satellites (Indonesia's Palapa 2-B and Western Union's Westar VI) were 
not placed into correct orbits. Although they were later recovered during another space 
shuttle mission and sold to another user, the insurer had to pay a total of USD 182 million 
in claims. The failure of an Atlas-Centaur launch in June 1984 resulted in the loss of an 
Intelsat V satellite worth USD 102 million. Insurance premiums for a shuttle launch rose 
from 5-7% of tl1e value of the satellite in 1983 to 15-20% in June 1984. And in 1985, five 
more satellites were destroyed as a result of launch failures, costing the insurers a further 
USD 370 million. The year 1986 was catastrophic: in January the space shuttle Challenger 
exploded, killing the seven member crew. And in the months thereafter a US Titan, a US 
Delta and an Ariane launch vehicle failed, all resulting in the loss of the payloads: the 
combined ratio reached 148% and "satellite underwriters lost total confidence in satellite 
launches", see ibid. Premiums for launch insurance, still 5% in 1979 reached 30% in 1986, 
id., at 5. 
112. An amendment to the NASA Act, effective October 1, 1979 added a new Sec. 308, entitled 
Insurance and indemnification, which read as follows: "(a) The Administration is authorized 
on such terms and to the extent it may deem appropriate to provide liability insurance for 
any user of a space vehicle to compensate all or a portion of claims by third parties for 
death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property resulting from activities carried on in 
connection with the launch, operations or recovery of a space vehicle ... 
70 
United States Jaw, policies and practices 
The U.S. private launch companies, for each license application, had to await 
the examination of their 'case' by DOT, which would determine the amount 
of risk to the public associated with the launch and the corresponding insurance 
requirements. Launch companies could then decide on the extent of the 
remaining exposure (on the basis of their own perception of the risks) and buy 
insurance above the level required by DOT, to protect their assets in the event 
of losses above the risk as defined by DOT. The problem for these companies 
was that, although the risk of a catastrophic accident was small, "one such 
accident could wipe out their company and thus they would be "betting the 
company" with each commercial launch". 113 In all these cases, it was entirely 
possible that the insurance required by DOT or the additional insurance found 
necessary by the company would simply not be available or too expensive, thus 
effectively grounding the vehicle. 
Understandably, the private companies referred to the above NASA policy as 
a sensible approach to their problems. They also pointed at Arianespace, active 
in the commercial launch market on behalf of Europe since the Ariane maiden 
flight of December 1979. The French government, from the start, provided 
third party liability coverage for any claims over 400 million French francs 
(equivalent to about USD 70 million in the mid-1980s), a level based on 
NASA's third party liability insurance requirement for ELV launches in the 
1970s. 114 The launch industry maintained that without a similar U.S. 
Government policy applying to ELV launches it would be difficult for them 
to compete with either the shuttle or the foreign launch provider. 
All NASA's launch services agreements, whether involving the use of the 
space shuttle or an ELV, also contain a cross-waiver of liability, first 
developed to facilitate multi-client use of the shuttle and to simplify the 
allocation of risk. Each participant in the launch (project) agrees not to sue any 
other participant in the same launch for damage or loss of property that might 
occur. This provision effectively takes away the need for insurance against 
claims for damage caused by a party to the launch to any other party involved 
(b) Under such regulations in conformity with this section as the Administrator shall 
prescribe taking into account the availability, cost and terms of liability insurance, any 
agreement between the Administration and a user of a space vehicle may provide that the 
[US] will indemnify the user against claims (including reasonable expenses of litigation or 
settlement) by third parties for death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property 
resulting from activities carried on in connection with the launch, operations or recovery of 
a space vehicle, but only to the extent that such claims are not compensated by liability 
insurance of the user ... ", see National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, 
reprinted in Space law and related documents: International space law documents, U.S. 
space law documents, S. Print 101-98, Senate Committee on Comm., Science and Transp., 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 1990), hereinafter referred to as Space law and related does 
1990 at 445-471. 
113. See Senate launch insurance report 1988, supra note 110, at 11. 
114. The insurance level NASA required was USD 100 million, which at the time converted to 
400 million francs: See id., at 15). 
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in the same launch. That saves money, but it also reduces uncertainty. With 
the largest class of potential claims eliminated, each party may proceed 
unburdened by the concern that other involved parties may bring claims against 
it, not without importance, particularly for private companies whose Directors 
(or lawyers) might otherwise object to assumption of large but undefined and 
unlimited contingent liabilities, or, depending on the novelty of the activity 
might be faced with prohibitive insurance costs. 115 
Liability/insurance and the use of government launch facilities 
One of the issues DOT addressed at the outset was the use by private launch 
operators of government launch facilities, such as Cape Canaveral or 
Vandenberg Air Force Base. The rules and procedures of both NASA and the 
USAF had been devised to regulate government launches and now needed 
adaptation to meet the requirements and problems connected with private use. 
So OCST and USAF in 1984 reviewed existing policies, procedures and 
processes affecting the cost and commercial use of the respective national 
ranges. 116 
The Act required the Secretary "to facilitate and encourage the acquisition (by 
lease, sale, transaction in lieu of sale, or otherwise) by the private sector of 
launch property of the [U.S.] which is excess or is otherwise not needed for 
public use and of launch services, including utilities, of the [U.S.] which are 
otherwise not needed for public use. "117 
A point, raised by the launch industry in this connection, was the less than 
accommodating way in which NASA and DOD in practice handled the 
industry's use of the government launch sites and facilities. Where the Act 
encouraged the use of such government facilities, the OCST Interim 
Regulations confirmed the authority of the agencies in charge of those facilities 
to set their own safety-related conditions: 
"All launch licenses issued under these circumstances will be conditioned by the 
requirements that the applicant : (1) comply with all applicable safety requirements and 
procedures of the range or launch site in question and (2) inform the Office of and obtain 
approval for any planned or proposed deviations from or alternatives to such requirements 
or procedures. " 118 
115. See Edward A. Frankle, NASA, Statement before the Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology, and Space, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
(Mar 5, 1998), hereinafter referred to as Frankle 1998, at 3 <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/ 
office/legaff/frankle3-5 .html >. 
116. See Steptoe 1984, supra note 60, at 194-195. 
117. See Sec 15 (a) (2614 (a). 
118. See Sec. 411.5, Interim Regulations, supra note 90. 
72 
United States law, policies and practices 
The agencies concerned, not particularly interested in pleasing the EL V 
industry (which had no alternatives anyhow), imposed detailed insurance 
requirements and far reaching obligations on the industry to indemnify the 
government for losses arising from the conduct of launch operations. By virtue 
of the above regulation, these requirements became part of the launch license 
conditions. It took a long time before even standard conditions were developed 
which gave some predictability as to the requirements imposed by the 
government launch operators. And when these were finally published they 
confirmed the harshness of the terms, at least in the perception of the users. 
The so-called Air Force Model Agreement of December 1986, though published 
after the Challenger disaster and the ensuing Presidential pro-EL V initiative 
(see chapter 2. 2. 4. hereafter), apart from reserving the right of the Government 
to preempt any or all launches from facilities covered by the agreement, still 
required the private users to assume all, i.e. unlimited, liability for all damages 
in connection with any activities related to the launch, including third party 
and government property damage, to indemnify the Government and hold it 
harmless for such liability and to obtain the necessary insurance for that 
purpose. 119 No guidance was given as to acceptable disparities between the 
required and the obtainable level of insurance, and, apparently, it proved 
difficult both for the industry and for DOT to come to terms with USAF on 
clear, fair and workable conditions in this field, a factor which seriously 
affected the investment community's enthousiasm to put its money into this 
promising infant industry. According to one author, "[t]he existence of the 
current Air Force model agreement ... frankly is scaring the living daylights 
out of ... the investment community." 120 
2. 2. 2. 2 The launch pricing (subsidization) issue 
One of the thornier issues to be addressed by OCST right from the start was 
its relation with NASA. One can imagine at least one of the reasons: where 
sofar, NASA had been responsible for all civilian launches, it now had a 
competitor whose mandate to promote the EL V industry not only brought 
regulatory influence in this field but also introduced free market concepts, 
including pricing considerations (and OCST/NASA negotiations on the matter). 
These were not only rather new to NASA but also posed a threat to its own 
119. See Expendable launch vehicle commercialization agreement, art. III, 12 Annals Air & 
Space L. 467 (1987). 
120. See Kim G. Yelton, Evolution, organization and implementation of the Commercial Space 
Launch Act and Amendments of 1988, 4 (l) J. L. & Tech 117-137 (1989) hereinafter 
referred to as Y elton, quoting a statement made during a Congressional hearing on the state 
of the US launch industry, at 131-132. Yelton adds:"The Air Force refused to set specific 
amounts of required insurance, to negotiate with the launch providers in connection 
therewith and to acknowledge the Transportation Secretary's role in this regard.", ibid. 
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job to make the shuttle the preferred omni-purpose space transport system (and 
to set its own prices accordingly). 121 
NASA's launch arrangements with potential customers since the late 1970s 
provided various alternatives to accommodate different types of use (rs). One 
arrangement, the Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA) was a cooperative 
arrangement between NASA and U.S. citizens (individuals, corporations etc.) 
which allowed the latter .free flight on board the shuttle for experiments and/or 
technology demonstrations of products which have a commercial potential. The 
company develops the test, NASA takes care of transportation, and gets all 
data resulting from the experiment and obtains the royalty-free license to use 
the product or invention in case the private party does not take care of its 
commercialization itself. 122 
For small pay loads (not larger than 5 cubic feet or two hundred pounds) NASA 
offered the so-called 'Get-away Specials', i.e. launch services on a space 
available basis at reduced cost, for small-scale experiments of a scientific 
research and development basis; and, also on a space-available basis, the 
'Hitchhiker' program providing expanded services for larger payloads of an 
experimental nature. 123 
NASA's main product, the shuttle orbiter's cargo bay, was sold to its 
commercial customers at a fixed price of USD 38 million in 1982 dollars 
through fiscal year 1985, USD 71 million for fiscal years 1986-1988, and at 
a price established through an auction process (but USD 74 million at a 
minimum) for the years thereafter. These fixed prices represented a 
reimbursement of part of the 'operational costs' of the flight and did not take 
into account either the development cost of the shuttle or the fixed costs such 
as the launch site or launch towers. 124 The Presidential Directive on 
Commercialization of EL V' s of 1983 had contained the following observation 
on this point: 
"Through FY 1988, the price of STS flight will be maintained in accordance with the 
currently established NASA pricing policies in order to provide market stability and assure 
121. Interestingly, two commentators, rather dramatically describing the ensuing bureaucratic 
struggle between the two agencies as the David of the OCST facing the Goliatb of space 
leadership and industry in the free world, see on the side of the Goliath of NASA (and thus 
confronting OCST) the U.S. aerospace industry, to wit General Dynamics and Martin 
Marietta, the private ELV owners/operators who "owed a good portion of their corporate 
economic stability and financial allegiance to NASA" and, as "large cost-plus aerospace 
contracters" apparently were not terribly lured by the promise of free market economics. 
See Robinson & Meredith, supra note 74, at 7, 8. 
122. See Raclin, supra note 59, at 42-43. 
123. See id., at40-41. 
124. See id., at 37. The author notes that the development cost of the shuttle program was in the 
order of USD 10-15 billion, whereas the fixed cost of maintaining the system had been 
estimated at USD 1 billion per year, see ibid. 
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fair competition. Beyond this period it is the U.S. Government's intent to establish a full 
cost recovery policy for commercial and foreign STS flight operations. "125 
It is clear that the above fixed amounts did not cover the full costs of the 
shuttle. In fact, Congressional budgetary experts, testifying at a 1986 Hearing, 
calculated that the full cost of a shuttle flight in 1989 (at 1982 dollars) would 
be USD 150 million. As this amount was based on an overly optimistic launch 
rate estimate of 24 flights per year, the figure faced criticism and was adjusted 
to USD 186 million in case 'only' 18 flights would take place. 126 The reality 
was that, though the launch rate increased, none of these years yielded a 
launch rate exceeding 10 flights per year (with 1985 being the best year ever 
with a launch rate of 9), of course also as a result of the Challenger accident 
in early 1986. 127 
Both DOT and the established EL V manufacturers and newcomers in the 
commercial launch market contended that, as long as this subsidization of the 
shuttle's costs continued with regard to ELV -compatible pay loads, these private 
companies would not enter the market: the USD 71-74 million shuttle launch 
price translated to a cost of about USD 26-27 million for a Delta class payload, 
for which, if launched by the Delta EL V, the private company would have to 
charge at least around USD 40 million to break even. Put differently, as one 
newcomer did, it would require a shuttle price of USD 150 million for the 
ELV industry to be able to compete at all. 128 
Interestingly, the above USD 38 million launch price NASA quoted in the 
early 1980s came from an estimate made in 1977 by the Agency which was 
based on a launch rate of 572 (!)missions to be flown between 1980 and 1991. 
With costs consistently and considerably exceeding budgets and launch rate 
projections declining, NASA, in 1984, had to increase the price to stick to its 
own promises and prepare itself for the year 1988, chosen by Reagan as the 
year in which full cost recovery should have been attained. But one year later, 
NASA reviewed the effect of its price policy and came to the conclusion that 
it amounted to handing clients to Arianespace on a silver plate and losing 
market share in the international commercial market as a result. Where once 
the U.S. had a complete monopoly, in a few years time Arianespace, with 30 
firm launch contracts concluded at the end of 1984 and approaching 40 in the 
course of 1985, 129 had taken about 50% of the market of international 
125. See ELV Commercialization Directive supra note 70. 
126. See Raclin, supra note 59, at 38. 
127. Launch rates for the first 75 flights were as follows: 1981: 2, 1982: 3, 1983: 4, 1984: 5, 
1985: 9, 1986: 2, 1987: 0, 1988: 2, 1989: 5, 1990: 6, 1991: 6, 1992: 8, 1993: 7, 1994: 7, 
1995: 7, see Space Shuttle 1996 supra note 51, at 268, 286 and 292. 
128. See Raclin, supra note 59, at 39. 
129. Arianespace' s sales activities since its start of operations showed the following pattern of 
success: (in firm launch contracts on Dec 31 of each year) 1981: 10; 1982: 16; 1983: 25; 
1984: 30; 1985: 41:; 1986: 58, see The world's first commercial space transportation 
company, Arianespace brochure, France (1993). 
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communications satellite launchings. Hence, in 1985, NASA's request to lower 
its price to USD 70.4 million, which would make the shuttle more competitive, 
both internationally and- to the understandable displeasure of the ELV industry 
and DOT - also domestically. And of course it meant that the concept of cost 
recovery had been replaced by market share considerations. 
The ensuing heated debate between NASA and, in particular, the ELV lead 
agency DOT, showed the absurdity of trying to reconcile two conflicting 
policies, i.e. of encouraging the creation of a new private launch industry 
while maintaining and subsidizing the shuttle as the 'primary' launch system 
for fostering the many space interests and goals of the U.S., including the sale 
of launch services to domestic and foreign clients. 
DOT (OCST) strongly and persistently argued for the shuttle to stick to shuttle-
unique uses (needing human presence), and advocated much higher shuttle 
prices for commercial launches in order to remove this very effective entry 
barrier for the commercial ELV firms: instead of NASA' s proposed USD 70.4 
million launch fee, they suggested USD 129 million. That "would allow entry 
by the private sector, leading to greater competition, innovation, and lower 
prices for all launch systems, thereby stimulating demand for still more 
launches and a more 'robust' national launch capability". 130 NASA was 
definitely not amused, and fought back with all the power, experience, 
knowledge and assistance of allies the agency could mobilize. 
Although DOT was new in the space business and policy 'arena' and its 
knowledge of the industry and the forces at work there was limited, it had an 
important ally in the form of Reagan' s own politico-economic philosophy, that 
is, to withdraw the government from any activity that could be performed by 
the private sector. DOT basically advocated the transfer of a commercial 
activity, the operation of a commercial transportation system, from a 
government agency which had other primary tasks (research and development) 
to private enterprise, and found the Department of Commerce on its side. The 
latter Department, which had space commerce responsibilities of its own, also 
had a problematic relationship with NASA because of the latter's competing 
role in space commercialization and its resistance to a more private enterprise -
driven space effort. 
NASA's reaction to the views and actions of the above departments was to a 
large extent based on its long history of being the sole provider of access to 
space, its immense aerospace know-how, its highly successful cooperative 
programs with the scientific community and industry in furthering space 
exploration and creating commercial spin offs, and its deep mistrust in the 
130. See Jack Scarborough, The privatization of expendable launch vehicles: reconciliation of 
conflicting policy objectives, 10 (2/3) Policy Studies Review 12-30 (1991) hereinafter 
referred to as Scarborough, at 17. 
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'fitness, willingness and ability' of the ELV industry (and DOT) to take over 
even a part of NASA's traditional transportation role. 131 
NASA had, since 1984 (!), an important space commercialization mission132 
which could only be accomplished with launch pricing acceptable to its U.S. 
users. And it could earn extra - much needed - income by selling excess 
capacity of shuttles, that would fly anyhow, at a discount to foreign users. 
Increasing the shuttle launch price would endanger both its domestic and 
foreign role and thus, to some extent, threaten NASA itself. 
Moreover, NASA - not without merit - maintained, that new modes of 
transportation (rail, air) had always been subsidized. In this connection there 
was little difference between a NASA subsidy for shuttle launches and 
Department of Defense funding of EL V research and development, 
procurement contracts, the use of launch facilities at less than full cost and 
other benefits which the EL V industry had received, preparing it for the new 
role of launch provider. 133 The pricing issue was finally dealt with by 
President Reagan. In August 1985 he announced that the price for a shuttle 
launch would be set at USD 74 million. NASA had won. 134 
The decision was later formalized by Congress, which, formulated in some 
more detail what the shuttle pricing policy was supposed to accomplish: 
"(1) the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in space research, 
technology, and development; 
(2) the efficient and cost effective use of the Space Transportation System; 
(3) the achievenment of greatly increased commercial space activity; and 
(4) the enhancement of the international competitive position of the United States. " 135 
131. As Scarborough notes, NASA saw the ELV industry as "too risk averse, too conditioned to 
large cost-plus-fifteen-per cent contracts, to invest in what, for them, would be a marginal 
business . . . If the market should fail or if they find they cannot compete, they simply can 
revert to being govermnent contractors, which is what they prefer to be anyway.", see id., 
at 21, 
132. Sec. 102 of the NASA Act of 1958, entitled "Declaration of policy and purpose", was 
amended by the [NASA] Authorization Act 1985, Pub. L. 98-361 (July 16, 1984) Sec. 110 
(a) (98 Stat. 426), which added the following paragraph (c): "The Congress declares that the 
genera! welfare of the [US] requires that [NASA] ... seek a11d encourage to the maximum 
extent possible the fullest commercial use of space.", see Space law and related does 1990, 
supra note 112, 443-471, at 445. See also Frankle, Concord or discord?, supra note 14 at 
216; the author quotes House Report 98-629, which states that "[t]he Committee wishes to 
emphasize that this language is intended to encourage NASA to agressively pursue all areas 
of potential commercialization.", id., at note 5. 
133. See ibid. 
134. See Shuttle pricing for foreign and commercial users (NSDD 181 of July 30, 1985). Fact 
sheet (Aug 1, 1985), see Scarborough, supra note 130, at 23. Scarborough suggests, on the 
basis of interviews with officials involved in the pricing issue, that the President's decision 
was probably driven most by ilie ilireat to ilie shuttle posed by international competition, 
"grounded in a strong sense of pride in ilie shuttle as a symbol of national strengili . . . [The] 
decision ... was a victory for nationalism over economics.", see id., at 23 and 27. 
135. See Shuttle pricing policy for commercial and foreign users, NASA Auiliorization Act 
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The findings of Congress gave more insight in prevalent thinking on the role 
of the shuttle system. One thing had slightly changed: instead of being declared 
the only launch system or the preferred system for all purposes, the Space 
Transportation System was now found to be "the primary space launch system 
for both United States national security and civil government missions". (emph. 
add.) It followed from the text that, for commercial use, the shuttle was not 
the primary launch system. As the finding further read, "[STS] contributes to 
the expansion of the [U.S.] private sector investment and involvement in space 
and therefore should serve commercial users". This was a clear confirmation 
of the NASA approach to the issue which therefore maintained the regulatory 
uncertainty for the private launch industry. 
The above shuttle pricing policy made clear that the problem, of how to turn 
the ELV industry's commercialization, which had received specific 
endorsement from Congress, into reality, had simply not been solved. Where 
two systems continued to receive verbal support, but the effects of their being 
competitors was not adddressed, and one of these, the shuttle had a de facto 
headstart, it had to be accepted that, for the time being, there would be no 
independant EL V industry marketing their products internationally or 
domestically. 
It should be noted that during these interim years, because the space shuttle 
could not fulfill all its expectations, the manufacturers continued to produce 
launch vehicles for others, particularly the Air Force. The latter had decided 
to rely upon (present and new) Titans, produced by Martin Marietta, for the 
launch of, among others, weather satellites into polar orbits. But, as a result 
of the government's non-committal approach towards the ELY's, there were 
no private U. S. operators offering launch services to the satellite manufacturers 
and operators. 
Though NASA, as a result of the shuttle decision, was definitely leaving the 
EL V business and offered all launchers and related hardware in its inventory 
to private enterprise, the number of serious 'takers' proved to be limited. 
One such party, Trans-Space Carriers, Inc. (TCI), was interested in taking 
over and marketing the Delta launch vehicle and, in 1984, signed a preliminary 
contract with NASA to that effect. The conditions TCI had to fulfill, 
presumably to show its worth as a candidate launch provider, were (1) to enter 
into a production agreement with McDonnell Douglas which had closed its 
78 
(1986), Pub.L. 99-170 (99 Stat. 1012), Dec 5, 1985, 42 U.S.C. 2466, 66a-66c, Title 11, 
Sec. 201-205, in Gorove US Space Law, supra note 55 at I.A.1 (d). The NASA 
Administrator had the authority to reduce the above base price in case he felt that the policy 
goals were not being achieved, but not without having enabled Congress to review his 
arguments for such a decision (Sec. 204(c)(l)); price reductions could not however bring the 
minimum price below the 'additive cost' (Sec. 204(c)(2)), i.e. the average direct and indirect 
costs to [NASA] of providing additional flights of the [STS] beyond the costs associated 
with those flights necessary to meet the space transportation needs of the [US] 
Government." (Sec.203(2). 
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production line, and (2) to sell three launches. (The latter would of course also 
be a pre-condition of MDD for re-opening the Delta production line.) TCI, 
a relatively unknown entity in the launch world, was unable to attract 
customers willing to construct or adapt satellites specifically for Delta 
launches. And its early experience with the effect of the Arianespace marketing 
and sales practices made it decide, in 1984, to ask the U.S. government to take 
measures against the European competitor (see later). 
The Atlas launcher, also available for transfer to a private launch provider, 
found one candidate, its own manufacturer General Dynamics, who would 
some years later indeed start its own sales activities. 
But, as the above regulatory and competitive conditions did not change, the 
period 1983-1986 saw no U.S. firms confronting their European counterpart 
in the international commercial launch market. 
The TCI complaint 
Thus, NASA and Arianespace remained the principal players in this field. 
Their comparable status as providers of subsidized services came to the fore 
when prospective launch services provider TCI, confronted with the difficulty 
of attracting domestic or foreign customers, launched a legal attack on 
Arianespace, alleging that the latter was subsidized by the Europeans and that 
it was dumping launch services in the U.S. market. 136 
136. TCI was incorporated in Maryland in September 1982, following the announcement of the 
US government that it planned to withdraw from the ELY business. It was formed 
specifically to provide launch services using the assets, technology and operational 
experience of NASA's Delta Launch Vehicle Program. In October 1983, TCI submitted a 
proposal to NASA to continue the management and operation of Delta as a commercial 
enterprise. (This included the acquisition of Delta assets such as spaceflight hardware and 
materials and the hiring by TCI of NASA personnel then working on the program) At the 
time of its complaint, TCI had signed an agreement with NASA whereby the necessary 
government facilities and equipment would be leased to, or purchased by, TCI, and the 
company had obtained exclusive marketing and production rights for future Delta launches. 
TCI would succeed to the launch authority after NASA had completed its manifested Delta 
launch program in October 1984. And management of the launch operations at Cape 
Canaveral and Vandenberg AFB would be transferred to TCI. All of the major Delta supply 
contractors such as McDonnell Douglas, Norton Thiokol, TRW, and Rockwell International 
(Rocketdyne Division), had, according to TCI, agreed to continue their supply roles for 
commercial Delta production as managed by TCI. The launch company was negotiating 
specific contracts with these suppliers, with NASA technical and management personnel and 
with the Air Force launch range service authorities for transition of their services to TCI. 
The Delta, designed to carry a single payload of between 2,000 and 5,000 pounds, was 
presented as "the free world's most successful spacecraft launch vehicle, having launched 
over 40% of all civil spacecraft", with an overall success rate since 1960 of 93.8%, and, 
since 1974 of over 97%. TCI promised to launch at about $11,000 per pound of payload 
launched into GTO in 1986, as compared to Shuttle, Ariane, Titan, and Atlas-Centaur 
which, only in a multiple payload configuration, would probably launch at $10,000 to 
$15,000 per pound. TCI felt therefore confident and eager to enter the market "if its ability 
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TCI' s action took the form of a May 1984 petition before the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR). It was the first time that this 
influential U.S. Government agency, responsible for negotiating trade 
agreements, was involved with international competition in the commercial 
space launch market. 137 With its petition TCI sought Presidential action under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against all individually named ESA 
member states and their "space-related instrumentalities". Section 301 gives 
the USTR broad ranging powers to combat unfair trade practices by foreign 
Governments. More specifically, the Act gives USTR the power to impose 
sanctions against countries that have unfairly restricted U.S. trade, including 
trade in services. 138 
to compete for launch customers is not undermined by the unfair and discriminatory 
commercial practices by the named European governments in the emergence of the private 
launch services industry. " See Before the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
Chairwoman, Section 301 Committee, Petition seeking Presidential Action under Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. Sec. 2411, et seq.) filed on behalf of the 
civil expendable launch vehicle services industry by Transpace Carriers, Inc. against the 
Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom and their space-related 
instrumentalities (May 25, 1984). 
137. The Office of the US Trade Representative was created by Congress in the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 and implemented by President Kennedy in Executive Order 11075 on January 
15, 1963. Initially named the Office of the Special Trade Representative this Agency was 
authorized to negotiate all trade agreements programs under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. As part of the Trade Act of 1974, Congress established the 
Office as a Cabinet-level agency within the Executive Office of the Presidentand gave it 
other powers and responsibilities for coordinating trade policy. In 1980, the Office was 
renamed the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). President Carter's 
Executive Order 12188 of January 4, 1980, authorized the USTR to set and administer 
overall trade policy. The USTR was also designated as the nation's chief trade negotiator 
and as the representative of the U.S. in the major international trade organizations. The head 
of USTR is a Cabinet-level official with the rank of ambassador. William E. Brock Ill was 
the Trade Representative at the time of the TCI case, see History of the USTR, <http:// 
www.ustr.gov/history/index.httn> (Mar 11, 1998). 
138. See Sec. 2411 "(a) Mandatory action (l) If the [USTR] determines ... that (A) the rights of 
the [US] under any trade agreement are being denied, or (B) an act, policy, or practice of a 
foreign countrj (i) violates, or is inconsistent wit.~, the provisions of, or otherwise denies 
benefits to the [US] under any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or 
restricts [US] commerce; the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection 
(c) of this section, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any 
such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the 
President that the President may direct the Trade Representative to take under this 
subsection, to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice 
... (3) Any action taken under paragraph (1) to eliminate an act, policy, or practice, shall be 
devised so as to effect goods or services of the foreign country in an amount that is 
equivalent in value to the burden or restriction being imposed by that country on [US] 
commerce. 
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(b) Discretionary action. If the Trade Representative determines ... that ( 1) an act, policy, or 
practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts [US] 
commerce, and (2) action by the [US] is appropriate, the Trade Representative shall take all 
United States law, policies and practices 
According to TCI, it was particularly the French national space agency, Centre 
National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), which subsidized the activities of 
Arianespace through practices which included: 
"-The two-tiered pricing oflaunch services offered by Arianespace. Member States ofESA 
have agreed to pay 25% to 33% per launch more than is charged to the export market for 
the same services. 
- The provision of launch and range facilities and services and/or personnel at no charge, 
or unreasonably low cost, to Arianespace by the French national space agency, CNES. The 
cost of launch and range facilities and services represents approximately one-third of the 
total cost of a launch. 
- The provision of CNES administrative, management and/or technical personnel 
to Arianespace either at no charge or at rates that are unreasonably low. 
-The subsidization of mission insurance rates which Arianespace customers would otherwise 
pay." 
Thus, TCI argued, Arianespace, as a beneficiary of such subsidy practices, 
had been able to offer launch services to U.S. companies and third country 
customers "at rates which are substantially less than those charged to Member 
States of ESA and substantially below those prices Arianespace would be able 
to charge in the absence of subsidization". This unfair competitive advantage 
had resulted in lost sales to the petitioner and price suppression, if not 
depression, of bid prices. 
Consequently, TCI asked the President to seek the immediate discontinuance 
of the above practices and, pending such action, to retaliate by prohibiting the 
Arianespace U.S. sales company from advertising and marketing its services 
in the U.S. and by imposing economic sanctions against the goods and services 
of the Member States of ESA. 
The USTR initiated an investigation on July 9, 1984 of ESA's and France's 
policies and practices with respect to Arianespace. 
One year later, on July 22, 1985, the U.S. President announced his 
"determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974", which read as 
follows: 
appropriate and feasibele action authorized under subsection (c) of this section, subject to the 
specific direction, if any, of the Presiden tregarding any such action, and all other 
appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the President may 
direct the Trade representative to take under this subsection, to obtain the elimination of that 
act, policy, or practice." Subsection (c) lists as authorized actions: to suspend, withdraw, or 
prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade 
agreement with the foreign country concerned, impose duties or other import restrictions on 
the goods and fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country for such time as 
the Trade Representative considers appropriate, or enter into agreements with such countries 




" ... Pursuant to Section 301 (a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2411 
(a)), I have determined that the practices of the Member States of the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and their instrumentalities with respect to the commercial satellite launching 
services of Arianespace S.A. are not unreasonable and a burden or restriction on U.S. 
commerce. While Arianespace does not operate under purely commercial conditions, this 
is in large measure a result of the history of the launch services industry, which is marked 
by almost exclusive government involvement. I have determined that these conditions do 
not require affirmative U.S. action as this time. But because of my decision to 
commercialize expendable launch services in the United States, and our policies with respect 
to manned launch services such as the shuttle (STS), it may become appropriate for the 
United States to approach other interested nations to reach an international understanding 
on guidelines for commercial satellite launch services at some point in the future. "139 
In the findings which formed the basis for the above determination, many of 
the factual allegations of TCI were said to be unsupported by evidence on the 
record. While other allegations were substantiated, the practices, in the view 
of the President/USTR, were not sufficiently different from U.S. practice in 
this field to be considered unreasonable under Section 301. The Presidential 
Determination looked at the various issues raised from the following three 
angles: government inducements to purchasers of Arianespace' s services, direct 
and indirect government assistance to Arianespace, and Arianespace's costs 
and pricing policies. 
Cost and pricing 
This item addressed TCI' s complaint that the ESA member states had to pay 
some 25% more for their (i.e. ESA payload) launches than foreigners. In that 
connection TCI quoted the pertinent statement of Arianespace's President at 
a Washington conference in 1982 to the effect that "European payloads are 
paying during the first three years of the STS pricing policy some 25% more 
than export sales to help us balance a bit this subsidy." In TCI's view this 
excuse ("we fight the subsidized shuttle") for a subsidy was not tenable, as 
the market segment in which Arianespace was operating was not so much the 
same as the shuttle's, but rather the one in which TCI was trying to make a 
living with its newly acquired Delta. So it was the U.S. private ELV industry 
which was targeted and hurt by this government-supported transfer price 
policy. As the Arianespace order book for launches as of May 21, 1984, 
showed that fully half of these launches were being carried out for participating 
European states, there was a virtual one-on-one subsidy for each non-European 
launch. "And, unlike TCI, Arianespace is virtually guaranteed a market, i.e., 
the satellite launches made on behalf of participating European nations." 
139. The President, Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Memorandum for 
the United States Trade Representative of July 17, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 29631 (Jul 22, 
1985). 
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The latter aspect, that of a -possibly - protected home market, received 
separate and more detailed attention on the part of USTR, who came to the 
following conclusion, worthy of being quoted in full because of the comparison 
between the U.S. and European 'home markets': 
"ESA and its member states have agreed to give Arianespace a preference over other launch 
service providers with respect to pay loads owned and operated by these government entities. 
Because of this preference and because almost all European communication satellites are 
operated by governments, rather than private firms, U.S. ELV's and the shuttle (STS) have 
limited opportunities to penetrate the European market. In contrast, much of the U.S. 
market, which is the major market in the world, is open because communications satellites 
are owned and operated by private sector firms. 
However, U.S.G[overnment] payloads also are carried almost exclusively by U.S. launch 
service providers. Thus there is little difference in the respective treatment by ESA and the 
Unted States of government pay loads. The major difference is in the structure of the market 
with European communication satellites being operated primarily by government entities." 
(On the other hand, the so-called 'fly U.S.' policy, effective until today, 
reserves a much bigger government market for US launch providers than the 
European policy does for Arianespace, see Chapter 3.4.4 on this issue). The 
European pricing policy, and more in particular the cross-subsidization 
practices, was one that the USTR could not condemn: "[u]nder current pricing 
policies, Arianespace is not recovering its full costs, nor is it likely to do so 
in the near future.", USTR said, but, while acknowledging that ESA had 
agreed to long-term, fixed-price contracts with Arianespace and the latter 
consistently charged less to non-ESA customers, the U.S. investigator also 
remarked that " ... it is not uncommon for firms to discount heavily in order 
to establish themselves in the market, especially when demand is low. 
Therefore, it appears that market forces, especially the current excess supply 
of launch capacity, are primarily responsible for current low launch 
prices. " 140 
Range services 
Though TCI had found reason to allege that launch range services were made 
available to Arianespace (virtually) free of charge USTR observed that in fact 
the latter company paid CNES a fee for the use of range services at Kourou, 
French Guyana, including personnel, but noted that this fee was arbitrary and 
140. Arianespace disagreed with the above conclusion that is was not recovering its full costs; a 
senior official contended that Arianespace was recovering all costs except for a portion of 
launch range expenses, but including that for hardware and operations. Arianespace's lower 
operational costs (lower than Shuttle and US ELY's) resulted from the fact that the Ariane 
rocket was unmanned and expendable, used existing EL V technology, and placed orders for 
boosters at the rate of 6 or 7 per year thus benefitting from economies of scale, see Raclin, 
supra note 59, at 51, note 79. 
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did not cover the full range costs incurred by that launch company. However 
the commercial ELY's also received U.S. government range services and 
launch support on a direct cost, rather than full cost reimbursement basis (as 
the Commercial Space Launch Act prescribed: the 1988 amendment of the Act 
would define 'direct cost' as "the actual costs that can be unambiguously 
associated with a commercial launch effort, and would not be borne by the 
Unites States Government in the absence of a commercial launch effort. "141 
Administrative personnel and services 
TCI complained that CNES personnel was made available to Arianespace under 
a Head Office Services Agreement to perform various administrative functions, 
such as legal and fiscal, personnel, management, quality assurance, etc., "on 
terms that do not comport with normal commercial practice." According to 
TCI, Arianespace would pay CNES 0. 3% of its after-tax revenue, and since 
Arianespace reported no revenue in 1980, it made no payments to CNES in 
that period, and "it is likely that the cost to Arianespace for such services in 
1981 to date continue to be unreasonably low." 142 
USTR did not agree with the petitioner: "While the fee is arbitrary, we have 
no reason to question CNES' assertion that the fee, in fact, covers actual wage 
costs plus fringe benefits. The amounts paid to date seem reasonable." 
Mission insurance 
TCI described its experience with the subsidization of insurance rates offered 
by Arianespace in a confidential exhibit. Whatever its contents, USTR, under 
the heading "Government Inducements" found no evidence of offsets or 
insurance being provided by ESA or its member states: "Member States of 
ESA do provide export financing for Arianespace's customers. However the 
terms of the financing are consistent with international agreements to which 
the United States is a party." 
141. See Sec 15 (b)(l)/(2614)(b)(l) as amended, CSLA, supra note 84. The text of the 
unamended part of the provision reads: "In the case of any acquisition of launch services, 
including utilities, the amount of such payment shall be an amount equal to the direct costs 
(including salaries of [US] civilian and contractor personnel) incurred by the [US] as a result 
of the acquisition of such launch services." 
142. The first European launch under Arianespace's responsibility took place in 1981. In the 
years preceding the TCI case the following launches took place: four "qualification flights": 
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Dec 12, 1979, May 23, 1980, Jun 19, 1981, Dec 20, 1981; four flights in the "promotion 
series": Sep 9, 1982, Jun 16, 1983, Oct 18, 1983, Mar 4, 1984, and one "commercial 
flight", under official Arianespace responsibility, on May 23, 1984, See Reaching for the 
skies: The Ariane family story and beyond, ESA BR-42, Netherlands (1988) hereinafter 
referred to as Reaching for the skies, at 11. 
United States law, policies and practices 
Additionally, USTR investigated whether any (other) direct government 
assistance was given to Arianespace in the form of, for instance, loans and 
capital grants. 
No evidence was found of either ESA or the individual member states 
providing soft loans or direct capital grants to Arianespace. Of course, the 
stockholders, some of whom were government-owned, e.g. Aerospatiale, put 
up equity capital, but USTR had no reason to suggest that these transactions 
were inconsistent with commercial practice. Arianespace also obtained some 
hardware from ESA at less than the cost of acquisition, but then NASA's 
agreement with TCI for the transfer of the Delta program also provided for 
transfer of certain flight hardware at less than the government's cost of 
acquisition. 
Finally, one form of possible indirect government assistance was addressed, 
to wit, that governments through their ownership of major suppliers, who are 
at the same time also major stockholders of Arianespace, could artificially 
reduce Arianespace's operating costs. However, the investigation did not 
uncover evidence to suggest that Arianespace was obtaining significant 
assistance by reason of low-cost inputs from its suppliers. 
The Presidential Determination finally observed that, since there were no 
international standards of reasonableness for launch services, they had no 
choice but to compare ESA practices to U.S. practice and to reasonable 
commercial practices. On that basis it concluded that the ESA practices were 
not sufficiently different from those ofthe U.S. to be actionable under Section 
301. However, a word of caution was added to this conclusion: 
"This determination is not an endorsement of ESA practices. 
Our policies in this area are now undergoing revision, and in the future we may wish to 
reexamine ESA's practices and their effect on U.S.G. launch services. 
At that time it may be in our mutual interest to engage in international discussions aimed 
at establishing appropriate guidelines for the commercial launch industry." 
The interesting aspect of these concluding remarks is not so much that the 
USTR, with the blessing of the President, kept its options open for the future; 
after all, in 1985, both the launch industry and the respective U.S. government 
policies were in a state of flux and Arianespace's competition hurt its U.S. 
counterparts. So, to keep open a basis for talks about "appropriate guidelines" 
concerning competitive practices was a prudent precaution. Remarkable is, 
however, the reference in the above quoted text to the effect of ESA' s practices 
on "U.S.G[overnment]" launch services. TCI complained about European 
behaviour, not NASA. U.S. private ELV's were threatened, not the space 
shuttle. 
As will be seen later, in Chapter 3.4.3, such discussions did take place 
eventually, triggered by the market entry of other, i.e. non-U.S., non-
European, launch providers. 
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In that connection it should be noted that Arianespace's marketing strategy was 
considered very agressive by its American counterparts, because the company 
consistently underbid the subsidized shuttle and was thus successful in 
attracting customers who were (supposed to be) traditional users of the shuttle, 
such as Intelsat and several U.S. companies. 143 Ironically, as Arianespace's 
launch pricing was keyed to compete with the shuttle price, that company had 
as much reason to complain about the artificially low level thereof as the U.S. 
ELV companies. In fact, ESA's participation in the TCI investigation was 
made conditional on receiving information on the price structure of the shuttle; 
and on the basis of that information ESA vigorously objected to NASA's 
interpretation of "full cost recovery" and the ensuing clear element of 
subsidization present in congressionally approved shuttle pricing. No doubt, 
the strong views of the ESA member states on this matter, and their lobbying 
for higher shuttle prices, played an important role in USTR's final report on 
the subsidization of Arianespace, and would also influence those countries' 
position in their discussions with the U. S. on competition guidelines. 
For the time being, however, U.S. government policies and practices, and the 
resulting regulatory and competitive conditions in the period 1983-1986, 
prevented the private U.S. launch firms from entering the international 
commercial launch market. 
2. 2. 3 The post-Challenger regulatory environment 
In the 'interim' period 1983-1986, the U.S. private ELV industry's competitive 
position remained unsatisfactory, both vis-a-vis the space shuttle and its foreign 
competitor Arianespace. And, although there appeared to be general 
recognition of the unfeasibility of having both the private industry and the 
shuttle cater to the same commercial market, the positions were frozen to the 
particular disadvantage of the ELV providers until the fatal date of January 
28, 1986, when an explosion destroyed the space shuttle Challenger, killing 
its entire crew of seven, destroying its payload, and grounding the system for 
more than two and a half years. 144 
143. See Harry R. Marshall, U.S. space programs: cooperation and competition from Europe, 
Address April 17, 1985, Dept of State Bull.83-87 (Sep 1985), at 84-85. At the time of this 
address, Arianespace had already launched 2 Intelsat 5 satellites, and, a.o., a Brazilian and 
an Arab satellite; its order book reportedly totalled nearly USD 875 million, covering firm 
launches of 28 satellites, of which 6 ESA satellites, 10 other European satellites, 6 US 
satellites and 6 spacecraft from non-European, non-US sources, ibid. 
144. The Challenger payload consisted of a NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-B) 
and the Spartan (Sptn-Halley) ultraviolet telescope to study comet Halley, see Space 
Almanac, Anthony R. Curtis ed., USA (1992) at 108. On Feb 3, 1986, Reagan announced 
the formation of a Presidential Commission to investigate the cause of the accident. The 
Commission was chaired by William Rogers, former Secretary of State under Pres. Nixon. 
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The accident not only crippled the military and intelligence community's 
launch programs, but also caused serious damage to the civilian 
(communications) satellite manufacturers and operators with shuttle launch 
contracts: all agreed launch dates had suddenly become uncertain at best 
(though NASA continued to assure its customers that their launches would 
remain on the launch manifest, nobody could tell when the system would be 
operational again). Moreover, the satellites were designed and built for the 
shuttle only and would need hard and software adaptation to make them fit for 
ELV launching, causing at least substantial delays and cost increases. Worse, 
the above policies of the government and its agencies, in stead of producing 
a healthy number of competitive companies with a range of products fit, 
willing and able to meet the demands of their eager customers, had resulted 
in a limited offer of ELV launch services, patently insufficient to take care of 
all civil and military launch needs. 145 Worse still, 1986 was a bad launch 
year, with a number of launch failures, increasing both the launch back log 
in general and, because of DOD's preemptive procurement of ELV's and 
launch facilities, costly delays for the private satellite industry in 
particular. 146 Finally, although Arianespace was in principle more than 
willing to take over the clients from its U.S. competitors, that company itself, 
on May 31, 1986, suffered a launch failure as well, causing the loss of an 
Intelsat V satellite, and would not launch again until close to one and a half 
year later. 147 
Other members included astronauts Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride (the first American 
woman in space, and crew member on two previous shuttle flights in 1983 and 1984), 
Robert Hotz, former Ed.-in-Chief, AW/ST, and several distinguished scientists and 
engineers including a Nobel laureate. The Commission finalized its work on June 6 1986 
and issued a report of that date which contained a detailed analysis of the cause of the 
accident and provided NASA with nine major recommendations of a technical and 
organizational nature. Recommendation 8 read as follows: "NASA must establish a flight 
rate that is consistent with its resources. The nation's reliance on a single launch system 
should be avoided in the future." (emph. add.), see Space Shuttle 1996, supra note 51, at 
279-280. For more detailed information on the flight, the accident, the Commission's 
analysis and recommendations and NASA's follow-up, resulting in a thoroughly refurbished 
(and safer) shuttle Endeavour, launched in Sep. 1988, see id., at 277-284). 
145. In his article prepared shortly before t.lje accident, Rac!in quoted Under Secretary of the Air 
Force Aldridge as stating: "Were the Orbiter fleet to be grounded for just six months in the 
early 1990s, it would take the nation two years at the nearly impossible surge rate of thirty 
flights per year to catch up. Moreover, if an Orbiter were lost, we could never catch up.", 
see Raclin, supra note 59, at 66, note 158. 
146. On April 16, 1986, a Titan 34D launch from Kennedy Space Center failed, resulting in the 
loss of launch capability for approximately 9 months for two launch pads, see Commercial 
Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, H.R. Report 100-639, H.R. Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (May 1988), H.R. 100-639, 
hereinafter referred to as H.R. CSLA Amendments Report, at 10. Additionally, on May 3, 
1986 NASA had to destroy a Delta launcher, carrying a weather satellite, which had become 
uncontrollable. See Fought, Legal aspects of the commercialization of space transportation 
systems, 3 High Tech. L. J. 99-147 (1989), hereinafter referred to as Fought, at lOO. 
147. Both before and after that date some former shuttle customers contracted with Ariane space 
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Surprisingly it still took more than 6 months before the first political reaction 
and sign of change was given. Reason for this delay was the heated 
interdepartmental debate on post-Challenger launch policies which raged all 
through the first half of 1986, with DOT and DOC pitted against NASA. The 
former argued that the shuttle be removed totally from the commercial launch 
market to give the EL V industry a clear signal that there would be no more 
competition on the part of government agency NASA: the only way of getting 
the industry to produce desperately needed launch services at all. It was clear 
to many - even prior to the accident - that the needs of the military and 
scientific community were of such magnitude that the shuttle's unique 
capabilities should be reserved for, and would be fully used by, those missions 
alone and that for all other fast growing uses a full-fledged ELV system was 
indispensable. 
NASA nevertheless had great difficulty accepting a departure from its 
traditional activities in the commercial launch market and put up a determined 
fight to be allowed to resume the whole range of launch tasks after the return 
of the shuttle. Partly as a result of the pressure of a number of highly 
frustrated, important shuttle-users with shuttle launch contracts but no prospect 
of any launch taking place soon, the private launch industry finally got what 
it wanted. 
In August 1986, President Reagan announced a Directive which, apart from 
proclaiming the decision to build a fourth shuttle orbiter to replace the 
Challenger, for all practical purposes ended NASA's role in launching 
commercial and foreign satellites. 148 The decision, although simply reflecting 
the reality of a fully booked shuttle manifest, and not meant specifically to 
promote the EL V industry, was nevertheless hailed by DOT Secretary Dole 
as a "turning point in the space program" and one which created a "natural 
division of work", leaving NASA and the shuttle with building and operating 
the space station (announced in 1984), planetary exploration, experimenting 
with new business opportunities in materials processing and meeting defense 
needs, and saving a share of the international launch market for the U.S. 
through its private launch firms. 149 
for a switch to an Ariane launch of their payload, see Ibid. 
148. Fourth Orbiter and the space program, statement by the President, August 15, 1986, 22 
Weekly Comp.Pres. Does 1103-1104 (1986), later formalized in U.S. Launch Strategy, 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 254, Dec 27, 1986, enacted in [NASA] 
Authorization Act, FY 1991, Pub.L.101-611, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3190, Sec. 112: 
"(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to use the Space Shuttle for purposes that 
(i) require the presence of man, 
(ii) require the unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle or 
(iii) when other compelling circumstances exist. 
(2) The term "compelling circumstances" includes, but is not limited to, occasions when the 
[NASA] Administrator determines, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State, that important national security or foreign policy interests would be 
served by a Shuttle launch." 
149. See Scarborough, supra note 130, at 24. 
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At the time of the decision to off-load commercial satellites, reached without 
any prior consultation with the U.S. satellite communications industry, 44 
companies held shuttle launch agreements with NASA. The President's new 
shuttle policy left the government with the problem of what to do with these 
commercial payloads. As a result of inter-agency deliberations, NASA, in 
October 1986, announced a new shuttle manifest of commercial pay loads which 
was comprised solely of 20 payloads which met the criteria set forth in the 
Presidential policy: five of these had national security implications, twelve had 
foreign policy implications (i.e. satellites of foreign governments), and three 
were shuttle-unique. The remaining customers were told that, as the new 
manifest represented the shuttle launch schedule through calender year 1994, 
there would be no chance of a launch for years to come anyhow, and they 
were reminded of their right to terminate the launch agreement on that 
basis. 150 In fact, the government hoped that these disappointed customers 
would voluntarily seek launch opportunities elsewhere, i.e. either - and 
preferably - by the U.S. ELV providers or -if unavoidable- by the foreign 
competitors. The accident and the ensuing government actions thus created two 
groups of unhappy customers: one, remaining on the manifest, whose launches 
were seriously and indefinitely delayed, the other, removed from the manifest 
and therefore forced to immediately look elsewhere. At least one of the 
customers belonging to the second group tried in vain to get its satellite 
upgraded to 'national security' status, and some companies would sue the 
government for breach of contract. 151 Twenty-two satellites out of the above 
forty-four were under construction at the time the presidential directive was 
released. The damages to these companies in most cases exceeded USD 100 
million on an individual basis, as a result of such expenses as non-usable 
shuttle-unique hardware, software, equipment and documentation, storage costs 
for unlaunched spacecraft, and more-than-doubling launch and insurance 
costs. 152 An even more serious impediment to overcoming the (damage of) 
delays for these companies was noted at Congressional hearings on the state 
of the U. S. launch industry in the autumn of 1987, 153 to wit, that, over a 
150. See American Satellite Co. v. U.S., No.525-89C, 26 U.S. CL Ct. 146 (1992), reprinted in 
Gorove U.S. Space law, supra note 55, at LA.5 (29). 
151. American Satellite Co. did both, see supra note 150. Hughes Communications also went to 
Court on the matter, see Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 
123 (1992) reprinted in Gorove US Space law, supra note 55, at l.A.25 (28). In both cases 
the Court would reject the claim. In the later (Hughes) case, the Court held that the 
Presidential decision to end commercial use of the shuttle . . . to eliminate all purely 
commercial satellites from the manifest, was a sovereign act which prevented NASA from 
honoring its obligations under the launch contract so there was no breach of contract on the 
part of NASA. On appeal, the decision was reversed, and the govermnent was held liable 
for breaching the launch contract, see 998 F. 2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and 34 Fed. Cl. 623 
(1995). 
152. See H.R. CSLA Amendments Report, supra note 146, at 7. 
153. See State of the commercial launch industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space 
Science and Applications, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, 1 OOth 
89 
Chapter 2 
year following the President's announcement of the new policy, no U.S. 
satellite manufacturer or operator had succeeded in obtaining a fixed cost or 
firm launch date for a launch with an American launch provider. The U.S. 
government, in its role of manager and controller of the launch ranges, was 
blamed for this cost and schedule uncertainty. As we have seen above, the 
priority given to government launches and the uncertainties created with 
respect to liability and insurance requirements (the latter primarily the result 
of the Air Force refusing to accept the authority of DOT to provide the 
necessary guidelines) effectively blocked the entry of private industry into the 
launch market; and President Reagan's Directive had not settled these 
issues. 154 
The hearings were initiated because of growing concern about the prospects 
for the shuttle's timely recovery and the negative impact of the 'no access to 
space' situation on both national security (aging 'spy' and other military or 
intelligence satellites needed urgent replacement) and the U. S. commercial 
communications satellite manufacturers (whose ability to sell satellites was 
severely handicapped by the unavailability of any means of transportation to 
their orbital positions). As one author remarked about the results of the 
hearings, "the message was mixed- on the one hand, the House Committee 
learned that the industry had stepped forward with significant financial 
investments and commitments, but, on the other, policy impediments were 
hindering industry's ability to compete ... The biggest problem looming to both 
providers and customers was the potential risk of liability." 155 In this 
connection mention was made of the onerous liability and indemnity conditions 
and the priority for government launches embodied in the AF model EL V 
commercialization agreement discussed above. It became apparent that as long 
as the U.S. government maintained this cost and scheduling uncertainty, there 
was little chance for the EL V industry to ever become an effective competitor 
of existing and prospective - subsidized and supported - foreign launch 
providers, such as Arianespace, but also the Soviet Union, China and Japan. 
In testimony at the hearings before the Congressional Committee, the following 
major issues were identified as needing resolution if the U.S. was going to 
have a commercial launch industry to assure access to space for government 
and commercial users. 156 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Sep 1987). 
154. In the meantime, in January 1987, the Air Force did conclude a procurement of medium 
launch vehicles for which proposals were required to include a commercial launch vehicle 
derivate. "The procurement was a significant and innovative effort in utilizing the 
government's buying power to incentivize the commercial launch industry.", See H.R. 
CSLA Amendments Report, supra note 146, at 3. 
155. See Trippett, supra note 94, at 51. 
156. For the following discussion, see, in greater detail, H.R. CSLA Amendments Report, supra 
note 146, at 4-8. 
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Government role: the government had obligations and responsibilities as 
(1) regulator of the U.S. launch industry, 
(2) owner and manager of launch ranges, 
(3) signatory to the Space Liability Convention which potentially confers 
absolute liability on the U.S. for damage caused by private citizens' space 
activities, 
( 4) user of the commercial launch industry to assure access to space for 
government purposes, 
(5) historically, the sole U.S. provider of launch services for government and 
commercial users. 
These roles and ensuing responsibilities justified an active government 
partnership with the launch industry to make the latter commercially viable. 
Policy continuity: where DOT, under the Commercial Space Launch Act, had 
principal responsibility for regulating the industry, it was important that it 
continued to actively consult with all departments and agencies concerned to 
keep the implementation of the Act's policies consistent (also in the face of 
perceived evolving roles of these various agencies concerned). 
Use of government ranges: U. S. government launch ranges must be considered 
a national asset, not the property of an agency. The conditions for the use of 
these ranges were critical for the foreseeable future to the survivability of the 
launch industry. The latter needed predictability and reliability in cost and 
schedules. Commercial requirements must be considered a national priority 
on government launch ranges and conditions should reflect that policy to create 
confidence in the commercial launch industry. 
Foreign competition: the U.S. industry entered a highly competitive 
international marketplace for launch services, with Arianespace, launching 
nearly 50% of the world satellite market in 1985, and China and the Soviet 
Union actively marketing (but not yet selling) their launch services to the West. 
Foreign government support came in many forms, such as two-tier pricing, 
charging less than full cost for launch facilities, services and insurance, 
preferential customs treatlnent, packaging (i.e. cross-subsidies among satellites, 
launch services and ground stations to entice potential customers to buy the 
whole package at lower total prices) and preferential treatment (by 
governments or regional organizations) of domestic or regional launch 
providers. Without a predictable level of U.S. government support and 
consistent policy provided in the legislation, the U.S. launch industry would 
not be competitive. 
Insurance requirements and risk uncertainty: both Arianespace and NASA had 
taken a risk allocation approach, with a reasonable share of the risk (and 
insurance) assumed by the client and the remainder by the agencies concerned. 
The private launch industry, however, carried the total burden of the risk (of 
unlimited liability) which created great uncertainty and a serious threat to that 
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industry. It was suggested that a risk sharing regime be introduced for the EL V 
industry similar to the shuttle precedent. 
Impact of the President's decision to remove commercial loads from the shuttle: 
the U. S. satellite communications industry had relied on the availability of the 
shuttle. Its commitments should be recognized and, to the extent feasible, 
honored by the government to the extent these prior commitments could be 
applied to U.S. commercial launches. In other words, this highly important 
national industry needed special treatment to restore confidence in the 
government as a contractual party and to partly offset the damages incurred. 
Research and development: foreign nations (European, Soviet, Chinese, 
Japanese) were actively supporting the development of new launch vehicle 
design capabilities that would challenge the competitiveness of the U .S. launch 
industry. Taking as an example NASA's successful role in aeronautical 
research and technology to the benefit of the U. S. aviation industry, Congress 
felt that a similar effort had to be made to foster advances in launch vehicle 
technology, in order for that industry to remain competitive. 
During the long period of Congressional discussions, including two series of 
hearings, on the above issues, i.e. between August 1986 and April 1988, a 
number of other developments increased the momentum for change and, 
conversely, were influenced by those debates: 
- President Reagan announced a new national space policy which also 
addressed the U.S. launch capabilities; 
- The Air Force released a new model EL V commercialization agreement, 
and 
- DOT -OCST published its final launch licensing regulations 
Each of these development will be briefly reviewed hereafter. This paragraph 
will be concluded by a discussion of the CSLA Amendments of 1988. 
The new national space policy of February 1988 
In August 1987, President Reagan ordered an inter-agency review of U.S. 
government space policy, which included, inter alia, a thorough analysis of 
previous Presidential decisions and the implications of the space shuttle and 
ELV accidents. The resulting Presidential Directive on National Space Policy 
of January 5, 1988, released on February 11, 1988157 divided U.S. space 
157. The President's space policy and commercial space initiative to begin the next century, Fact 
sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb 11, 1988, announcing and 
explaining the National Security Decision Directive, signed by the President on January 5, 
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acttvttles in three separate and distinct sectors: two strongly interacting 
governmental sectors (civil, and national security), and a separate non-
governmental commercial sector. (This was in fact the first time that the 
Administration clearly identified a separate and distinct commercial space 
sector.) 
The Directive followed this distinction by detailing the government's policies 
under the following headings: 
- civil space policy and civil space sector guidelines 
- national security policy and national security space sector guidelines, 
- inter-sector (national security and civil space) policies and guidelines. 
- commercial space policy and commercial space sector guidelines. 
Space transportation received prominent attention in the Directive. Clearly the 
major purpose of the governmental policies was to create assured access to 
space, sufficient to achieve all U.S. space goals, but more in particular, and 
as a matter of priority, to serve governmental goals. The Challenger trauma 
was primarily a governmental trauma, and the text and spirit of the Directive 
reflected that aspect. Thus, as an inter-sector policy, the following statement 
was made: 
"United States space transportation systems must provide a balanced, robust and flexible 
capability with sufficient resiliency to allow continued operations despite failures in any 
single system. The goals of [U.S.] space transportation policy are: (1) to achieve and 
maintain safe and reliable access to, transportation in, and return from, space; (2) to exploit 
the unique attributes of manned and unmanned launch and recovery systems; (3) to 
encourage to the maximum extent feasible, the development and use of [U .S .] private sector 
space transportation capabilities without direct Federal subsidy; and (4) to reduce the costs 
of space transportation and related services." 
The civil space sector guidelines, primarily directed at NASA, reconfirmed, 
under the "civil government space transportation"- heading, the governmental 
use of the STS space shuttle for shuttle-unique purposes and projects. 
The national security space sector guidelines, primarily directed at DOD, paid 
particular attention to the spreading of risks and the maintainance of launch 
capabilities in all circumstances: 
"Payloads will be distributed among [manned and unmanned] launch systems and launch 
sites to minimize the impact of loss of any single launch system or launch site on mission 
performance. The DOD will procure unmanned launch vehicles or services and maintain 
launch capability on both the East and West coasts ... 
DOD will study concepts and technologies which would support future contingency launch 
capabilities." (emph. add.) 
1988, hereinafter referred to as the 1988 National Space Policy (partially) reprinted in Space 
law and related does, supra note 112 at 581-585. 
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Space transportation guidelines, addressing both national security and civil 
space needs and concerns falling under DOD and NASA responsibilities, 
confirmed that the government launch needs would be met by a mix of 
vehicles, consisting of the STS, unmanned launch vehicles (ULV's) and in-
space transportation systems. For its own purposes, DOD was directed to 
assure, in coordination with NASA, the shuttle's utility to national defense and 
to integrate missions into the shuttle system. Coordination with NASA was 
necessary for this joint use as operational control of the shuttle and mission 
management would be in the hands of the agency of the mission concerned. 
This switching of responsibilities was already provided for in a NASA/DOD 
MoU on the matter. 
The Directive confirmed that the commercial launch operations were an 
integral part of a "robust national space launch capability". Therefore, NASA, 
contrary to its own wishes, 158 was prohibited from maintaining an EL V fleet 
adjunct to the shuttle. 
In fact, all civil government agencies were directed to use, as much as 
possible, the EL V services of the domestic commercial launch industry, or of 
DOD. As we saw in the above quoted, and emphasized, national security 
guideline, only DOD was required/permitted to have its own in-house launch 
vehicles. With them it would thus be able to offer launch services to other 
government agencies in competition with U.S. private industry. 
The Directive also listed specific guidelines for the federal encouragement of 
commercial ULV's, inter alia: 
- the use of government launch facilities was encouraged, but 
- government priority use to meet "national security and critical mission 
requirements" was maintained, with the obligation to minimize the impact 
thereof on commercial operations, 
- no subsidization, but (development and competition) 'encouraging' pricing 
of government facilities, equipment and services, 
- NASA and DOD should provide access to their launch facilities on a 
reimbursable basis, and develop, in consultation with DOT, contractual 
arrangements covering such access by commercial launch firms; they should 
also provide technical advice and assistance to commercial launch firms on a 
reimbursable basis, 
- pricing of the above services to be based on "direct cost" incurred by the 
government. 
158. Shortly after the Challenger explosion, NASA had announced plans to -again- assemble its 
own 'in-house' ELV fleet, see Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Toward an 
industrial policy for outer space: Problems and prospects of the commercial launch industry, 
29 Jurimetrics J. 7-42 (Fall 1988), hereinafter referred to as Reynolds Merges, at 16. 
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A fifteen point Commercial Space Initiative which formed part of the new 
national space policy contained two provisions of major importance to the 
private industry, one which - again - directed Federal agencies to "procure 
existing and future required [EL V] services directly from the private sector 
to the fullest extent feasible", and another which finally addressed the 
insurance concerns of the U.S. commercial launch industry using Federal 
launch ranges, by promising administrative steps including: 
"- Limits on third party liability: Consistent with the Administration's tort policy, the 
Administration will propose to Congress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic damage awards 
to individual third parties resulting from commercial launch accidents; 
- Limits on property damage liability: The liability of commercial launch operators for 
damage to government propertyresulting from a commercial launch accident will be 
administratively limited to the level of insurance required by the [DOT]. 
If losses to the Government exceed this level, the Government will waive its right to recover 
for damages. If losses are less than this level, the Government will waive its right to recover 
for those damages caused by Government willful misconduct or reckless disregard." 
Though Congress would later support the Administration's above approach on 
government property damage, it rejected the idea of tort reform by capping 
pain and suffering damages at USD 200,000, and would instead opt for a risk-
sharing formula based upon the NASA model. Still, the President's initiative 
showed a willingness to protect the launch industry against unlimited liability, 
and with Congress opting for a similar approach, there was reason to be 
optimistic about the chances for the creation of a 'private-launch-firm friendly' 
regulatory environment. 
Finally, the Directive contained an undoubtedly well-meaning, but curiously 
selective contribution towards the damage incurred by the off-loaded shuttle 
customers, in the form of so-called "vouchers for research payloads": 
"NASA and [DOT] will explore providing to research payload owners manifested on the 
Shuttle a one time launch voucher that can be used to purchase an alternative U.S. 
commercial launch service." 
Congress would not endorse this approach but instead opted for a different 
measure which compensated all shuttle customers, though to a more limited 
extent. 
The revised USAF model ELV commercialization agreement of February 
1988 
The AF model agreement was revised in early 1988. It showed a number of 
improvements, partly in letter, partly in spirit, to the advantage of the user, 
95 
Chapter 2 
though it still reflected the oligopoly position (together with NASA) of this 
governmental provider of the "property, facilities, goods and services" . 159 
One could say that the revised agreement, in a number of ways, honoured the 
pro-commercial EL V language and spirit of the Act of 1984 and the prevailing 
Congressional views as expressed during the September 1987 hearings, and 
distanced itself from the 'just be happy you're allowed to use our launch site' 
attitude shown by its predecessor. 
Thus, in contrast with the latter, it: 
- specifically referred to the authority of the Commercial Space Launch Act, 
- promised that "[t]he Government will make all reasonable efforts to 
minimize adverse impacts its actions may have on commercial operations 
and accord commercial users a high degree of stability in conducting their 
commercial launch business.", and 
- promised that, where a government permission or authorization was 
required the Government wouldl act promptly and not impose unreasonable 
conditions. 160 
The provisions on the allocation of risks, liability and insurance were of course 
the crucial items. 
As we saw above, the original model agreement obliged the user to obtain 
insurance protecting himself, the government and its (sub) contractors from 
any third party liability and (own and government) property damage liability, 
at amounts as required by the DOT Secretary. At the same time, the user was 
to indemnify the Government and hold it harmless against liability for claims 
by third persons, including employees of the user, for death, personal injury, 
damage to or loss of (user's or government or other) property, including 
liability for fines or costs arising out of any violation by the user of 
government regulations. 
The original agreement did not address the question of how much of the user's 
exposure could in fact be insured and at what price, nor did it suggest, in case 
the actual claims exceeded the insured amount, who would pay. 
The revised agreement created the concept of (third party and property 
damage) liability and insurance for a specific launch up to "the amount of the 
maximum available insurance", i.e.: 
"The amount of insurance available in the world market at a reasonable premium and on 
terms considered commercially reasonable for the risks involved to fund the User's 
responsibilities under this Agreement, or a special provision of this Agreement." 161 
159. See Department of the Air Force, Expendable launch vehicle commercialization, Model 
agreement, revision one, February 1988, hereinafter referred to as USAF revised model 
agreement 1988 or revised agreement, reprinted in Space law and related does 1990, supra 
note 112, at 547-563. 
160. See artt. I and II respectively of the revised agreement, supra note 159. 
161. See art IV b.3. of the revised agreement, ibid. 
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To the extent that Government damages and/or third party claims arising in 
connection with a specific launch exceed the amount as defined above, 
"questions of liability between parties and responsibility for paying claims will 
be left for resolution according to the applicable law of the U.S. (e.g. tort law, 
the Federal Tort Claims Act)". In other words, 'we'll cross that bridge when 
we come to it!' 
It would be up to the Government to determine what the maximum available 
insurance for a specific launch would be and which price would be considered 
reasonable for that product. That decision would be final and not be subject 
to appeal. That provision in itself and the uncertainty about the possible 
outcome of such determinations did not bring about the desired feeling of 
stability on the part of the launch industry, though the fact that in the end it 
would most probably be the OCST setting the standards and Congress watching 
over the behaviour of all departments concerned, created at least some sense 
of comfort on the part of the industry. 
Also in another way the revised agreement was somewhat kinder to the launch 
firms. The original provision on "support interruptions", i.e. that the launch 
ranges ("Centers") will act in good faith and negotiate to minimize scheduling 
and support conflicts, was supplemented by a new commitment which 
expressed the "government's intention to accord commercial users a high 
degree of stability in conducting their commercial launch business." 162 What 
remained was the ground rule in case of conflict (the established policy since 
1983), 163 namely that the Government had priority in the use of government 
property and support services to meet national security interests or U.S. 
Government mission requirements. To discourage 'easy' claims in that field 
and address the consequences for the industry, the revised agreement added 
that the government decision to exert its first priority rights had to be made 
by the Center commander, and provided also: 
"In the event the Government asserts its first priority right, the Government will make its 
best effort to coordinate with the User in advance (except in emergency situations when the 
Government must act immediately) so that the User may adjust its work schedules to 
minimize the impact of an interruption. " 164 
Of course, the fact that the government retained its first priority right without 
even having to weigh the interests of and consequences for private enterprise 
was far from reassuring, particularly where another provision absolved the 
Government in advance from any liability for any costs, including but not 
162. See art. XII of the revised agreement, ibid. 
163. See ELV Commercialization Directive, supra note 70, at 712, reconfirmed in the 1988 
National Space Policy, supra note 157. 
164. See art. XII b.1. of the revised agreement, ibid. 
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limited to consequential damages incurred by third parties, the user, its 
contractors, or subcontractors as a result of such interruptions. 
One should not forget, however, that this subordinate role of the commercial 
users followed to a large extent from the wording of the Commercial Space 
Launch Act itself, which, under the heading "Use of government property" 
provided: 
"The Secretary shall take such actions as may be necessary to facilitate and encourage the 
acquisition ... by the private sector of launch property of the United States which is excess 
or is otherwise not needed for public use and of launch services, including utilities, of the 
United States which are otherwise not needed for public use." (emph. add.) 
On the same basis, the department of the Air Force introduced an additional 
provision, which enabled the Government, without liability for any resulting 
costs, to terminate the agreement in its entirety on a thirty days notice in case 
"[r]equirements are developed for critical, conflicting national security or other 
governmental launches or launch activities which cannot be reasonably satisfied by such 
means as schedule adjustment, and therefore preclude the Government from making 
available to the User, as excess capacity, all or substantial portions of the Government 
facilities and services otherwise provided for in this Agreement." 165 
The traumatic experience of the military and intelligence community with the 
breakdown of the space shuttle and the failures of the ELV 'back-ups' in the 
1986 disaster year undoubtedly contributed to the 'me first' letter and spirit 
of the above clauses. Nevertheless, it conflicted sharply with the prevailing 
(Presidential and Congressional) mood, as the ensuing amendments to the Act 
would show. 
The final DOT-OCST launch licensing regulations of April 1988 
The licensing regulations for commercial launch activities which OCST 
published on April 4, 1988166 did not differ much from the interim 
regulations in force since early 1986. This was partly a result of the 
Department's close consultation, through COMSTAC, with the launch 
industry. Also the detailed attention paid to the numerous comments received 
by OCST on its Policy Statement which preceded the interim regulations and 
of OCST' s growing experience with the launch industry positively affected the 
quality of the regulations. In addition, OCST observed, "much progress had 
been made since the interim regulations were published in developing the 
contractual arrangements covering access of commercial launch firms to 
165. See art. XIV a.4. revised agreement, ibid. 
166. See OCST Licensing Regulations, supra note 97. 
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government-developed launch technology and government-provided safety 
services. " 167 OCST noted with satisfaction the President's Space Policy's 
"emphasis on commercial launch services as an integral element of the robust 
transportation capability essential for maintaining [U. S.] space leadership" . 
Observing with concern the potential capacity problems at the national launch 
ranges caused by the demands of the three space sectors, OCST still tried, in 
consultation with NASA and DOD, to get a fair share of access to these 
facilities (on reasonable terms) for the private launch sector commensurate to 
the latter's new 'official' position. This included 'encouraging' pricing of the 
facilities and the establishment of "allocation of risk principles and insurance 
requirements that are appropriate for commercial launch activities conducted 
at national ranges." 168 Obviously, the revised USAF model ELV agreement 
had not settled all commercial issues satisfactorily. 
The Department of Transportation at the same time remained firmly committed 
to the concept of deregulation, applied so successfully to domestic aviation and 
pursued with determination in international aviation relations. 169 And, like 
aviation, the space transportation industry was to be regulated primarily to 
guarantee safety of operations, and with as few other administrative burdens 
as possible. 
Thus, the final regulations contained a number of clarifications and 
simplifications, but no material changes in philosophy or approach or 
provisions substantially changing the rights and obligations of the industry or 
others concerned. (Though the planned amendments to the Commercial Space 
Launch Act of 1984 were at the same time, in April 1988, the subject of 
Congressional fine tuning, the final licensing regulations could formally only 
be based on the CSLA as it stood). 
Consequently, these licensing regulations: 
- continued to apply to all U.S. commercial or non-commercial, manned or 
unmanned space launches, except launch activities of the U.S. government 
and amateur rocket activities: the latter, which number annually in the 
millions, are subject to state and local regulation and self-regulation by the 
sponsoring organizations concerned; 
- maintained, for unmanned launches, the system of two reviews, the safety 
review and the mission review (commercial manned launches would 
eventually require different and/or additional reviews); 
167. Id., Supplementary information: background. 
168. Id., Supplementary information: national space launch infrastructure. 
169. In 1978, the U.S. adopted a policy of deregulation of domestic air transport by phasing out 
government regulation and, inter alia, 'sunsetting' the Civil Aeronautics Board. At the same 
time, the idea of international deregulation and more free competition in the international air 
transport market was embraced, resulting in the conclusion of more liberal bilateral air 
transport agreements, see the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 
(Oct 24, 1978) and the International Air Transport Competition Act of 1979, P.L. 96-192 
[S. 1300] (Feb 5, 1980). 
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- provided, in general terms, for the possibility of operating a commercial 
launch site, in a way comparable to the operation of a commercial airport, 
but without detailed (safety and other) provisions to that effect; 
- provided for mission approval "unless some element of the proposed launch 
poses a threat to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, 
constitutes a hazard to public health and safety or safety of property, or is 
inconsistent with international obligations of the [U.S.]" (Sec.411. 7 (a)) 
- provided for safety approval, which, in case of the use of a Federal launch 
range, will ordinarily be given "once the applicant has been accepted by 
a range or site capable of handling the launch activity proposed." (Sec. 
411.5 (b)); 
- introduced the obligation for the licensee to submit to the Office, in 
accordance with article IV of the 1975 Convention on registration of objects 
launched into outer space170 specified information on the vehicle and 
object launched (Sec. 415.10); 
- contained more detailed requirements with respect to the information to be 
submitted to the Office in support of the license application, particularly 
safety-related information when it concerned launches from non-Federal or 
non-OCST-licensed launch sites. 171 
Limitation of liability: the 1988 amendments to the CSLA 
The September 1987 hearings on the state of the commercial launch industry, 
and more in particular the testimony received at that occasion from 
representatives of the U.S. launch and satellite communications industry, 
created sufficient concern on the part of members of the House Subcommittee 
170. Art. IV para. 1 of that Convention reads: "Each State of registry shall furnace to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, as soon as practicable, the following information 
concerning each space object carried on its registry: 
(a) Name of Launching State or States; 
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number; 
(c) Date and territory or location of launch; 
(d) Basic orbital parameters, including: (i) Nodal period, (ii) Inclination, (iii) Apogee, (iv) 
Perigee; 
(e) General function of the space object". See Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space, opened for signature at New York, Jan 14, 1975, U.S. ratification 
deposited Sep 15, 1976 (TIAS 8467) e.i.f. (for the U.S.) Sep 15, 1976; text in Space law 
and related does 1990, supra note 112, at 73-80. • 
171. Id., Appendix [to the licensing regulations] - commercial space launches: information 
required for applications. 
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application fees, was supported by OCST, but it took another three years to formalize this 
administrative detail: Sec. 413.5 (d), providing for the payment of a non-refundable fee of 
$2,500.00 upon submission of the application, was introduced through an amendment of the 
regulations, at 56 FR 41068 (Aug 19, 1991). 
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on Space to introduce legislation addressing the main impediments the industry 
was confronted with. 172 
The bill and the resulting Act amending the Commercial Space Launch Act 
of 1984 came into force on November 15, 1988. It adopted a risk-allocation 
model along the lines of the Shuttle and Ariane arrangements, and, in a 
number of other ways, improved and strenghtened the position of the 
commercial launch industry: 
Limitation of liability 
The bill set overall maximum liability amounts and insurance requirements for 
the launch industry of USD 500 million for third party damage and USD 100 
million for government property damage. In that connection and for the 
purpose of establishing the individual requirements per licensee, the concept 
of "maximum probable loss" was used. Thus, each licensee had to obtain 
liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility (self insurance) in 
an amount sufficient to compensate the maximum probable loss as determined 
for each licensed launch activity by the DOT Secretary, up to an amount not 
exceeding the lesser of the above figure or the "maximum liability insurance 
available on the world market at a reasonable cost." 173 
The concept, first proposed by the aerospace industry in a January 1988 
position paper, was based on the distinction between (a) the "probable 
172. See To facilitate commercial access to space, and for other purposes, H.R.3765, lOOth 
Cong., 1st Sess., Dec 15, 1987. The bill was discussed at a second series of the hearings in 
February 1988, after which a new version, incorporating the comments received from the 
Administration and the industry witnesses, was drafted (mark-up of April 14, 1988). On 
April 18, 1988, a clean bill, H.R. 4399, was introduced incorporating the amendments 
adopted by the Subcommittee. H.R. 4399 was thereupon approved by the full Committee on 
April 21, 1988, see H.R. CSLA Amendments Report, supra note 146. The Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation considered its own - largely 
identical- version of the bill, S.2395, on May 13, 1988, and, in the same month, reported 
favorably on the final draft, see S.Report 100-593, 100th Cong.,2d Sess. (1988), hereinafter 
referred to as Senate Amendments Report. 
173. See Sec. 16. a(l)(A) of the Act as amended: "Each license issued or tra11sferred under t.1J.is 
Act shall require the licensee or transferee - (i) to obtain liability insurance, or (ii) to 
demonstrate financial responsibility, in an amount sufficient to compensate the maximum 
probable loss (as determined by the Secretary, after consultation with the Administrator of 
[NASA], the Secretary of the Air Force, and the heads of other appropriate agencies) from 
claims by a third party for death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property resulting 
from activities carried out under the license in connection with any particular launch. In no 
event shall a licensee or transferee be required to obtain insurance or demonstrate finacial 
responsibility under this subparagraph, with respect to the aggregate of such claims arising 
out of any particular launch, in an amount which exceeds (I) $500,000,000 or (I!) the 
maximum liability insurance available on the world market at a reasonable cost, if such 
insurance is less than the amount in subclause (I)." An identical text governed the maximum 
probable loss from claims "against any person by the [US] for loss of or damage to property 
of the [US]" with a limit of $100,000,000, Sec. 16. a(l)(B). 
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maximum" loss and (b) the "maximum possible" loss. Where for the former 
insurance would, in the experience of the industry, in principle be available 
at reasonable cost, the latter, involving that extraordinary incident which 
rarely, if ever, occurs, but cannot be totally ruled out, was generally 
uninsurable. Therefore, the industry had recommended that the NASA 
approach be followed to the effect that the commercial party which benefited 
from the launch would be responsible, through insurance coverage, for what 
was considered the probable maximum loss resulting from that launch, and the 
Government would assume the potential but extremely unlikely excess-of-
insurance liability risk of the maximum possible loss. 174 Apart from the 
above, the bill also provided for the licensee to enter into "reciprocal waivers 
of claims" with its (sub) contractors, customers and (sub) contractors of 
customers, under which 
"each party to each such waiver agrees to be responsible for any property damage or loss 
it sustains or for any personal injury to, death of, or property damage or loss sustained by 
its own employees resulting from activities carried out under the license." 175 
And a further provision authorized the DOT Secretary, on behalf of the U.S. 
government, its agencies, personnel and (sub) contractors to also enter into 
reciprocal waivers of claims with the parties involved in the launch. Such an 
agreement would make each party responsible for the losses, damage or 
injuries it incurred, to the extent that claims exceeded the insurance for 
government property damage (of at most USD lOO million). 
The bill required the respective insurance policies of the private parties 
concerned to protect the U. S. government and its agencies (by naming these 
authorities as eo-insured) at no cost to the U.S. Thus, one could say, the quid 
pro quo was: the U.S. government was, together with the industry, protected 
through insurance against the financial consequences of maximum probable 
loss, and the industry was protected by the U .S. Government against any losses 
insofar as they exceeded those maximum insured amounts. 
The original bill, approved by the House, provided for government liability 
for the excess above the insured amount without any limitation whatsoever. 
In view of the unlimited State liability for damage caused by space objects 
contained in the Space Liability Convention of 1972, this made perfect sense. 
Nevertheless, the administration, as we saw above, had different views on the 
matter and preferred legislation which would only place a cap on non-economic 
damages. To assume all liability above a certain amount in its view amounted 
174. See U.S. commercial space transportation risk allocation and insurance- an AIAA position 
paper, January 1988, reprinted in 16 (1) J. Space L. 110-115 (1988). 
175. See Sec. 16(a)(l)(C). 
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to a form of unwarranted government subsidization of the launch industry 
which could trigger requests for similar treatment from other industries. 176 
Faced with the possibility of a veto of the whole bill because of this particular 
aspect, the Senate approved two amendment to the bill, one which limited the 
government's indemnification exposure to USD 1.5 billion per incident and 
another which would terminate the indemnification authority of the government 
five years after its enactment, i.e. on November 15, 1993. 177 The two 
amendments re-introduced, at least to some extent, elements of uncertainty into 
the indemnity regime. First, the total amount of damage to third parties 
'insured' for the launch industry was thus established at USD 2 billion. This 
implied that compensation for any damage exceeding that amount would have 
to be paid by the industry again. Though the risk can be seen as rather 
theoretical, it is there, and cannot be totally ignored. Secondly, though the 
U. S. aerospace industry, encompassing both the satellite manufacturers and 
the launch industry, would probably be able to mount an effective 
counterattack to any Presidential or Congressional intent not to extend the 
above indemnification scheme, the provision introduced the explicit possibility 
for a change in the system - and thus uncertainty for the industry - in the 
period after November 1993. (Congress did extend the above termination date 
to January 1, 2000). 178 The legislation contained yet another element of 
uncertainty with respect to the payment of claims by the government: in any 
such case (where the government indemnification scheme will likely become 
effective), the President will have to submit a "compensation plan" to 
Congress, which will be acted upon by the Senate. Whether or not, and if so 
to what extent the Senate will support this compensation plan is difficult to 
predict. The Act as amended states, 
"[t]o the extent provided in advance in appropriations Acts or to the extent there is enacted 
additional legislative authority to provide for the payment of claims as submitted in the 
compensation plan outlined in paragraph (4), the Secretary shall provide for the payment 
by the [U. S.] of successful claims . . . of a third party against the licensee ... " 
and requires for a compensation plan, in paragraph 4, that it 
176. See Trippett, supra note 94, at 53-54. 
177. Sec. 16 (b)(l): the amount of $1.5 billion may be increased with additional sums necessary 
to reflect inflation occurring after January 1, 1989. Sec. 16 (b)(5) provides the following 
'sunsetting' language with respect to government indemnification: "The provisions of 
paragraphs ( 1) through ( 4) shall apply only to each license issued or transferred under this 
Act for which a complete and valid application has been received by the Secretary prior to 
the date that is 5 years following the date of enactment of the [CSLA] Amendments of 
1988". 
178. By PubL L. 102-588, Sec. 503 (NASA Authorization Act FY 1993) (Nov. 4, 1992). The 
subject provision was recodified at 49 USC Sec. 70ll3(f) (Title 49, 'Transportation', as 
revised by Publ. L. 103-272 (July 5, 1994). 
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"(i) outlines the aggregate dollar value of such claims; (ii) recommends sources of funding 
to pay for these claims; and (iii) includes any legislative language required to implement 
the compensation plan or plans if additional legislative authority is required. " 179 
As one author remarked with respect to the effect of the above provisions, "the 
amended Act does not compel the Congress to comply with the undertaking 
to indemnify. As a result, any incident that triggers the possibility of 
indemnification must be considered at the time with no assurance now that it 
would actually be forthcoming." 180 
Preemption 
The Amendments addressed a number of other concerns of the industry (and 
of DOT), one of which was the possibility for the government agency 
concerned to 'preempt' the commercial launches from the launch facilities. 
Although in the revised USAF model EL V commercialization agreement the 
'absolute' right of preemption had been deleted, the government's priority in 
the use of its property and support services "to meet national security interests 
or U.S. government mission requirements" had been retained (without any 
liability on the part of the government for any consequential damages). The 
government's reaction to the shuttle accident had shown the serious 
consequences of these provisions for the launch industry and the shuttle clients. 
And these injured private parties had made their views heard at the hearings, 
resulting in a provision in the bill which tightened the criterion to be met to 
justify a preemption and contained 'stern' follow-up obligations for the agency 
concerned: 
-the bill prohibited government preemption of agreed licensed commercial 
launches, "except in cases of imperative national need."; 
-only the Secretary of Defense or the NASA Administrator could make such 
a determination of imperative national need, in consultation with the DOT 
Secretary, with no delegation possible; 
-the same high officials were to report to Congress within 7 days after any 
such determination, with "an explanation of the circumstances justifying such 
determination and a schedule for ensuring the prompt launching of a preempted 
payload" 181 
The original bill introduced in the House also contained a provision which 
would have obliged the preempting agency to pay a predetermined amount of 
liquidated damages included in the license, in the event the preemption did not 
take place because of an imperative national need. This provision was later 
deleted. The proposal did however evidence the clear intention of Congress 
179. See Sec. 16 (b)(1) and 16 (b)(4)(B) respectively 
180. See Peter D. Nesgos, Commercial space transportation: A new industry emerges, 16 Annals 
Air & Space L. 393-421 (1991) hereinafter referred to as Peter Nesgos 1991, at 412. 
181. See Sec. 7 of the 1988 Act, amending Sec. 15(b) of the CSLA, by adding new para. (4)(A). 
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that commercial customers "should not be faced persistently with second class 
status." 182 
The Amendment in its final version did provide the licensee preempted from 
access to a launch site or launch property with the guarantee that he would not 
have to pay to the U.S. "any amount for launch services solely attributable to 
the scheduled launch prevented by such preemption. ", presumably meaning: 
no bills have to be paid by the launch provider for the services rendered by 
the agency concerned until and including the preemption. 183 
Incentives to 'bumped' shuttle customers 
As discussed above, the House Committee felt very strongly about the 
'nonchalant' way in which the 44 shuttle launch contracts had been dealt with 
by the government in the aftermath of the Challenger accident. To restore the 
confidence of the industry in the government as a bona fide contract partner, 
Congress agreed on a number of special measures for those 22 shuttle 
customers whose satellites were under construction at the time of the 
President's policy decision: 
First, for the commercial launch of these so-called "eligible satellites" (by U.S. 
private launch provider) the requirement to take out insurance for government 
property damage was waived ; secondly, the customers concerned would not 
have to pay for the government (launch range etc.) support services provided 
in connection with the commercial launch of an eligible satellite. 
The term "eligible satellite was defined" as 
". . . a satellite that-
(1) was under construction on August 15, 1986; 
(2) was the subject of a launch services agreement or contract with [NASA], which as of 
August 15, 1986, was in effect and not yet carried out; and 
(3) is licensed for launch under the Commercial Space Launch Act ... " 184 
The 'direct cost' of the above government launch support services were 
calculated by NASA and the Air Force to range between USD 1 and 3 million, 
depending on the type of launch vehicle used. The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) assumed that, of the 22 eligible satellites, some might never be 
launched and others would use foreign launch firms. (Gu)estimating that some 
8 satellites would indeed be launched from government ranges, the CBO 
expected the federal government to lose receipt of roughly USD 10 million 
182. See Trippett, supra note 94, at 53. 
183. Yelton, supra note 120, has a different interpretation: " the launch provider is not 
required to pay for any additional launch services.", at 135 (emph. add.). 
184. See Sec. 6(a)-(c), CSLA Amendments 1988, supra note 103, amending Sec. 16, CSLA. 
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over the next two years, the price of its largely symbolic gesture vis-a-vis the 
shuttle customers. 185 
Development of international guidelines on market access and competition 
The Congressional hearings had brought an acute awareness on the part of the 
legislators of the various ways in which foreign launch providers, incumbent 
and prospective, subsidized and assisted their launch industries. In that 
connection, both the European practices (see also the findings in the TCI case) 
and Soviet and Chinese appeals to sell launch services to the West were noted 
with concern. (In 1987-1988 both China and the Soviet Union had already 
offered their services to manufacturers and operators of U.S.-built satellites; 
the national security, foreign policy and commercial ramifications thereof 
would lead to intense internal (inter-agency) discussions and, in autumn 1988, 
to Congressional hearings on the matter. This will be discussed in the next 
Chapter). 
The latter competitive threat to the U.S. launch industry revealed, in the view 
of the House Committee, a real need to develop a Western policy toward the 
use of non-western launch services. "Unless U.S. decisions are made in an 
international context, U.S. launch vehicle and satellite industries may lose 
opportunities involving western commercial satellite competition. " 186 
Put differently, a U.S. launch policy vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union 
could be rendered ineffective if Europe did not concur with and support that 
policy. And some international guidance on competitive launch practices was 
also called for. Hence the inclusion of a new Section in the Act which 
expressed the sense of the Congress that the U.S. 
"should explore ways and means of developing a dialogue with appropriate foreign 
government representatives to seek the development of guidelines for access to launch 
services by satellite builders and users in a manner that assures the conduct of reasonable 
and fair international competition in commercial space activities. " 187 
The resulting regulatory environment 
The clear division of U. S. space activities, introduced by the U. S. president 
in 1988 and supported by Congress, into two main sectors, the governmental 
(civil, and national security) and the non-governmental commercial space 
sector, had thus led to distinct launch policies for each sector. 
U.S. government launch needs would be met by the mix of vehicles available, 
i.e., at the choice of the agency concerned, the shuttle (operated by NASA), 
185. See H.R. CSLA Amendments Report, supra note 146, at 22. 
186. See id., at 17. 
187. See Sec. 9 "Commercial space launch service competition" CSLA Amendments 1988. 
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government ELY's (owned and operated by DOD) or the private launchers 
(ELY's owned and operated by the U.S. private launch industry). 
As all civil government agencies were directed to use the EL V services of the 
industry or of DOD as much as possible, the launch industry continued to 
compete with both NASA and DOD, but only in the government payload 
market. Congress, in 1990, went a step further by adopting legislation which 
required NASA "to purchase launch services for its primary payloads from 
commercial providers whenever such services are required in the course of its 
activities" .188 (The above provision, directed only at NASA, was expanded 
by the Commercial Space Act of 1998 (H.R. 1702), passed by Congress on 
October 9, 1998, to cover Federal (i.e. including DOD) acquisition of space 
transportation services. The relevant provisions will be reviewed in Chapter 
3.4.4 infra. 
The international and domestic commercial payload market remained out of 
bounds for these government agencies. The U.S. private launch industry had 
thus to contend only with its successful foreign competitor Arianespace. 
The CSLA Amendments of 1988, providing for limited liability, for the use 
of government facilities and services on a "direct cost" basis, and for 
governmental restraint in preempting commercial launches, had, to a large 
extent, levelled the playing field. What remained was the clear headstart of 
Arianespace in the international commercial market built up in 5 years of 
agressive marketing in competition with the space shuttle. 
What remained also was the right of the government not to grant, c.q. to 
revoke or suspend, a commercial launch license for reasons of national security 
or foreign policy. The combination of this right with existing satellite and 
missile (technology) export controls had major consequences for both the U.S. 
launch and the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry, and would play an 
important role in the competitive relations with all, but particularly the new, 
foreign launch providers. 
2.3 Satellite and missile technology export controls: effects on launch 
market access 
Introduction 
" ... nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is central to our national 
security strategy. I think there is no higher priority on the President's agenda or that of the 
188. See Launch Services purchase Act of 1990, Sec. 201-205, Pub.L. 101-611 (NASA 
Authorization Act 1991 (Nov 16, 1990). The congressional fmdings (Sec. 202) contain pro-
competitive and pro-(US) private enterprise language including: "(3) the interests of the 
[U.S.] will be served if the commercial launch industry is competitive in the international 
market place; (4) commercial vehicles are effective means to challenge foreign competition; 
... (8) predictable access to [NASA] launch markets would encourage continuing [US] 
private sector investment in space and related activities". 
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Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense and others than to impede the flow of 
dangerous technologies around the world and to prevent the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons or missiles by more countries. That means both strenghtening the 
global regimes--the treaties and supplier regimes that constrain those technologies. Also it 
means detailed, day-by-day enforcement on the ground, and we're very active in both 
areas. 189 
The above statement, made in early 1998 by a senior State Department official, 
succinctly sums up the worries and corresponding responsibilities felt by the 
U.S. government since the end of the cold war. Similarly, the International 
Strategic Plan published by the Department in September 1997 lists the foreign 
policy goals of the U.S., mentioning first of all the goal to "[s]ecure peace; 
deter agression; prevent, defuse, and manage crises; halt the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; and advance arms control and disarmamant. "190 
Hence, those countries which, for various reasons, are seen as posing a threat 
to U.S. security, should not be able to obtain any arms, whether the above 
weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons or the 
technology to make, or improve the effectiveness of, those weapons, including 
advanced computer hard and soft ware and encryption. Of course, the 'enemy' 
of today is not the same as yesterday's nor is the weapons' provider the same 
over the years. 
In early 1998, Iraq, North Korea and Iran were identified by the State 
Department as countries trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and 
their delivery systems and/or the technology to build these weapons and 
systems. India and Pakistan belonged to the same category. Russia and China 
were seen as countries of concern because of their role as producers and 
suppliers of such weapons (technology) to the above countries. According to 
the State Department: 
" ... very real concerns persist about the porosity of Russia's military-industrial infrastructure 
and the prospect for unauthorized transfers of materials, equipment, know-how, and 
technologies. The leakage of missile technology and expertise from Russia's industries to 
Iran has underscored this serious proliferation concern." 191 
189. John Holum, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, 
Special briefing on trip to China (Apr 9, 1998) 
< http://www.state.gov/www/policy _remarks/1998/980409 _ holum _china.htrnl >, hereinafter 
referred to as Holum briefing, at 1. 
190. See Phyllis E. Oakley, Ass. Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Assessing 
current and projected threats to U.S. national security, Testimony before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 1-14 (Jan 28, 1998) 
<http://www .state.gov/www/policy _ r. . ./1998/980128 _ oakley _security .htrnl >, hereinafter 
referred to as Oakley testimony, at 1. 
191. See id., at 3. 
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The legal means used by the U.S. to prevent such unauthorized transfers 
involving the above countries, including re-exports of U.S. origin items from 
foreign destinations to third countries, are of a domestic and international 
character. U.S. laws originating from the cold war period and multilateral 
arrangements of the U .S. and its friends and allies, both regularly updated and 
adapted to changes in geopolitical and military/security circumstances, try to 
stem the flow of weapons around the world, with particular attention being 
paid to specific (categories of) countries and to specific uses, the so-called 
"end-users or end-uses of concern". 
The effectiveness of the national export control regulations is enhanced by their 
being maintained as part of multilateral control arrangements. In turn, the 
multilateral arrangements create the need for (amendments to) national laws 
on the subject. Well-known arrangements in this connection are the Nuclear 
Suppliers Groui92, the Australia Group (chemical and biological 
weapons), 193 the Coordinating Committee for multilateral export controls 
192. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed on the initiative of the U.S., following the 
1974 nuclear explosion by India. The primary purpose was to ensure that suppliers 
uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines to ensure that nuclear cooperation did 
not contribute to proliferation, and to involve a key supplier and non-member of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, France. By early 1978, when its guidelines and control list were 
published, NSG membership had grown to 15 countries. The NSG did not meet throughout 
the 1980s, but resumed doing so in 1991, with annual meetings taking place since then 
leading to a strengthening of controls and a membership of 34 at the end of 1996. In 1992, 
spurred on by revelations about Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons program, the NSG adopted 
controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods, for example those with both nuclear and non-
nuclear applications, that could make a major contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear 
activities or to nuclear explosive activities. NSG cooperates with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, which publishes the former's guidelines, incl. "Guidelines for transfers of 
of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and related technology", see Multilateral 
nuclear export control regimes, ACDA fact sheet, <http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptcon/ 
nuexpcnt.htrn > (Dec 17, 1996). 
193. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal 
is to discourage and impede chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW)(together 
CBW) proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW precursor chemicals, 
BW pathogens, and CBW dual-use production equipment, sharing information on CW 
proliferation developments, and seeking ot.iJ.er ways to curb the use of CBW; these actions 
are complementary to provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and 
Toxins Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The Group was 
formed in 1984 as a result of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Membership in late 1996 came 
to 30 states: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S. The European Union also participates 
in the meetings. The Group has no charter or constitution and operates by consensus. The 
Group has established common export controls for chemical and biological weapons 
nonproliferation. For CW, members of the AG control 54 chemical precursors as well as 
specified CW-related production equipment. For BW, members have established export 
controls on certain micro-organisms, toxins and equipment that could be used in a BW 
program. The Group has issued an informal "warning list" of dual-use CW precursors, bulk 
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(Cocom) and its successor the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional weapons 
and 'dual-use' goods and technologies) and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR). 
The application of these unilateral and multilateral regulations has had a 
continuing - in some ways unintended and undesirable - effect on the trade in 
launch services in cases where either the payload or the launch vehicle, or 
component thereof, happened to fall under any of the above regimes. 
The discussion hereafter will focus in particular on the interaction between 
pertinent U.S. laws, policies and practices and the Cocom, Wassenaar and 
MTCR arrangements, and on their combined effect on the launch trade. 
2.3.1 The export controls of the Department of State and Commerce 
2.3.1.1 The International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the U.S. 
Munitions List 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA or the Act)194 authorizes the 
U. S. President to control the export and import of so-called defense articles 
and defense services. The Act establishes the principle that licensing decisions 
with respect to these articles and services, also traditionally referred to as 
"munitions", are to be made "in furtherance of world peace and security and 
foreign policy of the United States". In other words, the respective licensing 
decisions should not be based primarily on commercial or business interests, 
but on foreign policy and national security grounds. The rationale for this 
approach is a simple one: thou shalt not arm thy (tomorrow's) enemy! 
The statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations in this 
respect was delegated to the Secretary of State195 and on that basis, the 
Department of State issues the so-called International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) 196 which contain export licensing provisions and a 
chemicals, and CW-related equipment. Members develop and share the warning list with 
their chemical industry and ask it to report on any suspicious transactions. Within the State 
Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) participates in U.S. 
delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual AG plenary meetings in Paris, and to 
periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U. S. 
government, see ACDA Annual Report 1995, Chapter 6 <http:/lwww.acda.gov/reports/ 
chap6.htrn>. 
194. See Sec. 38, Pub. L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (Jun 30, 1976), 22 U.S.C. 2778. 
195. See Executive Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (1977). 
196. ITAR, November 1989, based on Dept Reg 108.840, 49 FR 47684, Dec 6, 1984, 
Department of State Publication 9793, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 22 CFR 120-130 
hereinafter referred to as ITAR 1989; amended in 1993, Part II, 58 (No. 139) FR 39279-
39326 (Jul 22, 1993), hereinafter referred to as ITAR 1993; amended in 1996, 61 FR 48830 
(Sep 17, 1996), hereinafter referred to as ITAR 1996. For the March 1999 ITAR 
amendments, see Ch. 4.1.2.4. 
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description of the defense articles and services concerned. Designations of 
defense articles and services are based primarily on whether an article or 
service is deemed to be inherently military in character or has a predominantly 
military application. The fact that an article or service may be used for both 
military and civilian purposes ("dual-use") does not in and of itself determine 
whether it is subject to the IT AR export controls. 
Designation 
Such designations are made by the Department of State with the concurrence 
of the Department of Defense. The items so designated constitute the United 
States Munitions List (USML). 197 If an article is placed on the Munitions 
List, its export is regulated exclusively by the Department of State. The above 
regulations are primarily administered by the Director of the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls (ODTC), formerly the Office of Munitions Control within the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department. 198 
197. See ITAR 1989 supra note 196 Part 121. 
198. The Bureau of Political-Military (formerly Politico-Military) Affairs (PM), which reports to 
the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, advises the 
Secretary and other Department principals on security and defense issues worldwide, 
including arms control negotiations, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means to deliver them, regional security arrangements, programs for selected foreign 
security assistance, conventional arms sales, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear 
reactor safety, dual use and technology transfers, and international space issues involving 
military systems and controlled technologies. The Bureau is also responsible for licensing 
and regulating commercial exports of military equipment and services, see the U.S. 
Department of State: Structure and organization, released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 
May 26, 1995 <http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/dosstruc.htrnl (23-4-98)> 
Prior to an internal reorganization of State in 1993, PM shared its responsibilities with other 
Bureaus within State such as the Economic Bureau and the Bureau of Oceans, Environment 
and Science, for nuclear, 'dual use' (see later) and other export controls. The reorganization 
brought all the above responsibilities together under PM, further increasing its export 
licensing work load (in 1993, it was already the major processor of such licenses within the 
government, with 50,000 'munitions' licenses per year versus 26,000 licenses at 
Commerce). The 1993 changes also reflected a reorientation in export control priorities for 
strategic trade, from tJ:e old NATO versus Warsaw Pact focus to t.IIe new emphasis on 
regional security and non- proliferation. 
The State Dept wields considerable, and often decisive power over (international) space 
policy and space relations with foreign countries. As a result, clashes with other departments 
and agencies which also have responsibilities in the space field, such as DOT, Commerce, 
Defense and NASA, are not uncommon. The issue of (the application of) export controls is 
one on which Commerce and State have frequently disagreed, see 4 (3) Space News (Jan 
1993) at 4, 8, 21, and infra. As a result thereof the latter Dept put gradually more emphasis 
-in spirit and procedure - on finding a better balance between its interest in the prevention of 
exports that might contribute to proliferation on the one hand and the promotion of 
legitimate exports that help US industry and the economy on the other hand. Commerce, 
traditionally, and notwithstanding its own tasks in the field of export controls, had a stronger 
focus on export promotion. 
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Again, the Department of State determines -but not without having consulted 
an inter- agency panel in which Defense plays a crucial role and, when it is 
a space item, also NASA - whether an article or item will be placed on the 
Munitions List or, as a somewhat lesser or more debatable risk to national 
security, should be put on the Department of Commerce's "dual-use" 
Commodity Control List or Commerce Control List (CCL), bringing the 
commodity concerned under the export control regulations of the latter 
Department and its Bureau of Export Administration (BXA). (See para. 
2.3.l(ii) hereafter). 
Commodity jurisdiction 
If an exporter is in doubt about the character of his product and about the 
proper licensing authority he may request the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
to provide a determination on that product. 199 ODTC will, if necessary, 
consult with other agencies concerned (Defense and Commerce) and then make 
a jurisdictional determination. A company may use the same procedure to ask 
that an item or product be moved from State Department to Commerce 
Department jurisdiction. (Such removal of an item from the USML to the CCL 
is a matter for Congressional review!) ODTC regularly publishes overviews 
of commodity jurisdiction determinations to provide general guidance to 
industry. 200 
Defense articles on the Munitions List include: rockets, launch vehicles, 
spacecraft, including manned and unmanned, active and passive satellites and 
non-military communication satellites, space electronics, launching and 
guidance equipment and all components, parts, accessories, attachments and 
associated equipment specifically designed or modified for the above 
items. 201 (On the removal from the USML, and subsequent re-introduction 
into the List, of commercial communications satellites, see infra, Ch. 4.1.2.4). 
Defense services are defined as: 
a) the furnishing of assistance, including training, to foreign persons in the 
design, engineering, development, production, processing, manufacture, 
use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification, or 
reconstruction of defense articles, whether in the United States or abroad; 
or 
b) the furnishing to foreign persons of any technical data, whether in the 
United States or abroad. 
199. See ITAR 1996 supra note 196 at Sec. 120.4. 
200. See Defense Trade News, quarterly of the Bureau of Political-Military Affair, Dept of State, 
passim. 
201. ITAR 1989, supra note 196 at Sec. 121.1. 
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"technical data" in this connection means inter alia classified information 
relating to defense articles and defense services and any information directly 
related to the design, engineering, development etc. of defense articles, 
including for example information in the form of instructions, computer 
software and documentation). 202 
Export, in IT AR terminology, means sending or taking defense articles or 
technical data outside of the United States in any manner, disclosing or 
transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in the United States 
or abroad, the performance of a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit 
of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad, or "transferring 
registration, control or ownership to a foreign person of any . . . satellite 
covered by the United States Munitions List, whether in the United States or 
abroad; ... " (emph. add.)203 
The launch of a U.S. satellite outside the United States is therefore impossible 
without specific authorization from the Office of Defense Trade Controls in 
the form of an export licence. For that purpose, companies in the U.S. 
engaged in the business of either manufacturing or exporting defense articles 
or furnishing defense services are required to register with that Office. Such 
registration provides the Government with necessary information on who is 
involved in certain manufacturing and exporting activities and is generally a 
precondition to the issuance of any license or other ODTC approval. 204 
Prior to 1984, the year in which the Commercial Space Launch Act was 
passed, the Department of State, under the above definitions of defense 
articles, defense services and export, claimed that launches .from U.S. territory 
also required an export license under the IT AR, provided the rocket left the 
(air space over the) three mile territorial waters. The primary reason for the 
State Department to apply the above regulations at the time, and for the other 
Departments to accept that role, had less to do with arms export control than 
with the Department's statutory responsibility for ensuring that the United 
States complied with its international obligations under the various treaties with 
respect to the exploration and use of outer space. Uncertainty, both on the part 
of the private launch industry and of the various governmental agencies 
concerned, about the rules to be applied and the agencies to be involved, also 
played a role. 205 Thus, the State Department employed the "export" 
202. See ITAR 1989, supra note 196 at Sec. 120.8, 120.21). 
203. See ITAR 1996 supra note 196 at Sec. 120.17; the 'ownership' criterion did not appear in 
the ITAR 1989. 
204. ITAR 1989, supra note 196 at Sec. 122.1. 
205. See Steptoe 1984, supra note 60, at 193: "No agency, however, appeared to have direct 
responsibility for licensing the actual launch. Consequently, a decision was made by 
members of a senior interagency group on space, operating under the aegis of the National 
Security Council, to rely upon the Department of State's authority under [Sec 38 of the 
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construction even though the Arms Export Control Act and the Munitions List 
were originally promulgated before rocket flight became a reality. The legality 
of requiring an export licence for private launches from a U. S. launch site was 
therefore questioned at the time (though a costly, lengthy challenge to the 
authority of State was not encouraged). 206 
The issue was resolved with the passing of the Commercial Space Launch Act 
in 1984, which made the D.O.T. the sole launch licensing authority within the 
federal government. In particular, Sec. 23 (a) of that Act (headed "Relationship 
to other law") provides: "A launch vehicle shall not by reason of the launching 
of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of any law controlling 
exports." 
In December of the same year, the State Department revised its regulations 
to provide expressly that a launch in itself is not considered an export under 
the IT AR. 207 
The IT AR designate all launch vehicles, rockets and missiles and all 
spacecraft, including electronic equipment specifically designed or modified 
for spacecraft or spaceflight as "significant military equipment" (SME), i.e. 
articles for which special export controls are warranted because of their 
capacity for substantial military utility or capability. Non-military 
communication satellites are specifically excluded from this designation. 
Prohibited exports and sales to certain countries 
The Regulations single out a number of (categories of) countries for 'special' 
treatment. Thus, 
AECA and the ITAR], as the umbrella authority under which the Federal Government 
would discharge its international and municipal legal obligations to authorize and supervise 
the proposed launch." DOT's Office of Commercial Space Transportation referred to the 
"uniqueness and urgency of the proposed launch" as the reason for SIG (space) to decide 
that ELY launches would be considered "exports" and thus be subject to ITAR. Utilization 
of ITAR was seen as an appropriate, though temporary, expedient for addressing most of the 
domestic and international issues raised by t.IIese launches. But OCST also noted that, as a 
regulatory apparatus for authorizing and supervising commercial launch activities, the IT AR 
proved to have significant limitations as none of the Federal agencies involved had 
developed either procedures for reviewing launch applications or criteria for granting 
approval. "As a result, the first private launch applicant was subjected to duplicative reviews 
and other complications that prolongued the licensing process", see DOT Policy Statement, 
supra note 92, at para. 3, Background. 
206. On the various regulatory and political aspects of this question, see Chapter 2.2.1 and Myers 
1984, supra note 62, at 47-48; Webber 1984, supra note 13, at 13-15; Straubel1987, supra 
note 76, at 947. 
207. See William B. Wirin, U.S. restrictions on space commerce, Proceed. 33d Colloq. L. Outer 
Space 120-132 (1990) hereinafter referred to as Wirin, at 121. ITAR 1996 supra note 196 
Sec. 120.10 sub (e) now reads (in part): "A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason 
of the launching of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subcharter". 
114 
United States law, policies and practices 
"it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals with respect to 
defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in certain countries or areas. 
This policy also applies to exports to and imports from these countries or areas." 
IT AR 1989 mentioned the following such countries, all belonging to the (then) 
Communist bloc: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Estonia, Hungary, Kampuchea, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The above policy 
also applies to countries with respect to which the U.S. maintains an arms 
embargo, e.g. (in 1989) Angola, or "whenever an export would not otherwise 
be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the 
[U.S.]". Two other countries subjected to an arms embargo received special 
mention, namely South Africa, by virtue of a U.N. Security Council 
Resolution against apartheid, and Chile. Finally, the category of countries "that 
have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism" was 
represented by Cuba, Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and North Korea. 208 
Though absent in ITAR 1989 from the above categories of countries, China, 
after the Tiananmen square incident, was also subjected to special export 
controls. 
Depending on the developments within and relations with these countries, their 
names will disappear from this list, or new countries will be added as they 
become subject to the denial, suspension or revocation of licenses to export 
to them. For instance, in 1993 the State Department terminated the arms 
embargo against Angola, and the IT AR was amended accordingly. Similarly, 
in 1992, Liberia was included in the category of embargoed countries, 
resulting in a suspension of all Department of State export licenses, in 
compliance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution instituting a general 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to that 
country. The State Department, in 1993, clarified that the arms embargo 
imposed against South Africa in 1977 included the so-called "independent" 
homelands. And new export restrictions were imposed on Nigeria "to 
underscore the importance the [U.S.] attaches to an orderly and timely 
transition to unhindered elected civilian government, as well as to respect for 
human rights. "209 The end of the cold war also ended 'special treatment' for 
former Communist countries such as the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania: as from early 1994, the State 
department would consider applications for the export of defense articles and 
services (USML items) to these governments on a case-by-case basis. 210 The 
208. ITAR 1989, supra note 196, Sec. 126.1. 
209. See 4 (3) Defense Trade News (1993) at 7(Angola), 3 (4) Defense Trade News (1992) at 6 
(Liberia), (1-2) Defense Trade News (1993) at 5 (South Africa, and 7 (1) Defense Trade 
News (1996) at 2 (Nigeria). Such amendments of ITAR will be published in the Fed. Reg. 
210. See 5 (2) Defense Trade News (1994) at 17. As of June 26, 1994, the list of countries 
which were subject to ITAR export proscriptions or restrictions still numbered 36, including 
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focus of attention/concern has thus moved from the traditional 'east bloc' 
countries to - roughly - the "terrorist countries", the countries subject to U. N. 
embargo, countries presenting human rights concerns, countries selling arms 
to areas of conflict, and to countries aiming at regional dominance. (The 
country pairs Iraq/ Iran and India! Pakistan would, inter alia, belong to the 
latter category, but these countries individually are also listed under other 
categories). 211 
Suspension or modification 
In the interest of the security and the foreign policy of the U. S., the Director 
of the Office of Defense Trade Controls "may order the temporary suspension 
or modification of any or all of the [above] regulations ... " And exceptions 
to the above provisions can be made by the above State Department official 
"[i]n a case of exceptional or undue hardship, or when it is otherwise in the 
interest of the United States Government ... "212 ( emph. add.) 
The latter clause gives the Department and the President considerable 
discretion to deviate from the letter and intent of the IT AR and take export 
license decisions (partly) on other than national security grounds. As we will 
see later (in the respective chapters on the U.S.' launch trade relations with 
Russia and China) this frequently happened. 
Congressional notification process 
The Arms Export Control Act requires the President (who has delegated this 
task to the Secretary of State) to notify the Congress of certain export license 
applications at least 30 days prior to their approval. This provides Congress 
with an opportunity to review these specific transactions, and to enact a joint 
resolution or pass a law to prohibit the issuance of a license. If no such action 
has been taken by Congress, the Director of ODTC may issue the license on 
the 31st day. The Act delineates which cases require Congressional 
notification: 
- all exports of defense articles or services with a value of USD 50 million 
or more; and 
- all exports of Major Defense Equipment (MDE) with a value of USD 14 
million or more. 
The Act defines MDE as Significant Military Equipment (SME, i.e. articles 
for which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for 
Russia and a number of former Soviet republics, China, Mongolia, Iraq and the other above 
'terrorist' states, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire etc., see 5 (3) Defense Trade News (1994) 
at 12. 
211. See ITAR 1996, supra note 196, Sec. 126.1 and 7 (1) Defense Trade News (1996) at 6-8. 
212. /bid, Sec. 126.2 and 3 respectively. 
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substantial military utility or capability) "having a one time research and 
development cost to the U.S. Government of $50 million or more, or a total 
U.S. Government procurement cost of $200 million or more. "213 
To the category of Significant Military Equipment belong all launch vehicle 
and missile systems, aircraft with missile launching equipment and all 
spacecraft and spacecraft equipment, except non-military communications 
satellites. 214 
As will be discussed later, in Chapter 3.1., this provision of the Act was 
applied in 1988 to the license application for the export of two U.S.-built 
telecommunications satellites to China, for launch on the Long March launch 
vehicle, which led to Congressional hearings on the matter. 
Debarment 
Violation of the (conditions of the) AECA may result in a fine and/or 
imprisonment and also in an exporter's "debarment", i.e. a prohibition from 
participating directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles, including 
technical data or in the furnishing of defense services for which a license or 
approval is required; the debarment is generally for a period of 3 years, and 
such a decision will be published in the Federal Register. 215 
213. See Sec. 36(c) and 47(6) AECAjo. Sec. 123.15 ITAR 1996; similar definitions of SME and 
MDE have also been included in ITAR 1996, in Sec. 120.7 and 120.8 respectively. "Special 
export controls" for SME include the need for Congressional approval, and, a.o., a special 
provision in agreements relating to the transfer of such SME which obliges the foreign 
consignee and end-user, and, if these are private parties, the foreign government to certify 
that the SME defense article will not be reexported to a third country without prior approval 
of State, see Sec.123.10 ITAR 1989. Even a proposal or presentation to a foreign person for 
the purpose of selling SME has to be notified to and approved by ODTC in advance, see 
id., at Sec. 126.8). 
214. See id., at Sec. 121.1. All applications for so-called TechPical Assistance Agreements 
(TAA) and Manufacturing License Agreements (MLA) involving the the manufacture of 
SME or MDE of a certain minimum value for or in a foreign country also have to be 
certified to Congress for review purposes, see Sec. 36(d) AECA and Sec. 124.11, ITAR 
1996. An MLA is an "agreement (e.g., contract) whereby a U.S. person grants a foreign 
person an authorization or a license to manufacture defense articles abroad and which 
involves or contemplates (a) the export of technical data . . . of defense articles or the 
performance of defense services, or (b) the use by the foreign person of technical data or 
defense articles previously exported by the U.S. person." TAA is an "agreement (e.g., 
contract) for the performance of defense services or the disclosure of technical data, as 
opposed to an agreement granting a right or license to manufacture defense articles.", Sec. 
120.21 and 120.22 resp., ITAR 1996 supra note 196. 
215. See Sec. 127.3 and 127.7, ITAR 1996; lists of debarred persons are also published in 




The fact that all satellites were included in the USML, with the State 
Department controlling their export from the United States, put a national 
security and foreign policy 'brake' on the sale (and re-sale?16 of U.S. 
satellites to foreign satellite operators, not only if launched by a U.S. firm 
from U.S. territory but also, and of particular relevance to our subject, if to 
be exported for launch by a foreign launch firm from the territory of a foreign 
country. The interdepartmental question and the concern of the industry in the 
course of the years was not so much whether the export of a non-military 
communications satellite should be subject to certain governmental controls, 
but whether these controls should remain in the hands of the State Department 
or rather be a matter for the Commerce Department. 217 
With the latter in the 'driver's seat', the industry increasingly felt that, though 
national security and foreign policy considerations would always continue to 
play a role in export licensing decisions, there would be a stronger pro-
industry bias, at least mitigating (and possibly even neutralizing) the restraints 
and uncertainties caused by the State Department's foreign policy 'imprint'. 
The export controls of the Commerce Department do not apply to "arms" or 
"munitions" but to "dual-use" items, to some extent already a psychological 
difference both for the regulator and the regulated. 
Finally, another provision of concern to U. S. exporters of space defense 
articles and services in the IT AR is entitled "Denial, revocation, suspension, 
or amendment of licenses and other approvals." It provides, in part, that 
"[a]ny application for an export license or other approval . . . may be 
disapproved, and any license or other approval or exemption may be revoked, 
suspended, or amended without prior notice whenever: (1) The Department of 
State deems such action to be in furtherance of world peace, the national 
security or the foreign policy of the United States, or is otherwise advisable; 
,218 
From the point of view of arms control, this clause may be justified and even 
reasonable. It is however hardly reconcilable with the U.S. exporters' 
understandable need for transparency and - particularly - predictability of the 
216. Once in space, a satellite is still covered by the ITAR; the transfer of ownership, control or 
use of a satellite in orbit from one country to another requires a license, see 5 (1) Defense 
Trade News (1994) at IO. 
217. In fact, as early as the late 1970s, the U. S. aerospace industry expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the situation that these satellites and the related technology, both available in Western 
Europe and Japan, were controlled by the State Department. At a Congressional hearing it 
was argued that a transfer to the controls of Commerce "would help American aerospace 
industry in the commercial exploitation of space technology in international markets.", see 
Valnora Leister, Space technology: From national development to international cooperation, 
unpubl. D.C.L. thesis, McGill University (Institute of Air and Space Law) (1982), 
hereinafter referred to as Leister, at 134. 
218. See Sec. 126.7, ITAR 1989 supra note 196. 
118 
United States law, policies and practices 
export licensing process, both in their relations with their international clients 
and vis-a-vis their international competitors. 
2. 3.1. 2 The Export Administration Regulations and the Commerce Control 
List 
In December 1774, the First Continental Congress declared the importation 
of British goods to be illegal. Twelve months later the Congress outlawed the 
export of goods to Great Britain, thus establishing the first American export 
controls. Since then, the U.S. has imposed export controls for a variety of 
reasons through legislation such as the Trading with the Enemy Act and the 
Export Control Act. The latter act of 1949 gave the Department of Commerce 
primary responsibility for administering and enforcing export controls on dual-
use items. The term 'dual-use' is used by Commerce to distinguish products 
and technologies (that are controlled by that Department) that can be used both 
in sensitive (e.g. military or nuclear) and non-sensitive applications from 
products that are (a) weapons or military-related in use or design and subject 
to the controls of the Department of State or (b) subject to the nuclear-related 
controls of the Department of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
In other words, dual-use items are commercial items which could have military 
applications. The Export Control Act for the first time formulated three reasons 
for the imposition of such export controls: national security, foreign policy and 
short supply. Its successor was the Export Administration Act (EAA or Export 
Act) of 1979 which was amended several times and lapsed on August 20, 
1994. While its provisions and controls were thereafter maintained through an 
Executive Order, the EAA has been in the process of being rewritten and 
resubmitted to Congress ever since. The EAA and its implementing 
regulations, the Export Administrative Regulations (EAR or Commerce 
Regulations),219 contain controls on exports from the U.S., and re-exports 
of U.S.-origin items from foreign destinations, on strategic commodities and 
technical data worldwide to prevent the diversion of such strategic items to 
end-users or end-uses of concern. The primary licensing agency within 
Commerce is the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA). 
License requirements are dependent upon an item's technical characteristics, 
the destination, the end-use and the end-user, and other activities of the end-
user. In other words, to quote a fact sheet of BXA, entitled "How do I know 
if I need to get a license from the Department of Commerce?" the following 
five facts have to be established to determine an exporter's obligations under 
the EAR: "What is the item you intend to export or re-export; where is it 
219. EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq; EAR, 15 C.F.R. Subchapter C. 
119 
Chapter 2 
going; who will receive it; what will they do with it; and, what other activities 
are they involved in?" 220 
A Country Chart in the EAR identifies those countries to which specific items 
cannot be exported without a license. As in the IT AR, specific countries or 
groups of countries may be subject to specific control criteria and conditions. 
Thus, exports of strategically significant commodities and technology not 
designated as defense articles or services on the Munitions List are subject to 
the export controls of the EAA and the (implementing) Commerce Regulations. 
Because modern weapons depend on many advanced supporting technologies 
that have both civilian and military ('dual-use') applications, some commercial 
technology transfers raise U. S. national security concerns. Consequently, under 
the above Act, the Commerce Department is charged with issuing a license 
before any such dual-use technology or equipment can be exported from the 
United States to a potential adversary, and it must ensure that transfers of dual-
use technology do not occur under the guise of civilian projects. 221 
The EAA of 1979 as amended sets out in its paragraph 2401 the following 
Congressional findings guiding - as far as the above security aspect of exports 
is concerned - the interpretation and application of the export controls laid 
down in the Act and in the Commerce Regulations based thereon: 
"(5) Exports of goods or technology without regard to whether they make a significant 
contribution to the military potential of individual countries or combinations of countries 
may adversely affect the security of the United States. 
(8) It is important that the administration of export controls imposed for national security 
purposes give special emphasis to the need to control exports of technology (and goods 
which contribute significantly to the transfer of such technology) which could make a 
significant contribution to the military potential of any country or combination of countries 
which would be detrimental to the national security of the United States. 
(11) The acquisition of national security sensitive goods and technology by the Soviet Union 
and other countries the actions and policies of which run counter to the national security 
interests of the United States, has led to the significant enhancement of Soviet-bloc military-
industrial capabilities. This enhancement poses a threat to to the security of the United 
States, its allies and other friendly nations, and places additional demands on the defense 
budget of the United States. 
220. See Fact sheet- Do I need an export license? the US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of Export 
Administration <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/factsheets/facts l.htm> (Apr 29, 1998). 
221. See US exports: strategic technology controls, U.S. Department of State Dispatch (Jul. 29, 
1991) at 551. 
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(12) Availability to controlled countries of goods and technology from foreign sources is 
a fundamental concern of the United States and should be eliminated through negotiations 
and other appropriate means whenever possible". 
The EAR specify in great detail the licensing procedures, the "controlled 
commodities" as laid down in the so-called Commerce Control List (CCL), 
the countries (most) affected, divided into groups, and other administrative 
provisions. The "general policy" part of the EAR mentions the following 
purposes for these controls: 
"(1) To protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to 
reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand; 
(2) To further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its 
international responsibilities; 
(3) To exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance 
to the national security of the United States" .222 (emph. add.) 
Groups of countries 
For export control purposes the Commerce Regulations provide for categories 
of countries or "Country Groups", to which each foreign country is assigned 
depending on the level or strictness of the controls the U.S. Government 
wishes to apply to the respective country. There are seven of these country 
groups designated by the symbols Q, S, T, V, W, Y, and Z, with, for 
instance, the "geographic area formerly known as the [USSR]", together with 
inter alia Laos and Albania in a country group to which strict controls apply 
(group Y). 
China has been a special case, receiving increasingly better treatment (than the 
Soviet Union) through the years. In the 1960's it was classified under country 
group Z which prohibited all U.S. shipments to that country. As a result of 
President Nixon's 'normalization' overtures and the ensuing improvement of 
relations between the two countries, China, in 1972, was reclassified to group 
Y. In 1980, Carter saw reasons to further broaden export possibilities to 
China, and so did his successor Reagan one year later, establishing the so-
called 'two-times' policy which allowed China to receive exports with twice 
the technical sophistication as exports to the Soviet Union. 223 It was also 
Reagan who, in 1983, placed China finally in the most liberal Country Group 
V, which it shares with most western countries until today, with the 
concomitant -more relaxed- controls (until the Tiananmen Square incident 
took place). 
222. See para. 770.1, EAR supra note 219. 
223. See Wirin, supra note 207. 
121 
Chapter 2 
To determine whether a particular commodity qualifies for export to a 
particular country of destination the exporter has to check the so-called 
Commerce Control List, which lists all commodities subject to the 
Department's export controls, and therefore also known as the "Commodity 
Control List" (CCL). 
Roughly, a distinction can be made between commodities which do not raise 
foreign policy or security concerns no matter which country they are exported 
to, and which therefore qualify for a "general license", and all other 
commodities which, depending on the general category to which they belong 
(e.g. "telecommunications and cryptography" or "propulsion systems and 
transportation equipment"), the group of products (e.g. "software" or 
"technology"), particular type of control (e.g. "missile technology controls" 
or "nuclear non-proliferation controls") and the country group the commodity 
is destined for, require an individual so-called "validated license". Validated 
licenses require a formal application by the exporter of the commodity and a 
formal approval on the part of the Department of Commerce before the 
commodities can be exported. 
Revocation 
Sec. 770.3 (b) of the Regulations, entitled "Revocation of export licenses and 
other authorizations", contains a provision of similar concern to U.S. exporters 
of space related commodities on the CCL as the IT AR revocation provision 
does to probably the same exporters insofar as their space defense artcles and 
services fall under the USML: 
"All export licenses and other authorizations to export or reexport are subject to revision, 
suspension, or revocation, in whole or in part, without notice. It may be necessary for the 
Office of Export Licensing to stop a shipment or an export transaction at any stage of its 
progress; e.g., in order to prevent an unauthorized export or reexport ... " 
Communications satellites 
In November 1990, President Bush, by Executive Order, stated: 
"I ... find that proliferation of chemical and biological weapons constitute an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. "224 
The B.O. ordered the State Department to lead multilateral efforts to conclude 
a global convention prohibiting the production and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons, ordered the Departments of State and Commerce to make a list of 
224. Executive Order (E.O.) 12735 (Nov 16, 1990), reprinted by ACDA, <http://www.acda. 
gov/factshee/wmd/bw/execordr.htm> (May ll, 1998). 
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all goods, technologies and services that would assist a country in acquiring 
the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use chemical or 
biological weapons and whose export should therefore be forbidden, and 
ordered that sanctions be imposed on foreign persons and countries, including 
a prohibition on the sale of arms and dual-use goods and technologies, in case 
of their (contribution to the) development, production or use of chemical or 
biological weapons. (The sanctions against such foreign countries included the 
termination of landing rights of air carriers "controlled in fact" by the 
respective foreign government). 225 
At the same time, the president directed various other export control measures 
including the removal from the USML of all items contained in the Cocom 
dual-use list (the International Industrial List) (see hereafter) unless significant 
U.S. national security interests would be jeopardized. This order was meant 
to make the USML and the CCL more consistent with the above Cocom list, 
and to transfer those items to the CCL which, because of their dual-use 
character, should be controlled by Commerce rather than by State. A State 
Department official remarked, in March 1992, about this 'harmonization 
exercise' in testimony before the Subcommittee on space of the House 
Committee on science, space and technology: "our goal is to move all space 
items which are primarily commercial in nature off the [USML] onto 
Commerce's dual use list. "226 
To implement this part of the presidential directive, a technical working group 
was established, consisting of representatives from State, Commerce and 
Defense, and a number of other U.S. agencies. The analyses and proposals 
of the working group had a special political dimension in the period 1991-1992 
because of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the resulting interest on the 
U. S. side in a redefinition of the rules and practices regarding space 
cooperation and trade in space goods and services (including the launch by 
Russia of U.S.-built satellites, which will be discussed later) between the U.S. 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The result of the working group's recommendation was a final rule published 
in October 1992 by the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 
which removed certain commercial communications satellites from the 
Munitions List to the Commerce Control List, contingent upon publication of 
a Commerce rule establishing national security controls on such satellites. 
Commerce published that rule on the same date in October 1992, adding these 
225. See id, Sec. 5. 
226. See Statement by Charles A. Duelfer, Director, Center for Defense Trade, Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs, US Dept of State, March 25, 1992, hereinafter referred to as 
Duelfer statement, in Bilateral space cooperation with the former Soviet Union, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on space, House Committee on science, space, and technology, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 59-75 (March 25, 1992) at 66; the expression "harmonization 
exercise" was used by a Commerce official at the same hearing, see id, at 78. 
123 
Chapter 2 
satellites to the CCL.227 On December 28, 1992 the above State Bureau 
published another rule that proposed to remove all generic components, parts, 
accessoires, attachments and equipment associated with commercial 
communication satellites and passive remote sensing satellite ground stations 
from the USML to the CCL. Components that were specifically designed for 
satellites which remained on the USML would also remain under State 
Department control. 
In other words, as a first step towards harmonizing and simplifying the two 
control regimes, a distinction was put into effect between military satellites and 
"certain non-military communications satellites which have capabilities that 
justify keeping them on the USML in the interest of U.S. national security", 
to be kept on the USML, and all other complete commercial communications 
satellites, including components and associated equipment, data and services, 
to be transferred to the CCL. 228 (In view of the partisan nature of U.S. 
politics it is relevant to note that the Clinton administration, having performed 
its own inter-agency study on the matter, approved the respective ITAR 
admendments, developed and proposed under president Bush, without change). 
The impression remains that only less sophisticated satellites were transferred 
to the export controls of Commerce. This predictably resulted in increased 
pressure from the industry for further de-controls to enable them to compete 
with their more sophisticated products on the world market (including the 
former Soviet Union), without direct (or indirect) State Department 
interference. The above State Department official remarked in conclusion: 
"I would like to tell you that this [i.e. the transfer of certain commercial satellites to the 
Commerce list] will solve the question of the export of commercial satellites to the CIS. 
However, these same issues will be relevant when these commercial satellites are on the 
Commerce list. Therefore, we have placed a high priority on a review of this issue within 
the Administration. "229 
The U.S. aerospace industry's insistent call for change was supported by a 
number of compelling arguments. They compared the Administrations's 
227. See Commercial communication satellites; Revisions to the Commerce Control List, 15 CFR 
Part 799, Dept of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 58 FR 47322 (Sep 8, 1993) 
Background. 
228. The amended USML, in its Category XV (Spacecraft systems and associated equipment), 
mentioned inter alia the following such satellite capabilities justifying continued State 
Department export controls: "... communications satellites . . . (3) designed, modified or 
configured for intersatellite data relay links that do not involve a ground relay terminal 
('cross-links') ... (5) employing any of the cryptographic items controlled [elsewhere in the 
USML] ... (9) having orbit transfer engines ('kick-motors') which remain permanently with 
the spacecraft and are capable of being restarted after achievement of mission orbit and 
providing acceleration greater than 1g." See Amendments to the ... (ITAR), 22 CFR Part 
121, Dept of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 58 FR 47636 (Sep 10, 1993). 
229. See Duelfer statement supra note 226, at 75. 
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treatment of communication satellites with the way it dealt with other 
communications trade, such as fibre optics and telephone switching equipment 
which were controlled by the Commerce Department. They pointed out that 
characteristics once unique to military satellites were now routinely employed 
on commercial communications satellites. And they argued that the 30-year 
U. S. lead in selling commercial communications satellites was under challenge 
from Japan, Europe and Canada, each promoting the view that American 
manufacturers were unreliable because of the U.S. Government's restrictive 
export policies. 230 
The issue of export control reform in high technology would become the 
subject of Congressional scrutiny in 1993 with high profile statements of 
concern on the part of the U.S. industry, further increasing the pressure on 
the Administration. 
In the mean time, the above Presidential concern, fueled by the sophistication 
of Iraqi missile capabilities due to rather careless U. S. and European exports 
of sensitive technologies to Iraq prior to the 1991 Gulf War, had led to new 
and stricter regulations promulgated by Commerce under the so-called 
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). 231 
These EPCI regulations were specifically aimed at stemming the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, 
and of the missiles used to deliver those weapons. For that purpose the EPCI 
regulations created the concept of projects and entities of concern. The most 
stringent forms of licensing, individual validated licenses, are required when 
an exporter "knows" or is informed by the Commerce Department's Bureau 
of Export Administration (BXA), that an item is either destined for such a 
project or for use by a country where a project of special concern is listed, 
regardless if it is destined for that specific project. This "knowing" standard 
imposed a much heavier burden on exporters than had been previously imposed 
in American export licensing. 232 To identify for U.S. businesses some of the 
organizations and companies that may be involved in prohibited weapons 
proliferation activities (so they know that exports even of normally 
uncontrolled goods and technology to these entities would create an 
unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to such activities) the EAR contains 
a list of so-called "entities of concern". This list puts exporters on notice that 
any products sold to these end-users may present concerns to the government 
and will require a license from BXA. This "Entity list" is revised and updated 
230. See John D. Holum, Acting under secretary of state for arms control and international 
security affairs and Director ACDA, testimony before the House International Relation 
Committee and National Security Committee (Jun 18, 1998) 
< http:/www .acda.gov/speeches/holum/holtest.htm >, hereinafter referrred to as Holum 
testimony 1998. 
231. See 56 FR 40,494-40,502 (1991). 
232. Jack H. McCall, Jr, The Missile Technology Control Regime and space launch vehicles: an 
update, 20(2) J. Space L. 61-65 (1992) hereinafter referred to as McCall at 64. 
125 
Chapter 2 
on a periodic basis, by adding new or amended notifications and deleting 
notifications no longer in effect. The U. S. intelligence community undoubtedly 
plays a vital role in collecting the information necessary for that purpose. But 
the exporters also have a duty to determine the nature and activities of their 
potential customers and to report on anything that suggests that the customer 
concerned may be involved in proliferation-related activities. And penalties 
for violation of the Regulations may be stiff. 233 
To stay on the safe side, U.S. firms should also check BXA's "List of denied 
persons", which provides the names of all American and foreign persons 
(including companies, institutions and organizations) which, because of 
violations of the Commerce Regulations, are not allowed to participate in any 
transaction involving commodities subject to these Regulations and with whom 
U. S. firms are not allowed to do such business. 234 
Exporters frequently complained about the extent of the 'knowledge' they were 
required to have about the end-user and the end-use to avoid possible sanctions 
from the controlling agency. In fact, in 1997, the government admitted that 
"[w]e continue to grapple with revising the 'catch-all' controls that form part 
of the 1991 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Exporters view 
the catch-all as too broad in scope and the knowledge standard as 
unclear. "235 
One of the phenomena the U.S. administration also has been grappling with 
for many years is the question of how to effectively deal with 'pariah states', 
233. See The Entity List, Entities of proliferation concern listed in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 
of the [EAR], updated Oct 1, 1997 <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/entities.htm> This 
supplement lists a number of Indian and Pakistani research centers and laboratories, but also 
a Russian research institute, Chinese laboratories and Ben Gurion University, Israel, "for 
computers between 2,000 and 7,000 Mtops." According to a senior official of the 
Commerce Department in early 1997, BXA's enforcement programs, focusing on specific 
end-users and end-uses, led to hundreds of investigations over the last four years that have 
led to the criminal prosecution of persons who illegally exported zirconium for Iraqi 
munitions, unlicensed equipment for India's missile program, brokerage services for Iraqi 
rocket fuel, and gas masks to suspected Aum Shinrikyo terrorists in Japan, see Update West 
1997, speech William A. Reinsch (Undersecretary for export administration, Dept of 
Commerce (Feb 10, 1997), hereinafter referred to as Update west 1997, at 2 
< http://www.bxa.doc.gov/supdate.htm>. 
234. See U.S. Dept of Commerce, [BXA], Denied persons list currently in effect (Revised May 
6, 1998) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/2_denial.htm>. 
235. See Update west 1997, supra note 233, at 4. The same govermnent spokesman concluded: 
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"Since the definition of 'knowledge' includes 'awareness of a high probability' that a 
proliferation-related use is involved, you need to screen, to pursue and resolve red flags, and 
to come to us for guidance or a license if you cannot satisfactorily resolve red flags", ibid. 
'Red flags' are defined as "any abnormal circumstances that indicate that the export may be 
destined for an inappropriate end-use, end-user, or destination ... Commerce has developed 
lists of such 'red flags' which are not all-inclusive but are intended to illustrate the types of 
circumstances that should cause reasonable suspicion that a transaction will violate the 
EAR", see U.S. Dept of Commerce, [BXA], Know your customer guidance <http: 
//www. bxa.doc.gov /Enforcement/knowcust.htm > . 
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and the attitude of Congress in this connection. In early 1997, a Commerce 
official put the dilemma as follows: 
"Most of the time scholars have concluded sanctions have little effect, and they frequently 
hurt the imposer more than the recipient as other countries' exporters rush to fill the trade 
gap. Sanctions work best when they are broadly multilateral, when the target country is 
small and relatively defenseless, and, I would argue, when sanction-breaking activity is most 
likely to lead to media criticism and international embarrassment. Sanctions work least well 
when they are unilateral and are driven by home country politics rather than as part of a 
well thought-through multilateral strategy. 
What is new is the increasingly assertive role of Congress in what I call the country-of-the-
month-syndrome. Amendments have been offered for years, but until recently the moderate 
center used to prevail, and they were defeated. "236 
The role of Congress will be further illustrated in Chapter 3.1 discussing the 
U. S. -China launch relations and in Chapter 4. The observation that multilateral 
sanctions are more effective than unilateral ones reflects a longstanding policy 
of the U. S. to seek multilateral arrangements on export controls in view of the 
futility of unilaterally restricting the exports of specific commodities or 
technologies when these are readily available for export in other countries and 
the latter not only feel no obligation, legal, moral or other, to follow the U.S. 
example, but rather see a U. S. export restriction as a unique opportunity for 
their own exporting industries to make a sale unhindered by their American 
competitors. Hence U.S. inspired Cocom, hence Wassenaar, hence MTCR. 
2.3.2 The role of CoCom and its successor, the Wassenaar Arrangement 
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls was established 
in 1949 following the separation, by the 'iron curtain', of Europe in a western 
and a Soviet-dominated eastern part. The western countries, including the 
U.S., felt the need to join forces and agree on the type of goods/equipment 
and technology that, because of their strategic importance, should not fall into 
the hands of the Soviets and their allies. A Senate hearing in 1983 elicited the 
following rationale for stronger controls, as proposed by the Reagan 
administration, on the transfer of technology from the West to the East: 
"Current controls are based on the importance of advanced technology in military forces 
and its supporting industrial sectors and the existence ... of a technology gap between the 
[U.S.] and the Soviet Union. A technological gap in our favor is also a means of reducing 
the risk of technological surprise .... a particular technological development could give the 
discoverer a decisive advantage. Consequently, one of the major means of preventing war 
is to avoid technological surprise ... an increasing one-way stream of U.S. technology is 
236. See Update west 1997, supra note 233, at 5. 
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moving to the Soviet Union. Nearly all technological developments have direct or indirect 
military application. "237 
CoCom was created as a non-treaty organization, a forum, that (a) 
cooperatively restricted exports to certain, primarily communist, countries and 
(b) collectively determined the goods and technologies to be restricted and the 
controlled countries. 
Its membership included the members of NATO, with the exception oflceland, 
plus Australia and Japan. 238 
To perform its control functions, CoCom established and updated lists of 
embargoed products and technologies which provided the basis for the national 
control lists administered by each of the member governments. 239 
There were three such lists which were reviewed about every three years to 
take account of technology developments and other control-relevant factors: 
- a list of military items and technologies, 
- an atomic energy list, and 
- a list covering commodities and technologies which can have both military 
and civil applications (dual-use), later better known as the "(International) 
Industrial List" ((I)IL). 
A second traditional CoCom task was to act as the clearing house for 
individual requests submitted by the member governments to permit the 
shipment of specific embargoed items to the proscribed countries when the risk 
of diversion to military use was considered sufficiently small. (Proscribed 
destination for CoCom purposes in 1983 were the Soviet Union, the other 
Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, the People's Republic of China and some 
other (communist) countries in Asia, such as Vietnam). 
237. See W. Schneider (Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology), 
Export control of high technology (Mar 2, 1983), Dept of State Bull. 71-74 (Jun 1983) at 
71. 
238. The Commerce Regulations, as published in 1994, the year of CoCom's demise, listed the 
following 17 CoCom members: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Demnark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, t.IJ.e Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and the U.S. Apart from these, there were a number of so-called 
"cooperating countries", i.e. countries which cooperate fully with the CoCom members in 
restricting strategic exports to controlled countries in accordance with CoCom standards: 
Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, see Sec. 
770.2, Commerce Regulations, Bureau of Export Administration, Dept. Of Commerce, 
15CFR Ch. VII (1-1-94 Edition). 
239. In the U.S., primarily the Export Administration Act of 1979 and also the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976, see previous para. The U.K. implements its CoCom control 
obligations through the Export of Goods (Control) Order and Germany has its 
Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz, see Dennis J. Bumett and Marco Fuchs, Amendment of CoCom 
rules and the commercialization of space, Proceed. 33rd Colloq. L. Outer Space 11-17 
(1990) hereinafter referred to as Bumett and Fuchs, at note 3. The Netherlands national 
equivalent is the "Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen" of 1963. 
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A third major function of CoCom was to serve as a means of coordinating the 
administration and enforcement activities of the member governments. 
In practice this meant that, after national export control authorities such as 
Commerce's BXA or State Department's ODTC, had decided to grant a license 
for the export to the Soviet Union of a controlled good or technology 
appearing on any of the above lists, this export permission would only become 
effective after CoCom had reviewed and unanimously approved it. For 
example, in 1989 a total of 1557 of such national requests for an exception to 
the Cocom export restrictions were submitted to the members. Generally, some 
90% of these requests would receive approval. 240 
Obviously, this multilateral system could only work if all CoCom parties' 
national export regulations encompassed the same items as laid down in the 
above lists, and if a 'no license' decision of CoCom vis-a-vis one of its 
exporting members would be scrupulously adhered to by all other members; 
and, even more important, if all members shared the same non-proliferation 
worries, to the same extent and with respect to the same countries ... The latter 
requirement was probably only met during the first decade of the cold war 
when the concept of a common (communist) enemy was very much alive in 
the western world. But, where only one member insists on strict common 
controls towards its own (pet) adversary and other members perceive a lesser 
threat emanating from the country in question, adherance to the letter and spirit 
of the CoCom arrangement is much harder to achieve. 
Most items on the U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List were 
also included in the CoCom lists, and the CoCom lists found their way into 
the national export regulations of the member states, resulting in unilateral US 
export controls thus having the coveted multilateral 'blessing' (and support). 
Basically all space-related products and technologies, such as communications 
satellites, launch vehicles and technology, and computers fell under the 
controls of all CoCom members, and the sale of these 'strategic' goods to 
countries like the Soviet Union, China, the East-European countries, Vietnam 
and North Korea remained restricted until the overall political landscape and/or 
specific bilateral relations called for change. 
Although the members of CoCom had no legal obligation to abide by 
commitments made, at least over the first three decades of its existence there 
had been only a few instances when a member nation exercised its sovereign 
right to deviate from CoCom decisions. Decisions were made on the basis of 
240. See Letter Netherlands Deputy Minister Economic Affairs of Feb 26, 1990 to 
(Parliamentary) Permanent Foreign Trade Committee, on Cocom Executive Committee 
meeting, Paris, Feb 14-15, 1990, Staatscourant 1990-41 (Feb 27, 1990). Some goods on the 
IL do not have to be submitted to the Cocom partners; the export can be approved by the 
country concerned ("administrative exception"), ibid. 
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unanimity (which some saw as the basic reason for CoCom's durability). No 
change in the CoCom lists could be made, and no specific export of a 
controlled item could be approved if any of the members objected. 
During both the 1960s and the 1970s the combination of national and 
international export control systems was in principle applied, but technology 
transfer issues, both in the U.S. and within CoCom, received relatively little 
attention in practice. The situation changed with the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan coupled with the growing realization that acquisition of advanced 
western technology was enhancing the military capabilities of the Soviet 
Union. 241 
As a consequence, export control in general and the prevention of the 
acquisition of advanced technology by the Warsaw Pact in particular became 
an early and very high priority of the 1981 Reagan administration. 
In that connection, a review of CoCom's effectiveness was made. It revealed 
that, though in general the national controls coordinated through CoCom had 
been useful for restricting exports of items reviewed by the CoCom 
governments, and competition between western exporters in selling technology 
to the Warsaw Pact countries had been prevented, violations of CoCom 
controls had taken place, items had not been multilaterally controlled at the 
time of the sale, and Soviet 'technology piracy' had increased, resulting in 
militarily sensitive technology ending up in the hands of the Soviet bloc 
countries. Hence, a series of efforts was made on the part of the Reagan 
administration to considerably strengthen the effectiveness of the national 
enforcement activities and harmonize licensing procedures. A particular worry 
at the time was the the difficulty of controlling the export or re-export of 
commodities from non-CoCom countries to the Communist states, a problem 
which the U.S. addressed by requiring national licenses for re-exports of the 
U. S. -origin embargoed products from third countries, but a solution which few 
CoCom partners were willing to copy. 
This renewed attention, on a high policy level, to the effectiveness of the 
national controls and corresponding vigorous efforts to 'bringing CoCom out 
of the doldrums' led not only to large increases in staff dealing with export 
controls within t.he Departments of Commerce, Defense and State, but also to 
241. An example of the latter was the sale of $1.5 billion worth of U.S. and otber western 
technology tbat allowed tbe Soviets to build tbe Kama River Truck Plant in the early 1970s. 
The factory produced large numbers of military trucks that were used in tbe Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and by Soviet military units in Eastern Europe opposite NATO forces. The 
sale was legal at the time and approved with tbe understanding that tbe technology would be 
put only to civilian use, see U.S. export control policy, address by tbe Senior representative 
for Strategic Technology Policy, Dept. of State (Wendt) before the Atlantic Council of tbe 
United States (Jun 14, 1988), American Foreign Policy (Dept. of State pub!.), Doe. 47, 
126-129 (Jun 1988), hereinafter referred to as Wendt address 1988, at 126. 
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a strengthening of CoCom's structure. As a consequence, in 1988, a State 
Department official could conclude: 
"There is no question that the U.S. export control system is vastly superior to what it was 
in 1980. The CoCom system is far more effective ... We have certainly frustrated countless 
Soviet acquisition efforts across the world. "242 
Nevertheless, the sale by Japanese and Norwegian firms of machinery that 
provided a Soviet naval shipyard with the means to mass-produce quiet 
submarine propellers shocked the U.S. administration and its CoCom partners 
into a campaign to (further) revitalize CoCom. As a result, a high-level 
January 1988 meeting in Versailles agreed to rationalize the CoCom control 
list243 , strengthen cooperation with non-CoCom countries on technology 
transfer, harmonize and reinforce national controls and facilitate the flow of 
strategically significant goods and technologies among participating countries. 
The latter goal was of particular importance as it was meant to result in a 
license-free strategic trade zone among the CoCom countries with common 
export control standards with respect to the controlled goods and technologies 
vis-a-vis the outside world, i.e. primarily the Warsaw Pact countries. In June 
1988, the State Department still took the view that nothing had happened that 
would justify a more liberal policy on exports of strategic goods and 
technology to these countries: 11 As we pursue greater contacts, greater scientific 
exchanges, and greater non-strategic trade with the Soviet bloc, we must, at 
the same time, protect the technology that underlies our security. 11244 
Less than 2 years later, President Bush called upon the CoCom member states 
to adapt their export control regimes to the rapidly changing international 
political and military environment following glasnost and perestroika in the 
Soviet Union and the desintegration of the Warsaw Pact. A major year-long 
review of East-West export control policies within CoCom followed, and in 
May 1991 the parties agreed to implement a new system of export controls for 
dual use goods and technologies with significant military applications. Central 
to the new system was a thorough overhaul of the CoCom lists, not only 
because the strategic situation had changed but also in view of the rapid 
diffusion of some technologies, such as computer technology, that were making 
the existing control lists increasingly obsolete. A new "Core List" designed 
to cover only the most strategic, 'truly critical' dual-use goods and 
technologies, 50% shorter than the one it replaced inter alia because of a 
massive de-control of readily available off-the-shelf items, and the adoption 
of a 'common standard' of effective national control enforcement provisions 
242. See id., at 127. 
243. E.g. by removing items from tbe list which, due to worldwide technological developments, 
have become less relevant for control purposes, such as many types of personal computers. 
244. See Wendt address 1988, supra note 241, at 128. 
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were to constitute "a higher fence around fewer items". This new list, the 
International Industrial List (IlL), also provided wide-ranging favorable export 
licensing treatment for former Soviet bloc East European countries that were 
seen as representing a lesser strategic threat, namely Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary. These countries could henceforth be the recipient of all 
telecommunications equipment, except encryption devices, exported by 
individual CoCom countries without Cocom intervention. (As a necessary quid 
pro quo, the U.S required these countries to implement CoCom standard 
national control measures to ensure that the controlled goods and technologies 
they would be entitled to receive would not pass to unauthorized destinations 
and were used exclusively for civilian purposes.)245 The Soviet Union, on 
the other hand, was only permitted to acquire telecommunications goods and 
technologies comparable to western standards of the early-to-middle-1980s. 
In fact, the selections made were very much dependent on the level of 
sophistication of Soviet capabilities the U .S. military and security establishment 
could feel comfortable with. Thus, the U.S. introduced a new measure of 
military criticality: the degree to which acquisition of a good or technology 
by the Soviets would result in the closing of a critical technological gap 
between Western and Soviet-based military systems. 
(The example used in this connection was the night vision device which played 
a critical role in the coalition victory in Operation Desert Storm)246 
An important criterion for de-control was "foreign availability", a test which 
was applied by the U.S. in the CoCom talks to anything from avionics to laser 
systems. In the words of the U.S. representative, 
"[w]herever we found wide availability outside CoCom, we readily agreed to decontrol such 
commodities. Further, where we found Soviet capabilities equal to or better than previous 
control levels, we also sought decontrol. But, where dual-use goods or technologies are 
unique to CoCom suppliers, and are of gap-closing strategic significance, we pressed the 
allies to retain controls. "247 
It is important to note in this connection that, where in this multilateral forum 
the selected level of controls with respect to the Soviet Union was to a large 
extent determined by the U.S. Administration's perception of the military-
strategic risks concerned, Congress targeted Soviet treatment of nations and 
religious groups within its sphere of influence and used the (possible relaxing 
245. See Bumett and Fuchs, supra note 239, at 14. 
246. See Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on multilateral export controls, May 24, 1991, 
27 (21) Weekly Comp. Pres. Does. (Administration of George Bush) (May 27, 1991); also 
on the above subject, US export controls in a changing global environment, Ambassador 
Allan Wendt, Senior representative for strategic technology policy (address before a National 
Academy of Sciences symposium, Jun 11, 1991), US Dept of State Dispatch 480-482 (Jul1, 
1991) hereinafter referred to as Wendt 1991, at 481. 
247. See Wendt 1991, supra note 246, ibid. 
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of) export controls to exert pressure on that country to show a 'better 
behavior'. As one author noted: 
" ... the House of Representatives on June 6th [1990] voted 390 to 24 to block increased 
computer, telecommunications and hight technology sales to the U.S.S.R. The reason for 
this action was the Lithuanian issue [i.e. the Soviet's economic boycot against Lithuania] 
and to insure the continued emigration of Soviet Jews. "248 
Although the same author calls it "perplexing . . . that space issues are held 
hostage to serve political goals", this was of course not a new phenomenon 
in U.S. political practice in general and in the interaction between the 
Administration and Congress in particular. The U.S. 'space relations' with 
China showed a similar pattern. (See Chapter 3.1) 
Nevertheless, towards the end of 1991, Administration officials were already 
using a different approach when discussing the necessity of continued CoCom 
controls with respect to the Soviet Union. Not only did the new core list of 
dual use items constitute a "vast liberalization" of strategic trade restrictions 
as such, but the U.S. and its CoCom partners had also greatly liberalized in 
practice their treatment of requests for licenses of controlled items to the Soviet 
Union, because of the parties' commitment to supporting the Soviet Union's 
integration into the world economy and Soviet market reform. As a Commerce 
official assured the House of Representatives, "CoCom's remaining high 
technology restrictions will not impede the modernization and restructuring of 
the Soviet economy. CoCom restrictions are really very peripheral to the 
problems affecting Soviet economic progress ... [these] problems are caused 
by the lack of markets, not CoCom controls. "249 
In March 1992, the U. S. decided to establish diplomatic relations with Georgia 
(after having recognized Georgian independence in December 1991), and in 
the same month a White House announcement called for expanding and 
normalizing trade with the republics of what had been the Soviet Union, 
especially in areas of high technology. This involved both the decision to 
248. See Wirin, supra note 207, at 6. 
249. See US expon control policy adapts to a changing world, Cristopher G. Hankin, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for international trade controls, statement (Sep 24, 1991), US Dept of 
State Dispatch 752-754 (Oct 7, 1991) at 752. The statement also detailed the liberalization 
measures already taken by CoCom vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in such areas as the energy 
sector, the computer industry, transportation, manufacturing and telecommunications, and 
announced for the Baltic states an approach similar to the one used vis-a-vis Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Finally, controls on 'intra-CoCom trade' would be virtually 
eliminated by Jan 1, 1992 (concurrent with the expected time of implementation of the 




purchase sophisticated space-related goods from Russia and a commitment to 
further adapt CoCom controls to post-Soviet Union circumstances.250 
The above developments culminated in a June 1992 decision by the CoCom 
member countries to establish a CoCom Cooperation Forum on Export 
Controls (CCF) and to invite the republics of the former Soviet Union to 
participate. The resulting historic meeting of November 1992 in Paris included 
representatives from all East European countries, the Baltic states and all but 
three of the former Soviet republics (and the CoCom member states of course) 
in attendance. For the first time the former adversaries jointly discussed both 
the liberalization of trade in sensitive goods and technologies between the 
countries participating in the forum and the establishment (with CoCom 
members' help) of harmonized national export control systems vis-a-vis non-
participants. The final step towards a total revamping of CoCom's aims and, 
in fact, towards its dissolution was taken at the April 1993 Vancouver summit 
meeting of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. At that occasion, President Y eltsin 
expressed concern that CoCom, along with other cold war era restrictions, was 
harming reform and standing in the way of building a new strategic partnership 
with the West. In the joint statement with which the two presidents concluded 
their two-day meeting, they not only announced the establishment of a U.S.-
Russian Commission on technological cooperation in the fields of energy and 
space (headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Vice President Gore), but 
also decided "to promote access to each other's markets ... removal of 
impediments to trade and investment ... [and] to work together to remove 
obstacles impeding Russia's access to the global market in high technology and 
related services. "251 
This outcome provided additional impetus to the CoCom countries' review of 
the arrangement's (possible) future purposes. The conclusion was clear: 
"[t]he end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, deep cuts in the arsenals 
of both sides, and the goal of assisting economic and political reform in Russia and the other 
New Independent States- rather than retarding their economic development- allied us and 
250. See Statement by White House Press Secretary Fitzwater, Mar 24, 1992 (re Georgia) and 
Fact Sheet, White House, Off. of the Press Secretary, Mar 27, 1992, US Dept of State 
Dispatch 253 (Mar 30, 1992). The U.S. bought a Topaz space-nuclear reactor, Hall 
Thrusters (for efficient orbital transfers of satellites) and Plutonium-238, which would fuel 
generators supplying electricity on NASA deep-space missions (typically, the sale would be 
conditioned on a commitment by Russia not to use the proceeds to support its nuclear 
weapons production). Under its new export policy, the Administration would review license 
applications promptly, consider with a presumption of approval all export licenses for dual-
use items to civilian end-users in the republics of the former Soviet Union, and deny such 
applications only if the export would jeopardize the security interests of the U.S. and its 
allies, see ibid. 
251. See Joint statement at Vancouver by Clinton Yeltsin, White House Press Release, Apr 4, 
1993, The White House Virtual Library <http://library.whitehouse.gov/cgi>. 
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our allies to the view that the CoCom arrangement had outlived its strategic rationale and 
could not be sustained. "252 
Rather than sweeping away the CoCom arrangement altogether, the parties 
found good reasons for an orderly transition to a new regime which could 
respond to new security threats. One argument supporting that approach was 
the fact that the Western cooperation within CoCom, e.g. in the elaboration 
of control lists, licensing standards etc., was worth preserving as a means for 
addressing these new threats. 
A proposal, for a new, more broadly based mechanism with which the U.S 
approached its CoCom allies in mid-1993, outlined the following objectives: 
"-To deal firmly and creatively with dangerous states- e.g., Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and 
Libya - that are contributing to tensions in regions such as the Middle East; 
- To further the process of engaging Russia and other New Independent States in 
establishing effective export control systems and combating the global proliferation of 
weapons and sensitive dual-use technology; 
-To close gaps in the non-proliferation regimes and improve our ability to enhance regional 
stability by controlling conventional arms and sensitive dual-use sales on a multilateral basis 
for the first time; and 
-To remove disadvantages placed on U.S. exporters by the lack of adequate multilateral 
coordination on sensitive transfers to terrorist states and on other threats. "253 
A high-level meeting of the 17 CoCom governments in The Hague later that 
same year endorsed the broad outlines of of the above proposal and agreed on 
a work program for phasing out CoCom and inaugurating a new arrangement, 
with a timetable to achieve both on March 31, 1994. 
While indeed, at a meeting in The Hague on that specific date, CoCom' s end 
was made official, the new regime would take much longer to become a 
reality. One can identify at least two reasons for this delay. 
First, though Russia had expressed interest in participating in the new 
arrangement and being among the founding members, and the U.S. and its 
partners were eager to bring in Russia as an equal partner to make the regime 
effective, there were hesitations on Russia's de facto commitment to the (new) 
group's export control policies. A particular concern in this connection was 
Russia's continuing sales of arms to Iran, a country which had been 
categorized by the U.S. and a number of other former CoCom members as 
one of the "rogue" countries targeted by the new regime. 254 
252. See Export controls and non-proliferation regimes in the post-cold war world, Lynn E. 
Davis, Under Secretary for international security affairs, statement, House (Feb 24, 1994), 5 
(11) US Dept of State Dispatch149-152 (Mar 14, 1994) hereinafter referred to as Davis 
statement, at 150. 
253. See ibid. 
254. See ibid. 
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The second reason: a White House statement one week after CoCom's 'sunset' 
identified the new post-cold war security threats which justified the creation 
of a successor to the deceased cold war regime as follows: 
" ... dangers to peace and stability in new regions of the world, particularly the Middle East 
and South Asia, and also threats posed by rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and 
North Korea. So the two major goals of the new regime will be to work together to deny 
trade in dangerous arms and sensitive technologies to those regions and to those states. "255 
The problem was to get an agreement, within an increasingly large group of 
potential arms suppliers and sellers of sensitive goods and technologies, on the 
specific regions and countries which should be denied such arms, goods and 
technologies under the new regime. For, it was one thing for the parties to 
come to a gentlemen's agreement on provisionally continuing national controls 
of these items (on the basis of the established CoCom lists), albeit on a global 
instead of East-West basis, but it was something completely different - and 
difficult to get agreement on - to jointly identify the regions and countries of 
special concern, to which, in a new regime, the national export restrictions of 
all participating countries should apply. 
During CoCom times, the national lists of proscribed countries of the U.S. 
were both different and longer than those of some other CoCom members. 
Now, a new multilateral system based on a selection of countries, let alone on 
veto power as in CoCom, was increasingly difficult to accomplish. 
At one stage, though the U.S. had also Sudan, Syria and Cuba on its national 
lists, the parties appeared to be close to an agreement on jointly denying 
conventional weapons to only four 'blacklisted' countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya 
and North Korea. 
At the same time some countries refused to have specific weapons on the list, 
or were unhappy about the relevant procedures, which included a transparent 
reporting system on sales made. (For a long time the U.S. proposals contained 
a requirement of pre-notification of intended exports of a limited number of 
highly sensitive technologies and products, which a number of European 
countries and Japan saw and rejected as a potentially competition-distorting, 
if not foul play inviting 'tell your competitors what sales you try to make' 
obligation. In an arms sales market which had shrunk considerably since the 
end of the cold war, the international arms manufacturers' battle for market 
share had considerably intensified already.) 
But the most fundamentally contentious issue, splitting the party into two 
groups, was the overall scope of the arrangement: one group insisted on a 
system covering both conventional weapons and dual-use goods, the other, (not 
255. See Reforming export controls, opening statement by Under Secretary for international 
affairs Lynn E. Davis, State Dept press briefmg, April 7, 1994, 5 (15) US Dept of State 
Dispatch 204 (Apr 11, 1994). 
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surprisingly including major arms-exporting countries, in particular France), 
preferred the new regime to be limited to dual-use goods and technologies 
only.256 
As long as Russia did not join there was little sense in even continuing the 
multilateral discussions. At various occasions, both before and after CoCom's 
demise, bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Russia took place on the 
above issues, but, for a long time, without result. Russia's hesitations to both 
open the books and accept restrictions on weapons sales, the proceeds of which 
this cash-starved country desperately needed, blocked progress of the talks. 
The U.S. was however determined to have Russia, and eventually also China, 
a major arms exporter, on board, though not at all cost: as a State Department 
official responsible for export controls stated in early 1995: 
" ... in September 1994 President Yeltsin made a public commitment to end future arm sales 
to Iran and fulfill only existing contracts ... Russia, as a major supplier, must be factored 
into the CoCom successor regime and any credible arms restraint arrangement ... Resolving 
this issue [of Yeltsin's pledge to end arms sales to Iran] will pave the way for Russia's 
participation in the new regime. 
According to mutual agreement, new members must adhere to international non-proliferation 
norms, be committed to responsible arms and sensitive dual-use transfer policies, and have 
effective export controls. By these standards, China is not yet eligible to join the successor 
regime." (emph. add.)257 
Finally, in September 1995 Russia was prepared to join the regime and the 
U.S. was prepared to accept that country's participation on the basis of the 
latter's commitment to cease selling weapons to Iran and institute adequate 
export controls. In December of the same year 28 countries, the former 
CoCom members plus Russia, the 4 Visegrad (East European) states, Ireland, 
Finland, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and New Zealand, appropriately 
convened in the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands, and agreed on 
the establishment of the new arrangement. 
And on July 12-13, 1996 in Vienna, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies was 
officially established, with an - overly ambitious - implementation target date 
of November 1, 1996. (On that date parties aimed to have the new lists of 
dual-use items and munitions in place and functioning). 
The primary goals and tasks of the W assenaar Arrangement, also known as 
the New Forum, were summed up by the State Department as follows: 
256. See "Nieuw Cocom, met Rusland, gaat wapenexport controleren" ("New CoCom, including 
Russia, will control export of weapons"), interview with Frans Engering, Director General 
Foreign Economic Relations, Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, NRC Handelsblad 
(Jan 5, 1996) at 11. 
257. See 6 (1) Defense Trade News (Oct 1995) at 12, 13. 
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" ... to focus on preventing destabilizing buildups by encouraging transparency, holding 
consultations, and adopting common policies: and to deal firmly with countries of concern 
(Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya) by restricting transfers of arms and sensitive dual-use 
technologies. 
Members will share intelligence on threats and global trends; provide information on 
transfers of arms and sensitive dual-use articles to countries of concern; and defme common 
approaches, including restraint policies when appropriate." (emph. add.)258 
Unlike CoCom the Arrangement is not directed against any state or group of 
states and therefore does not mention specific 'blacklisted' countries. It is not 
supposed to stand in the way of bona fide civil transactions, nor will it 
interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to 
defend themselves pursuant to article 51 of the U.N. Charter. All in all, 33 
countries eo-founded the Arrangement and committed themselves to contribute 
to regional and international security by, inter alia, "enhancing cooperation 
to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for 
military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behaviour of a state is, or 
becomes, a cause for serious concern to the Participating States. "259 
Sharply different from the CoCom regime is the absence in 'Wassenaar' of a 
veto power for each of the members. This had provided - in principle - an 
effective tool for the mulilateralization of controls in the case of exports 
covered by Cocom. Wassenaar has given more responsibility to each individual 
member to behave responsibly and to legislate and enforce effective national 
controls. The multilateral aspect is taken care of in two ways: 
first, a new list of controlled weapons and strategic commodities had to be 
unanimously agreed upon by all Wassenaar members; 
secondly, all national export licenses for weapons and dual-use commodities 
have to be reported to the Secretariat in Vienna, for distribution among the 
member states. 
The combination of these two requirements provides all participants with 
insight into the sensitive exports of all Wassenaar adherents and enables all 
concerned to ex post facto review and challenge any member's sensitive sales 
and export practices; this system of 'transparency' is also supposed to assist 
the pa.rticipants in "developing common understandings of the risks associated 
258. See 7 (1) Defense Trade News (May 1996) at 20. Wassenaar is the name of the town, close 
to The Hague, where preparatory discussions on the issue took place. 
259. See The Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies, factsheet ACDA (Jul 1996) <http://www.acda.gov/factshee/ 
conwpnlwassenaa.htm > The factsheet lists the following participants, with Bulgaria and 
Ukraine among the new-comers: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of 
Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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with the transfers of these items" ,260 which may be translated to "now that 
you (we all) know how the listed arms or goods you sold to a foreign 
country/company were used, you (we all) will think twice before making the 
same mistake again. " Similarly, the participating states have also undertaken 
commitments to notify each other preferably within 30 days, but no later than 
60 days, of an approval of a license that has been denied by another 
participating state for an essentially identical transaction during the preceding 
three years. Transparency should thus lead to mutual control of export 
behaviour and, hopefully, to overall responsible behaviour in accordance with 
the spirit of the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
To that end, the contents of the Wassenaar list and the agreed reporting 
procedures have to be translated into national export regulations. The U.S did 
so on January 15, 1998.261 
One question is of course whether this arrangement will do the job it is 
supposed to do, i.e. to contribute to regional and international security. As 
indicated above this will depend on the extent to which each participant feels 
the need to strike a balance between its national economy-driven sales efforts 
on the one hand and the international security-induced restraints (no sales of 
certain goods/technologies to certain countries or regions) on the other hand. 
A U.S. Commerce official, in early 1998 gave the following tentative appraisal 
of the Arrangement's prospects: 
"The Wassenaar Arrangement's lack of strong central authority and its lack of explicit target 
countries, in contrast with CoCom, is a reflection of the times - the absence of a single large 
threat and lack of agreement over the nature and seriousness of the smaller threats. That 
weakness has complicated its development and made consensus among the expanded 
membership more difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, its inclusion of conventional weaponry 
is a major step forward, and I am confident that as its procedures and reporting 
requirements become routinized, discipline will grow. "262 
Another, and in fact the main, question is to what extent Cocom introduced 
or reinforced controls which affected the trade in launch services and whether 
Wassenaar will have similar consequences. 
260. See Implementation of the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Items; Revisions to the 
Commerce Control List and Reporting under the Wassenaar Arrangement, Supplementary 
information, 63 FR 2452 (Jan 15, 1998) (to be codified at 15 CFR pts. 732, 740, 742, 743, 
744, 746, 762, and 774. 
261. For the amendments of the U.S. Commerce Regulations and the CCL, see id.; the 
Netherlands amended its corresponding regulations, Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen 
1963, by Besluit van 19 november 1997, houdende de 22e wijziging van het Uitvoerbesluit 
Strategische Goederen 1963, Staatsblad 1997-560 (Nov. 27, 1997). 
262. See Opening address Under Secretary William A. Reinsch, [BXA], Dept of Commerce, 
Update West 98, Los Angeles (Feb 10, 1998) 
<http://www .bxa.doc.gov/press/98/updbills.htm > hereinafter referred to as Reinsch 
Update West 98. 
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An attempt to more fully answer that question will be made after the review 
of the (effects of the) Missile Technology Regime in the next sub-chapter. 
As part answer the following is submitted. There is no doubt that CoCom, both 
in itself and as an extension of U.S. and other national export regulations, put 
brakes on the sale of high technology, including launch technology and 
satellites to communist countries. The veto power of the member states over 
national exports of these controlled items meant that these countries could not 
buy Western satellites or satellite components, either for own use or for resale 
to third countries and had therefore also no possibility to launch such satellites. 
If a European satellite manufacturer wanted to sell a satellite to the Soviet 
Union, it knew beforehand that the U.S. would probably veto such a deal. 
When in 1988, the U.S. administration was finally prepared to allow the 
Chinese to launch a U.S.-built satellite, it needed not only a Congressional 
consent but also CoCom members' unanimous approval of the satellite export 
license before the final go-ahead could be given. Moreover, as will be 
discussed later, these (multilateralized) export controls gave the U.S. 
government the negotiating leverage to conclude agreements with both China 
and Russia, which regulated launch market access of these latter countries. 
The W assenaar Arrangement's proclaimed aim will discourage export of high 
technology goods to countries of concern. Though not supported by individual 
participants' veto powers, this will effect sales of satellites, including 
computers and encryption devices on board to such countries or regions of 
concern, which in turn reduces the number of clients for the launch vehicle 
operators. 
New entry into the international launch market, and thus the possibility of an 
increase in competition between launch vehicle operators worldwide, has been 
stymied by the U.S. launch/missile technology export regulations based on the 
Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. Both were 
multilateralized by the Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987. 
2.3.3 The Missile Technology Control Regime 
One way of countering the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD, i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), is to maintain 
vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related 
technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD. National export 
licensing measures on these products and technologies make it harder for 
countries seeking to acquire and produce such systems to actually get what they 
want. But national controls, such as the U.S. ITAR, do not make much sense 
if such products and technologies are available from other countries which do 
not implement the same controls. Coordination of such national measures, or 
multilateralizing the controls, make these much more effective and prevent 
distortion of competition. 
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Thus, on April 16, 1987, seven Western countries, i.e. the U.S. and its G-7 
partners, all major suppliers of missile technology sharing a growing concern 
with regard to the dangers of nuclear proliferation, agreed to jointly tighten 
restrictions on the transfer of equipment and technology used in military 
ballistic missiles, civilian sounding rockets and space launch vehicles to 
countries suspected of developing or planning to develop nuclear weapon 
launch systems. The seven nations concerned, the U.S., Canada, U.K., 
France, West-Germany, Italy and Japan, exchanged diplomatic notes and made 
statements confirming their adherence to a common international export policy, 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, and established a control mechanism, 
including an administrative framework, to give teeth to their commitment to 
prevent this technology from being used by - in practice particularly third 
world-countries to develop such "nuclear-capable missiles", or "systems (other 
than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction", 
according to the broader terminology introduced later. 263 
The MTCR has in the meantime grown to an informal and voluntary 
association of 32 countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of 
unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and which seek 
to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their 
proliferation. 
The Regime rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines. These 
Guidelines apply to an integral common list of controlled items, the MTCR 
Equipment and Technology Annex. All decisions with respect to the Guidelines 
and the Annex are taken by consensus. 
The MTCR does not take export licensing decisions as a group. Rather, 
individual partners are responsible for implementing the guidelines and annex 
in accordance with national legislation and practice. 
263. Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related to Missiles, 
April 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 599 (1987), hereinafter referred to as MTCR or the Regime. The 
Regime consists of two parts, the "Guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant transfers" (the 
Guidelines) and the "Equipment and Technology Annex" (the Annex); the U.S. publication 
includes a summary of the -very detailed- annex (the Annex summary). For background 
infonnation and (US) implementation measures, see Missile Technology Control Regime, 
Dept of State Press Briefing, April 16, 1987 (Extract), Doe. 31, American Foreign Policy 
74-80 (1987), hereinafter referred to as MTCR State briefmg. The MTCR members meet 
regularly to keep the Equipment and Technology Annex up-to-date and exchange views on 
the national application/implementation of the Regime. In 1993, a revised version of the 
Guidelines was adopted, which replaced the term "nuclear" (weapons) by "weapons of mass 
destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons)", and tightened some of the 
criteria used. The new Guidelines became effective on Jan 7, 1993 and replaced with effect 
from that date the 1987 Regime, see Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised, 
Department Statement, Text of revisions, 4 (3) US Dept of State Dispatch 41-42 (1993) 
hereinafter referred to as MTCR revision. 
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Membership in the MTCR does not create an entitlement to obtain technology 
from another partner nor an obligation to supply such technology. In fact, the 
partners are expected, just as in such trade between partners and non-partners, 
to exercise appropriate accountability and restraint in inter-partner trade. 
In making membership decisions (also by consensus), the following factors are 
taken into consideration: 
" ... whether a prospective new member would strengthen international non-proliferation 
efforts, demonstrates a sustained and sustainable commitment to non-proliferation, has a 
legally based, effective export control system that puts into effect the MTCR Guidelines 
and procedures, and administers and enforces such controls effectively. "264 
A country can choose to adhere to the guidelines without being obligated to 
join the group, and, through the years, often in preparation of full 
membership, a number of countries have indeed done so. 
The aim of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air 
vehicles and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 
kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems intended for the 
delivery of weapons of mass destruction. 
The MTCR considers missiles to include: ballistic missiles, space launch 
vehicles and sounding rockets. Unmanned air vehicles (UAV's) include: cruise 
missiles, drones, UAV's and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's). 265 
The national controls of transfers of the above and other items on the Annex 
(which all have been identified as contributing one way or the other to delivery 
systems for WMD) are implemented by evaluating applications of firms 
exporting these items taking into account the following factors: 
" 3 ... A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; 
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems 
(other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction; 
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the 
recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below; 
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements." 
5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, 
the government will authorize transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate 
assurances from the Government of the recipient state that: 
264. See ibid. 
265. See ACDA fact sheet The Missile Technology Control Regime (Sep 15, 1997) 
<http://www .acda.gov/factshee/exptconlmtcr96.htm>. 
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A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modified 
nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the United States 
Government; 
B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivates thereof will be retransferred without the 
consent of the United States Government. "266 
Some of the countries targeted by the Regime in 1987, such as India and 
Brazil, were already developing a commercial launch capability that could be 
turned to military uses, whereas Argentina and Pakistan were also believed to 
be developing launch vehicles. 
Moreover, short-range missile systems and rockets, sold by both U.S.(!) and 
Soviet firms prior to 1987 to countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and 
Middle-East countries like Syria and Iraq, created a military hazard as such 
and were also a cause for concern. Some of these latter countries possessed 
sufficient know-how to develop more sophisticated and/or longer range 
versions of the weapons obtained. 267 Most of these so-called "projects of 
concern" were, in 1987, still in the design or development stage and would, 
in the view of the MTCR parties, be severely slowed or entirely crippled if 
foreign exporters did not assist them. 268 
This non-proliferation goal was to be attained by a system of export controls, 
applied to two categories of items, as specified in an annex: (1) complete 
rocket systems, including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding 
rockets, capable of delivering at least a SOOkg payload to a range of at least 
300 km as well as the specially designed production facilities for these systems, 
and subsystems such as rocket stages, reentry vehicles and rocket engines; (2) 
components that could be used to build (sub) systems, such as, for example, 
missile computers and flight control systems. 269 
The category I items -the term 'item' covers both the equipment and the 
relevant technology - are the items 'of greatest sensitivity', creating a strong 
presumption to deny any transfers of the systems concerned. And the transfer 
of production facilities for the manufacture of category I items "will not be 
authorized until further notice". Or, to put it differently: category I is the 
'denial list'. 
If a 'proliferator' cannot buy complete missile or launch vehicle factories or 
major missile components, it must assemble bits and pieces with much greater 
time and effort. That is where the category II list, the 'restraint list', comes 
in. 
266. See MTCR revision supra note 263, Guidelines. 
267. See AW/ST, April 20, 1987, at 28, 29 ("Seven nations curb nuclear weapon launch system 
exports"). 
268. See MTCR State briefing, supra note 263, at 76. 
269. See MTCR, supra note 263, Guidelines, para. 2 and Annex summary. 
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As most of these latter items can also be used for purposes other than projects 
of concern, so-called 'dual use commodities', "restraint will be exercised in 
the consideration" of all transfers of such items and "all such transfers will 
be considered on a case-by-case basis", with particular attention being paid 
to the item's end use: if it is destined for a project of concern, the export 
application will generally be denied; if the transfer could contribute to a 
delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, assurances from the 
government of the recipient state are required, to the effect that: 
"A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be 
modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the [government 
of the state of transfer]; 
B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivates thereof will be retransferred 
without the consent of the [government of the state of transfer]. "270 
The MTCR is not a treaty, but establishes identical guidelines to be 
implemented by the members - all possessing a certain degree of sensitive 
missile (components) technology - in accordance with their national legislation. 
As outlined above, in the U.S., both the Export Administration Act and the 
Arms Export Control Act and their implementing regulations contained 
provisions controlling the export of the above items, including enforcement 
procedures and appropriate sanctions. Nevertheless, Congress was not 
impressed by these controls and, with fresh memories of the role of missiles 
(both on the Iraqi and on the 'allied' side) in the Gulf War, wished to 
strengthen the relevant provisions. Several bills were introduced - with 
widespread bipartisan support - in the 1 0 1st Congress with that intention, 
focusing in particular on additional mandatory sanctions against nations, 
companies and individuals who violated U.S. export regulations. The Bush 
administration was unhappy with that approach, which would take away the 
President's freedom of choice in reacting to inappropriate missile transfers. 271 
Nevertheless, the end-product, the Missile Technology Control Act of 1990, 
which amended the above Acts, contained provisions which require the U.S. 
President to impose sanctions on U.S. and foreign persons who violate the 
export regulations with respect to the MTCR items and commodities as 
specified. Sanctions in both Acts include denial of U.S. export licenses and 
prohibitions on U.S. government contracts for two years or more, depending 
on the seriousness of the violation, with, understandably, violations involving 
category I systems (complete rockets or launch systems) belonging to the more 
serious ones. 272 
270. Id., paras 1, 2, 3 and 5. 
271. See Non-proliferation regimes: A comparative analysis of policies to control the spread of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, by Zachary S. Davis, CRS Report 
for Congress (Apr 1, 1991), hereinafter referred to as CRS Report 1991, at 30. 
272. The Missile Technology Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the MTC Act, became law 
as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1991, Pub. L. 101-510 (Nov. 5, 
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1990), Title XVII (Sec. 1701-1704) "Missile Technology Controls", 104 Stat. 1738-1750. 
The MTC Act implemented the MTCR guidelines and introduced sanctions on violations 
through amendments of the export license provisions of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (EAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA). More in particular, the lists 
of controlled goods contained in the implementing regulations, the CCL and the USML, 
were supplemented with the dual-use goods and technologies and other items contained in 
the MTCR Annex respectively. (This Annex is being reviewed regularly. The responsible 
agency in the US Administration is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
within the State Dept. ACDA participates in US delegations to bilateral discussions, to the 
annual MTCR plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in 
internal missile non-proliferation efforts. ACDA serves as the executive secretary to the 
interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group which is responsible for US interdiction efforts 
and missile sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of missile 
technology export licensing through the Missile Technology Export Control Group, and 
provide inputs to the review process of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the 
Missile Annex Review Committee, see ACDA Annual Report 1995 
<http://www.acda.gov/reports/chap6.htm>, hereinafter referred to as ACDA Annual 
Report 1995, at Chapter 6. 
The EAA as amended required an "individual validated license" for "(A) any export of 
goods or technology on the list [of the above MTCR items] to any country; and (B) any 
export of goods or technology that the exporter knows is destined for a project or facility for 
the design, development, or manufacture of a missile in a country that is not an MTCR 
adherent" (subsection I, para. 2). Licenses would in general be denied in para. 2 cases 
where the goods would end up in a missile developing or building facility in a non-MTCR 
country; and be denied if the ultimate destination was a facility in a country supporting 
"international acts of terrorism" (para. 3). 
Both Acts, as amended by the MTC Act, provided new sanctions related to MTCR-related 
violations. 
Thus, the MTC Act amended the EAA by inserting, under the heading "Missile proliferation 
control violations" a new Sec. liB, which distinguished between (a) "violations by United 
States persons" and (b) "Transfers of missile equipment or technology by foreign persons" 
with specific trade sanctions per category as follows: if a foreign person exports MTCR 
items to a 'forbidden' destination, the President shall, in the case of a Cat. II item, "deny 
for a period of 2 years, licenses for the transfer to such foreign person of missile equipment 
or technology the export of which is controlled under this Act" (In other words, no US 
export to that country of missile-related dual use items) If the violation concerns the export 
of a Cat. I MTCR item, US exports to that country will be denied for any dual-use item 
covered by the Act, for a period of minimal 2 years. The President has the authority to 
waive t.lte imposition of a sanction on a foreign person if he determines that such waiver "is 
essential to the national security of the [US]", but before doing so he will have to notify 
Congress and fully explain his reasons. (Para. 5) In case of similar violations by US 
persons, the latter will face corresponding sanctions, i.e. depending on the category of items 
involved in, and thus the seriousness of, the violation (MTCR Cat. I or II), they receive no 
licenses for exports of missile-related dual-use goods or any dual-use goods for a specific 
period of time, i.e. 2 years or minimal2 years (Sec. liB. (a)) 
The AECA was amended by the insertion of Chapter 7, "Control of missiles and missile 
equipment or technology", containing roughly similar provisions/sanctions as the above 
amendments to the EAA, under the headings "Denial of the transfer of missile equipment or 
technology by United States persons" (Sec. 72), and "Transfers of missile equipment or 
technology by foreign persons" (Sec. 73). 
The sanction which applies to a US person unlawfully trading in MTCR goods/technologies 
("defense articles") on the USML as amended by the MTC Act, is, in case of trade in Cat II 
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In the years following the adoption of the MTCR guidelines, more and more 
nations joined the original seven, either by becoming a member or through 
declarations committing themselves to abide by the Regime; this non-
proliferation policy is thus being implemented, at least in principle, by 
practically all major missile suppliers. 273 
items, a denial for 2 years of US Government contracts relating to missile equipment or 
technology, and licenses for the transfer of missile equipment or technology controlled under 
the AECA; in case of forbidden trade in the more sensitive Cat I missile equipment or 
technology, "the President shall deny to such [US] person for a period of not less than 2 
years (i) all [US] Government contracts, and (ii) all export licenses and agreements for items 
on the [USML]." Cat. II violations by foreign persons result in a denial for 2 years of "(i) 
[US] Government contracts relating to missile equipment or technology; and (ii) licenses for 
the transfer to such foreign person of missile equipment or technology controlled under this 
Act." Cat. I violations have the stiffer penalty of a denial by the President, for a period of 
not less than 2 years of "(i) all [US] Government contracts with such foreign person; and 
(ii) licenses for the transfer to such foreign person of all items on the [USML]". An 
additional sanction is imposed in case the export/trade of the foreign person "has 
substantially contributed to the design, development, or production of missiles in a country 
that is not an MTCR adherent, then the President shall prohibit, for a period of not less than 
2 years, the importation into the [US] of products produced by that foreign person" (Sec. 
73. (a) (2)(A)-(C)). The President has, again, the authority to waive the imposition of these 
sanctions if such waiver is essential to the US national security (subject to notification to 
Congress). 
273. Membership grew gradually. Near the end of 1989, the following additional countries had 
become members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden, putting the total at 18. A RAND 
Corporation study published in 1993 mentioned the former Soviet Union, Switzerland, Israel 
and China as - additional - countries that had agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines. The 
same study quoted a U.S. government official's statement of April 1992 before a 
Congressional committee to the effect that Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria had already adopted, or were in the process of adopting, controls comparable to 
those of the MTCR; this left only North Korea as the remaining major missile supplier 
outside MTCR, a lonely position which the author expected to be of a temporary nature 
only, see Brian G. Chow, Emerging national space launch programs - economics and 
safeguards, National Defense Research Institute, RAND, U.S.A. (1993) [hereinafter cited as 
RAND study] at 2. A Pentagon official, in August 1993, put total MTCR membership at 23, 
and voiced tl1e expectation that Argentina and Hungary would join in the not too distant 
future, see 4 (32) Space News (Aug. 1993) at l. A statement issued by MTCR after its Mar 
8-11, 1993 plenary session in Canberra, welcomed Iceland as member number 23, agreed to 
invite applicant countries Argentina and Hungary to become Partners, and listed the 
following members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the US, 
see 4 (14) US Dept of State Dispatch (1993) at 206. In November 1997 the number of 
participating countries had increased to a total of 29 (including but only after years of 
complicated US- (Soviet-) Russian talks, Russia): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K. and the U.S, see Commonly asked 
questions on the ... (MTCR), ACDA fact sheet 
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There is general agreement amongst experts and policy makers alike that it is 
virtually impossible to distinguish between peaceful space launch technology 
and offensive missile technology (and, in fact space launchers are simply 
surface-to-space ballistic missiles). 274 If that is a fact, then technical 
assistance to a nation's space launch program - either through direct sales of 
launchers, rocket engines and/or the relevant technology or through a bilateral 
cooperative launcher development programme - is as potentially 'proliferatory' 
as selling ballistic missiles (technology) to its military establishment. 
Thus, although the MTCR states that "the Guidelines are not designed to 
impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs 
as long as such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons delivery 
systems", this is a matter of interpretation: a country enforcing the guidelines 
can conclude that its decision has made the world a safer place while the 
'victim' country decries the same decision as one causing an unwarranted set-
back to its peaceful space (launch) program. 
An example of the latter category is India, a country with an advanced and 
consistently government- funded space program, both a -modest- seller of 
space goods in its own right and a buyer of U.S. satellite components. Inda 
has the technological know-how, the cost-consciousness and the ambition to 
obtain independent access to space for its own satellites. 275 To that end, since 
<http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptconlfs.htm> (Nov 26, 1997). In a May 1998 
"Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting", the MTCR partners reached consensus to 
admit the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR, bringing total 
membership to 32, see Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President of the Senate, The White House, Off. of the Press 
Secretary (Nov 12, 1998) 
<http\ \www .pub. whitehouse.gov/urires/TzR?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov .us/l998/ll/l6/9.text.l 
>India, though both a missile and launcher manufacturer, has not joined yet. 
274. At the Dept of State briefing on MTCR it was put as follows: "Space launch vehicles, for 
instance are virtually interchangeable with ballistic missiles. When President Kennedy was 
asked the difference between the Atlas rocket that put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas 
rocket armed with a nuclear warhead and aimed at the Soviet Union, he replied with one 
word-'attitude'.", see MTCR State briefing, supra note 263, at 75. 
275. India has built remote -sensing satellites and ground equipment, and telecommunications 
satellites. In 1992, Indian officials mentioned remote sensing data, propellant tanks and 
launcher propellant as- potential- export products, see 3 (17) Space News (May 1992) at l, 
21. In December 1994, Intelsat decided to lease more than half the transponder capacity of 
an Indian Insat 2E communications satellite to be launched in 1997 to cover its 
telecommunications needs in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the contract Intelsat would pay 
India $ lOO million over a 10-year period, see 6 (l) Space News (Jan 1995) at 16 . For a 
more extensive account of -the development of- India's space applications program, 
including launchers, see the series of articles on "Indian Space" in 3 (18) Space News (May 
1992) at 14, 15, 3 (19) Space News (May 1992) at 14, and 3 (20) Space News (May 1992) 
at 11. India aimed, with its own rocket, to bring launch costs down to about one third of 
western launch prices, see 4 (28) Space News (Jul 1993) at 3. Whether the PSLV it has 
developed in the meantime now meets that requirement is a matter of debate; and whether its 
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1984, India has been developing its own launch vehicles, one of which is the 
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle. For the so-called cryogenic upper 
stage, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), in the late eighties, 
after talks with General Dynamics and Arianespace had failed, turned to the 
Russian space agency Glavkosmos and finally signed an agreement in 
November 1990 for the sale oftwo such engines to be delivered in 1994/1995, 
with future engines to be built by ISRO itself, based on the technology 
transferred by the Russians under the agreement. 
The State Department considered the sale of this engine, which according to 
its arms control experts could be used to propel ballistic missiles, a violation 
of the MTCR guidelines and, by virtue of the Arms Export Control Act and 
the Export Administration Act, as amended by the Missile Technology Control 
Act, prohibited with effect from May 6, 1992 for two years all exports ofU.S. 
made components to Glavkosmos and to the Indian organization. 276 The 
embargo was applied by both the State Department and the Department of 
Commerce. It also affected contracts already signed and would, according to 
ISRO officials, delay the manufacturing and launch schedule of its domestic 
communications satellites Insat 2C and 2D. ('delay', because the components 
would have to be obtained elsewhere in the world aerospace industry, and 
obviously from a country which did not abide by the MTCR rules, either as 
an outsider or as a member with a different interpretation of the law or the 
facts). ISRO rejected the U.S. government assertion that the Indian launch 
program was closely linked with military ballistic missile efforts, and 
maintained that there was a complete separation between civilian space launch 
and military missile efforts. 277 
GSLV will do so also remains to be seen. But low cost is not its highest priority: India's 
main goal with its space effort in the 1960's was to accelerate national development; and 
more recently, it was formulated along, inter alia, the following lines: 
"sustain and grow autonomous national space capability by virme of India's size, diversities 
and development needs; enable strategic and leading edge technology development; realize 
economic benefits and promote sustainable space industry", etc. That is why India builds 
both satellites and launch vehicles, see speech ISRO Chairman, IAF Melbourne Congress 
(Sep 28, 1998), hereinafter referred to as ISRO Melbourne speech. 
276. The State Dept issued the following statement: " ... The MTCR partners all have concluded 
that the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal is inconsistent with the MTCR guidelines. That is why they 
have urged that this deal not go through ... Since the facts are clear and since the parties to 
the transaction have declined to terminate these activities, the [US] has imposed sanctions in 
accordance with our law. The sanctions are: -a 2-year ban on all US-licensed exports to 
these entities (i.e., Glavkosmos and ISRO); a 2-year ban on all imports into the [US] from 
these entities; and a 2-year ban on US Government contracts with these entities ... We have 
explained to both governments that termination of the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal could permit 
us to consider a waiver of these sanctions.", see Russian sale of rocket engine to India, 
Statement by Department deputy spokesman (May 11, 1992), US Dept of State Dispatch 
(May 18, 1992) at 386. For the legal basis, see AECA and EAA as amended, supra note 
272. See, for press report on the sanctions, 3 (19) Space News (May 1992) at 14 ("U.S. 
sanctions imposed; India deal with Russia still on"); for -further- background, see 3 (18) 
Space News (May 1992) at 1, 28 ("U.S. sanctions target Indian, Russian programs"). 
277. See above press reports. The ISRO chairman, in an interview after the imposition of the 
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The sale of the engine went through as planned, and India bought the 
components it needed from companies outside the United States. The U.S. 
measures, which were apparently not sufficiently supported by corresponding 
measures of the other MTCR members, drew strong reactions from American 
industry. At a Congressional hearing on "Export control reform in high 
technology" of August 1993, a representative of the American Electronics 
Association voiced, on behalf of 3000 American high technology companies 
involved in electronics, his frustration about the effects this imposition of 
unilateral controls had produced for U.S. industry: 
" ... the parties most hurt by this decision have been U.S. companies. After some fifteen 
months, exporters are still unable to export even such basic goods as pencils to I.S.R.O. 
In the meantime, our European and Japanese competitors have had no difficulty filling the 
void ... 
When customers such as I.S.R.O. are no longer able to obtain needed goods from U.S. 
industry, they turn elsewhere and often make permanent decisions not to 'buy America' ... 
Our government should quit playing the Pied Piper expecting others to quickly follow in 
line with us after we have imposed controls unilaterally. "278 
A similar case erupted in June 1993, when the State Department determined 
that the Russian firm KB Salyut was directly involved in the sale of liquid-
fueled rocket engines to India. This time, the controversy was more 
complicated. What remained the same were the desparate financial needs of 
the Russian aerospace industries, which therefore were as eager as ever to sell 
any hardware and/or technology to any customer willing to pay in hard 
currency. On the U.S. side, the existing non-proliferation worries were joined 
by the concern that the Russian space industry, with all its advanced 
technology and expertise, if unassisted, would be successively sold, in bits and 
pieces, to the highest bidders amongst which were suspected to be particularly 
those countries whose technological advances the MTCR tried to curtail. 
For that reason, the U.S. was trying to get Russian manpower, space 
technology and hardware involved in the Space Station program (with the 
welcome side-effect of a possible interesting reduction of the much-criticized 
astronomical cost of the project). For the same reason, negotiations were 
taking place on Russia's entry into the international commercial launch market 
sanctions, expressed particular anger at the retro-active character of the ban, and rightfully 
pointed out that this aspect of the measure would undermine the credibility of the U .S. space 
(components) industry in international markets. The American companies affected by the 
sanction, Lockheed and Hughes, were reported to challenge the retroactiveness of the ban, 
which was only applied by the Commerce Department, see 3 (26) Space News (Jul 1992) at 
9 ("Embargo threatens India's space program schedule"). 
278. See Export Control Reform in High Technology, hearing before the House Committee on 
Science, Space and Technology, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 13, 1993) hereinafter referred 
to as High technology hearing, 123-131 (statement of Ms. Derrel de Passe) at 127-128. 
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in such a way that the Russian launch industry would be able to sell launch 
services without their U. S. counterparts being unduly damaged as a result. (See 
next Chapter) 
An additional complication were the new links that had been forged among the 
Russian industries and also between Russian and U. S. companies: a ban, 
depending on its scope, could apply to all and effectively halt all space 
cooperation, whether on an intergovernmental or private level, between the 
U.S. and Russia. 279 
The compromise reached in July 1993 between Prime Minister Chemomyrdin 
and Vice President Gore saw India at the loosing end. It was agreed that the 
Russians could sell a number of rocket engines to ISRO, but would not be 
allowed to sell the technology that India needed to manufacture the engines 
independently. Russia at the same time agreed to henceforth abide by the 
MTCR guidelines. New sanctions were thus averted (the original sanctions 
against Glavkosmos and ISRO remained in place for the remainder of the two 
year period, i.e. until May 6, 1994), and the planned space cooperation 
between Russia (without participation of Glavkosmos!) and the U.S., as 
outlined above, was safeguarded, to the undisputable benefit of both, but to 
the- financial -relief of particularly the former and the 'security' relief of the 
latter. 280 
279. KB Salyut, which designs the Proton rocket, merged with Khrunichev Enterprise, Proton's 
manufacturer; the latter concluded an agreement with Lockheed to jointly market the Proton 
rocket outside Russia. NPO Energia, which builds the fourth stage of the Proton rocket, in 
July 1993, agreed with Rockwell to build a docking unit and provide technical services for a 
joint Mir and space shuttle mission; and United Technologies Pratt & Whitney concluded a 
marketing agreement with Energomash of Moscow which builds rocket engines, see 4 (27) 
Space News (Jul1993) at 1, 20 ("U.S. may slap new sanctions on Russia"). 
280. Preceded by an understanding reached by the US and Russian presidents in Vancouver on 
Apr 3-4, 1993, Vice President AI Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, on Sep 2, 1993 
concluded a number of related cooperation agreements. Most important in the context of this 
Chapter were a joint statement on space cooperation, particularly addressing Russia's 
participation in the international space station program (which promised work/money for the 
embattled Russian space industry), a bilateral launch trade agreement giving Russia access to 
the international launch services market (promising work/money for the Russian launch 
industry) and a M.o.U. on missile-related exports, in which Russia agreed to abide by the 
criteria and standards of MTCR. The Fact Sheet released by the office of the Vice President 
added somewhat cryptically: "We also reached an understanding on the disposition of 
Russia's cryogenic rocket engine contract with India. We expect a final arrangement on this 
issue to be reached by the beginning of next year", see Fact Sheets, Joint statements on 
space cooperation, aeronautics and eanh observation, Office of the Vice President (Sep 2, 
1993), Gorove US Space Law, supra note 55, at I.A.4 (a-2). See also Testimony of John H. 
Gibbons, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, before the House 
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications (Oct 6, 1993) 
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India's loss was not so much a matter of now lacking the hardware as such, 
but of being deprived of the technology and having lost two precious years in 
which they could have worked on the development of their own engine; which 
of course was exactly what the MTCR aims were all about. 281 
In October 1993, the Russians formally cancelled the engine contract 
altogether, citing legal provisions in the contract. 282 India, at the same time, 
continued to autonomously develop and test two other families of smaller 
launch vehicles, and it was generally expected that neither the mixed results 
of the latter, nor the above cancellation of the engine contract would lessen 
its drive to build an independent launch system. 283 (And in fact, on 
September 29, 1997, India reached a milestone with the first operational launch 
of its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle. The payload was an Indian earth-imaging 
satellite, which underscored that country's increasing independence from 
will get the Russians' attention on issues like the [MTCR], then the Clinton administration 
should use it to put the pressure on full force. A little heavy-handedness by the [U.S.] now 
could avert many potential crises for decades to come, if missile proliferation goes 
unchecked due to Russian greed", see 4 (27) Space News (Jul 1992) at 14 ("Commentary"). 
281. That result may have been overstated: according to Henry Sokolski, former deputy for 
nonproliferation policy in the Pentagon, in July 1993, Yeltsin promised Clinton to 
reconfigure Russia's contract with ISRO by Nov 1, 1993, so it would exclude any transfers 
of production technology. But between July and October Russia, according to Indian 
officials, transferred more than 4/5 of the sanctioned production technology and sent its 
'drawings of the engine' in Sep 1993 that would enable India to produce the engines within 
a few years, see 9(21) Space News (May 1998) at 11. 
U.R. Rao, the ISRO chairman, said in an interview in 1993 that "without the technology 
transfer this contract is not worth much . . . The technology is the heart of this contract". 
According to the same official, India had agreed with Russia that the engine technology 
would not be transferred to third parties, and that it would be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes, see 4 (28) Space News (Jul 1993) at 3 ("Russia backs away from India deal"). 
That latter commitment would not have satisfied the U.S. which considered India itself a 
country that should not be assisted in building up launch technology; in the American view, 
countries like India should be allowed their legitimate access to space through U.S. and 
other launch services at reasonable prices. In the same vain, Russia, as part of its fence-
mending efforts vis-a-vis India, offered inexpensive launches of Indian communications 
satellites aboard Proton rockets "which would give India time to complete its new vehicle 
using Russian engines and eventually its own domestically built engines". See ibid. The 
launch price argument did play a role -though not a decisive one- in India's decision to 
build an indigenous launch vehicle, see supra note 275. 
282. Information provided by an ISRO spokesman as quoted in 5 (11) Space News (Mar 1994) at 
3. 
283. Ibid. and see 4 (38) Space News (Sep-Oct 1993) at 1, 28 ("India's rocket effort falters"). 
Shortly after the date of expiry of the 1992 sanctions, in May 1994, India and Russia were 
reported to have signed a revised contract giving India four cryogenic engines, with an 
option for three more; at the same time India had begun its own engine development 
program. The Russian engines would be incorporated into India's own geostationary space 
launch vehicle to be ready for a first launch in 1996 of an Insat communications satellite 
built by ISRO. Under the terms of that latter agreement, the technology for the engines 
would not be transferred to India, see 5 (18) Space News (May 1994) at 3 and 5 (22) Space 
News (May/Jun 1994) at 2. 
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western space technology, at least as far as 'official' transfers are 
concerned). 284 
India's military scientists in the meantime continue the development and testing 
of 'real' ballistic missiles, for air defense purposes and to counter the threat 
posed by Chinese-made M-11 missiles deployed by Pakistan. 285 (As discussed 
in Chapter 3.1 on U.S. -China launch relations, the alleged M- 11 sales to 
Pakistan also brought about U.S. -imposed MTCR sanctions directed against 
China). 
Other countries subjected to MTCR controls 
A 1993 RAND Corporation study on emerging national space launch programs 
put India, Brazil and Israel in the same class of countries which have made 
substantial investments - in manpower and money - in both civil space 
launchers and ballistic missile programs. The report addresses the economic 
viability of the space launch program of one of these countries, Brazil, and 
concludes that the prospects for making profits from its space launch business 
are very poor. This conclusion extended to India and Israel as well, and 
applied a fortiori to the planned launch activities of a second group, whose 
programs were still in the early stage of development or planning, with 
investments significantly less than those in the first group: South Africa, Iraq, 
South Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan and Argentina. 
The study argued convincingly that the poorer the economic prospects, the less 
uncomfortable the U.S. and other MTCR members would be in exercising 
export controls and in - thus - stemming the flow of launch technology to the 
countries concerned. 286 
Two countries belonging to the second group were believed to have cancelled 
the development of indigenous launchers as a consequence of MTCR-inspired 
launch technology export license refusals on the part of the U .S., viz. Taiwan 
in 1990, and South Africa in 1993, with in the latter case "[p]oor commercial 
prospects for the vehicle [having] speeded the cancellation. "287 A third 
country, Argentina, cancelled its 'Condor 2' ballistic missile program, also for 
284. See 8 (47) Space News (1997) at 6. More recently, an ISRO official, without acknowledging 
the extent of the ensuring delays, observed that the MTCR affair had been blessing in 
disguise, because it forced India to develop its own launch technology, see Mukund Rao, 
Deputy Director, at IMF Melbourne Congress (convers. with the author). As for the issue of 
(non-)proliferation of launcher technology India made it one of the more important issues for 
'space policy adjustments'. As recently stated by ISRO, "we take into account international 
concerns [re proliferation of launch vehicle technologies] and have national regulations 
taking care of those", see ISRO Melbourne speech, supra note 275. 
285. See IHT (Jun 6, 1994) at 6 ("India test-fires missile, ignoring U.S. opposition"). 
286. See RAND study, supra note 273, at 4, 8. 
287. See AW/ST (Oct 22, 1990) at 1l ("Taiwan scraps booster plans"); A W/ST (Jul 5, 1993) at 
21 and 4 (32) Space News (Aug 1993) at 1 (re South Africa). 
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MTCR-related reasons, though planning to pursue 'peaceful use' of Condor 
technology. 288 Argentina became member of MTCR in 1994, and South 
Africa joined one year later. 
As for the countries in the first group, the Rand Report noted that Brazil's 
space launch program had experienced delays because of the non-availability 
of components due to MTCR and, without technical assistance, could be 
further delayed or even cancelled. 289 The latter (i.e. cancellation) did not 
materialize: Brazil became member of MTCR in 1995, and continued the 
development of its civil launcher, though with limited success: the Veiculo 
Lancador de Satellites' launch on November 2, 1997 failed at lift-off. The 
Brazilian space officials maintained their plans to build at least three more 
rockets of this type. 290 In 1995, also the Russian Federation - finally - joined 
the Regime, though, until today, the government's export controls are far from 
leak-proof, reportedly resulting in missile technology and expertise being sold 
by Russia's industries to Iran. The latter's considerable WMD capabilities, 
particularly extended-range missiles and chemical weapons, and its continuing 
efforts to enhance those capabilities are seen as a substantial threat to 
neighboring states and to U.S. installations in the region. The U.S. government 
therefore continues to press upon Russia to tighten its export regulations and 
enforcement. This pressure has apparently resulted in the Russian government 
288. See RAND study, supra note 273, at 7, 8. See also McCall supra note 232, at 64: "One 
Argentine program involving several large European companies, Iraq and Egypt was finally 
halted in 1990, amid mounting diplomatic pressure, scheduling breakdowns, financial 
shortfalls and technical difficulties attributed in large part to the Regime's efforts". In his 
address to the 48th Session of the UNGA on Sep 27, 1993, President Clinton stated: "I am 
proposing as well new steps to thwart the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Recently, 
working with Russia, Argentina, Hungary and South Africa, we have made significant 
progress toward that goal. Now, we will seek to strengthen the principles of the [MTCR] by 
transforming it from an agreement on technology transfer among just 23 nations to a set of 
rules that can command universal adherence", see Address by the President to the 48th 
Session of the [UNGA], White House Press Release (Sep 27, 1993), The White House 
Virtual Library <http://library.whitehouse.gov/cgi ... > Though the latter goal was rather 
ambitious, Argentina and Hungary joined in 1994, followed by Brazil, South Africa and, 
finally and of considerable importance, the Russian Federation in 1995, which at the end of 
that year brought total membership to 28, see ACDA Annual Report 1995, supra note 272, 
at Chapter 3 ("Controlling missiles and space weapons") Turkey is mentioned as the 29m 
member in various 1997 State Dept documents on the subject. 
289. See RAND study, supra note 273, at 50. A Brazilian author, some years later, conftrrned 
the effect of MTCR on the Brazilian space program and, more in particular, on the 
development of its national launch vehicle. In the same article the (then) Brazilian president 
is quoted stating, in 1988, at the occasion of the signing of a Protocol on space cooperation 
with China, that this cooperation "could brake those restrictions the developed nations had 
built against the advanced technologies transfer", see Jose Monserrat Filho, Brazilian-
Chinese space cooperation: an analysis of its legal performance, Proceed. 39th Colloq. L. 
Outer Space 164-175 (1996). 
290. See 8 (47) Space News (1997) at 22. Prior to joining MTCR, Brazil had enacted the 
required domestic missile/launcher export control legislation. 
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taking initial steps - and making commitments to take substantial additional 
steps - "to crack down on Russian entities supplying missile technology to 
Iran. n291 
Israel's special military and security relations with the U.S. make the former 
an unlikely candidate for being subjected to the strict application of the MTCR 
guidelines. As Israel's ballistic missile program is well-advanced and 
operational, and strategically acceptable to at least a number of MTCR 
members, additional missile technology will be accessable to Israel's military 
establishment. This makes the limiting of civil launch technology transfers 
under MTCR rules - for fear of this technology being used for the development 
of missiles - a bit frivolous to say the least. The RAND study concludes that 
the economic prospects for Israel's indigenous space launcher 'Shavit' are as 
poor as Brazil's, and there is little reason to believe that it will either be 
developed as an autonomous commercial launch system or be an attractive 
candidate for a joint venture with another MTCR member. (As a country that 
abides by the Regime itself, it would not be allowed to share its launcher 
technology with a non-member.) Nevertheless, development for domestic 
purposes continues (though with limited success: a January 1998launch of the 
Shavit, carrying an Ofek 4 imaging satellite, failed due to a malfunction in the 
rocket's launch sequence)292 and, as we saw in Chapter 1, a U.S. company 
is using Shavit design and technology to build a U.S. version for sale in the 
(U.S.) launch market. 
Japan's activities as a launch nation were made possible by a cooperative 
agreement concluded in 1969, which enabled Japan to use (U. S. Delta-derived) 
N-1 and N-2 launch vehicles built in Japan under license from McDonnell 
Douglas. By virtue of the agreement, Japan was given access to this technology 
and equipment on condition that the launch vehicles would only be used for 
peaceful purposes, and could not be used to launch satellites for other countries 
without U. S. permission. 293 
291. See Oakley testimony, supra note 190, at 3. As the State official further observes, "[e]vents 
over the past years [i.e. 1997] have demonstrated the ability of would-be pro!iferators, 
notably Iran, to exploit Russia's missile development infrastructure. If allowed to continue, 
access to Russian technology and expertise will enable the Iranians to develop and field 
intermediate range ballistic missiles faster than if they were left to their own devices." In her 
testimony, the speaker noted the economic/financial circumstances which had a strong 
influence on Russia's behaviour: " ... economic realities are such that Russia perceives the 
need to export arms in order to maintain its arms industry, and Moscow continues to try to 
expand sales to old and new customers alike", id., at 8-9. 
292. See 9 (6) Space News (1998) at 18. 
293. See Marcia S. Smith, Space Activities of the [U.S.], C/S, and other launching 
countries/organizations: 1957-1993, CRS Report for Congress (Mar 29, 1994), hereinafter 
referred to as Smith, CRS Report 1957-1993, at 163. See also Masal!iko Sato, The Japanese 
legal framework: Third party liability resulting from NASDA launch activities, IISL-98-
IISL.2.05, IAF Melbourne Congress, supra Chapter 1, note 31. 
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Where the latter condition, in view of the year of the agreement's conclusion, 
was probably more foreign policy related than commercially-oriented, the 
former had a clear non-proliferation purpose. This was supported by a Diet 
resolution in the same year which prohibited Japan from pursuing space 
programs for other than peaceful purposes. A bona fide interpretation of both 
agreement and resolution would rule out the use of the Delta technology for 
missile-related purposes of Japan and/ or export of that technology to countries 
with missile programs in statu nascendi. Its dependence on U.S. permission 
to launch foreign payloads, created the understandable wish to have an 
indigenous, 100% Japanese launcher. Hence the development of the H-class 
launch vehicle, the first version of which, the H-1, still contained U.S. 
components bringing it under the restrictions of the 1969 agreement. The H-2 
which replaced its predecessor after February 1992 is entirely Japanese and 
makes the relevant part of the 1969 agreement - insofar as it still exists -
obsolete. Its export control element had been taken over by MTCR of 1987, 
of which Japan was one of the founding members. This did not prevent the 
State Department, in 1996, from temporarily holding up the sale by the U.S. 
aerospace company Thiokol of (USML-listed) technology which Japan needed 
for the upgrade of its H-2 launch vehicle. Although brandished by the trade 
press at the time as a case of "proliferation paranoia"294 (which it possibly 
was), it (also) served to confirm that MTCR does not create a right for 
members to obtain launch or missile technology from other members and that 
U. S. MTCR -related export control regulations subject such deliveries to a case-
by-case review even when the recipient state is an MTCR friend and ally. In 
this connection it is worth quoting Clinton' s 1993 non-proliferation policy on 
which this approach is based: 
"The [U .S] will not support the development or acquisition of space launch vehicles in 
countries outside the MTCR. For MTCR member countries, we will not encourage new 
space launch vehicle programs which raise questions on both non-proliferation and economic 
viability grounds. The [U.S.] will, however, consider exports of MTCR-controlled items 
to MTCR member countries for peaceful space launch programs on a case-by-case 
basis. "295 
The above is standing U.S. policy, confirmed as such in e.g. the Annual 
Reports of the ACDA. 296 
294. See Space News Online (Sep 30, 1996) at 12 ("Proliferation paranoia") 
<http://www. spacenews.corn!spacenews/smembers/sarch/sarch96/sn093085 .htm > 
295. See Non-proliferation and export control policy, Fact Sheet, White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary (Sep 27, 1993), 4 (40) US Dept of State Dispatch 676-677 (Oct 4, 1993) 
hereinafter referred to as 1993 non-proliferation policy, at 677. See also Chapter 2.3.4 infra. 
296. See e.g. ACDA Annual Report 1995, supra note 272, at Chapter 3 ("Controlling missiles 
and space weapons"): "As a matter of policy, the U.S. does not encourage new space launch 
programs, and U.S. exports to foreign space programs are reviewed to ensure that they will 
not contribute to a missile program of proliferation concern." 
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It nevertheless remains remarkable that a trusted U.S. ally would receive 
treatment usually reserved for countries of more pressing proliferation concern. 
A Congressional report of 1991, apart from confirming a number of 
'successes' of the Regime, also mentioned that MTCR had made Germany 
tighten its export control law and investigate charges that its nationals had 
engaged in smuggling missile technology to developing countries. It noted 
further that Italy had taken legal action against alleged missile technology 
smugglers, and a number of other European countries, Japan and Australia had 
reviewed and tightened their export control systems. But the report also 
criticized the MTCR members for inconsistent and uneven application of their 
national export controls, cited companies and individuals in France, Germany, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States for 
having transferred entire systems, components, materials or technical 
information to other countries engaged in missile development, and brandished 
the Regime as not comprehensive or leakproof, not restricting all relevant 
missile technology and lacking verification and enforcement mechanisms. The 
1991 report finally warned of the growing number of non-MTCR states 
producing ballistic missiles with indigenous technology, increasingly less 
dependent on imported materials and forging alliances with other developing 
nations seeking to develop or purchase their own missiles. 297 
The above developments in the membership ofMTCR between 1991 and 1995 
implied that, of the countries which remained outside and were at the same 
time considered significant potential suppliers of missile technology, China and 
North Korea were considered the most actively 'proliferatory', with Middle 
Eastern countries Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria identified by the U. S. intelligence 
community as eager clients, and South Asian adversaries India and Pakistan 
equally determined to acquire the technologies necessary to keep a balance of 
threats. 298 The latter two countries were considered different in at least one 
way: where Pakistan was seen as an importer of missile-related goods and 
technology (mainly from China), India continued its development of indigenous 
ballistic missiles. At the same time India persisted in building its own civil 
launch capability, notwithstanding the MTCR controls, thus creating the 
interesting option for the U. S. and the other MTCR members to consider the 
latter activity as of lesser relevance for non-proliferation purposes (something 
India has always maintained) and therefore fit for a relaxing of controls, if not 
for cooperative ventures in the field of launching. On the other hand, it cannot 
be denied that a country's determination to develop or improve its missile 
capabilities make any outside-imposed creation of a 'Chinese wall' between 
that industry and its civil launch cousin largely illusory. (One has only to think 
<http://www .acda.gov/reports/chap3.htm >. 
297. See CRS Report 1991, supra note 271, at 28. 
298. See Oakley testimony, supra note 190, at 10,5 resp. 
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about a carreer move of an experienced civil launch engineer to the military 
establishment, a domestic conference on launch technology or research 
contracts for a domestic university's space (propulsion) technology 
department). Even a weak bout of proliferation paranoia may therefore 
disqualify a country as importer of launch technology for the only reason that 
there is thought to be a military establishment interested in missile 
development. 
Understandably, the countries affected strongly criticized the Regime as 
discriminatory, unnecessary and burdensome. 
An early view from India - one of the more vocal members of the above group 
of emerging space powers - probably reflected the prevailing sentiment among 
its fellow-members when it comes to determining the effects of the MTCR 
export controls. After having defended the right of the developing countries 
to follow the developed states in using outer space for military purposes, it 
challenged as unacceptable the underlying premise of the Regime "that only 
certain countries have the wisdom and sagacety to handle complex weapon 
systems. "299 It then identified the two main negative effects of an MTCR 
embargo: (1) it makes the affected country even more determined to achieve 
self-reliance in the missile field, and strengthens the hands of the 'hawks' in 
this respect, and (2) it affects (world) trade in the civilian space market and 
gets in the way of meaningful economic cooperation in that sector. 300 
A reaction to the first point may be that the draftsmen of the Regime, far from 
being convinced that it would stop missile proliferation altogether, are content 
with making it as difficult as possible for a missile technology-hungry country 
to obtain the right material at the right time and at acceptable cost, and will 
react to 'hawkish' behaviour with even more determination to implement the 
embargo, forcing the country concerned to turn to non-MTCR salesmen for 
- possibly - less reliable goods at higher cost. 301 
299. See S. Chandrashekar, Missile technology control and the third world - are there 
alternatives?, 6 (4) Space Policy 278-284 (1990) at 279. In the same vain Boutros-Ghali, 
International cooperation in space activities for enhancing security in the post-cold war era, 
report of the Secretary-General, UN, Dept of Political Affairs, A/48/221 (undated): "In 
recent years some states have taken steps, both individually and multilaterally, to halt the 
proliferation of advanced military technologies, most notably through the [MTCR] and other 
supply-side controls. However, these measures raise international political problems because 
they are perceived by many countries of the world to be inequitable . . . As with other 
elements of proliferation control and disarmament, any controls must be non-discriminatory 
and generally acceptable, if they are to be effective", at 9-10. 
300. Id at 280. 
301. See McCall supra note 232, which, apart from referring to the cancellation of Argentina's 
Condor 2 project, also mentions the ballistic missile programs of India ('Agni') and Brazil 
('Avibras') as "[having] been effectively hindered by the regime", and Iraq's missile 
production efforts as having been thwarted in large part by MTCR-related pressure on 
exporting companies and countries, id. at 64, 65. And a State Dept official in 1989 stated: 
"The MTCR has had a substantial impact on some developing programs which rely heavily 
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As to the second point, there is no denying that the MTCR premise, that no 
meaningful and effective distinction can be made between military missile 
technology and civil launch technology, affects trade in space (launch) goods 
and services and makes cooperation in that field a complicated and highly 
uncertain affair. No matter how utterly peaceful a launch program may be, the 
dual-use conundrum turns it into a suspected activity, to be feared and resisted, 
particularly of course where the country concerned is also known or suspected 
to be of the missile-seeking type. The ironic result in the latter case may be 
that a country, confronted with the high cost, complexities and uncertainties 
of the build-up of both a civilian launch and a military missile capability, will, 
if for economic reasons forced to choose, for (regional) security and strategic 
reasons opt for maintaining the latter rather than the former program. 
Missiles-turned-launchers 
A related issue with a MTCR angle is the control of missiles converted into 
and used as civil launch vehicles. 
An early example is Space Commerce Corporation of Houston, Texas, which 
on July 29, 1989, signed an M.o. U. with Technopribor, a Soviet Consortium 
set up to export previously classified technology related to the production of 
medium range SS-20 (nuclear capable) missiles. The two agreed to develop 
and market a new commercial launch vehicle based on this missile, the Start 
(not to be confused with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for which the 
same acronym is used). Initial discussion within the U.S. government focused 
primarily on the arms control aspect, i.e. the possibility that the Soviet Union 
would (continue to) produce missile-type vehicles 'disguised' as civil Start 
launch vehicles and therefore not counted as real missiles for arms limitation 
purposes. (The 1987 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty requires 
the U.S and the Soviet Union to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles 
(IRM's), shorter-range missiles (SRM's), associated launchers, equipment, 
support facilities, and operating bases worldwide. The START Treaty of July 
1991 has similar objectives: " ... The joint venture would provide the Soviets 
with an 'escape clause' for the INF and START treaties since it would allow 
Moscow to keep producing missiles with potential military applications ... [and 
would] add enormously to the verification burden. "302 
on the import of foreign technology. For example, the Argentine/Egyptian/Iraqi Condor II 
missile is far behind schedule due, in part, to the MTCR.", see The Bush Administration's 
Nonproliferation Policy, Prepared statement by the Under Secretary of State for security 
assistance, science and technology (Bartholomew), May 18, 1989 (Extracts), Doe. 21, 
American Foreign Policy 65-68 (1989), hereinafter referred to as State Dept nonproliferation 
statement, at 67. 
302. See M. Potter, Swords into ploughshares: legal, policy implications of a commercia/launch 
vehicle based on the SS-20 missile, Proceed. 33d Colloq. L. Outer Space 48-57 (1990) 
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The issue of high tech export control would most likely arise if the launches 
were to take place outside U.S. territory and the payloads involved U.S. 
satellites or satellite components. A further distinction was rightfully made at 
the time between launches from CoCom member countries' territory on the 
one hand and other foreign territory, such as (then) Warsaw Pact countries' 
territory. Obviously, the latter launches would have been impossible because 
of applicable CoCom-wide upheld AECA and EAA export restrictions to these 
countries. For launches from a U. S. launch base, different permits would have 
been necessary, such as a DOT license for this new launch provider and import 
licenses under AECA/ITAR for each Start launch vehicle. 
The production of new, inexpensive, missile-derived launch vehicles would 
also have missile proliferation aspects related to MTCR purposes. Where the 
transformation of missiles into civil launch vehicles as such may be considered 
a positive non-proliferation step, as it replaces a military application by a civil 
one, the 'downside' could be the possible transfer or sale of these launch 
vehicles to countries which do not possess either missile or launch technology 
and would thus become an additional proliferation hazard. This would be of 
particular relevance if the plans of the initiators were to materialize, i.e. " ... 
to be able to launch from the customer's launch site, or from his driveway, 
if he wants to. "303 But the proponents argued that the partners would not be 
selling the rocket or the technology, but only the launch service, thus removing 
any possibility of the project becoming an MTCR issue. Obviously, from a 
non-proliferation policy point of view this was hardly a satisfactory assurance. 
The most appealing MTCR-related argument in favour of missile conversions 
such as the Start project would appear to be the following: the more 
conversions of missiles take place the more competition will result in the 
commercial launch market, both domestic and international, and the more 
competition there is, the lower the launch prices and the lesser the need for 
have-nots to start their own launch industry and become potential proliferators 
themselves. As Potter rightly observed: 
"If the U .S. encourages the Soviets to provide inexpensive launches on the World market 
this may take the incentive away from developing countries to produce indigenous launch 
capabilities. Once these countries succeed in developing their own launch capabilities they 
often are forced to sell missile technology to other developing countries in order to defer 
their initial development costs. "304 
The issue of unfair competition created special concerns which led to the U.S. 
administration's regulatory interventions. A distinction should be made here 
between foreign and U. S. missiles-turned-launcher. The former deepened 
hereinafter referred to as Potter 33d Colloq., at 49. 
303. Id., at 53. 
304. Id., at 54. 
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existing worries of the U .S. launch companies about the effect of foreign non-
market economies' pricing of (new) launch services on their business. As we 
saw above, the U.S. launch industry, in the late eighties and early nineties was 
considered by many, including the companies themselves, an 'infant' industry, 
engaged in a competitive struggle inter alia against Arianespace. A strong need 
was felt for protection against any newcomers, but particularly against low-cost 
launch services 'dumped' on the western markets by centrally planned 
economies. (This trade issue will be further explored in Chapter 3.) 
But, given the existence of tools for protecting the U.S. companies through 
the application of the U.S. export control laws, it was, in the early nineties, 
particularly the prospect of competition created by U. S. missiles-turned-
launchers against U.S. companies operating in the same (small launcher) 
market segment in which the newcomers would be active, which sollicited the 
more critical reactions, and which would give rise to policy statements on the 
part of the U.S. administration trying to assuage the incumbents' fears. The 
latter was triggered by the Lodestar project devised by Lockheed Missiles and 
Space Company and consisting of retired U.S. Navy Poseidon missiles to be 
refurbished and adapted to civil use, e.g. for the launch of small- initially only 
governmental - scientific satellites. 305 
The initiative brought strong reactions from Orbital Sciences Corporation 
(OSC), a U.S. company which was planning the operation of two families of 
small launchers and felt directly affected by the missile conversion plans of 
Lockheed. The difficult choice the Government faced was between permitting 
(unfair?) competition with the private launch industry but, in so doing, 
recouping part of the investments (paid for by the taxpayer) in the missiles so 
used, and "throwing away the assets" and not stand in the way of private 
industry recouping its own investments. 
The U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines approved by President Bush 
on February 12, 1991, though containing many statements which reflected a 
spirit of 'promote but don't interfere with the private sector', was not very 
helpful on this specific issue. One provision might well have been quoted by 
the launch industry threatened by the Poseidon venture: 
"U.S. Government agencies may make available to the private sector those assets which 
have been determined to be excess to the requirements of the U.S. Government in 
accordance with U.S. law and applicable international treaty obligations. Due regard shall 
be given to the economic impact such transfer may have on the commercial space sector, 
promoting competition, and the long term public interest. "306 
305. See M. Potter, Swords into ploughshares - Missiles as commercial launchers, 7 (2) Space 
Policy 146-150 (1991) hereinafter referred to as Potter 1991, at 147. 
306. See U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary (Feb 12, 1991) in Gorove, US Space Law, supra note 55, at l.A.4 (a-1). 
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On the other hand, Lockheed could have quoted the same statement, referring 
to the pro-competitive language employed, to solicit support for its project. 
The matter was specially addressed and clarified in Clinton' s National Space 
Transportation Policy of 1994, which, in the spirit of a pro-commercial space 
transportation industry philosophy, limited the commercial use of U.S. excess 
ballistic missile assets with the following provisions: 
"U.S. excess ballistic missile assets that will be eliminated under the START agreements 
shall either be retained for government use or be destroyed. These assets may be used within 
the U.S. Government [USG] in accordance with established DoD procedures, for any 
purpose except to launch payloads into orbit. 
Requests from within the Department of Defense or from other [USG] agencies to use these 
assets for launching payloads into orbit will be considered by the DoD on a case-by-case 
basis and require approval by the Secretary of Defense. 
Mindful of the policy's guidance that [USG] agencies shall purchase commercially available 
U .S. space transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible, use of excess 
ballistic missile assets may be permitted for launching payloads into orbit when the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) The payload supports the sponsoring agency's mission. 
(b) The use of excess ballistic missile assets is consistent with international obligations, 
including the MTCR guidelines and the START agreements. 
(c) The sponsoring agency must certify the use of excess ballistic missile assets results in 
a cost savings for the [USG] relative to the use of available commercial launch services that 
would also meet mission requirements, including performance, schedule, and risk. "307 
As one of the Presidential draftsmen explained to Congress, 
"[t]hus engineering tests and suborbital flight experiments are allowed, but orbital flights 
which may compete with private sector providers would have to satisfy some tough criteria. 
We believe that these criteria are clear and reasonable and that they provide sufficient 
flexibility to protect government interests while continuing to encourage private sector 
investment in new space transportation systems. If converting ballistic missiles to space 
launch vehicles can be done in a manner that saves money to the government, this policy 
will still allow us to take advantage of those savings. "308 
307. See National Space Transportation Policy, Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (Aug 5, 1994). 
<http://www. whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/other/launchts.html >, hereinafter referred to 
as 1994 Space transportation policy. 
308. See Statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy on National Space 
Transportation Policy, before the Subcommittee on Space, House Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology (Sep 20, 1994). 
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OSC's original unhappiness with the above policy's potential for allowing 
competitive missiles-turned-launchers evaporated when, in 1997, it concluded 
a contract with USAF to convert as many as 24 Minuteman 2 missiles to 
launchers for government LEO launches. 
The program, which is potentially worth more than USD 200 million to OSC, 
will turn the missiles into four-stage launchers, half Minuteman 2 half Pegasus 
XL. It has in the meantime been christened the Orbital-Suborbital Program 
(OSP) Minotaur, and will, in September 1999, on its first launch carry two 
small USAF research satellites, inconformity with the above 1994 policy. (The 
Air Force is reported to have about 350 sets of Minuteman engines in storage, 
which could be used for the program). 309 
The Minuteman/Minotaur program is so far the only example of a U.S. 
missile-conversion project following the adoption of the 1994 policy. 
The Commercial Space Act of October 1998 (H.R. 1702), has formalized the 
provision of the above Policy. At the same time it created a measure of 
Congressional control by requiring the Federal agency, which seeks to use the 
excess ICBM as a space transportation vehicle, to transmit to a number of 
Congressional Committees a certification that the use of such missile: 
"(A) would result in cost savings to the Federal Government when compared to the cost 
of acquiring space transportation services from United States commercial providers 
(B) meets all mission requirements of the agency, including performance schedule, and risk 
requirements; 
(C) is consistent with international obligations of the United States; and 
(D) is approved by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. "310 
The legislation was presented as primarily cost -savings driven. 311 
As for the foreign missiles, although the above combination of national 
security, foreign policy and trade considerations made for such complicating 
factors as to appear to doom the above U.S.-Soviet Start initiative right from 
the beginning, the program not only survived (though without U.S. 
309. See Space News Online (Sep 15, 1997) at 4 ("Minuteman deal expands Orbital;s launch 
capability") and Space News Online (Sep 7, 1998) at 14 ("Dod approval sought for 
Minuteman motors/new rocket would loft research satellite"), <http://www.spacenews.com/ 
spacenews/members/ sarch/ sarch97/ sno915 rl. htm and .. .I sarch98/ sno907 ac.htm > 
respectively. 
310. See Sec. 205 ("use of excess intercontinental ballistic missiles"), Commercial Space Act, 
infra Ch. 3, note 247. 
311. As one of the sponsors said in a Senate Subcommittee meeting, "[this legislation] actually 
saves money by allowing the conversion of excess ballistic missiles into space transportation 
vehicles . . . they are extremely expensive to store ... using these missiles as launch vehicles 
... for small scientific and educational [Government] pay loads ... is a legal and efficient way 
to dispose of an expensive asset", see statement of U.S. senator Bob Graham, "Commercial 
Space Act of 1997", Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Senate Commerce, 
Science and Transportation Committee (Mar 5, 1998). 
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participation) with both a Start and a Start I rocket but was joined by the 
Rockot launch vehicle based on the Russian SS-19 ICBM. The latter launch 
vehicle is being marketed by DASA of Germany under the name Eurockot. 312 
In February 1994, the Moscow-based Start-1 sales company STC Complex was 
reported to have concluded a launch contract with a South African state owned 
defense firm for the launch of its Greensat remote sensing satellite. One of the 
two U.S. competitors, Orbital Sciences, accused the Russian firm of engaging 
in predatory pricing, in violation of the U.S.-Russian launch trade agreement 
concluded in July 1993 (See Chapter 3.2 infra), but the issue became moot 
when the South African firm, later that year, decided to abandon this and other 
space projects for lack of international investors. 313 
In 1994, a START-inspired debate erupted on the subject between the U.S. 
and Russia and the Ukraine. The latter countries took the position that ICBM's 
and SLBM's used for space launch purposes were not accountable under the 
START I Treaty. The U.S. vigorously opposed this position which would have 
directly undercut the provisions of the Treaty. And in the fall of 1995 the 
parties, joined by Belarus and Kazachstan, recorded in a joint statement in the 
START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, that all space launch 
vehicles that use the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM are accountable as 
ICBM's and SLBM's of that type under the START I Treaty. 314 
As for the use by U.S. commercial companies of these new foreign launch 
services, the U .S. government took the position that it would consider requests 
for export licenses (for U.S. satellites to be so launched) on a case-by-case 
basis and would grant licenses only if they complied with the START Treaty 
and the MTCR Guidelines. 315 As we saw earlier, these Guidelines permit 
312. See brief description of this DASA-Khrnnichev joint venture in Chapter 1.2.1. 
313. See Space News (Feb 28, 1994) at 8 ("Russia accused of underbidding to win Greensat 
launch") and (Nov 7, 1994) at 10 ("Denel derails launch of Greensat") respectively. A 
spokesman of the Defense firm Denel said in this connection: "It is safe to say that the space 
industry in South Africa has come to an end". The project to develop an indigenous space 
launch capability had already been abandoned in mid-1993 after an investment of USD 55 
million, see ibid. 
314. See ACDA Annual Report 1995, supra note 272, Chapter 3, at C ("Controlling missiles 
used as space launch vehicles"). Dennis J. Burnett and David Lihani give an other 
interpretation to the text of this Joint Statement Number 21, "On space launch vehicles that 
incorporate first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs", Geneva, Switzerland (Sep 28, 1995): "U.S. 
and Russia agreed that, on a case-by-case basis, the existence of a first stage of an ICBM or 
SLBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, during maintenance, storage and 
transportation of the launch vehicle, and is located apart from other stages of an ICBM or 
SLBM, does not result in ICBMs or SLBMs of that type of missile being considered as a 
ballistic missile. On that basis, U .S. and Russia agreed that the Start space launch vehicle 
assembled from stages of the SS-25 ICBM is not a variant of the SS-25 nor a new type of 
ballistic missile for Treaty purposes." See Developments in U.S. bilateral launch service 
agreements- an update, XXI(3) Air & Space Law 100-104 (1996) (text to) note 9. 
315. See Policy on the use of foreign excess ballistic missiles for space launch, Fact sheet, White 
House, Office of Science and Technology Policy (Sep 29, 1995). 
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MTCR members to support the space programs of other countries or 
international cooperation 11 ••• as long as such programs could not contribute 
to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. 11 
An immediate beneficiary of the new policy was a Colorado-based company, 
called Earth Watch Inc., which received permission from the U.S. government 
to launch a commercial remote sensing satellite on a Russian Start -1 
launcher. 316 Understandably, the two U.S. companies that had lobbied hard 
to keep these converted missiles out of the commercial market, Orbital 
Sciences and Lockheed Martin, were far from pleased, and expressed 
particular concern about the prices that would be quoted by the Russians. 317 
(Though Russia, by virtue of its launch trade agreement with the U.S., was 
bound to observe pricing guidelines meant to prevent 'dumping' of launch 
services, only the more general provisions (prices should be comparable to 
prices for comparable 'market economy' launches) applied to low earth orbit 
launches, see Chapter 3.2, infra). 
The overall effect of the 'ex-missiles', although recognized as a possible 
alternative on the launch market, has remained limited. Noteworthy in this 
connection is not so much the fact that the various controls and policies restrict 
the use of both U.S. and foreign missiles, but that (a) the U.S. (small) satellite 
manufactures and (small) launch manufacturers were pitted against each other, 
with the U.S. government caught in the middle, and that (b) the latter had to 
balance an array of diverse interests and obligations, such as national security, 
including non-proliferation of missiles, arms control and high technology 
exports, (fair) trade and foreign policy issues. It is submitted that, in view of 
the high priority and importance the U.S. in the early nineties attached to a 
reduction of Russia's (and Ukraine's) missile stockpiles and in the light of the 
cost involved and of the economic woes of these countries, a policy providing 
for case-by-case approval of foreign missile-derived launches, paid in hard 
currency by U.S. clients, made particular sense without dramatically affecting 
316. See Space News (Oct 9, 1995) at 1 ("Converted Soviet missiles gain entry to U.S. market"). 
A more recent UN Report (partially) on worldwide space transportation systems 
development noted matter of factly: "The Subcommittee also took note of the introduction 
into the space transportation system of the Russian Federation of the Start and Rokot 
launchers that were based on converted ballistic missiles.", see Report of the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee on the work of its thirty-fifth session, UNCOPUOS, UNGA Doe. 
AI AC.l05/697 (25 Feb 1998) at 25-26. 
317. Ibid. A December review by this publication of the performance of the above small rocket 
companies in the year 1995 listed only failures: Start-! failed in its first flight in March, 
destroying the Israeli, Russian and Mexican satellites on board; Orbital Sciences' Pegasus 
XL went out of control shortly after its launch in July and was destroyed (following the fate 
of its predecessor); the Lockheed Martin Launch Vehicle (LLV) for small payloads also did 
not survive its maidenflight in August; and in October 1995, EER System's Conestoga 
rocket exploded in mid air, see Space News (Dec 11, 1995) at 8. There was, as a result, 
certainly some room for additional small launchers, whether U.S. or Russian-built!). 
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the other interests concerned. The fact remains that State Department and DoD 
interests determined the fate of this market entry/access issue and thus 
interfered with the autonomous, free market development of the trade in launch 
services. 
2. 3. 4 Liberalization of U. S. export controls 
For the purpose of this study 'liberalization' of export controls is of relevance 
to the extent that the liberalizing measures, if any, resulted in e.g. (a) new 
launch companies being able to get off the ground and enter the international 
commercial launch market, (b) both new and incumbent launch companies 
gaining access to all (important) parts of that market, and (c) a reasonably level 
playing field making competition on price and quality possible. 
The export controls discussed in the previous paragraphs can be distinguished 
in two main areas: launcher/missile controls and (high tech) payload controls. 
Roughly translated these controls address two situations: (a) a country wishes 
to acquire the capability to launch (weapons or civil loads) and needs foreign 
hardware and technology for that purpose, and (b) a country already possessing 
a launch industry wants to sell its service to the market of satellite 
manufacturers and owners/operators of satellites or satellite systems. Both 
candidates and their potential launch technology suppliers have, through the 
years, been confronted with (multi-)national regulatory barriers, which made 
it hard to 'just' join the ranks of the incumbents. To what extent did the 
various U.S. and international export control 'liberalization' measures make 
life easier for the above newcomers? 
'Payload controls' 
Through the years, the restrictions on the export of dual-use items in particular 
have been the subject of hot debates and challenges by the industry concerned. 
This is understandable. 
The arms industry, or the 'military-industrial complex', has always been fully 
aware of the risks and uncertainties inherent in their line of trade: today's 
accepted customers may be the subject of tomorrow's restrictions, imposed by 
the Administration or by Congress due to shifts in national security and/ or 
foreign policy priorities or threats. 
It is different for the manufacturer and exporter of aircraft or personal 
computers, whose exports to foreign customers may be severely handicapped 
by the fact that, what they consider to be off-the-shelf technology, readily 
available in everyday commerce both at home and abroad, is also considered 
by the U. S Administration to be of military -strategic value for certain countries 
and should therefore not be exported without a license, with all the 
concomitant uncertainties, red tape, delays, costs and risks of loosing the 
contract to a foreign provider. (For example, the avionics and computer 
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systems aboard Airbus planes sold to the Soviet Union in the late eighties/early 
nineties were much more sophisticated than those found on many military jet 
aircraft, yet were not prohibited). 318 
The expansion of the licensing bureaucracy within State and Commerce in the 
1980s brought at the same time increasing demands for a relaxing of controls 
and for a faster and less cumbersome processing of export license requests on 
the part of the 'high tech' industry. Where the national controls - at least with 
respect to the communist countries - had been multilateralized through CoCom, 
a two-step approach was needed: first the U.S. administration had to be 
convinced of the commercial benefits and strategic harmlessness of more 
relaxed controls with respect to certain (types of) dual-use goods and 
technologies. And thereafter these proposals would have to be endorsed by all 
CoCom members. 
Such endorsements were in fact a less formidable barrier than it would seem, 
as, through the years, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and the 
security/intelligence community - all involved in listing and de-listing 
decisions - had in general been more security conscious and control inclined 
than the foreign CoCom members. 
The developments in the Soviet Union and the ensuing relaxation of East-West 
tensions in the years after 1990 gave sufficient domestic impetus and foreign 
support for substantial cuts in the list of CoCom controlled dual-use goods. 
Thus, in line with the objective to 'build higher fences around fewer items', 
controls were reduced in June 1990, and again, more substantially in 
September 1991, for sales to former East bloc countries of such items as: 
navigation, avionics and aircraft technology (including B-747 and 767 aircraft) 
and related communications equipment, aircraft propulsion systems, 
electronics, machine tools, computers and telecommunications, and some liquid 
fuel rocket engines and their technologies. 319 
But, as we saw earlier, CoCom, on the instigation of the U.S., made a 
distinction between the levels of sophistication allowed to the Soviet Union on 
the one hand and such 'democratized' countries as Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia on the other hand. The latter, to which the so-called 'Bikini 
list' (sic!) of only 40 restricted items applied, were allowed to buy 
sophisticated telecommunications equipment from the West. This was 
considerably superior to what the Soviet Union was permitted to acquire: the 
latter was allowed to upgrade its telephone network only to the level of 
American systems of the early 1980s.320 
318. See IHT (Jun 17, 1991) at 9 ("CoCom red tape eases with tensions"). 
319. See AW/ST (Jun 10, 1991) at 73. 
320. In the somewhat condescending, but, at the time, probably - materially - correct view of the 
US, " ... what the Soviets need is plain old telephones and not a lot of bells and whistles.", 
Allan Wendt, head of the US delegation to CoCom, see IHT 1, 10 (May 56-26, 1991) at 10 
("CoCom cuts back barriers"). 
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The new CoCom regulations changed a fundamental aspect of the multilateral 
control structure. It turned a system of a presumption of denial, meaning that 
high technology products could not be exported unless specifically approved 
or exempted by CoCom, into one which enabled the manufacturers to export 
anything not specifically banned by CoCom; in other words, 'if it is not listed 
it can be sold'. But the rules continued to apply restrictions to the transfer of 
technology, in other words, 'ship the goods but keep the technology'. 321 
These 1991 reductions in export restrictions freed exporters considerably. As 
an example, Commerce faced 70% fewer computer export applications, and 
the liberalization of controls represented an overall reduction of some 50% in 
the CoCom list of militarily significant goods and technologies. But not all was 
well for the parties concerned. For one thing, as observed earlier, the Gulf war 
taught a few lessons on the military relevance of some dual-use goods, such 
as night-vision devices (Iraq's Soviet technology-based capabilities turned out 
to be far less sophisticated than the products used by the allies) and fiber optic 
links (which Iraq used for military communications and the coalition forces 
found difficult to knock out).322 
As a consequence, U .S. export controls on these items remained in force vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union (and it would take a unanimous 'yes' from CoCom to 
permit any member to export such technology to that country). 323 
Business groups representing 'high tech' companies were still disappointed, 
particularly in the area of computers and telecommunications, 324 but had to 
wait until 1992 for another modest liberalization step. In that year, the State 
Department, concluding an exercise started two years earlier with Executive 
Order 12735 of November 1990, published a Final Rule transferring some 
'innocent' satellites from the USML to the Commerce Control List. 325 
What had started as a "harmonization exercise" aimed at bringing all space 
items of a primarily commercial nature under Commerce jurisdiction, turned 
out to be a measure of such limited scope and importance to the U.S. 
manufacturers that a Congressional Hearing on "Export control reform in high 
technology" one year later became a full-fledged U.S. industry attack on the 
321. See IHT 9, 14 (Jun 17, 1991) at 9. 
322. See AW/ST (Jun 10, 1991) at 73. 
323. The SU had expressed interest in buying a state of the art fiber-optic communications 
network to span their entire territory, but the NSA had argued that it is harder to listen in on 
a fiber optic telephone line than on traditional telephone wiring, see IHT 1, 10 (Jun 25-26, 
1991) at 10. 
324. "Our expectations had been raised by the rhetoric used by President Bush when he 
announced the core list reductions last June [1990] ... [but] we are seeing very little 
improvement in the last year", see ibid. 
325. Final Rule of October 23, 1992, to amend Sec. 38 of the AECA. The rule transferred 
commercial communications satellites that do not have certain sensitive characteristics (under 
nine categories) to the export licensing control of the Commerce Dept. Military satellites and 
communications satellites with any of the nine categories of sensitive characteristics 
remained on the USML. 
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country's outdated, complicated, bureaucratic, costly and ineffective, if not 
futile, export controls. 326 
Noteworthy is that, already at that occasion, the U.S. software industry 
strongly criticized the export controls both on computers as such and on 
commercial encryption software (which is used to protect, 'encrypt', 
confidential computer data (transmission) against theft, manipulation, etc.) as 
unrealistic and virtually meaningless given the wide foreign availability of this 
technology. 327 In 1998, the issue of the protection of encryption technology 
had grown to become the biggest export control 'headache' of the U. S. security 
and intelligence community and the single most time and energy consuming 
export licensing issue for both the State Department and Commerce. 328 
Notwithstanding the above severe criticism on the part of the industry and 
intense lobbying efforts, with a leading role of Hughes Space and 
Communications, and supported by Commerce329, a bill proposed in 
Congress in April 1994 transferring all commercial satellites from USML to 
CCL was defeated as a result of a determined Defense and State Department 
defense of the status quo. 
In 1995, the U.S. administration improved the dual-use export control process 
by, inter alia, strengthening the role of other agencies in the review process. 
By Executive Order, the Departments of Defense, Energy, State and ACDA 
were given the right to review any license of interest to them, with, in case 
of dissent, each department casting a single vote and decisions taken by simple 
majority; moreover, enforcement of the regulations was strengthened. 330 
The demise of cold war export regulator CoCom in 1994 freed the former 
Communist countries of multilaterally enforced restrictions on military and 
dual-use goods and technologies, bringing computers, encryption and satellites 
(as an example of one highly valuable combination of advanced technologies 
326. See High technology hearing, supra note 278, passim. 
327. See id., at 30 (testimony James A. Abrahamson, chairman, Oracle Corp.). 
328. See inter alia Reinsch, Update West 98, supra note 262, at 3-4. 
329. As Hughes Space and Communications' President Dorfman said (in 1994), "communications 
satellites are commercial products having nothing to do with weapons, and should be under 
the Commerce Department to facilitate international trade of US industry." Hughes wanted 
to use Chinese launch vehicles for its satellites "without having to convince skeptics in the 
Pentagon and the State Department that the satellites do not pose a technology proliferation 
hazard." And he called the Export Administration Control Act, proposed by Jane Harman, 
D-Calif, in April 1994, which would transfer license approval from the State Dept to the 
Commerce Dept for communications satellites, an "improvement ... because the approval 
process would be centered in a single agency and the State Dept would not use satellites as a 
tool to conduct foreign policy.", See 5 (18) Space News (May 94) at 30. 
330. E.O. 12981 (Dec 1995), see US/China technology transfer, testimony of William A. 
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of relevance in the space market) in principle within reach, though henceforth 
depending on less predictable national laws, policies and practices. Since both 
China and Russia, once prime targets of CoCom controls, were at the same 
time potential launch providers restrained in the performance of that role by 
these controls, the end of CoCom meant the removal of a multilateral Western-
made barrier to market entry and access. 331 
The W assenaar Arrangement now focuses in a different way on other countries 
with a - so far - less effective control mechanism. None of these - possibly -
targeted countries belong to the category of prospective launch providers which 
would be prevented from entering the market as a result of Wassenaar controls. 
To the extent Wassenaar discourages its parties from selling certain dual-use 
items, such as satellites or satellite components, to terrorist-supporting or other 
'rogue' countries, all Wassenaar launch providers (and satellite manufacturers) 
may perceive this as effectively limiting their market access through the 
restrictions imposed on their free choice of clients. 
An additional complication for the export of satellites is the increasing 
sophistication of the software and the concomitant need for sophisticated data 
(transfer) protection, i.e. encryption. The more sophisticated the latter, the 
more hesitant the U.S. security and intelligence community has been with 
respect to the export thereof, and the more complicated and time-consuming 
the accompanying licensing process has become. 
Where, originally, the sale and export of encryption was seen as a national 
security-endangering activity (how can you listen in on international 
communications if the messages concerned are encrypted?) and therefore 
subjected to State Department controls, at the end of 1996 new Commerce 
regulations were published that transferred licensing of encryption products 
331. Three years later, in testimony before the Senate Committee on governmental affairs, 
Subcommittee on international security, proliferation, and federal services, of Jun 11, 1997, 
hereinafter referred to as Reinsch testimony 1997, Commerce Under secretary for export 
administration Reinsch made the following statement on the Administration's post-CoCom 
attitude towards Russia: "Russia is continuing to develop its own export control system and 
is in the early stages of participating in international export control regimes. It is a member 
of Wassenaar ... It is a party to major non-proliferation treaties and agreements ... At the 
same time . . . although Russian policies with respect to the development and export of 
weapons of mass destruction are encouraging, actual events from time to time are not 
consistent with those policies. Until we see greater consistency between Russian policy and 
practice, including a Russian export control system that is more reliable and fully 
harmonized with our own and that of our Wassenaar partners, we will continue to maintain 
appropriate controls on exports to Russia." With respect to China, the same official said: 
"our export control policy toward China seeks to support our engagement strategy and 
creation of higher -paying, export-based jobs in the U.S., while denying licenses for items 
whose export would pose significant national security risks to the U .S. . .. we scrutinize 
carefully exports which might raise national security concerns. We also continue to maintain 
Tianamnen sanctions, which limit the items that can be licensed for China. Where 
appropriate we impose sanctions on Chinese entities for proliferation or other activities, 
consistent with U.S. laws. <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/97/warcon10.httn >." 
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from the State Department' Munitions List to the Department of Commerce's 
dual-use list (CCL). This did not result in a substantial lessening of controls, 
but created a different, more industry-oriented starting point for national 
controls (which remain an inter-agency responsibility). 
From 1994, on an ad hoc basis, a number of satellites received State 
Department or Commerce clearance- depending in each case on the satellite's 
performance characteristics - for export to China. 332 But it took until March 
1996 before President Clinton, following - what is now called - a "tense 
Washington turf war between the State and Commerce Departments, and a 
broader debate over how to balance America's security concerns and 
commercial competition in the hottest of all the commercial markets", 333 
decided that control of export licensing for communications satellites was to 
be transferred to Commerce. Henceforth, all commercial communications 
satellites would be controlled by Commerce even if they had embedded in them 
individual munitions list (USML) components or technologies. 
Though at the same time national security and foreign policy controls in the 
Commerce regulations were tightened, this shift from State to Commerce 
control was hailed by the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry at the time 
because it de-emphasized the national security and foreign policy aspects of 
the sale of satellites to, and their launch by foreign countries. 
In the meantime, in 1998, the Clinton decision has become the subject of 
intense - though largely partisan - Congressional criticism, in part because of 
the benefits it provided to the Chinese launch industry, in part because of 
technology transfer issues which arose in 1996, and, in large part, because of 
the suggestion of improper re-election campaign-related influence peddling by 
a combination of Chinese and U.S. satellite industry (Loral Space and 
Communications) interests, including sizeable donations to Democratic causes 
by the two parties concerned. 334 
One of the actions the House took in this connection, infuriating and frustrating 
the U.S. satellite industry, was the approval of legislation which prohibits 
exporting American-made satellites to China, a measure which would prevent 
China Great Wall Industry from launching any satellite built in the U.S. or any 
satellite that contains U.S. components for which an export license is 
required. 335 (The Senate fortunately did not concur with this piece of rather 
ill-considered legislation). 
332. Part of these export licenses concerned satellites which were to be launched on Chinese 
Long March rockets, see Chapter 3.1. 
333. See NYT 1, 18 (May 17, 1998) at 1 ("How Chinese won rights to launch satellites for 
U.S."). 
334. See id. 
335. See 9 (21) Space News 1, 20 (May 1998) at 1. 
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At a May 1998 Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on 
international security, proliferation and federal services members questioned 
Clinton' s 1996 decision to transfer the licensing of communications satellites 
exports to Commerce. 336 This already resulted in legislation adopted by both 
House and Senate, and - reluctantly - signed into law by President Clinton on 
October 17, 1998, to transfer this authority back to the State Department, a 
move with which Congress reintroduced a more emphatic national security and 
foreign policy imprint on satellite export licensing (see further Chapter 4). 
The political uproar created by these allegations has led to the setting up of 
a special nine-member House Committee with far-reaching authority to look 
into whether U. S. national security was undermined by Clinton Administration 
actions by allowing the launch of U.S. satellites on Chinese Long March 
Rockets. The committee was given wide subpoena powers and the ability to 
examine tax records of people and businesses it deems relevant, dating back 
to 1988. 337 
That year had not been chosen at random. It is the year in which Chinese entry 
into the international commercial launch market through the possible launch 
of U.S.-built satellites became a matter of debate within and between the 
Administration and Congress. (The U.S.-Chinese launch trade relations will 
be discussed in the next Chapter). 
In June 1997, a U.S. Commerce official made the following statement before 
a Senate Subcommittee (under the heading "Further export control 
liberalizations will be limited"): 
"We are down now to less than 9,000 licenses annually, and, increasingly, they are limited 
to items that are multilaterally controlled or items that are controlled to terrorist or other 
336. See ibid. The suggestion that national security was compromised by the Clinton decision was 
firmly rejected by the Director of ACDA, John Holum, in testimony before the House 
International Relations and National Security Committees in June 1998. As he observed, " ... 
the further shift in control was accompanied by new control procedures and regulations to 
strengt.IJ.en safeguards. !nteragency review was strengthened, giving State and Defense the 
right to review all Commerce export license applications. A new foreign policy and national 
security control was established in Commerce's Export Administration Regulations whereby 
State and Defense could recommend denial of a satellite export to any destination on the 
basis of national security or foreign policy interests. Commercial communications satellites 
were made exempt from the foreign availability requirements of the [EAA] .... it remains 
the judgement of the Department of State, that the changes made in the Commerce export 
licensing system in 1996 were sufficient to deal with the national security sensitivities 
associated with foreign launches of communications satellites. They provide a degree of 
protection for these items when under Commerce control that approximates the strict 
controls of the [ITAR]. Therefore, [State] was provided with reasonable assurance that U.S. 
national security would not be adversely affected with the jurisdictional change.", see 
Holum testimony 1998, supra note 230, at 4-5. 
337. See IHT (Jun 20-21, 1998) at 3. And see Chapter 4 infra. 
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rogue states where our policy is unlikely to change in the short run. Accordingly, we are 
not likely to see many dramatic control list modifications in the near term. Nevertheless, 
we have an ongoing need to keep our controls up to date with advances in technology and 
spreading foreign availability. In sectors like electronics, where product life cycles are short, 
we need to review our policies regularly to make sure we are not continuing to control old 
generation items that are now widely available from other sources. "338 
Less than one year later, the same official expressed his frustration about 
Congressional action in 1997 which, contrary to his Department's policy (i.e. 
to focus controls on those choke-point technologies without which a weapon 
cannot be built and which can be controlled because of their special qualities, 
small number of producers, or limited alternative uses), imposed new restraints 
on the export of 'high performance' computers, requiring his Bureau of Export 
Administration (BXA) to perform post-shipment checks on U.S.-built 
computers sold to 50 countries. The many customers involved and the fact that 
these computers possessed a level of sophistication available in other exporting 
countries made this requirement not only "an unsustainable burden" but also 
one "that served no purpose". 339 
The Commerce official went as far as qualifying this Congressional 
intervention as "attempts ... to roll back those hard-fought improvements 
[made through reform, streamlining and liberalization of the export control 
system] and return us to a darker era." 
On the issue of further liberalization of export controls, it was noted that one 
of the reasons why BXA licensing load was inching back up (instead of further 
being reduced) was the transfer of encryption licensing to Commerce. A 
decline of licenses to be processed was also not expected "because I see few 
high volume areas ready for major liberalization." The latter, it must be 
concluded, is both a result of earlier streamlining and liberalization activities 
on the one hand and a more or less stable membership of the group of terrorist 
supporting or 'rogue' states as referred to earlier on the other hand. Of course, 
the liberalization of 'payload controls' has been dealt a severe blow by the 
decision of Congress to treat commercial communications satellites as arms 
for the purpose of export controls. (The relevant Strom Thurmond Act will 
be discussed in Chapter 4.1.2). 
Launcher/missile controls 
The limited 1991 relaxation of CoCom controls included an easing of 
restrictions on the export of some liquid fuel rocket engines and technologies 
to the 'East bloc' (while retaining such controls on more modern solid fuel 
rocket technology). Although, apparently, the U.S. delegate did not veto this 
338. See Reinsch testimony 1997, supra note 331, at4. 
339. See Reinsch, Update West 98, supra note 262, at 2. 
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measure, the new rules would not likely result in a new market for American 
exporters of such rocket engines because, notwithstanding pressure from U.S. 
manufacturers, the State Department did not amend the Munitions List 
accordingly. 340 Other CoCom members would thus be in a position to sell 
these engines to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus rendering the U.S. 
restrictions less than effective. 
An important feature of the new CoCom agreement was that individual 
countries would continue controlling those goods and technologies which, 
though dropped from the CoCom list, could contribute to the development of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. 
This provision originated from a U. S. domestic initiative to strengthen rather 
than liberalize State and Commerce controls on WMD and missile 
proliferation, the so-called Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) 
of 1991. 341 
As we saw earlier, these expanded controls provided authority for the 
government (Commerce) to block exports on any dual-use goods regardless 
of whether such items are specifically listed on the CCL, in cases involving 
exports to end-uses or end-users 'of proliferation concern' or involving risks 
of diversion to proliferation activities. And it imposed on exporters the burden 
of 'knowing' these destinations or missile projects. Put differently, an exporter 
should apply for a license when he knows (or is informed by BXA) that the 
end use of an item may be destined for a project or activity of WMD and/or 
missile proliferation concern. 
In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed a new policy on non-proliferation 
and export control, which included important provisions on U.S. exports of 
space launch and missile technology. The policy which was developed in 
consultation with the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense, 
proclaimed the ambitious aim of finding a balance between proliferation 
concerns on the one hand and commercial needs and economic benefits on the 
other hand, "avoiding ineffective or unduly burdensome constraints while 
maintaining controls essential to curbing proliferation." 
The Presidential Directive in its draft version permitted U. S. companies to sell 
missile and launch systems on a case-by-case basis to countries that agreed to 
340. See 2 (20) Space News (Jun 1991) at 16. 
341. See Ch. 2.3.1.2 supra. The EPCI expanded controls, first published by Commerce in March 
1991 and effective as an interim rule as from August 15, 1991, reflected measures called for 
by President Bush's December 13, 1990, decision on the EPCI and included in his E.O. 
12735 of November 16, 1990 on chemical and biological weapons proliferation, see 
Imposition and expansion of foreign policy controls, 15 CFR Parts 771, 773, 776, 779, and 
799, Interim rule with request for public comment, BXA Docket, Commerce, 56 FR 40494 
(Aug 15, 1991) The Rule grouped the regulations relating to weapons proliferation in a 
newly designated part 778, Proliferation Controls. These new regulations supplemented 
controls exercised inter alia by State's ODTC under the AECA. 
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abide by the MTCR guidelines. This quid-pro-quo ("become a member and 
you may buy my launch technology")342 which originated in the State 
Department, brought severe criticism from a Congress which did not see 
MTCR membership as a sufficient guarantee against misuse of the technologies 
bought. (And they were right in the sense that MTCR does not provide for 
(multilateral) inspection or other measures to ensure that peaceful launch 
technology is not diverted to military programs.) The main worry 
Congressional opponents had was that any (developing) country, by becoming 
a MTCR member, would be eligible for receiving launcher, and thus missile, 
technology, which would in fact defeat the purpose of the non-proliferation 
exercise. Administration officials denied that the new policy would 
automatically open the door to increased sales, while at the same time 
highlighting the benefits of the policy to the exporting industry. What they did 
maintain however was the principle of case-by-case appraisal of each export, 
which would give the Administration the desired latitude for each individual 
case, exactly the situation Congress tried to prevent343 • The end result of 
(hurried) discussions on the matter between the administration and Congress 
was a new "Non-proliferation and export control policy", issued on September 
27, 1993, which still did not quite please Congress, as it maintained a 
difference in treatment depending on the purpose, either military (missile) or 
civil (launcher), and did not limit this 'relaxation' of controls to deserving 
trusted allies only. The relevant text on "missile proliferation", apart from 
strongly supporting the MTCR and promoting the guidelines' principles as a 
global missile non-proliferation norm, stated: 
"We will support prudent expansion of the MTCR's membership to include additional 
countries that subscribe to international non-proliferation standards, enforce effective export 
controls, and abandon offensive ballistic missile programs ... 
The [U.S.] will continue to oppose missile programs of proliferation concern and will 
exercise particular restraint in missile-related cooperation. 
We will continue to retain a strong presumption of denial against exports to any country 
of complete space launch vehicles or major components. 
The [U.S.] will not support the development or acquisition of space launch vehicles in 
countries outside the MTCR. 
For MTCR member countries, we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs 
which raise questions on both non-proliferation and economic viability grounds. 
The [U.S.] will, however, consider exports ofMTCR-controlled items to MTCR member 
countries for peaceful space launch programs on a case-by-case basis. 
342. The idea was to induce all those countries to become MTCR member which already 
possessed a level of launcher or missile technology and were therefore potential exporters of 
that technology to 'rogue' countries known or suspected to have offensive missile programs: 
in that connection Russia, Brazil, South Africa, India and Israel were mentioned as possible 
candidates for this membership drive, see 4 (37) Space News (Sep 1993), at 4 ("Gore to 
mediate missile dispute"). 
343. See ibid. 
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We will review whether additional constraints or safeguards could reduce the risk of misuse 
of space launch technology. We will seek adoption by all MTCR partners of policies as 
vigilant as our own." (emph. add.). 344 
The emphasized safeguard clause was added by the White House following the 
above discussions with members of Congress. Statements made in the House 
after the release of the policy showed that this measure alone did not allay 
Congressional fears of missile proliferation through exports to developing 
countries. An amendment approved by the House called for the U.S. 
government to consider export of space launch vehicle technology identical to 
ballistic missile technology exports, and therefore subject to the same stringent 
export restrictions. 345 
On the subject of export controls in general, the policy confirmed that "[t]o 
be truly effective, export controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers. 
The United States will harmonize domestic and multilateral controls to the 
greatest extent possible." But, on the other hand, the policy recognized that 
".. . the need to lead the international community or overriding national 
security or foreign policy interests may justify unilateral export controls in 
specific cases. " 
Disappointed exporters could find some comfort in the promise of the President 
"to review our unilateral dual-use export controls and policies and eliminate 
them unless such controls are essential to national security and foreign policy 
interests" and in the plan to streamline the implementation of the controls and 
to make the system more responsive and efficient "and not inhibit legitimate 
exports that play a key role in American economic strength, while preventing 
exports that would make a material contribution to the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them." ( emph. add.) 
The emphasized words would appear to place the burden of proof (that a 
product or service must remain on either the Munitions List or the Commodity 
Control List) on the government and, if so interpreted, would mean a 
significant victory for the U.S high technology product exporters. However, 
as we saw above, the period immediately after September 1993 did not see any 
substantial relaxation of dual-use controls. 
344. See 1993 non-proliferation policy, supra note 295, at 677. 
345. See 4 (39) Space News 4, 20 (Oct 1993) at 20 ("Launcher export policy changes draw 
opposition") The sponsor of that legislation and principal opponent to "the misguided efforts 
of some State Dept officials to have . . . Clinton loosen existing missile and nuclear non-
proliferation controls", recalled that earlier (1989) State Dept suggestions to aid emerging 
international space launch programs had led to the missile technology control provisions that 
were ultimately adopted as part of the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, requiring the [US] 
to treat exports of space launch vehicle technology as restrictively as those relating to 
ballistic missiles. But "[a]pparently, the State Dept did not get the message.", see 4 (40) 
Space News (Oct 1993) at 18 ("Maintain missile proliferation policy"). 
175 
Chapter 2 
Finally, the policy promised to "intensify efforts to ensure that the former 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China do not contribute to the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles. " 
In an address to the 48th session of the U. N General Assembly on the date of 
the policy's release, President Clinton proposed new steps to thwart the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles. And " ... working with Russia, Argentina, 
Hungary and South Africa, we have made significant progress toward that 
goal. ,346 
As we saw earlier, these countries soon became adherents to MTCR, and at 
least one, Russia, demanded substantial space trade concessions in return. 
The above controls mainly addressed the supply-side of the U.S.' missile non-
proliferation effort. 
The demand-side is a much longer and more complicated path, which the U.S. 
nevertheless has been following as the logical complement to the above 
approach. Consequently, the Policy announced that the U.S. "will also promote 
regional efforts to reduce the demand for missile capabilities", and singled out 
regions of tension such as the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and South 
Asia for efforts to "address the underlying motivations for weapons acquisition 
and to promote regional confidence-building steps." The latter region was the 
target of a particularly ambitious goal: 
" ... we will encourage India and Pakistan to proceed with multilateral discussions of non-
proliferation and security issues, with the goal of capping and eventually rolling back their 
nuclear and missile capabilities." 
The May 1998 nuclear tests performed by India and immediately reciprocated 
by Pakistan dealt a heavy blow to the U.S. ambitions in this respece47 and 
in fact refocused attention in the region on the nuclear option and thus also on 
346. See Address by the President to the 48th Session of the [UNGA], White House Press 
Release (Sep 27, 1993) The White House Virtual Library <http:l/library.whitehouse. 
gov/cgi>. 
347. In a conunentary on the tests, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to 
President Carter, attributed this failure of US non-proliferation policy to two causes: first, 
the US policy since 1945 was in fact an active, though selective and in fact opportunistic, 
proliferation policy, aimed at assisting friends and allies, such as the UK, France and Israel, 
to get nuclear capabilities, and discouraging all others. So why shouldn't China and Russia 
do likewise with their friends and allies like Pakistan and Iran? Secondly, an effective non-
proliferation policy is only possible if countries which adhere to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and abstain from the nuclear option, will not fall victim to agressive 
neighbours which possess such WMD. In other words, the US would have to give 
guarantees for the protection of the 'unarmed' against (nuclear) agression. (Of course, 
Brzezinski admits that Congress would never agree to such a blanket guarantee), see de 
Volkskrant (May 19, 1998) at 9. 
176 
United States law, policies and practices 
the corresponding need for missile capabilities (thus frustrating the 
administration's demand-side approach). 
At the same time, the Indian and Pakistani tests brought swift U.S. sanctions 
in the form of restrictions on the export of, inter alia, defense articles and 
services on the USML. The legal basis for these sanctions was the Glenn 
Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, which requires the U.S. 
President to impose an array of sanctions on a so-called "non-nuclear state" 
(i.e. a state which does not belong to the official club of nuclear 'haves'), 
which explodes nuclear devices. These sanctions include the termination of all 
sales to India and Pakistan of any defense articles and services and of all 
licenses for the export to that country of any item on the USML. 348 
As far as India is concerned, the State Department consequently revoked all 
export licenses and technical assistance agreements, involving that country, 
dating back to 1994,349 representing a value of several hundred million US 
dollars (not counting the value of possible Commerce sanctions). 
(For instance, the ban was expected to block the export to India of Loral Space 
and Communications' Globalstar ground station equipment and other space-
related goods and services, also affecting cooperative projects such as U .S.' 
use of Indian environmental satellites.) 
Obviously. India and Pakistan are being hurt by these sanctions. But it is 
equally clear that the U.S. interests are also affected. First, this failure of its 
non-proliferation policy may have serious destabilizing and proliferatory 
consequences in the region, with countries like Pakistan, Iran and China 
prodded into renewed interest in and more investment into nuclear and other 
arms, including missiles. Secondly, the sanctions undermine the U. S. aerospace 
industry's reliability as a contract partner and encourages (potential) clients 
to seek alternative, more reliable foreign suppliers of the aerospace goods and 
services they require. As such, it is another example of the pitfalls of legislated 
unilateral export sanctions. As a Commerce official stated a few months before 
the nuclear tests took place: 
"Increasingly ... we think of [sanctions] as a first resort, rather than as a last resort. More 
than many other issues, however, the sanctions devil is in the details. Badly implemented, 
these measures can cause enormous uncertainty and difficulty for businesses - even for those 
who do not trade with these [sanctioned] countries and have no intention of doing so. 
Careful implementation will minimize the extraterritorial impact that so irritates our allies. 
The Administration is working to develop a healthier sanctions policy. The one lesson we've 
all learned is that unilateral sanctions almost never work - support and agreement for 
348. See U.S.C. Title 22, Sec. 2799aa-1 (b), "Prohibition on assistance to countries involved in 
transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices ... ". 
349. See 9 (20) Space News (May 1998) at 1, 35. 
177 
Chapter 2 
sanctions among the international community is paramount to reaching a successful 
result. "350 
The above 1993 missile proliferation controls made it very hard for non-MTCR 
member countries to acquire any missile or launch technology from the U.S. 
for either military or civil purposes. For member states however, the opening 
was there, though subject to the conditions as outlined above. One of the few 
'lucky' countries was Brazil, which saw its new-found status as an MTCR 
member in October 1995 as its ticket to becoming a space-faring nation with 
an indigenous launch capability and an international - Equator based -
commercial spaceport. Its membership would, in its view, allow it to purchase 
from other MTCR signatories key foreign technologies needed to build launch 
vehicles. 351 
Though neither the Regime nor nationallegislations provided an automatic and 
guaranteed access to the desired technology, the assured civil character of 
Brazil's plans (whatever their economic viability), the country's MTCR-
adjusted export control laws and its status as a political ally of the U.S. and 
other Western states, made arrangements to that effect a distinct possibility. 
With respect to missiles and launchers, Clinton's 1996 National Space Policy 
basically repeated the same approach as the above 1993 policy, by: 
- opposing missile programs of proliferation concern, 
retaining a strong presumption of denial against exports of complete space 
launch vehicles or other MTCR Category I components, 
not supporting the development or acquisition of space launch vehicle 
systems in non-MTCR states, and, for MTCR countries, 
not "encouraging" new space launch vehicle programs "which raise 
questions from a proliferation and economic standpoint", while at the same 
time 
- considering exports of MTCR-controlled items to MTCR countries subject 
to additional safeguard measures where appropriate. 352 
Though there may be small differences in emphasis between the above 1993 
and 1996 policies and related practices, neither the national controls nor 
MTCR have been liberalized to any appreciable extent. On the contrary, the 
widely held concerns about WMD and missile proliferation, renewed by the 
Gulf war and, more recently, by the nuclear tests on the Indian subcontinent 
have resulted in a sharp awareness of the potential risks of a further spreading 
of launcher technology. 
350. See Reinsch, Update West 98, supra note 262, at 6-7. 
351. See Space News (Oct 1995) at 1 ("Brazil relishes freedom as MTCR member"). 
352. See National Space Policy, Intersector guidelines, (4) Non-proliferation, export controls, and 
technology transfers, Fact Sheet, The White House, National Science and Technology 
Council (Sep 19, 1996) <http://www. pub. whitehouse .gov /uri-res/12R ?urn: 
pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1996/9/20/l.text.!> hereinafter referred to as Clinton space policy. 
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In general, therefore, new space launch programs, whether in MTCR or non-
MTCR member countries, have little chance of getting any substantial support 
from the U.S. and from the other MTCR members (although the latter may 
in some cases, that is, vis-a-vis some applicants, have fewer qualms about 
selling launcher technology than the U.S.). 
Thus, non-member applicant countries with a missile program face in principle 
considerable problems convincing an MTCR supplier of launch technology that 
the technology is destined for a purely civil launch program, the more so 
where the poor economic prospects of an indigenous launch industry will raise 
foreign eyebrows as such and will also raise proliferation worries. If the new 
program is a commercial failure, the technology may still be used to strengthen 
the indigenous missile program or, worse, may be sold to third parties with 
missile development aspirations. 
And even non-members with a nascent or existing civil space launch program 
will find little encouragement, for basically the same reasons. 
So the solution is to become a member of MTCR? There is no doubt that the 
thresholds to launch technology are lower among members, subject to certain 
safeguards and conditions. 
But MTCR is meant to prevent the proliferation of missile/launcher 
technology, and targets particularly those countries which are known, suspected 
or potential missile 'proliferators'. In that connection it would appear to be a 
higher priority for the members to woo China or North Korea than to aim for 
e.g. Brazil. (And, of course, countries which do not posses such technology 
or whose technology is not sufficiently sophisticated to warrant restrictions on 
its export to third countries, are not suitable candidates for membership at all) 
The U.S., as we saw earlier, has applied a 'carrot and stick' approach to those 
countries whose potential exports it considered potentially proliferatory. 
Russia's membership of MTCR was 'bought' with considerable concessions 
in the field of space trade, including participation by Russia in the space station 
program and limited access to the international launch trade market. The quid-
pro-quo was clear: Russia would loose the revenues derived from the export 
of missiles but would be compensated by substantial civil space technology 
sales to particularly the U.S. 
The same approach is being used vis-a-vis the U.S. 's prime candidate for 
membership, China. 
In 1994, China agreed to follow the principles ofMTCR, although it continued 
sales of missile components and technology to Iran and Pakistan, creating 
concerns on the part of the MTCR members about China's interpretation of 
the guidelines and a sense of urgency concerning China's full MTCR 
membership. 
Where in the field of export of nuclear or dual-use commodities, China's 
adherence to stricter non-proliferation commitments was rewarded with nuclear 
cooperation programs with the U. S. , the latter also promises to increase 
cooperation in the space launch field, in the form of more or speeded-up 
licenses for the export of U.S. satellites to China (for launch by the Chinese) 
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in return for strengthened Chinese controls on the export of missile 
technology. 353 
(The threat of) sanctions in case of missile-related sales violating the principles 
of MTCR and the above positive incentives are some of the tools used by the 
U.S. to get China, which is considered both part of the proliferation problem 
and at the same time indispensable to any effective nonproliferation policy, to 
fully adhere to the MTCR guidelines and, preferably, to become full member 
of the MTCR group. 
Notwithstanding the fact that among MTCR members further development of 
launch capabilities are not encouraged, the combination of increased 
membership and the - admittedly modest - 'loophole' of peaceful space 
cooperation ("The [MTCR] Guidelines are not designed to impede national 
space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such 
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.") which would permit cooperation in the launch field and, finally, 
political pressure from 'allies' within MTCR insisting on their place under the 
(launching) sun- see Brazil -,has created a large group of 'insiders' with some 
- modest - prospects of increased launcher (and, potentially, missile) 
knowledge and a number of 'outsiders', non-members which are not supposed 
to receive any launcher/missile technology assistance at all, either because they 
sell missiles (proliferators) or because they buy missiles and are considered 
a (regional) security hazard. 
The effectiveness of MTCR, dependent as it is on strict controls of all of its 
members, may be threatened by its very success. Do all members give the 
same interpretation to, and (continue to) faithfully comply with, the export 
guidelines vis-a-vis non-members? And do they all apply common principles 
toward the other members? 
The number of countries with a civil launch capability has remained very 
small. New viable commercial operators which could threaten the oligopoly 
of the incumbents in the international launch market have not materialized. A 
number of countries have been discouraged either by the national and 
multilateral missile and launcher export controls or the poor economic 
prospects or incentives of various kinds or by any combination thereof and 
have decided to forego the development of an indigenous launch industry. Only 
some countries with other than purely commercial reasons retained this 
ambition. Within MTCR, Brazil is one of these. Outside MTCR, India would 
appear to be the only country with a sufficiently strong strategic 'independent-
access-to-space' drive (on top of its military missiles programs) and the 
expertise and technology-base to turn a non-MTCR supported development of 
its own launch capability into a reality. But both U.S. missile controls and 
353. See Holum briefing, supra note 189; also Holum testimony 1998, supra note 230. 
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MTCR have, up till the present time, certainly slowed down the process, and 
will continue to discourage other countries to follow India's example. 
The strengthened export controls and increased national security awareness 
brought about by the 'China affair' and the resulting Strom Thurmond 
legislation (see Chapter 4.1.2) will only reinforce the U .S. government's 




The U. S. bilateral launch trade relations 
and agreements 
3.1 China 
3.1.1 The Long March: China's entry into the launch market- prologue to 
the U. S. - China launch trade agreement 
With the space shuttle not available for private commercial launches and a 
severe shortage ofU.S. launchers as a result of both the late entry of the U.S. 
private launch industry into the launch market and a spate of U.S. private 
launch failures, Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd (AsiaSat), in 1988, 
concluded a contract with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) 
for the launch of its U.S.-built communications satellite on a Long March 
launcher. 1 CGWIC quoted especially friendly introductory prices for its launch 
service in order to break into the lucrative international commercial launch 
market. This attractive pricing also induced the Australian Aussat Company 
to procure Long March launchers for its two Aussat B communications 
satellites, also made in the U.S. 2 Asiasat, in testimony to Congress, gave yet 
1. In 1986, the four major U.S. launch vehicles (the Space Shuttle, Titan, Delta and Atlas) 
were grounded because of launch failures (the Atlas was grounded because of similarities 
with the Delta). Delta and Atlas resumed operations by the end of 1986 and a variant of the 
Titan was back in service by Februari 1987. Also in 1986, the Ariane failed, and did not 
resume service until September 1987. All these failures created a significant backlog in 
satellites awaiting launch, see Marcia S. Smith, Space Commercialization in China and 
Japan, CRS Report for Congress, July 28, 1988, reprinted in Space Committee Hearing 
1988, infra note 6, at 414 (footnote 28). 
Asiasat Ltd. is a private consortium owned equally by Cable & Wireless PLC of the U.K., 
the Beijing based, state-run China International Trust and Investment Corp. and Hong 
Kong's Hutchison Whampoa Group. 
2. An Aussat official, in a 1991 article, mentioned some -additional- factors influencing the 
Australian choice of the Long March launcher: the first contacts with the Chinese were 
already established in 1986, when, after both an Ariane launch failure and the Challenger 
accident, Aussat, looking for reliable and timely alternatives for the launch of the Aussat A-
3 satellite, only found the Long March 3 fit, willing and able to do the job. The A-3 would 
nevertheless be flown on an Ariane launcher, but this first technical and commercial contact 
was further pursued in 1987 when, again, the search for a suitable launcher brought the 
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another reason to accept the Chinese launch offer, and not Arianespace's, 
namely the inability of the latter to pin down the schedule and the fact that 
with a shared (dual) launch - which is the preferred Arianespace practice as 
it keeps the price per satellite/customer down - Asiasat would be at the mercy 
of the schedule of the companion payload. 3 
Since these satellites, included as defense articles in the United States 
Munitions List (USML), could not be exported (to China) without specific 
authorization from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control (later 
renamed Office of Defense Trade Controls), both companies asked for the 
required export licenses with that Office. 4 Hughes Aircraft Corporation, the 
manufacturer of the satellites, actively supported the application through an 
intense lobbying campaign, but the U .S. launch companies, particularly Martin 
Marietta and General Dynamics, opposed the granting of licenses since this 
would permit China, a country with a non-market economy, to become a full-
fledged low-priced competitor in the international commercial launch market. 5 
The export license application, lodged by Hughes in July 1988 (but informally 
already broached in late 1987,6 prompted a governmental review of prevailing 
U.S. space policy, which included such issues as the (necessity and 
effectiveness ot) technology transfer controls, the- increasing -trade relations 
with China, the relations with Australia, the importance of the satellite industry 
for the U.S. economy as compared to that of the launch industry and the 
possibility of offering the license as a non-proliferation quid pro quo in the 
form of a Chinese commitment to refrain from selling Silkworm missiles to - at 
that time - Iran. 
The trade relations in general and the satellite industry in particular won: on 
September 12, 1988, President Reagan notified Congress of his approval of 
the export licenses for the three satellites. 7 As a result, Hughes felt sufficiently 
Australians in touch with a China that "had the ability to become a very competitive supplier 
of launch services." The contract for the two Aussat B satellites was awarded to Hughes 
Aircraft Company in June 1988. A thorough (on-site) review of the Chinese launch vehicle 
programme, including its manufacturing facilities, design capability and launch site support 
services further reinforced the favourable impressions gained earlier: it was this Chinese 
technical credibility coupled with the attractive introductory pricing which, later in 1988, 
made Aussat confirm its choice of the Long March 2E (LM-2E), see Gordon Pike, Chinese 
launch services, a user's guide, hereinafter referred to as Gordon Pike 1991, 7 (2) Space 
Policy l03-ll5 (1991) at 103, 104. 
3. See testimony, 1988 China hearings, as quoted by Stephane Chenard, The long march to 
launch regulation, hereinafter referred to as Chenard launch regulation, 4 Space Markets 
193-201 (1990) at 199. 
4. On the U.S. export control regulations, see supra Chapter 2.3. 
5. McDonnell Douglas was less prominent in its opposition, beause of its involvement in China 
as an aircraft manufacturer. See, for more background information, Chenard launch 
regulation, supra note 3, at 197-199. 
6. See Gordon Pike 1991, supra note 2, at ll4. 
7. Section 36 (c) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the Administration to notify 
Congress before issuing a license for an item on the U.S. Munitions List that is sold under 
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confident to conclude a formal launch services agreement with CGWIC, on 
condition that Aussat would stick to its selection of the LM-2E and that 
CoCom would endorse the export license issued by the U. S. Government. 8 
But a price had to be paid to also satisfy the concerns of the U.S. launch 
industry. So the U.S. Trade Representative was asked to negotiate an 
agreement with the People's Republic on the conditions to be applied to the 
latter's first steps into the international commercial launch market and the way 
in which the Chinese were to behave whilst selling their launch services to 
international customers. Also, technology transfer and liability concerns created 
by the Chinese launching U.S. satellites from their nationallaunchpads had 
to be addressed. 9 
In the mean time Congress, by virtue of the Arms Export Control Act, had 
30 calendar days (ending October 12) during which time it could object to the 
intended licensing via joint resolution prohibiting the export. For that purpose 
House of Representatives hearings were held on September 23 and 27 
(Committee on Science, Space and Technology) and on September 28 
(Committee on Foreign Affairs). 10 
The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology examined the issue in two 
days of extensive hearings, involving government witnesses, the principal 
private parties directly involved in the decision, outside experts on China, and 
representatives of the American launch and satellite industries. The Committee 
on Foreign Affairs had a one day meeting to review the issue, and consulted 
largely the same parties and experts. A wealth of background material was 
made available to both Committees, and both oral and written statements and 
contract for $50 million or more. The Aussat contract was valued at $260 million; the 
export value of the Asiasat was about $40 million, but "[i]n an effort to keep Congress fully 
informed of related developments, the Administration also informed Congress of its intent to 
approve the Asiasat license ... ", see statement of Eugene McAllister, Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and business Affairs, Department of State, in The Administration's decision to 
license the Chinese Long March launch vehicle, Hearings before the Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, lOOth Cong., 2nd Sess. (Sep 23 
and 27, 1988), hereinafter referred to as Space Committee Hearing 1988, at 24. 
8. See Gordon Pike 1991, supra note 2, at 114. 
9. For the text of the Dept of State statement of Sep 9, 1988, announcing the Administration's 
intended decision to issue the export licenses subject to the conclusion of agreements with 
the PRC on the above subjects, and subject to Congressional and CoCom approval, see Dept 
of State Bull. (Nov 1988) at 27-28; also in Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 
174. 
10. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, and Proposed sale and launch of United 
States satellites on Chinese missiles, Hearing before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, 
International Security and Science, on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and on International 
Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
lOOth Cong., 2nd Sess. (Sep 28, 1988), hereinafter referred to as Foreign Affairs 
Committee Hearing 1988. 
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(additional) questions & answers provided all information possibly required 
for a thorough evaluation and an informed Congressional view. 
The Government, represented by the State Department and the Department of 
Defense made a strong case for the granting of the export license. 
With respect to the national security angle, the government addressed two 
aspects: the viability of the U.S. expendable launch industry (to assure access 
to outer space for national defense purposes) and the protection of sensitive 
U.S. technologies with potential military applications. 
With respect to the first aspect, the State Department made it clear that, with 
or without the approval of the U.S., the Chinese would enter the international 
market for launch services anyhow as a number of other nations could also 
produce and sell satellites and procure Chinese launches for their customers. 
The fact that Aussat and Asiasat had bought U.S. satellites gave the U.S. 
government, by virtue of its export control legislation, the unique opportunity 
and the leverage to negotiate a bilateral launch trade agreement with the 
Chinese which would stipulate appropriate Chinese behavior, when selling 
Long March launch services, with respect to the entire international satellite 
launch market and not only that portion relating to U.S.-made satellites. 
"Allowing limited competition now will strengthen our [EL V] industry before 
other nations enter the launch services market later in the 1990's" .u 
As for the protection ofU.S. technology, the Department ofDefense observed 
that, on the one hand, the U.S. had already significantly liberalized its policy 
with regard to technology transfer to China, a "friendly non-allied country", 
over the past five years. Moreover, as part of the U.S. 's developing military 
relationship with China, weapons and equipment had been transferred to China 
which embodied military technologies in some instances more advanced than 
those to be found in the satellites in question. Furthermore, many of the 
technologies embodied in the satellites had already been sold or released to 
China via commercial channels. 
On the other hand, and this to some extent contradicted the above soothing 
remarks, both a government-to-government agreement on technology 
11. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 30. The State Dept official gave the 
following example to illustrate his point: "If these were British satellites the U.S. would 
have the opportunity in a sense to veto the licenses in CoCom if we believed the technology 
was sensitive and could not be protected. However, we will not necessarily have the 
opportunity to establish as a pre-condition the negotiation of a U.S. -PRC agreement on 
launch practices. If the satellites were Brazilian, we would have not have the opportunity to 
veto the sale, nor would we have the opportunity to establish a fair trade agreement as a pre-
condition.", id. at 19. Conversely, one might add, the denial of a license would have robbed 
the U .S. government of the opportunity, at this moment in time, to set the stage for this new 
field of international competition. The above example simplified the situation to the extent 
that it did not refer to the distinct possibility that a British or Brazilian satellite would almost 
invariably contain one or more U.S.-built components, enabling the U.S. authorities to use 
the export licensing system to require (fair trade) conditions. 
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safeguards was a condition precedent to the issuance of the export license and 
a detailed safeguard regime had to be actually in place. The regime as 
proposed by the applicants would include strict control over access of Chinese 
personnel and dedicated, secure payload handling facilities. 
The Department concluded in its testimony "that China's entry into the foreign 
commercial space launch industry will provide no additional impetus to the 
development of China's military capabilities to include its capabilities in 
space. "12 
On the issue of technology safeguards, one of the Asiasat partners confirmed 
that its technology control plan would preclude any Chinese access to the 
satellite, except to those visual aspects that were already in the public domain. 
In fact, "the only involvement of Chinese personnel will be to operate the 
crane that will lift the satellite on top of the launch vehicle. "(!)13 
In its presentation to Congress, the State Department put considerable emphasis 
not so much on the dollar value of the satellite sale as such, but rather on the 
impact of the license decision on Chinese-American economic and trade 
relations in general. 
Thus, impressive figures were quoted reflecting the expansion of two-way 
trade, of U.S. exports to China and U.S. investment in China, and including 
in particular the promising, ever-growing market for U.S. high technology 
products in China. And the Department also stressed that, for China, entry into 
the international satellite launch market represented an important national 
12. See statement of Dr. Karl D. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs), Department of Defense, in Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, 
at 36, 37. 
13. See statement of Alan L. Cooper, General Manager, Satellite Policy and Planning, Cable & 
Wireless, plc., in Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 114. The statement 
further elaborated on the controls as follows: "To the extent that there is any activity 
surrounding the preparation of the spacecraft on-site, all such work and incidental exposure 
of constituent elements of the satellite will take place in a locked facility to which the 
Chinese will be denied access. Whenever the satellite is outside the preparation building, it 
will at all times be sealed, even while it is lifted on top of the launch vehicle and installed in 
its fairing.", ibid. The Ambassador of the PRC to the U.S. gave the following assurances: 
"The security of foreign satellites shipped to China for launches is guaranteed. To a foreign 
satellite manufacturing country, the entry of its satellite into China for launch is a matter of 
transit and not of export or transfer of technology. The satellites made by U.S. companies 
and those produced by other countries with U.S. patents and technical know-how will be 
exempted from customs inspection in China if they are to be launched on Long March 
launch vehicles. The satellite and its related equipment will remain under the control and 
supervision of its owner during the entire process of transportation, storage, testing and 
launch operation from its entry into Chinese territory. China has no intention to seek any 
classified technical know-how therefrom about the satellite and its related equipment." see 
letter to Hon. Step hen J. Solarz, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, H.R. Committee on Foreign Affairs, in Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, 
supra note 10, at 134. 
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initiative in high technology trade and an opportunity to earn much-needed 
foreign exchange. 14 · 
Finally, both State Department and Defense addressed the most thorny internal 
issue, i.e. the conflicting interests of the U.S. satellite industry on the one hand 
and the U.S. launch industry on the other hand. 
With respect to the former industry, they submitted the following 
considerations. 
The U.S. commercial satellite industry was an important asset: over the next 
five years more than $2.5 billion, representing more than 60 percent of all 
western-built communications satellites, would be earned in export revenue. 
But the U. S satellite manufacturers faced increasing competition from 
European firms. (For instance, the runner-up to Hughes in the Aussat 
competion was the European team British Aerospace/Matra). Permitting U.S. 
firms to use cost competitive launchers such as the Long March would allow 
them to remain competitive vis-a-vis both foreign satellite firms and terrestrial 
competitors such as fiber optics. 
Denying the U. S. industry this possibility would in this particular case mean 
the probable loss of approximately $40 million in Asiasat export value (as the 
commercial viability of the Asiasat consortium depended on the Chinese 
partner's access to foreign exchange provided by the Long March contract). 
It would also put at risk the approximately $250 million to be spent in the U.S. 
by Hughes and its major subcontractors under the proposed Aussat contract, 
as Aussat would have to choose an alternate supplier of either the satellites or 
the launch services; and foreign firms would be most happy to oblige! 15 
14. See statement of Eugene McAllister, in Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 28, 
29: "Two-way trade increased from about $1 billion in 1977 to over $10 billion in 1987. 
Exports to China in 1987 exceeded $3,5 billion. Tbe U.S. is the third largest investor in 
China, with about $2 billion in assets . . . High technology trade has become particularly 
important in our economic relationship. Over the past five years, the U.S. has supplied 
anywhere from 30 percent to 47 percent of China's total high technology imports." As for 
the foreign exchange, Alan Cooper of Cable and Wireless, in his testimony on behalf of 
Asiasat, stated that the dollars earned with the launch would be needed to a.o. pay Hughes 
for the satellite: "In terms of tl1e direct needs of the venture, the purchase of launch services 
from Long March will provide a hard currency in-flow that will justify outflows for the 
Chinese investment in Asiasat, through CITIC, and the payment of Asiasat of usage charges 
for capacity actually subscribed by domestic PRC users." See his statement, supra note 13, 
at 100, 108. 
15. See statement of Eugene McAllister, Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 29, 
30. Richard Johnson, Aussat's general manager, responding to a question by the chairman 
of the Hearing, confirmed that there was certainly no guarantee that the business, i.e. the 
satellite procurement, would stay with the U.S. and that a U.S. launch firm would be chosen 
in case of a Congressional veto of the Long March. In fact there were a number of options 
available to Aussat, which had received four tenders for its satellite system, three from U .S. 
suppliers (Hughes Aircraft Company, Ford Aerospace and GE Astrospace) and one from a 
European consortium (British Aerospace/Matra). As a result of Aussat's requirement that 
tenders should offer a package of satellite construction and launch arrangements, each 
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The interests of the U.S. launch industry were, as we saw earlier, in the view 
of the Administration officials better served by saying "yes" to the license 
request and being able to attach conditions thereto with respect to Chinese fair 
launch trade practices, than by saying "no" and postpone the discussion on 
Chinese launch behaviour and/or leave it to e.g. the Europeans to deal with 
the threats and opportunities of Chinese launch competition; in the latter case, 
the U.S. leverage would be far less than in the present situation. 16 Besides, 
there was no guarantee whatsoever that the U.S. launch industry in this 
particular case would benefit from a veto of the Long March launcher. 
Apparently, the European Ariane launcher, and not a U.S. company, was 
Hughes' and its customers' chosen alternative in case the Chinese were barred 
from launching the satellite. 17 
Predictably, the U.S. launch industry, represented primarily by General 
Dynamics (Atlas) and Martin Marietta (Titan), expressed rather strong views 
on the matter, along the following lines. 
The U. S. EL V industry was still in its infancy, if not "embryonic", had not 
even had its first commercial launch yet and had been able to win a number 
of international launch contracts since mid-1987 only because the Ariane 
launch manifest had quickly filled through early 1991 (and contracts therefore 
more or less spilled over to the U.S. companies): in other words, this young 
U.S. industry was only now entering into a much more truly competitive phase 
involving launches for 1991 and beyond. 
It was at this sensitive stage that they felt confronted with new and unexpected 
competition. For the companies concerned, strongly encouraged by policy 
intiatives and statements of both the President and Congress, had invested 
tenderer had offered more than one launch vehicle, collectively including the U.S. Titan and 
Atlas Centaur rocket, the European Ariane and the Long March. All four had offered the 
Long March, which - through its low introductory price - meant a prospective cost reduction 
to Aussat of some $80 million or 20% of the system cost. Aussat's initial selection of 
Hughes to negotiate with resulted in a letter of intent in which Aussat directed Hughes "to 
enter into a Launch Services agreement for the provision of a Long March launch", see 
Johnson statement, ibid, at 91, 92. If this cost advantage could not be had with a U.S. 
satellite firm, the logical step for Aussat would be to turn to the European consortium 
which, apparently, not only had made a very competitive satellite offer but also had fewer 
qualms about using a Chinese launcher. (Arianespace Inc. USA President Heydon, in a letter 
of October 7, 1988 to the Chairman of the Committee hearing, denied this, stating that the 
European bidder British Aerospace had consistently supported the position that "it is not in 
Europe's long-term interest to use Long March as a weapon in their competitive battles with 
the major U.S. satellite builders.", see Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 
426). 
Of course, the other, more expensive, options -i.e. a U .S. satellite delivered in orbit by 
either U.S. or European launcher and a European satellite with the same launcher choice-
were not completely off the table, but less likely to be choosen. 
16. See supra (text to) note 11. 
17. See Bill C. Lai, National subsidies in the international commercial launch markett, 9 (1) 
Space Policy 17-34 (1993), herinafter referred to as Bill Lai, at 26. 
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significant amounts in launch pad and launch vehicle improvements, believing 
that the U.S. Government, interested in a healthy commercial U.S. space 
transportation industry, would not put that strategic asset at risk by voluntarily 
bringing in unfair competition. 
In that connection, Chinese pricing practices were seen as most threatening. 
As the Martin Marietta representative put it, 
" ... American launch companies cannot compete against a foreign government program that 
is totally independent of free market pressures, and whose pricing decisions seem driven 
by foreign exchange needs and foreign policy considerations rather than private enterprise 
considerations of cost and return on investment." 
Chinese entry into the market place would thus disrupt and undermine the 
viability of the U.S. companies; that is, unless this entry was made subject to 
a thoughtful, balanced and comprehensive trade policy, in which (guarantees 
with respect to) fair pricing behavior would have to play a central role. 
Both U.S. companies expressed their concern about the contents of the 
conditions yet to be agreed upon with the Chinese in this regard, and strongly 
recommended to first have the fair trade I fair pricing agreement concluded 
(and considered by Congress), after which the licenses could be resubmitted 
by the State Department. 18 
McDonnell Douglas, the third U.S. company, though showing a more positive 
attitude towards granting an export license in view of its broader business 
involvement with China, made its support conditional on agreement having 
been reached on inter alia economic conditions, "most likely centered around 
establishing a specific and limited number of Long March commercial launches 
per year, and establishing fair cost-based pricing for those launch services. "19 
Arianespace echoed the concerns of the U .S. industry about the impact of non-
market entrants' less than fair competition on the viability of the western 
commercial launch services companies (with Arianespace being even more 
vulnerable because it lacked the "healthy military production base" the U.S. 
companies could rely on20 , and demanded prior Chinese demonstration of 
18. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 47, 53 (statement Martin 
Marietta) and 88 (statement General Dynamics). 
19. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 168. 
20. In its "fact sheets on the China launch issue" of Sep. 1988, the Department of State largely 
confirmed Arianespace's observation, stating that "[h]istorically, the major source of 
investtnent for development of ... (ELVs) in areas such as design launch facilities, and 
tooling has resulted from Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA contracts. The 
magnitude of that investtnent as indicated by the size of the total military contracts discussed 
below is significant ... - U.S. ELV Manufacturers have signed contracts for 48 military 
launch vehicles worth $4.8 billion.", see Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 
392. There is no comparable (European) military production base available to Arianespace. 
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willingness and ability to abide by rules of fair and reasonable competition 
based on market-oriented principles before such entry could be permitted. The 
European launch company consequently called for a (prior) multilateral 
agreement on pricing and trade practices to ensure reasonable and fair 
competition. 21 
Although the above launch companies were asked to state their views on a 
number of other issues, such as the question of technology transfers and 
liability for Long March launches, their views were particularly sollicited on 
standards for "fair pricing for launch services". In the absence of a reasonably 
accurate insight in the true costs of the Long March, there was a general 
tendency to take the (historical) western launch prices as a yardstick: on the 
basis of an analysis of price/performance ratios, General Dynamics came to 
the conclusion that they all fell within a rather narrow band, and suggested that 
Chinese pricing in dollars per pound within the same band would not be 
unfair. 22 Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas and Arianespace expressed 
similar views. 23 
In this connection, the State Department, already sufficiently aware of the U.S. 
launch companies' views prior to the hearing, had identified the following 
items as "market disruption safeguards", which the Chinese would have to 
agree on to help establish a level playing field: 
- price future launches at "international rates" 
- participate in "rules of the road" talks regarding government involvement 
in, and support for, the commercial launch industry, and 
- limit the number of future launches to an appropriate level. 24 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation, in its submission to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee Hearing, rejected the suggestion that it was "dumping" their 
launch services or received subsidies from the Chinese government. They 
attributed the comparatively lower price of their launch services to a 
combination of factors, such as "practical and reliable rocket design, fairly 
high successful launch record, entirely home-made materials and components, 
fairly low labour costs and the corporation's practice of seeking no high profit 
... ". The company also defended the promotional price for its Long March-2E, 
a new type of launch vehicle, as fully in accordance with international practice, 
and submitted that the introductory price for the new Ariane 4 launcher had 
been even lower than the one offered for its Long March. Finally, the Chinese 
company cited certain operational limitations which put its launch vehicle at 
21. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 184, 185. 
22. Id., at 282, 284. 
23. Id., at 288, 290 (Martin Marietta), 295, 296 (McDonnell Douglas) and 301, 303. 
(Arianespace). 
24. Id., at 389. 
191 
Chapter 3 
a disadvantage compared to its western competitors and made price 
comparisons inappropriate. 25 
Expert testimony at the hearing supported the statements made by the Chinese 
with respect to the difference in price based on qualitative differences between 
their own launch vehicle and the western ELV's. In essence, the comparison 
boiled down to a sharp contrast between sophistication on the one (western) 
hand and the inexpensive and simple "big dumb booster" concept on the other 
(Chinese) hand. 26 
Of course, the above justifications for lower Chinese prices only addressed the 
contention of dumping or "unfair pricing", and, rather than reconciling the 
western launch industry with Chinese entry into the launch market, only 
heightened their concerns about the effects thereof. 
As for a possible safeguard in the form of quantitative limitations, the U.S. 
launch industry itself recommended a numerical standard of one award of one 
launch per year; its European competitor, hardly more generous, came to one 
or two. 27 These were in reaction to indications received from China that the 
Chinese would be agreeable to a limitation to four launches per year, which 
represented the maximum number of launch vehicles China Great Wall 
Industry Corporation could spare each year for foreign customers taking into 
account its domestic launch needs. 28 
Whereas, in the view of the Department of State, this latter number of launches 
would not jeopardize the U.S. launch industry29 , the latter, seeing a "thin" 
world launch market for the 1991 and beyond period of some 16 or 17 annual 
launches (with Arianespace acquiring at least half of the contracts), felt 
"discouraged" at the prospect of loosing such a sizeable part (25%) of the 
market to the Chinese, and spoke in this connection of a "serious blow to the 
nascent U. S. commercial launch industry". 30 
At the time of the hearing, the Administration had not made up its mind on 
either the level (or even the principle) of a quantitative restriction31 or on the 
definitive approach to be taken with respect to "fair pricing" . 
The Administration presented a number of other issues which had been the 
subject of inter-agency study and review prior to its decision: the role of 
CoCoM, the U.S. policy on Soviet launches of U.S. satellites, the liability 
condition, and its relations with the European Space Agency (ESA). 
25. See Foreign Affairs Connnittee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 118, 119. 
26. See statement David R. Scott, Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 
112. 
27. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 288 (Martin Marietta) and 302 
(Arianespace). 
28. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 120, 134. 
29. Id., at 36. 
30. Id., at 45 (Martin Marietta) and 44 (General Dynamics). 
31. Id., at4l. 
192 
The U.S. bilateral launch trade relations and agreements 
CoCoM, whose -unanimous- approval was needed before the U.S. 
Government could issue the licenses, had already been approached in June 
1988, i.e. prior to the official license applications, for an early consideration 
of the matter. 
At that time, the U.S. had confirmed its support for case-by-case review of 
satellite export cases involving China with a presumption of approval (provided 
national security concerns could be met) as opposed to similar Soviet cases 
where a presumption of denial was maintained. This was consistent with both 
the CoCoM policy of differentiating between the PRC and the USSR, with the 
U.S. view of Soviet threat, and with U.S. export regulations. 
Although CoCoM's export embargo proscribed export of satellites to Warsaw 
Pact nations, Korea and other communist countries, China had, through the 
years, been subjected to increasingly less rigorous controls. 
CoCoM's initial consideration did not result in agreement on policy or 
procedure, and further discussion of the matter was scheduled for November 
1988, i.e. after the 30 days Congressional review (and assuming export 
approval of the latter had been obtained). 32 
Soviet launches of U. S. satellites remained prohibited, affirmed the Department 
of State, and any pressure, domestic or foreign, to treat the Soviets in the same 
way as the Chinese would be strongly resisted: the P.R.C., a "friendly, non-
allied" nation, did, in the consistent view of State, not pose the same threat 
to the United States space assets as did the Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet 
and Chinese capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. satellites were vastly 
different. 33 
Liability involved the applicability to the Chinese launches of the 1972 Space 
Liability Convention, to which the United States was, but China was not, a 
party. That Convention holds a "launching State" absolutely liable for damage 
caused by its space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. 
As the definition of "launching State" includes "a State which procures the 
launching of a space object", and it could be argued on the basis of the 
provisions of that Convention that the U.S. was "procuring" the launching of 
the satellites in question, the U. S. Government wanted to ensure that China 
would compensate the U.S. for any payments the latter would have to make 
pursuant to its liability under the Convention. A government-to-government 
agreement, covering this eventuality, was therefore considered a necessary pre-
condition by the U.S. 34 
At the request of the European Space Agency, the U.S. Government and ESA 
had met on several occasions since July 1987 to develop "rules of the road" 
32. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 384. 
33. Id., at 390. 
34. Id., at 388. 
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with respect to government involvement in, and support for, the commercial 
space launch industry. Although, at their most recent meeting in July 1988, 
the two sides had made considerable progress in identifying specific 
governmental practices which directly affect commercial operations and had 
concluded that further work on indirect supports was needed, the talks between 
the two parties had not yet progressed to negotiation. 
ESA, confronted by the U.S. at the latter meeting with the export license 
applications, had expressed its concern about additional entrants into the 
"crowded" launch market. The two sides had subsequently discussed possible 
(joint) approaches to launches by such third parties, but, according to the State 
Department, had not come to a decision on how to proceed. 
The U.S. Administration had in the mean time informed ESA about its decision 
with respect to the Chinese launch services and expected to have further 
discussions with that organization on the matter. 35 
In the two Committee Hearings brief discussions took place on the politically 
sensitive issue of Chinese (future) behavior in the area of missile proliferation, 
particularly in the Middle East, and on the possible linkage of this issue with 
the the export license decision. Basis for the discussion was the rather veiled 
reference to this "trade off" in the statements made by the representative of 
the Department of Defense before both Committees: 
"Entry into the commercial space field will also foster efforts to direct China's missile and 
space activities into areas more compatible with our own non-proliferation concerns and 
objectives. "36 
While denying a direct linkage between the two issues, upon questioning on 
the part of Committee members the Defense official conceded that the 
Secretary of Defense, during his - recent- visit to China had raised U.S. 
Administration concerns about Chinese sales of Silkworm missiles to Middle 
East countries and that the Chinese were undoubtedly aware of the negative 
effect these sales had on their relationship with the U.S. And, as the 
spokesman added, "the discussions that Secretary Carlucci had in China were 
the most successful discussions we have had to date with the Chinese on this 
topic. "37 By finally drawing Congress members' attention to the fact that the 
President's decision on the export licenses had taken place at the end of the 
Secretary's successful mission to China, he appeared to put the trade off rather 
squarely on the table. 38 
35. Id., at 391. (Some further discussions did indeed take place but dit not result in an 
agreement between the two parties, see Ch. 3.4.3 infra). 
36. Id., at 36; see also Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 33. 
37. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 47. 
38. Id., at 33. Ten years later, this veiled linkage has become an express and openly proclaimed 
policy; in June 1998, a high State Dept official stated in testimony before the House: "One 
aspect of our efforts to persuade China to adopt a more responsible nonproliferation policy, 
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Although "healthy skepticism" was expressed both on the part of Committee-
membership about what verbal commitments the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
had exactly extracted from the Chinese39 and on the part of Defense itself 
about the Chinese "deeds" to be expected on that basis,40 details given to 
Congress in private session apparently further justified the Administration's 
hope that "the problem of missile proliferation is now behind us. "41 
In his letter of October 14, 1988 to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, the Secretary of Defense noted a recent legislative initiative in the 
Senate to block the export of the satellites. The House of Representatives, 
through its opposition against this attempt, in the Secretary's view, not only 
"helped build our bipartisan effort to develop a constructive relationship with 
China. More importantly, however, it signaled strong support for our 
diplomatic efforts to stem missile proliferation in the Middle East". 42 
Expressing concern that other attempts might be made to block the export of 
the satellites or delay consideration of the licenses until the next 
Administration, Secretary Carlucci warned against the effect of the ensuing 
withdrawal of the Administration's notification (of intended approval) to 
Congress: 
- it would undercut the U.S. negotiating position with the Chinese on the 
three conditions, i.e. the conclusion of agreements on market access, on 
technology safeguards and on liability, if the latter were to commit 
themselves to specific terms without knowing whether the Administration 
would then have the authority to provide the licenses; 
- because of the time-sensitive character of the contracts, delay would 
jeopardize $300 million in U.S. exports (as well as related American jobs), 
and other exports would be at risk if China responded by switching to other 
countries for high technology equipment, such as commercial aircraft; 
- it would mean trouble with "a staunch ally in the South Pacific", Australia, 
which had a strong interest in the success of the Aussat launch by China; 
particularly regarding missile transfers, has been the basic policy of three administrations, 
beginning in 1988, to allow U.S.-made satellites and foreign satellites with significant U.S. 
components and technology to be launched on Chinese rockets. This policy has been used 
judiciously as a "carrot" to encourage China to enforce strengthened nonproliferation 
standards". (emph. add.), see Holum testimony 1998, supra Ch. 2 note 230. 
39. See statement Hon. Solomon, Representative, ("I really think that our good friend, Secretary 
Caducei, was hornswoggled."), Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 
16. See also critical press coverage ("Mr. Caducei apparently was unable to persuade his 
hosts to change their policy, because the statements at the end of his visit said nothing about 
China expressing willingness to stop being a merchant of death, only that China conducts 
and would continue to conduct its arms business "responsibly"), Chicago Sun-Times, Sep 
10, 1988, reproduced in Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 223. 
40. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 39. 
41. Ibid. As we saw in the previous Chapter, this was a clear overstatement of the 
Administration's accomplishments: the problem is still there today. 




" ... it would most certainly imperil the important progress made in my talks with Chinese 
leaders in Beijing in August. These meetings touched on a number of bilateral issues, but 
most important were the successful discussions on China's arms sales policy. I said in 
Beijing that these talks on arms sales were "the best discussions that we have ever had" with 
the Chinese, and I am now hopeful that we can put the issue of missile proliferation behind 
US. n43 
And, as late as October 20, National Security Advisor Colin L. Powell, in a 
similar letter to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, warned against any last 
minute legislative efforts in Congress to prohibit or delay issuance of the 
export licenses, and confirmed the linkage between the two issues: "Finally, 
the extremely positive results achieved during Secretary Carlucci's recent visit 
to China in putting the issue of Chinese IRBM sales behind us could well be 
lost [if such legislation would be adopted]. 1144 
As we saw earlier and will revert to later, Chinese (non-) proliferation 
behavior would dominate the export licensing and launch debate for many 
years to come. 
In the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chinese human rights behavior was also 
brought up as a matter of concern and linked with the satellite export licenses. 
As one member observed 11 ••• the manner in which a number of us will react 
to these negotiations will have a great deal to do with the manner in which the 
Chinese observe the human rights problems and correct the human rights 
abuses that are evident in Tibet. 1145 
At the hearings, the matter was not further pursued. As an important 
Congressional concern, it would nevertheless join missile proliferation as a 
factor which would continue to considerably affect and complicate U. S.-
Chinese launch trade relations. 
Congress felt rushed with just 30 days to make up its mind, and in both 
Committees complaints were voiced that the members had to judge the issue 
without knowing the contents of the agreements yet to be negotiated by the 
U.S. Government with China. (And after those 30 days, Congress would, to 
the concern of some members, essentially loose jurisdiction over the 
matter). 46 
43. Id., at 123. (And see note 41). 
44. Id., at 101. 
45. Id., at 40. 
46. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 38, 39, and Foreign Affairs 
Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 4, 6, 92, 94. 
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There was - at times heated and emotional - debate about the various 
dimensions of the issue as presented above. Already prior to the hearings, a 
number of Congressmen had appealed to the National Security Advisor to 
protect the U.S. ELY industry, on the brink of (re-)assuring U.S. access to 
space, against the detrimental effects of non-free market economy prices, 
mentioning the loss of (launch-) trade opportunities and American jobs and the 
dangers of technology transfers as added reasons for denying the license 
applications. 47 A joint resolution of dissapproval was introduced in both 
Senate and House of Representatives48 , and particularly in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee hearing, China's missile sales to Middle East countries were cited 
as the type of behavior that should not be "rewarded", nor abstention from that 
behavior be bought, by having them launch U.S. satellites. 49 
The determination of the Administration to improve (trade-) relations with 
China and the assurances its representatives gave that all interests would be 
scrupulously and evenhandedly served, both in the negotiatiations on the three 
agreements the Administration proposed to conclude with China and in the 
follow-up period thereafter, in the end prevailed. 
On October 7, 1995, the Chairman of the House Space Committee wrote to 
Secretary of State Shultz: 
"Following the committee"s careful scrutiny of this issue and vigorous discourse with 
affected parties on the implications of this licensing decision, I have concluded that the 
licensing decision outlined in the President's notification to Congress, including the specific 
conditions therein, is responsible, fair and prudent to the overall interests of the United 
States. Moreover, this license and the conditions to which it is subject present significant 
opportunities to this country that extend far into the future. "50 
On October 12, when the deadline for Congressional disapproval had passed, 
the Foreign Affairs Committee had also, albeit tacitly, accepted the 
Administration's decision. Nevertheless, some of its members remained 
sufficiently opposed to it to consider further legislative action, which prompted 
both the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense to write 
urgent letters to the Committee Chairman requesting his assistance in 
forestalling these last minute actionsY 
A reason for the Congressional opponents to bide their time may well have 
been their conviction that, where this battle appeared to be lost, the 
Administration had reaffirmed that it would decide each future export license 
47. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 10, at 95-97. 
48. Id., at 6, 122. 
49. Id., at 6. 
50. See Space Committee Hearing 1988, supra note 7, at 422, 423. 
51. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, supra note 10, at 100 and 122 respectively. 
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request on its own merits52 and would have to submit its decisions to 
Congress, whose members would continue to closely monitor Chinese 
"behavior" and have every opportunity to link the issues. An opportunity they 
used soon thereafter. 
On January 26, 1989, after two rounds of negotiations, the U.S. and China 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China regarding international trade in commercial launch services. This 
Memorandum of Agreement (M.o.A.) was preceded by, and intimately linked 
with two other M.o.A.'s signed by the same parties on December 17, 1988, 
i.e. a Memorandum of Agreement on satellite technology safeguards and a 
Memorandum of Agreement on liability for satellite launches ; the latter lost 
most of its relevance when China, on December 20, 1988, acceded to the U. 
N. Space Liability Convention of 1972.53 
The three agreements, which will be referred to hereafter as the (Launch) 
Trade Agreement, the Technology Safeguards Agreement and the Liability 
Agreement respectively, entered into force on March 16, 1989, the date on 
which the U.S. Government had notified its Chinese counterpart that U.S. 
licences for the export of the Asiasat and Aussat satellites to China for launch 
from Chinese territory had been approved. 54 
52. Id., at 100. 
53. The technology safeguards and liability M.o.A. 's were negotiated under State Dept 
chairmanship and initialled by the two parties in Beijing on Oct 21, 1988. The trade 
agreement was negotiated under USTR chairmanship, with participation from other agencies, 
and was initialled on Dec 17, 1988. At the latter occasion, the State Dept issued a statement 
in which it outlined the contents of the trade agreement and declared not yet to be " ... in a 
position to issue the export licenses for the three . . . satellites . . . We must still review and 
formally approve the trade agreement. We also must await CoCoM approval of the satellite 
exports"., see American Foreign Policy (1988) at 539 (Doe. 321). 
54. The agreements are reproduced in 28 I.L.M. 596 (1989). The guidelines for the 
implementation of the main M.o.A., approved by the Trade Policy Staff Committee and the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and issued by the Office of the USTR appear in 54 Fed. 
Reg. No. 19 (Jan. 31, 1989) at 4931-4933. To avoid issues of liability between China, the 
launching state, and the United Kingdom, the state of registration of the Asiasat satellite, the 
two parties exchanged notes on March 16, 1990, which provided that "China and the United 
Kingdom agree that, with regard to the compensation arising during the launch phase (from 
ignition of the launch vehicle to the separation of the satellite from the launch vehicle), 
China shall assume the liability as between them under the Liability Convention, the Outer 
Space Treaty and other principles of international law". See He Qizhi, Legal issues of 
China's entry into international space market, 40 (3) Zeitschrift fuer Luft- und 
Weltraumrecht 278-281 (1991) at 279. For a detailed analysis of the Convention on 
international liability for damage caused by space objects of March 29, 1972, e.i.f. 
September 1, 1972, 24 U.S.T 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, see H. Peter van Fenema, supra Ch. 2, 
note 9. 
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3.1.2 The U.S.-China Agreements of 1989 
a. The Launch Trade Agreement 
Under the article II heading "trade issues and market entry", the agreement 
sought to regulate (future) Chinese behaviour in the international market place 
through adherence to both general principles and specific - launch capacity and 
price - limitations. 
Thus, the Agreement had the U.S. and the PRC support the 
"application of market principles to international competition among providers of 
commercial launch services, including the avoidance of below-cost pricing, government 
inducements, and unfair trade practices." 
Government support 
Included in the steps the PRC had to take to ensure that Chinese launch 
providers upon entry "do not materially impair the smooth and effective 
functioning of the international market for commercial launch services", was 
a commitment to ensure that any direct or indirect government support 
extended to its launch companies "is in accord with practices prevailing in the 
international market" (emph. add.); this latter term, according to the Annex 
on definitions which forms part of the agreement, refers to practices "by 
governments of market economies", and thus, for all practical purposes, to the 
behaviour of the U.S. government and of the governments of ESA and the 
ESA member states in this field. To what extent these entities do subsidize -
either directly or indirectly - their launch companies is a matter which is at 
best not easily answered and thus unfit for specific guidance for the Chinese, 
at worst a total regulatory-financial mystery of nightmarish proportions. 
Consider a few elements, assembled for a study published in 1993.55 
In the U. S., although various policies through the years have rejected direct 
government subsidies to private (space) companies, the U.S. launch industry 
has benefitted from its association with the government in a number of ways. 
One form is the economies of scale resulting from government, in particular 
Department of Defense, contracts. Examples include General Dynamics, 
which, in 1987, invested USD 400 million to produce 18 commercial Atlas 
I and II launch vehicles. At the same time it received a contract from the U.S. 
Air Force for another 11 Atlas II vehicles. By combining the two production 
orders GD created economies of scale resulting in lower cost per launcher and 
a lower, more competitive price in the international market. 56 Martin Marietta 
55. See Bill Lai, supra note 17. 
56. Id. Timothy A. Brooks, Regulating international trade in launch services, 6 High 
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(Titan) and McDonnell Douglas (Delta) could make similar arrangements with 
the Government. For all three launchers, according to the above study, 
Defense accounted for 29-93% of all launches, and with NASA included U .S. 
government usages accounted for as much as 57-93%. In fact, without the 
prospect of military contracts, these companies would probably not have 
decided to modernize their production facilities and enter the commercial 
launch market after the Challenger accident. 
Another form of indirect government support is research and development 
(R&D) funding for military products and technologies, which can later be 
transferred to commercial applications without obligation to reimburse the 
government. Finally, the U.S. government's commitment to use as much as 
possible the domestic launch services may also be seen as a clear support for 
the U.S. industry (see chapter 3.4.4. infra). 
In a more recent trade press report on the activities of Japan's aerospace firms, 
reference was made to NEC, Mitsubishi and Toshiba which spent 1997 
"pushing toward commercialization of their products and technologies" and 
using work on satellite projects for the government agencies NASDA and ISAS 
"as springboards to making a commercial splash." The same report has Nissan, 
(eo-) builder of the H2A launcher, looking forward to major revenues from 
NASDA purchases of this new rocket, while at the same time selling 30 of 
these launchers to Rocket System Corporation which is marketing the H2A for 
commercial launches. 57 
The various ways and means through which ESA and its member states (may) 
have supported the production and sale of the Ariane in the past, have been 
discussed in the framework of the TCI case in Chapter 2.2.2 (ii). This is not 
the place to further review all- possible - indirect-subsidization methods. The 
foregoing is simply to indicate that subsidization or other support may take 
many forms in Western countries; the respective provision in the Agreement 
therefore gives China a large measure of freedom in supporting CGWIC and 
its family of Long March launchers. 58 
Government inducements 
A related provision, in article 11 d., had the U. S. state that 
"The U.S. does not provide government inducements of any kind in connection with the 
provision of commercial launch services to international customers which would create 
discrimination against launch service providers of other nations ... " 
Technology L.J. 59-107 (1991) at 75. 
57. See 9 (28) Space News (Jul 1998) at 16 ("Commercialization drives Japan's big three"). 
58. On subsidies, see also Yanping Chen, China's space commercialization effort- organization, 
policy and strategies, 9 (l) Space Policy 45-53 (1993) at 52, 53. 
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China agreed to behave in the same way. 
The agreed definitions in the Annex to the Agreement gave the following 
explanation to the term "government inducements": 
"Government inducements' with respect to particular launch services transactions include, 
but are not limited to, unreasonable political pressure, the provision of any resources of 
commercial value unrelated to the launch service competition and offers of favorable 
treatment under or access to: defense and national security policies and programs, 
development assistance policies and programs, and general economic policies and programs. 
(e.g., trade, investment, debt, and foreign exchange policies)". 
In other words: no bribes, no threats, no trade-offs, no special "deals". 
Pricing 
In order to avoid unfair pricing, the agreement provided: 
"The PRC shall require that its providers of commercial launch services offer and conclude 
any contracts to provide commercial launch services to international customers at prices, 
terms, and conditions which are on a par with those prices, terms, and conditions prevailing 
in the international market for comparable commercial launch services." (emph. add.) 
The latter part of this provision as emphasised, according to the Annex 
"includes but is not limited to prices, financing terms and conditions and the 
schedule for progress payments offered to international customers by 
commercial launch service providers in market economies." 
Further, insurance and/ or re flight guarantees were subject to the same "on a 
par" condition as the launch prices. And the Chinese launch providers would 
be prevented from offering introductory or promotional prices except for the 
first or, in extraordinary cases, second successful commercial launch of a new 
launch vehicle. 
Some remarks on the above pricing condition. 
The idea was, as we saw earlier, to avoid a practice of dumping or below-cost 
pricing conducive to hurting or even destroying the (competitive position of 
the) U.S. launch companies. 
By setting a (U.S./European) international market standard in pricing, the 
assumption was created that those prices were above-cost or at least that with 
those prices a break-even could be reached. That would imply that the 
international cost was to be considered the true cost, undistorted by direct or 
indirect government support or so distorted only to an extent regarded as 
acceptable by the above governments of market economies. However, already 
for quite some time, these governments and their - fiercely competitive -
launch companies had been accusing one another of government subsidization 
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and/ or preferential treatment distorting the free market mechanism. 59 In other 
words, although during the Congressional Hearings on the subject the western 
launch companies agreed on this "international standard" as being an 
acceptable one for providing guidance to their new competitor, in reality this 
standard would only produce the real price in a temporary - oligopoly driven -
sellers market, and hardly play a role in a competitive "buyers market" 
environment. 
On the other hand, it was noted before that in practice the cost of constructing 
and launching a vehicle in China was considered substantially lower than in 
western countries, and that, anyhow, cost calculation was not the first priority 
of the Chinese launch industry. 60 
The provisional conclusion of the above could be that the pricing provision 
would force the Chinese launch industry to raise its prices to an international 
level where the launch quality difference would induce the customer to choose 
an American launch provider. Alternatively, Great Wall Industry would still 
conclude the contract and make a substantial profit on it, because of the 
difference between the - artificially increased - launch price asked and the 
launch cost incurred. In both cases the launch customer would pay a higher 
bill than necessary. 
Of course the Chinese launch price could also be set at a level which, in the 
eyes of the U.S. or European competitors, would be too low to pass the test 
of the Agreement, in which case the U.S. producer of the satellite 
(components) probably would not obtain an export license from the U.S. 
government, or only get one after lengthy investigations and negotiations (and 
possibly with the help of some political pressure on the part of the country 
most affected by the delaying process). 
For, in case of violations of the provisions of the Agreement, the U.S., by 
virtue of article V of the Agreement, had the right to take any action permitted 
under U.S. laws and regulations. Moreover, the same article reaffirms the U.S. 
government's quasi-total freedom of action in this regard as follows: 
"With regard to export licenses, any application for a U.S. export license will be reviewed 
on a case-by-case basis consistent with U.S. laws and regulations. Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to mean that the U.S. is constrained from taking any 
appropriate action with respect to any U.S. export license, consistent with U.S. laws and 
regulations. Nevertheless, the U.S. will do its utmost to assure, consistent with U.S. laws 
and regulations, continuity of issued license(s) and the completion of the transactions 
covered in such license(s)." 
59. See TCI case 1984, Chapter 2.2.2.2. supra, and see supra (text to) note 20. 
60. See supra (text to) notes 25 and 26. 
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The above would indicate a distinct need of clarity on the question of 
- permissable, i.e. "market" - pricing on the part of Great Wall Industry, 
before responding to any launch tender. But, although the Agreement offered 
abundant consultation and information exchange possibilities for that purpose, 
it neither sought to produce any specific reference prices nor did it provide 
acceptable discount percentages which would assist the Chinese in establishing 
"on a par" launch prices taking into account the differences in cost and other 
launch-related aspects. 
Here, the Agreement's above-quoted pricing provision created uncertainty for 
China but also a loophole, where it referred to prices for "comparable" launch 
services. 
One aspect, already noted earlier, is the comparative level of sophistication 
of the launch vehicles used. 61 The lack of precision it offered and the more 
limited life expectancy resulting therefrom were quoted as additional 
handicaps. 62 
Another related aspect was its performance level in the sense of range. 
As CGWIC stated at the Congressional hearing: 
"Chinese Long March-2E, unlike many other western launchers, is a Low Earth Orbit 
mission launch vehicle which cannot directly deliver the communications satellites into 
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit without an upper stage. Therefore, the price offer of Long 
March 2E should not be put on a par with the price offer of other countries launch vehicles 
that perform direct Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) mission .... In order to provide 
GTO capability, Long March-2E needs a third stage (upper stage), such as McDonnell 
Douglas Astronautics Company's PAM-D3 or PAM-D3 A or other American firms upper 
stages. When using a Long March-2E, the customer needs to purchase a U.S. made upper 
stage ... n63 64 
Yet another aspect was the geographical position of the Xichang launch site, 
used for the Long March launches. Kourou in French Guyana, used by the 
European Space Agency for the Ariane launches, is situated near the equator 
and the location of Cape Canaveral, the primary U.S. launch base, is also 
61. See (text to) footnotes 24 and 25. 
62. "Asiasat contends that the effective cost of its $27-28 million launch was in fact almost 
doubled by the loss of 6-9 months of use (equivalent to about $13 million in revenues), due 
to the lower orbital-injection accuracy of the Long March.", see Chenard, launch regulation, 
supra note 3, at 199. 
63. See Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, supra note 10, at 119. 
64. And Gordon Pike 1991, supra note 2, observes with respect to Aussat (at 107): " ... As 
currently planned [large spacecraft destined for GTO] will be delivered to a relatively low 
(typically 200 km) orbit ... An additional perigee kick motor (PKM) will then be used to 
boost the spacecraft into GTO. For the Aussat-B missions the PKM will be supplied by the 
spacecraft manufacturer [Hughes] ... ". 
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closer to the equator than the Chinese base: because less fuel is thus needed 
to get the satellite into its final - geostationary - orbit, more of it remains 
available for the satellite's orbital life, which is thereby extended by reportedly 
up to two years. 
Finally, as an Asiasat official observed after the launch of Asiasat I, the price 
advantage of the Long March launch was partially offset by poor facilities and 
limited assistance at the launch site, resulting in twice as many people of 
Hughes Company being necessary for twice as long to get the satellite prepared 
for launch. 65 This quality aspect would supposedly not be a permanent 
handicap to be used by the Chinese as a justification for a lower launch price. 
Annual consultations between the parties were foreseen by the Agreeement. 
An important purpose of these meetings was to review possible Chinese (and 
U. S. ! ) direct or indirect government support, but more in particular the pricing 
practices of both parties. 
Capacity limitation 
By way of introduction to and/or explanation of the Agreement's provisions 
on the number of satellites the Chinese would be allowed to launch, a Chinese 
statement was included in the text to the effect that China had a limited 
capability of manufacturing launch vehicles which (first) had to meet the 
domestic launch needs, thus leaving only a limited number of communications 
satellite launches each year for international customers. "Chinese launch 
services", the explanation concluded reassuringly, "therefore, are only a 
supplement to the world market, providing international customers with a new 
option." 
The capacity limitation, which included some special measures aimed at 
reducing the commercial impact of (a concentration of) Chinese launch 
contracts, was formulated as follows: 
"(i) PRC providers of commercial launch services shall not launch more than 9 
communications satellites for international customers (including the two Aussat and one 
Asiasat satellites) during the period of this Agreement [i.e. until December 31, 1994], and 
(ii) The PRC shall require that any commitments to provide commercial launch services 
to international customers by PRC launch service providers are proportionately distributed 
over the period of the Agreement. 
To this end, the PRC shall prevent a disproportionate concentration of such commitments 
during any two-year period of the Agreement. 
The PRC may make commitments in any 3-year period of the Agreement consistent with 
subparagraph (i) above. 
65. See AW/ST (Apr 16, 1990) at 25, 28. 
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The PRC shall also require that PRC launch service providers shall not commit at any time 
to launch in any calendar year covered by the Agreement more than twice the average 
annual number of launches permitted under subparagraph (1) above. 
The PRC shall seek to ensure that PRC launches of communications satellites for 
international customers are performed as scheduled in the original launch commitment." 
Given the period covered by the Agreement, it was difficult to foresee all 
eventualities and developments in the international launch market. In order to 
give an opening to the Chinese to enlarge their above entitlement, and also to 
safeguard the interests of the U.S. satellite manufacturers and users (the 
Challenger accident and other launch failures of both U.S. and European 
ELV's happened only three years before!), annual consultations were foreseen, 
which would address developments in the international launch market and also, 
if so requested by the Chinese, a reconsideration of the above quantitative 
restriction, with a U. S. decision on such a request to be be made within thirty 
(30) days after the completion of the annual consultations. 
b. The Technology Safeguards Agreement 
The Technology Safeguards Agreement is intended to preclude the transfer of 
sensitive U. S. technology, associated with the launch of the Asiasat and A us sat 
satellites, to China, and specifies the security procedures to be followed by the 
parties when undertaking a launch of a U.S.-manufactured satellite on a 
Chinese launch vehicle. 
The Agreement controls access to U.S. spacecraft and related equipment, and 
requires that under no circumstances shall there be unmonitored or unescorted 
access to U.S. spacecraft, or to any equipment and technical data related to 
the launch. 
In this connection, the following - extensive - interpretation is given to the 
emphasized words: 
spacecraft covers the satellite and kickmotor; 
equipment means support equipment, ancillary items, components and spare 
parts thereof; 
technical data means, for the purposes of the Agreement: 
"(a) Classified information relating to the equipment; 
(b) information covered by an invention secrecy order; 
(c) information which is directly related to the design, engineering, development, 
production, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, 
modification, or reconstruction of the equipment. This includes, for example, information 
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in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions, computer software, 
and documentation". 66 
These security procedures applied to all phases of the launch activities, starting 
already at the Hughes facilities in the U.S. and covering the transportation of 
the spacecraft from the U.S. to China and the activities in China. The 
procedures of the Agreement supplemented other provisos and restrictions 
detailed in the so-called 'technology (transfer) control plans' - which must 
identify the extent and level of hardware and technical data to be released -
which the State Department license required to be included in the launch 
contracts signed by Hughes and CGWIC. (And in case of conflict between the 
provisions of the contract and the Agreement, the latter would apply). 
A determination on the part of the U.S. government that any of these 
provisions had been violated could result in suspension or revocation of the 
export license of the satellites. 
The Agreement made a distinction between "authorized technical data" and 
"unauthorized technical data and assistance". The former, which could be 
released, basically consisted only of specified interface information that 
described mechanical and electrical mating requirements for attaching the 
spacecraft to the launch vehicle. The latter covered all other technical data, 
whose disclosure was therefore prohibited. Moreover, The PRC was expressly 
forbidden to seek, and Hughes to provide, any assistance relating to the design, 
development, operation, maintenance, modification, or repair of the equipment 
and the launch vehicle. 
Detailed "access controls" included: 
- the right of the U.S. government to oversee and monitor implementation 
of the Hughes-CGWIC Plan, 
24-hour controls by U.S. security personnel of access to all equipment and 
technical data, throughout launch preparations, satellite transportation, 
mating/demating, test and checkout, satellite launch and return of equipment 
to the U.S, 
the right of the U.S. government to inspect, without prior notice, the 
equipment and technical data provided by Hughes to the PRC, at the 
facilities of Hughes or in China, 
the right of the U.S. government to electronically inspect and monitor, 
including through a closed circuit television system and electronic devices, 
all areas where Hughes equipment and data are located, "including the 
spacecraft clean operation area after the mating of the spacecraft to the 
launch vehicle." 
the wearing of identification badges by all persons performing duties 
associated with the launch, and badge-dependant access to the facilities 
66. See Technology Safeguards Agreement, para. I, footnote. 
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housing the equipment, the technical data, the spacecraft and/ or the 
motorsY 
The transportation of the satellites to China has to take place by U.S.-
registered aircraft operated by a U.S. crew, though upon arrival at the Chinese 
point of entry, non-U.S. persons may join the crew to perform navigational 
duties from the point of entry to the launch site; they are not permitted to enter 
the cargo area of the aircraft during the flight. 
The U.S. aircraft carrying the satellite, the equipment and technical data can 
pass through Chinese customs without inspection and will not be subject to 
inspections while in China. 
(And the export license requires Hughes not to carry aboard the aircraft any 
contraband goods unrelated to the launch activities(!) and to make sure that 
the aircraft complies with Chinese customs regulations). 
In the event of accident or crash of the aircraft transporting the satellite in the 
territory of China, the same procedures will apply as in the case of a launch 
failure after liftoff, i.e.: 
- U.S. persons are permitted to assist in the recovery of all parts/debris 
resulting from the accident, 
- a U.S. controlled "satellite debris recovery site" will be located near the 
launch facility, 
- all satellite-related items recovered by Chinese nationals have to be returned 
to the U.S. without any examination (including photographs), 
- U. S. search and recovery personnel has access to the accident site. 68 
At the launch site, non-U.S. persons may, under supervision ofU.S. persons, 
unload the aircraft and deliver the sealed crates to the "satellite preparation 
area". While the satellite is being tested and/or prepared for integration, non-
U.S. persons are not allowed into that area. U.S. persons assemble the 
spacecraft, add propellant to the spacecraft and place the spacecraft in the 
fairing. 
Transportation of the sealed container to the launch pad takes place under 
supervision of U.S. personnel, though the driver of the vehicle may be 
Chinese. 
U.S. persons will conduct the launch preparation and satellite testing at the 
launch pad and will monitor access to the spacecraft clean operation area once 
the spacecraft and the launch vehicle are integrated. 69 
In case of delays or cancellation of the launch, all steps reversing the above 
sequence of events, would again be controlled and supervised by U.S. 
personnel up to and including the loading of the satellite on a U.S. registered 
aircraft for return to the U.S. 
67. See id., para. IV ("access controls"). 
68. See id., para.V.B ("transportation of the spacecraft") and VI (recovery terms). 
69. See id., paras V.C ("preparations at launch site") and D.("launch pad operations"). 
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The same applies to "post-launch" return of all equipment and technical data 
associated with the launch (including exemption from Customs inspection). 70 
Finally, the agreement prescribed the conduct of U.S persons while in the 
PRC, forbidding in particular activities "that will harm launch safety or would 
lead to the transfer of Chinese launch vehicle and launch operations 
technology. " ( emph. add.), and contained a dispute settlement clause providing 
for consultations through diplomatic channels in case of disputes regarding the 
application and interpretation of this M.o.A. 71 
On February 11, 1993, as a result of a renegotiation of the security 
procedures, the two parties signed a new agreement on satellite technology 
safeguards which superseded the above agreement. Notwithstanding the above 
far reaching safeguard provisions, transfer of sensitive U.S. technical data may 
have taken place after two Long March failures (in 1995 and 1996), in the 
form of the release ofU.S. co-authored reports on these failures to the Chinese 
(see discussion in chapter 2.3.4. supra and chapter 4 infra). 
c. The Liability Agreement 
The Memorandum of Agreement on Liability for Satellite Launches sought to 
regulate questions of liability between the U.S. and China arising from the 
launch of the Asiasat and AUSSAT satellites. This agreement was found 
necessary because at the time of the negotiations on the Launch Trade 
Agreement, China had not yet become a party to the Space Liability 
Convention. This situation would have resulted in the U.S., a party to that 
Convention, becoming a - potential - liable State under the Convention in case 
of damage resulting from the launch of the satellites to third parties, whereas 
China, though having performed the launching, could not be held liable under 
the Convention. 
Since the U.S. felt that, as one of the quid-pro-quo's for allowing China's 
entry into the international commercial launch market, China should bear the 
burden of liability in case of damages, the above Agreement provided that 
China would assume, and compensate the U.S. government for all amounts 
for which the U.S. government may be liable under the Space Liability 
Convention, the Outer Space Treaty or any other applicable international law. 
Other provisions dealt with the practicalities of involving China in the 
(handling of the) claim for compensation brought against the U.S., as follows: 
- the U.S. government notifies its Chinese counterpart as soon as practicable 
of a claim received, 
70. See id., paras VI ("launch failure, delay or cancellation") and VII ("post-launch 
procedures"). 
71. See id., paras VIII ("conduct of U.S. persons while in the PRC") and IX ("settlement of 
dispute") respectively. 
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- the U.S. shall not make any settlement with any such claimant without full 
consultation with the Chinese government, 
- if China doesnot agree with the terms of the proposed settlement, the U. S 
will submit the claim to a Claims Commission as provided for in the Space 
Liability Convention, or, in case the claim is not based on that Convention, 
to a claims commission with similar procedures, 
- China will compensate the U.S. government for any settlement up to the 
amount recommended by the respective claims commission, 
- China will provide the U.S. with all information and cooperation necessary 
for the U.S. 's defense against a claim. 
When China, in December 1988, had become a party to the Space Liability 
Convention as well, a decision no doubt speeded up by the launch contract and 
the U.S.-Chinese talks on the matter, it became also a potential target for 
claims under that Convention. The agreement kept its relevance because the 
U.S. could still be sued or held liable as a "launching State" together with and 
separate from China, in relation to the launch of the three satellites. 
As the Asiasat satellite was owned by the Hong Kong based and registered 
Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company Ltd., and this in itself was a 
sufficient link with the United Kingdom to make the latter country, as a 
"launching State" (i.e. as the State which procured the launching of the 
satellite) under the Space Liability Convention, potentially liable for damage 
caused by that satellite, the United Kingdom concluded an agreement with 
China which was virtually identical to the above agreement, both in substance 
(China assuming all liability) and in procedure. 
The two differences were that, first, on the date of the entry into force of the 
agreement, which took the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes, both 
countries were parties to the Space Liability Convention and the Outer Space 
Treaty. Secondly, this arrangement was limited to the extent that China only 
assumed liability for damage arising during the launch phase of the satellite, 
that is from ignition of the launch vehicle to the separation of the satellite from 
the launch vehicle. 72 
d. Guidelines for the implementation of the Launch Trade Agreement 
A few days after the signing of the Agreement, the USTR published a set of 
guidelines which the government would follow in implementing the 
agreement. 73 A paragraph on "remedies" or enforcement in these guidelines 
72. See Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China concerning liability for damage arising 
during the launch phase of the Asiasat satellite, Peking, 26 March 1990 and 2 April 1990, 
e.i.f. on 2 April 1990). 
73. USTR, International trade in commercia/launch services; Guidelines for implementation of 
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reflected the USTR's view that the agreement should be seen and treated as 
a trade agreement for purposes of (the application of) Sec. 301(a)(l) of the 
Trade Act of 197 4, which deals with investigations into alleged unfair or illegal 
trade practices or violations of trade agreements and provides for possible 
sanctions. (The TCI case was brought under the same provision, see Chapter 
2.2.2.2. supra). 
The responsibility for the overall implementation of the Agreement was given 
to a new Subcommittee on commercial launch services, chaired by the Office 
of the USTR, and reporting to the existing Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(TPSC) of the USTR. To assemble the information necessary for this 
Subcommittee to carry out its responsibilities, a Working Group on 
Information was established under the chairmanship of DOT, and including 
among its members the Departments of Commerce and State. 
An important part of the functions of the Subcommittee was the collection of 
data for the effective monitoring ofthe PRC's compliance with the Agreement. 
Reflecting the obligations and prohibitions laid down in the Agreement, the 
Working Group had to collect information on such matters as: 
- the number of launches committed and carried out by the PRC, 
- the distribution of such launch commitments, 
- promotional prices, and, in general, 
- prices, terms and conditions in the PRC launch contracts, 
- government supports and inducements, 
- insurance, 
- non-discrimination, and 
- launch delays. 74 
The Working Group also had the task to assemble information for the 
Subcommittee which the U.S. had to provide to China, e.g. on the prices and 
conditions, including insurance arrangements, prevailing in the international 
commercial launch market, but also possible U.S. and other government 
(European, Japanese?) supports or inducements and the number of U. S. launch 
commitments. 
Additionally, the annual consultations with China had to be prepared and, once 
held, would require (recommandations for) follow-up by the Subcommittee. 75 
the Memorandum of Agreement with the People's Republic of China, Fed. Reg. Vol 54, No. 
19 (Jan 31, 1989), hereinafter referred to as (the) Guidelines. The Guidelines entered into 
force on the same day as the e.i.f. of the Agreement. 
74. See Guidelines, para. 111.1. 
75. See id., para. III.2. Where the Agreement, in art. IV.4, contained the somewhat obscure 
commitment of the parties "to work toward a common understanding of the application of 
market principles to prices, terms, and conditions of commercial launch services for 
international customers", para. III.3 provided vaguely that the Subcommittee "will consider 
ways to carry out" this provision. Additionally, the Subcommittee was asked to consider at 
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A provision on remedies dealt with the way USTR and its organs were to 
handle cases of (suspected) non-compliance with the Agreement by the 
Chinese. The following consecutive steps could be distinguished: 
1.-the Subcommittee finds out or determines that PRC's launch providers have 
not complied with the Agreement, 
-it will notify the TPSC and recommend consultations with China if 
appropriate, 
-if consultations do not lead to a satisfactory resolution or consultations are 
deemed inappropriate, the Section 301 Committee of USTR may recommend 
that the latter initiate an investigation pursuant to its authority under section 
310(a)(1) of the Trade Act. 
2. The initiative may also come from a private party, e.g. -predictably- a 
representative of the U.S. launch industry: this will lead to the following steps: 
-a petition may be filed with the section 301 Committee, alleging a denial of 
U. S rights under the Agreement or a violation of the Agreement, 
-the section 301 Committee will seek the advice of the Sucommittee on 
Commercial Launch Services, 
-if the Subcommittee finds that China did not comply with the Agreement, "it 
will make such recommandations to the section 301 Committee as it deems 
appropriate" , 
-if USTR determines that a violation of the Agreement has occurred it will take 
such action, subject to the specific direction of the President, if any, as is 
appropriate under section 301.76 
The Executive Branch has a broad range of measures from which to choose 
under Section 301. For example, in taking retaliatory action pursuant to 
Section 301 (c), USTR may 
(i) suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of trade agreement 
concessions, 
(ii) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of the foreign 
country, 
(iii) impose fees or restrictions on the services of the foreign country, or 
(iv) enter into an agreement with the country that commits the latter to 
eliminate or phase out the offending practice or provide compensation. 
least yearly whether discussions with other international parties could be beneficial; in the 
affirmative it could make a recommandation to the TPSC and the USTR to that effect, see 
para. III.4. The Guidelines, in para IV, also provided for consultations on the above issues 
with domestic interests, i.e. the US launch companies and launch vehicle manufacturers, 
satellite manufacturers,and, as appropriate, interested Congressional committees, the user 
community and other interested parties, including the relevant private sector advisory 
committees such as COMSTAC and possibly also the AIAA. Finally, the Guidelines also 
instruct DOT, as chairman of the Working Group, on how to deal with business confidential 
information, see para. IV. 
76. See para. VII (l)-(3). 
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An additional provision allows USTR to restrict the issuance of service sector 
authorizations in certain circumstances. "Ultimately, the Trade Representative's 
authority under Section 301, subject to the direction of the President, 
encompasses any power of the President. "77 
3.1.3 Implementation of the Launch Trade Agreement and U.S. sanctions 
Already in June 1989, the U.S. Government, sanctioning China in response 
to the June 4 Tiananmen Square incident, inter alia suspended indefinitely all 
export licenses, including the above Asiasat and Aussat permits. 78 
Congress went a step further and, limiting the Administration's freedom of 
action in this field, enacted a law prohibiting the approval of export license 
applications for the launch of U.S.-built satellites on Chinese -built launch 
vehicles. 79 The law, enacted in November 1989, thus effectively suspended 
77. See Peter Allgeier, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Mediterranean, 
statement at Global trade in satellites and launch services, hearing, House Committee on 
Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on space (Sep 29, 1994), hereinafter referred 
to as Launch trade hearing 1994 and Allgeier statement resp. 
78. At a press conference on June 5, 1989, President Bush stated: " ... mindful of these 
complexities [of the US-China relations], and yet of the necessity to strongly and clearly 
express our condemnation of the events of recent days, I am ordering the following actions: 
Suspension of all govermnent to govermnent sales and commercial exports of weapons, 
suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders, sympathetic review of 
requests by Chinese students in the United States to extend their stay, and the offer of 
humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross to those injured during the 
assault, and review of other aspects of our bilateral relationship as events in china continue 
to unfold.", see "This is not the time for an emotional response", Press Conference by 
President Bush (Jun 5, 1989), American Policy 1989, Doe. 312, at 517-519). 
79. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 610, 103 Stat. 988, 1038 
(Nov. 21, 1989). Sec. 610 of the Act read as follows: 
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"(a) No moneys appropriated by this Act may be used to reinstate, or approve any export 
license applications for the launch of United States-built satellites on Soviet - or Chinese -
built launch vehicles unless the President makes a report under subsection (b) or (c) of this 
section. 
(b) The restriction on the approval of export licenses for United States-built satellites to the 
People's Republic of China for launch on Chinese-built launch vehicles is terminated if the 
President makes a report to Congress that: (i) the Govermnent of the People's Republic of 
China has made progress on a program of political reform throughout the entire country 
which includes (A) lifting of martial law; (B) halting of executions and other reprisals 
against individuals for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs; (C) release of 
political prisoners; (D) increased respect for internationally recognized human rights, 
including freedoms of expression, the press, assembly, and association; and (E) permitting a 
freer flow of information, including an end to the jamming of the Voice of America, and 
greater access for foreign journalists; or 
(c) It is in the national interest of the United States". (emph. add.) 
The prohibition was reintroduced in 1990 through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, "902, 104 Stat. 15 (Feb. 16, 1990). 
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the implementation of the above agreements. However, already on December 
19 (!)the Bush Administration, for "engagement" policy reasons, reversed its 
course and, using an express exception in the legislation adopted by Congress, 
invoked the "national interest of the United States" and re-approved the export 
licenses for the three satellites. 80 
This decision would set the pattern for the following years: Presidential 
licenses by exception to the Congressionally legislated restrictions (which 
remain in force until today). 
As a result of this Presidential waiver, on April 7, 1990, Asiasat 1 was 
launched from the Xichang launch base in South-West China, in the presence 
of a dozen military and Hughes Aircraft Company guards who had watched 
the satellite around-the-clock to prevent any unwanted transfer or misuse of 
Sec. 902, apart from suspending, or rather continuing the suspension of, the issuance of 
licenses under Sec. 38 of the Arms Export Control Act for the export to China of any 
defense article on the U.S. Munitions List, also specifically provided that "[e]xports of any 
satellite of United States origin that is intended for launch from a launch vehicle owned by 
the People's Republic of China shall remain suspended unless the President makes a report 
under subsection (b) (1) or (2) of this Section"; the envisaged report, on which a presidential 
waiver would be based would have to contain fmdings as detailed in Sec. 610 above. 
And the prohibition was reintroduced again in 1991 through the Appropriations Act 
concerning the same departments, Fiscal Year 1992, Pub. L. 102-140, "608, 105 Stat. 824 
(Oct. 28, 1991); Sec. 608 provided: 
"(a) No funds provided by this Act may be used to reinstate or approve any export license 
applications for the launch of United States-built satellites on Chinese-built launch vehicles 
unless the President waives such prohibition in the national interest or under sub-section (b) 
of this section. The term export license applications also includes requests for approval of 
technical assistance agreements or services that would serve to facilitate launch of such 
satellites. 
(b) The restriction on the approval of export licenses for United States-built satellites to the 
People's Republic of China for launch on Chinese-built launch vehicles contained in 
subsection (a) may be waived by the President on a case-by-case basis upon certification by 
the United States Trade Representative that the People's Republic of China is, with regard to 
the respective satellite, components, or technology related theretofor which the export 
license request is pending, in full compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement between 
the government of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
regarding international trade in commercial launch services". (emph. add.) 
80. In December 19, 1989, the President reported in letters to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and President of the Senate the following: "Pursuant to the authority vested 
in me by section 610 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1990, P.L. 101-162) ("the Act"), and as President 
of the United States, I hereby report that it is in the national interest of the United States to 
lift the prohibition on reinstatement and approval of export licenses for the three United 
States-built AUSSAT and AsiaSat satellites for launch on Chinese-built launch vehicles", see 
25 (51) Weekly Comp. Pres. Does. (Dec. 25, 1989) at 1972, as quoted in Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, supra note 78, at footnote 77. 
"Mr. Bush argued that the satellite would provide badly needed telecommunications services 
to friendly Asian nations and would support the U.S. aim of maintaining commercial 
relations with China even while imposing some sanctions against Beijing", IHT (April 9, 
1990), at 3. 
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satellite technology. According to an Asiasat official the price advantage of 
the Chinese launch, which at about US$ 30 million was considered to be some 
US$ 15 million cheaper than the Ariane alternative at the time, was partially 
offset not only by the cost of the above guards but also by poor facilities and 
limited assistance at the launch site, resulting in twice as many people of 
Hughes being necessary for twice as long to get the satellite prepared for 
launch. 81 
The Arabsat case, which "erupted" in January 1990 brought the first test of 
the pricing provisions of the launch trade agreement. Arabsat I C was a 
communications satellite built in 1985 for the 22-nation Arab Satellite 
Communications Organization by the French firm Aerospatiale. In 1989 serious 
bidding for the launch contract started with Arianespace offering a launch for 
US$ 50 million and CGWIC responding with a US$ 35 million bid. McDonnell 
Douglas, in an early stage of the 'race' opted out. In October of that year 
Arabsat and the Chinese launch company concluded a contract on the latter 
price. In January 1990, Arianespace made a last-ditch effort by underbidding 
its Chinese competitor with a launch price of US$ 34 million, down 30% from 
its previous bid. China was pressed for a reaction by Arabsat and finally won 
the contract for US$ 25 million, half the original Arianespace price. 
The latter company complained furiously to both the French and the U.S. 
governments, accusing Great Wall Industry of "unfair and predatory" pricing 
and of thus violating the U.S.-China Agreement of 1989. Belgium and West 
Germany took similar actions. 82 
In a July 1990 meeting between USTR and the Chinese vice minister for the 
aerospace industry, the above complaints were discussed, but no definite result 
was reported afterwards; as a USTR representative put it: "The issue is not 
resolved . . . The possibility of future meetings is open but no date has been 
set. n83 
The above course of events motivated the European Space Agency to meet 
separately with their Chinese counterparts in December 1990 for "exploratory 
talks regarding the international provision of launch services" . The press 
release issued after that meeting stated inter alia: 
81. See AW/ST (April 16, 1990) at 25, 28). 
82. See Chenard launch regulation, supra note 3, at 199; also 1 (35) Space News (Sep 1990) at 
1, 19. 
83. Statement as quoted in Chenard launch regulation, supra note 3, at 199. According to 
Chinese officials, interviewed in September 1990, China had received no complaints from 
U .S. govermnent officials "in recent negotiations regarding China's launch price policy", see 
1 (35) Space News (Sep 1990) at l. Around the same time, officials from China Aerospace 
and the Chinese govermnent approached the American ambassador in China, pressing for 
Pres. Bush to waive the Tiananmen Square sanctions. According to the ambassador, "[t]hey 
hit me very hard ... [i]t was a prestige national program. It was putting China on the map as 
the big space country of the 21" century", see NYT (May 17, 1998) at 18. 
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"Arranging for the fair exportation of [launcher] technology on the international market is 
a difficult task that will have to be faced in the coming period." 
It concluded vaguely that the talks had been informative. An ESA 
representative later in 1991 specified that the talks had centered around the 
question of creating a "level playing field" in the space transportation business, 
calling the matter highly sensitive and very complicated. The discussions were 
open-ended: they would, according to the same press release, be continued "in 
a framework to be defined. "(!)84 
The fact that the Arabsat 1 C satellite had been built by a French company but 
also contained communications equipment largely supplied by a U.S. 
manufacturer meant that export licenses had to be obtained from both 
governments. Although neither of the two countries' authorities had ever 
received such a request from the Arabsat consortium, the possibility that the 
French - to protect "their" Arianespace - and the Americans - for political 
reasons - would have refused to issue a license within a specific time frame, 
must certainly have influenced Arabsat' s decision in March 1991 to cancel the 
planned October 1991launch on Long March and to switch the launch contract 
back to Arianespace. Another - though probably not in itself decisive - reason 
for (re-)consideration was the fact that, as the Asiasat launch had shown, the 
cost of extensive modifications and of logistics connected with a Long March 
launch would have eroded much of the cost savings on the low launch price. 85 
The launch trade agreement, in stead of creating a stable and predictable 
regulatory environment for the U .S. and Chinese industries concerned, became 
itself subject to the political uncertainties caused by the multifaceted U.S.-
Chinese relationship, which involved human rights, trade and nonproliferation 
issues, a critical if not hostile Congress and an Administration determined to 
strengthen that relationship while at the same time trying to reconcile this aim 
with the views of Congress and the other U.S. industry players and with the 
unhelpful proliferation behaviour of the Chinese. 
The following years thus show a series of export licenses granted, U.S. 
sanctions suspending those licenses, and Presidential decisions to lift those 
sanctions, followed by Chinese actions inviting new sanctions. 
Though the launch trade agreement remained in force, so did the U.S. export 
regulations to the continued - overriding - applicability of which the agreement 
specifically referred, and the Congressional Tiananmen legislation of 1989 
84. See ESA Press Release No. 56, Paris (Dec 17, 1990). 
85. See 2 (11) Space News (Apr 1991) at 1, 20 ("Arab group opts out of Long March launch"). 
It has been suggested that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (both members of Arabsat), in 
August 1990, probably added yet another delaying and complicating element to the launch 
contract picture, see ibid. 
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forbidding export of satellites for launch to China unless an express 
Presidential waiver had been obtained. 
Chinese sales of missiles and/or related technology to third countries, violating 
the U.S. MTCR-based regulations, would trigger specific sanctions affecting 
the sale of defense articles and/or dual use goods and services (depending on 
the kind and seriousness of the violations) to specific Chinese and third country 
companies or (semi-) governmental entities. 
The following events, presented in chronological order, give an idea of the 
interplay of the various forces that dominated the launch trade relations of the 
two countries for many years to come. 
On April 30, 1991 President Bush barred the export of U. S. components for 
the Dong Fang Hong 3 ("The East is red"), a Chinese domestic com-
munications satellite, because "certain activities of Chinese companies raise 
serious proliferation concerns." (Actually, the Department of State was 
believed to have reported that China was helping Algeria in building a nuclear 
reactor and was in the process of selling ballistic missiles and technology to 
Pakistan). 86 
At the same time, the export licenses for the two Aussat satellites were 
reconfirmed, mainly to prevent problems in the U.S. -Australian relationship. 
And for the same reason components for Freja, a small Swedish scientific 
satellite, were cleared for export as well, the latter thus becoming the fourth 
spacecraft authorized for launch on a Chinese rocket since the agreement was 
concluded. 87 
86. According to the trade press, Pres. Bush's denial of the license was to punish China for 
attempting to obtain classified missile-related technology, see 2 (16) Space News (May 6-12, 
1991). 
In the respective official press statement, reference was made to the well-known fact that 
U.S. satellites, their components and associated technologies, because of their inclusion in 
the U.S. Munitions List, require licenses for export to controlled destinations, including 
China. Moreover, under sanctions contained in the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, 
FY 1990-91, licensing of these exports is prohibited unless the President determines it to be 
in the national interest. (For the text of this provision see supra note 79). "Given our 
proliferation concerns, it would not have been appropriate to waive the legislative 
prohibition for the Dong Fang Hong", see statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on 
restrictions on U.S. satellite components exports to China, April 30, 1991, 27 (18) Weekly 
Comp. Pres. Does. (May 3, 1991) at 531-532. (The Dong Fang Hong 3 (DFH-3) contained 
also important German components thanks to cooperation with German MBB, later absorbed 
by Deutsche Aerospace DASA, dating back to 1982 satellite development contracts. The 
DFH-3 contract was the first public tender by a foreign company for a Chinese satellite. On 
the basis thereof, DASA built the C-band antenna, solar generator and attitude controls of 
the DFH-3, see AW/ST (Oct 3, 1994) at 66. It is not clear whether, in view of this German 
interest in the satellite, there was any diplomatic pressure on the part of Germany to get a 
waiver for its Long March launch. 
87. " ... the President decided that it is in the national interest to waive legislative restrictions on 
exports for two other projects, AUSSAT and FREJA ... The President had previously 
waived legislative sanctions against launches from China for AUSSAT, but the project 
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When, in May 1991, President Bush extended China's Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) trading status for another year, 88 he ordered at the same time that, 
as long as China continued to sell missile technology to countries such as 
Syria, Pakistan and Iran, U.S. satellite companies would not receive export 
licenses for Chinese launches. Though the connection between the granting of 
MFN and the imposition of the export restriction was officially disclaimed, 
it was generally felt - and privately confirmed - that the President, under 
pressure from Congress to punish China for its human rights record and for 
selling missiles to the Third World, had chosen the export restriction as the 
less damaging way to display displeasure with Chinese policies, particularly 
where also the U.S. launch industry was asking for measures to limit the 
ability of the Chinese to undercut American business with their "unreasonably 
low-priced" launch services. 89 
required additional export licenses. The President was concerned that we live up to our 
earlier commitment to allow Australia to to proceed with this project. The Swedish FREJA 
satellite ... will be used by civilian atmospheric researchers in the U .S., Sweden, Canada, 
Germany, and Finland"., see press statement, supra note 16, ibid. For full text, see 
"Justification for waiving legislative prohibitions on approval of U.S. origin exports to China 
for the Aussat project", and id. " ... for the Freja project", as attached to letter from Pres. 
Bush to Speaker of the House (Apr 30, 1991), reprinted in Gorove US Space Law, supra 
Ch. 2 note 55, at I.A.4 (a-1). 
88. MFN, notwithstanding its literal meaning, does not denote any special or preferential 
treatment in trade matters but allows "normal" non-discriminatory tariff treatment for 
Chinese exports to the US. The reciprocal granting of MFN treatment was the main pillar of 
the US-China Trade Agreement signed in 1979, which created the basis for normal 
commercial relations between the two countries. As a non-market-economy country, China 
needs an annual renewal of its MFN status through a US presidential waiver stipulating that 
China meets the freedom of emigration requirements set forth in the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. (This amendment, enacted as Sec. 402 of the Trade 
Act, not only linked the treatment of Soviet jews to trade concessions, but was originally 
directed at all communist countries, which, in the mid-seventies apart from the Soviet 
Union, included Cuba, China, Albania, Vietnam and North Korea. Sec. 402 allows a non-
MFN nonmarket economy country to receive MFN status, incl. access to US fmancial 
facilities, only if the President determines that it permits free and unrestricted emigration of 
its citizens; the President is also authorized to waive the requirements for full compliance if 
he determines that such waiver will "substantially promote the objectives" of the freedom-of-
emigration provisions and if he has received assurances that the emigration practices of the 
country will lead substantially to the achievement of those objectives.) China received the 
waiver routinely prior to 1989, but after Tiananmen, although the waiver continued, 
Congress began to exert strong pressure to oppose MFN renewal, and in 1991 (and 1992) 
voted to place conditions on this MFN renewal (subsequently vetoed by the Bush 
Administration), see Background notes: China, October 1997, Dept of State <http://www. 
state.gov /www /background _notes/china _1 097 _ bgn.html". 
89. See, for disclaimer by senior administration official of connection between MFN and export 
restriction, IHT May 28, 1991, at 2: "One is not being done to sell the other". But this 
restriction did form part of a series of three measures to limit the export of missile and 
satellite technology, including high-speed computers that can be used for flight testing of 
missiles, as outlined by Secretary of State Baker in a memo to president Bush that proposed 
a strategy for how to sell his decision on Chinese trade to a reluctant Congress. See text to 
note 19; see also 2 (20) Space News (Jun 1991) at 16. One of the arguments used by the 
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On June 16, 1991, the White House clarified both the measures taken and the 
factors and reasoning that led to these actions, detailing three separate 
measures under the following headings: "[e]xport of high performance 
computers" , " [ s ]atellite launches on PR C missiles" , and " [m] issile proliferation 
sanctions" . 
As to the first issue, the Administration expressed serious national security 
concerns regarding the export of high performance computers to China, based 
on such factors as the potential diversion to military use of computer 
technology and experience acquired and the resulting enhancement of the 
capabilities of high technology military systems such as missiles (as 
demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm!). These concerns were heightened 
by the risk that the PRC might transfer advanced weapons-related technology 
to other countries, "as in the case of ballistic missile transfers". Because of 
the threat to regional stability resulting from ballistic missile proliferation by 
China, the President had decided to license the export of computers exceeding 
a certain composite theoretical performance "only after extensive review to 
ensure that the proposed sale poses no threat to national security." (And by 
involving CoCom, whose unanimous approval was anyhow required for the 
export of this category of computers, the U.S. ensured a common front of the 
17 members concerned vis-a-vis China). 
While acknowledging his right under the prevailing Congressional legislation 
to waive the suspension of licenses to Chinese entities of U.S. satellites 
(technology) and components if this is in the U.S. national interest, the 
President had decided "that PRC actions related to the proliferation of missiles 
make it inappropriate for the United States to approve any further export 
licenses for commercial satellite launches at this time." (emph. add) 
This decision thus did not affect the Aussat and Freja licenses already granted. 
Finally, two Chinese entities were identified as the culprits that had transferred 
missile technology to Pakistan, namely the China Precision Machinery Import-
Export Corporation and China Great Wall Industry Corporation, the launch 
company. Both would face sanctions as prescribed by MTCR -based legislation, 
laid down in the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration 
Act. 90 
U.S. President to defend his MFN decision was that he continued to need China's 
cooperation for other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as "seeking peace in Cambodia, 
reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula, and restricting transfers of nuclear, CBW 
[chemical and biological weapons] and missile equipment and technology" (emph. add.), see 
President's repon on MFN status for China, released by the White House, May 29, 1991, in 
US Dept of State Dispatch 430-432 (Jun 17, 1991) at 432. 
90. Sec. 73(a) AECA and Sec. 11B(b)(l) of the EAA respectively, see Chapter 2.3. supra. 
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On October 30-31, 1991 the annual U.S.-Chinalaunch trade talks as prescribed 
by the 1989 agreement took place. "The United States was expected to call on 
the Chinese to adhere to the fair-pricing provisions [of the 1989 launch trade 
agreement], while the Chinese were expected to complain about White House 
sanctions, imposed in May, that prohibit the export of U. S. made satellites to 
China. In a nutshell, they wanted the export sanctions lifted and we said that 
wasn't a trade issue", said a member of the U.S. delegation. 91 
In February 1992 the State Department voiced plans to lift the eight-month ban 
on U.S. satellite exports to China in exchange for China's MTCR adherence. 
Already during a November 1991 visit to Beijing, Baker, the U.S. Secretary 
of State, had received oral assurances from Chinese officials in this regard. 92 
After having requested written promises from the Chinese, Secretary Baker, 
on February 1, 1992 received a letter from his Chinese counterpart which 
confirmed that China would abide by the MTCR guidelines and parameters. 
Consequently, the State Department, on February 21, 1992, announced that 
the Administration intended to lift the sanctions and, as a result, expected 
China to announce its adherence to the Regime. 93 On March 23, President 
Bush indeed lifted the above MTCR sanctions. 
In July 20-21, 1992 discussions took place in Washington at the request of the 
Chinese on the possibility of receiving export licenses for the Chinese launch 
Administration had expressed urgent concern to the Chinese Government about exports of 
missile technology, a subject that the Under Secretary of State was to discuss in detail 
during his June 17-19 meetings in China; there is no report on the contents or outcome of 
his talks. 
91. See 2 (36) Space News (Oct 1991) at 1, 21 and 2 (38) Space News (Nov 1991) at 2. 
92. "... the Chinese have told us that they intend to observe the MTCR guidelines and 
parameters. To us, this means that they will apply them to any exports of missiles and 
related technology. We understand that this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles. The 
Chinese have told us that they will make this unconditional commitment to the MTCR 
guidelines if we will remove the proliferation sanctions imposed June 16 on two Chinese 
companies and on the licensing of high-speed computers and satellites for China". See 
Secretary Baker, opening statement at a news conference, Beijing, China, November 17, 
1991 in US Department of State Dispatch (Nov 25, 1991) at 859. 
93. See statement issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Feb 21, 1992: 
"This in no way means we will slacken our efforts to monitor either missile transfers 
worldwide, or Chinese missile and missile technology export practices. Transfers of missile 
technology covered by the MTCR guidelines will continue to be subject to sanction in 
accordance with US law", US Department of State Dispatch (Mar 9, 1992) at 189. In a 
March 2, 1992 letter from Pres. Bush to the House, he returned, without his approval, the 
so-called United States-China Act of 1991, which placed conditions ( improved human 
rights, cooperation in arms control, dropping barriers to trade) on the renewal of China's 
MFN trade status. Bush rejected this legislation as an ultimatum that would be 
counterproductive, and referred to the accomplishments of his Administration's policy of 
comprehensive engagement: "[r]ecent agreements by the Chines to protect US intellectual 
property rights, to abide by the [MTCR] Guidelines, to accede to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty by April, and to discuss our human rights concerns-after years of 
stonewalling ... " (emph. add.), See "China's MFN status", ibid. 
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of Afristar, a radio broadcasting satellite built by Defense Systems Inc. for 
Afrispace Inc. of Washington, and for a future Intelsat spacecraft. At the same 
time, U.S. negotiators would press China for concrete information to refute 
charges by U.S. and European commercial launch suppliers that CGWIC was 
quoting below-market prices for its launches. 94 
On September 11, 1992, the Bush Administration, as its last China launch-
related decision before the Presidential elections, waived export restrictions 
based on the Tiananmen legislation on five satellites (Apstar 1, Asiasat 2, 
Intelsat 7A, Starsat, AfriStar, and parts for China's Dong Fang Hong 3. 95 
But already in November 1992 U.S. intelligence reported another missile-
related action on the part of the Chinese, the delivery of M 11 missiles or 
components to Pakistan. China allegedly circumvented its above February 1992 
commitment by selling components and technology rather than whole systems 
to a range of countries including Iran and Pakistan. 96 
The U.S. government, since February 1993 led by President Clinton, was 
forced to - again - show that it could not tolerate this MTCR violation and, 
on August 25, 1993, the Department of State after an unsuccessful mission to 
China in July by the under secretary of State for international security affairs, 
aimed at seeking clarification on the nature of the sales announced the 
sanctions imposed on the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of China and the 
Ministry of Defense of Pakistan and their divisions, subunits and any successor 
entities (which in the case of China involved 10 entities under the above 
ministry, including CGWIC): 
94. At that occasion, the Director of DOT's Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
suggested that the US government consider enforcement measures, such as retaliatory trade 
sanctions because the Chinese had not met the letter of the agreement. USTR, leading these 
negotiations was however not prepared to consider changes to the accord to include 
enforcement measures, see 3 (26) Space News (Jul 1992) at 3, 20). And, one might add, the 
export regulations and, in particular, the Trade Act anyhow already provided adequate 
means for sanctioning violations of the agreement. 
95. See CRS China Report 1998, infra note 104, at 17. In the mean time, on August 14, 1992 
Optus Bl, the former Aussat Bl, built by Hughes and owned by Optus Communications of 
Sydney, had been launched on a Long March 2E rocket. It was the second Chinese launch 
of a US-built spacecraft. The first launch attempt of the satellite had been aborted on March 
22, 1992, without damage to either launcher or satellite. Hughes was under contract with 
Aussat Pty Ltd, Australia's government-owned satellite operator to manage the two-satellite 
construction and launch program; it purchased launch services and insurance on behalf of 
Aussat and was to deliver the spacecraft to orbit before receiving final contract payments. 
Aussat was sold to private companies and in January 1992 became Australia's second 
telecommunications provider, named Optus Communications Pty. Ltd of Sydney, see 3 (12) 
Space News (Mar/Apr 1992) at 4, 29 and 3 (30) Space News (Aug 1992) at 2. 
On December 21, 1992 Optus B2 (the former Aussat B2), was launched from Xichang 
launch facility on a Long March 2E rocket. The launch failed and, consequently, the satellite 
did not reach its planned orbit. 
96. See FEER (Sep 9, 1993) at 10, 11. 
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-all licenses for exports of MTCR equipment or technology controlled pursuant 
to the the AECA and the EAA to these entities were to be denied for two 
years; 
-no U.S. government contracts relating to MTCR equipment or technology and 
involving these entities would be entered into for two years. 
The same sanctions applied to (export or contracts involving) all activities of 
the Chinese government relating to missile development or production, as well 
as all activities of that goverment affecting the development or production of 
electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft. 
These sanctions halted - for the prescribed 2 years - the export of some of the 
above satellites, insofar as they had not yet received a definitive export 
approval following Bush's decision of September 1992. 97 
(At the same time, all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
voted to increase weapons sales to Taiwan. This vote, which pleased the U.S. 
arms manufacturers but upset the White House, was seen as at least partly 
inspired by both the ease with which China's MFN status had been renewed 
for another year and by China's above weapons sales to Pakistan. 98 
Both China and Pakistan denied the U.S. allegations and criticized strongly 
the leveling of sanctions. The Chinese condemned the U.S. action as 
meddlesome and unjustified, and threatened that they would reconsider their 
commitment to the MTCR Guidelines. 
97. See Dept of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Public Notice 1857: "Imposition of 
missile proliferation sanctions against entities in China and Pakistan", Fed. Reg. Vol 58. 
No. 165 (Aug 27, 1993) The sale by Hughes of a satellite to APT (Apstar1), was apparently 
not affected, see FEER Sept 9, 1993, at 10, 11. Reason why this satellite and also a Space 
Systems/Loral-built lntelsat 7 satellite and Hughes components for a domestic Chinese 
communications satellite escaped the sanctions, was that licenses already granted were not 
revoked, only those under review were affected. Under review were licenses for export of 
the Optus B3, a replacement of one that had been destroyed in a launch failure ("the 
Australians are going to to be screaming, and scratching at our door", according to a State 
Dept official, referring to the probability that Australia would insist on a waiver of the 
restriction), and the Asiasat 2; also affected were the Starsat and Afristar communications 
satellites, ibid. 
98. See FEER (Aug 5, 1993) at 15. When Clinton, on May 28, 1993, announced the extension 
of MFN for another year, he also referred to the Congressional attempts in 1991 and 1992 
to attach (human rights and other) conditions to MFN and the ensuing Presidential vetoes as 
the "annual battles between Congress and the Executive [which] divided our foreign policy 
and weakened our approach to China". In the same statement, the president promised "to 
pursue resolutely all legislative and executive actions to ensure China abides by international 
[i.a. arms control] standards", and added: "The Administration is now examining reports 
that China has shipped M-ll ballistic missiles to Pakistan. If true, such action would violate 
China's commitment to observe the guidelines and parameters of the [MTCR] ... [and] my 
Administration will not hesitate to act", see Statement by the President on [MFN] for China, 
White House Press Release (May 28, 1993) The White House virtual library <http:// 
library. whitehouse.gov/cgi > . 
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Though the sanctions were expected to have a negligible effect on Pakistani-
U.S. trade, they affected reportedly about USD 500 million worth of sales (of 
satellite launch equipment, flight control systems, computers, etc.) by U.S. 
companies in China, although this figure was not supported by everybody. 99 
Two other aspects of the sanctions warrant additional attention. 
One was the fact that, by limiting the accusation to the sale of missile 
components, in stead of complete missiles or missile systems, the U.S. 
Administration could also limit the scope and extent of the sanctions, thus 
minimizing the impact on both China and the U.S. exporters. And even that 
decision was reported to have been taken with extreme reluctance, reflecting 
the importance the U. S. attached to restoring relations with a regional power 
whose support they needed for a variety of issues. 100 
Another aspect was the fact that while the U.S. had repeatedly urged China 
to respect the missile regime (and China had promised to do so) it had been 
reluctant to let China into the club of MTCR signatories, reportedly because 
China would then have to be provided with new technical information about 
developments in the missile technology field. Although this interpretation of 
MTCR is not necessarily correct (see Chapter 2), it cannot be denied that the 
U.S. considered China not yet ready to join. At the same time China was not 
prepared to formally join the Regime until it had been able to extract a 
maximum of trade and other concessions from the U.S., including of course 
the lifting of sanctions and other restrictions on the export to China of 'high 
tech' goods and technology. 
Although the U.S. launch companies, notwithstanding crowded launch 
manifests, saw the sanctions as providing them with welcome opportunities to 
attract the disappointed Long March clients (though in competition with 
Arianespace and the Russians), the aerospace manufacturers, represented by 
the Washington-based Aerospace Industries Association of America (AIAA), 
voiced sharp criticism, particularly because the U.S. had not insisted that other 
(MTCR) countries also deny China the components that Hughes and other U.S. 
companies were now forbidden to sell to companies in that country. 101 
99. See Facts on File, U.S. imposes trade sanctions on China and Pakistan [about $500 million 
in the case of China] (Sep 2, 1993) "Somewhere between $400 and $500 million a year of 
commercial activity will be affected by the sanctions that are now imposed", see 4 (34) 
Space News (Aug/Sep 1993) at 21. A regional magazine, having interviewed companies like 
Hughes Aircraft and Motorola, rejected this figure as probably too high, paticularly because 
licenses already given would not be affected, see FEER (Sep 9, 1993), at 10, 11 ("Red 
rockets glare - China's sale of missiles to Pakistan and alleged shipment of chemical 
weapons to Iran further worsen an already strained relationship with US"). 
100. See FEER id, at ll. 
101. As the AIAA asked, "[w]hat is the point of [the U.S. restrictions] if the Chinese can buy 
from our [Japanese and European] competitors?" And the Hughes Space and 
Communications president Armstrong stated: "Two of the most serious issues facing the 
U.S. satellite industry today are the govermnent's current China trade restrictions and the 
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As we saw in Chapter 2.3.4, although intense lobbying took place on the part 
of the aerospace industry, focused both on the damaging effects on the U.S. 
industry's competitive position of the sanctions and on the predominantly 
"national security and foreign policy"-oriented role played by the State 
Department in controlling the export of satellites, it did not bring immediate 
legislative relief. However, in an industry-inspired letter meant for Secretary 
of State Christopher, several House members from (the "aerospace State" of) 
California argued that the sanctions should not prevent launches of U.S.-built 
communications satellites from China and that a continued prohibition would 
cost thousands of high technology jobs in California and could damage the 
U.S. satellite industry for years to come. 102 
And, after the Administration in November 1993 had relayed to China its 
willingness in principle to ease the satellite licensing procedures and had 
received encouraging reactions concerning possible nonproliferation 
commitments on the part of China, President Clinton, after an extensive 
interagency review, "months of bureaucratic wrangling and intense industry 
lobbying" 103 on January 6, 1994 announced a new policy exempting 
commercial communications satellites from the sanctions for missile 
proliferation imposed in August 1993. 104 This cleared the way for a 
Commerce export license for the two Martin Marietta satellites, the Asiasat 
2 and Echostar. Clinton's decision was seen as a clear victory for Commerce 
Secretary Brown who had maintained that purely commercial satellites did not 
fall under the sanctions, whereas the Secretary of State had argued that all 
satellites should fall under the ban. 105 Although the issue as such is an 
need for less expensive reliable launch vehicles. The US government's handling of export 
licensing and technology transfer in satellite deals involving the Chinese is hampering the 
industry's competitiveness." His Martin Marietta Astro Space colleague added that "a 
continued U.S. policy to prevent American satellite builders from using the Chinese Long 
March rocket would hurt the industry, because many customers want to use that launch 
vehicle because of its cheaper price tag"., see 5 (4) Space News (Jan 1994) at 10. 
Armstrong had previously accused the government of playing politics with export licenses 
and warned that other countries like Germany would benefit by winning future Chinese 
business. He noted at that occasion that China's National Space Administration said it would 
sign an $80-100 million contract with Deutsche Aerospace of Munich for a joint venture to 
build two communications satellites for the People's Bank of China, a contract which 
Hughes had expect to win, see Space News (Jan 10, 1994) at 3. 
102. See 4 (42) Space News (Oct 1993) at 4. The same article mentions the following satellite 
exports as being affected by the ban: Hughes' Optus B3, the second Apstar (Apstar 1 had 
already an export license and would be launched by the Chinese in July 1994) and a 
Chinasat communications satellite for the Chinese government, and Martin Marietta's 
Echo star direct broadcasting television satellite and AsiaSat 2 (AsiaSat 1, built by Hughes, 
was the first US satellite launched by the Chinese in 1990 under the launch trade agreement. 
103. See Space News (Jan 10, 1994) at 3 ("Clinton approves two satellite exports to China"). 
104. See Shirley A. Kan, China: Possible missile technology transfers from U.S. satellite export 
policy-background and chronology, CRS Report for Congress, 98-485 F (Aug 13, 1998), 
hereinafter referred to as CRS China report 1998, at 19. 
105. A memo of Nov 16, 1993 from the National Security Advisor to President Clinton proposed 
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interesting one from a legal point of view, fact is that the Clinton decision was 
motivated by other than legal considerations, i.e. the U.S.-China relations in 
general and progress in the missile proliferation dispute with China more in 
particular. That is why a full clearance for export was only to be expected after 
the Chinese would have provided assurances that they would strictly, or at least 
in an agreed way c.q. on the basis of a common interpretation of the MTCR 
Guidelines, abide by the Regime. To that end the two parties would meet later 
that month to sort out their differences which had arisen in relation to China's 
1992 commitments. 106 
A third Commerce-controlled commercial communications satellite, Hughes' 
Apstar 2, was now also exempted from the 1993 sanctions, and could thus 
expect an export license. There was an interesting though temporary 
complication: Apstar's owner, APT Satellite Co. of Hong Kong, was partly 
controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry, one of the entities 
specifically implicated by the State Department in its August 1993 sanction 
notice. A second issue of concern to Hughes was the fact that, although 
Commerce had cleared the satellite for export, liquid propellants and the 
perigee kick motor (PKM) rocket attached to the satellite were, as defense 
articles, covered by the State Department sanctions; so the ban had to be 
graciously lifted, or, to avoid further departmental delay, Hughes had to 
remove the U.S.-made PKM and look elsewhere for a non-U.S. supplier of 
this essential component: the kickmotor enables the satellite to reach its correct 
orbital position after being put into space. But that would also have caused 
unwanted delays. 107 In the end, neither of the two issues were important 
enough to stand in the way of Clinton's strategic gesture vis-a-vis China, and 
on February 1, 1994, Hughes received the required license for the satellite, 
including the PKM and propellants, from the Commerce Department. 108 
Finally, a fourth satellite to benefit from the new Clinton policy (or rather: 
interpretation) was the Optus B3, another Hughes-built advanced 
communications satellite, planned for launch in 1994 to replace the failed 
to follow the National Security Council and Commerce's interpretation of the MTCR 
Sanctions imposed in Aug 1993 to allow t.IJ.e export of two satellites controlled by the 
Commerce Dept, but not the five controlled by the State Dept. (State had argued that all 
satellite export licenses were suspended under the Sanctions, but Commerce had taken the 
position that the sanction did not cover the Commerce licences. The President approved the 
NSC recommendations, see ibid. 
106. See IHT (Jan 8-9, 1994) at 5 ("U.S. optimistic on reining in China missile sales"). In 
return, the U.S. had agreed to open talks with China on the US sales of F-16 jets to Taiwan, 
announced in 1992 by the Bush administration, see ibid. 
107. See IHT (Jan 15-16, 1994) at 4 ("Satellite exports: battle lines drawn after U.S. signal to 
China") and Space News (Jan 17, 1994) at 15 ("Curb missiles, not satellites"). 
108. On January 27, 1995 Apstar2 was launched, but the launch failed. In the meantime, the 
China Aerospace Corporation had reduced its vulnerability by completing the development 
of its own PKM which would be marketed for the launch of foreign satellites on the Long 
March -2E and -3 series launchers, see AW & ST (Sep 26, 1994) at 88. 
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Australian Optus B2. The satellite originally did not fall under Commerce 
authorization, because it contained a so-called "encryption device" , which 
protects the satellite communications from being interfered with by 
unauthorized outsiders. This is a defense article listed on the U.S. Munitions 
List, which thus brought the satellite under State Department jurisdiction. 109 
The manufacturer, in stead of going through the lengthier State Department 
licensing process, opted for a redesign of the satellite which resulted in the 
removal of the device and the transfer of the concomitant jurisdiction to the 
Commerce Department. The latter department issued the export license and 
on August 28, 1994, the satellite was launched on a Long March launch 
vehicle. 
In June 1994, President Clinton, with substantial bipartisan Congressional and 
-understandably - U.S. industry support decided to decouple the annual MFN 
process from China's human rights record, and renewed China's MFN 
status. 110 
On October 4, 1994 the Clinton Administration lifted the 1993 sanctions 
against China in return for China's renewed and expanded commitment to 
adhere to MTCR. Under the agreement reached China accepted the 
internationally recognised definition of what constitutes a violation of the 
MTCR. As a result, China promised not to export ground-to-ground missiles 
"inherently capable" of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers with a 
payload of at least 500 kilograms. The expression used aimed at solving the 
M 11 missile dispute: where China officially had never admitted delivering 
these missiles to Pakistan, it had privately insisted that the missiles had been 
specifically designed to conform to MTCR guidelines which contain the above 
range and payload limits. In the U.S view, if missiles carrying a higher weight 
than 500 kilogrammes cannot reach a distance of 300 kilometers, they may still 
be inherently capable of exceeding the MTCR parameters. The above words 
therefore were seen as covering the M11 and thus satisfied the U.S. concerns. 
(though it would require further meetings between the parties to fully clarify 
the matter and prevent any future disagreements on the scope of the restriction. 
The Chinese went a step further than MTCR requires: where MTCR speaks 
109. See 5 (2) Space News (Jan 1994) at 3. 
110. As Republican Senator Dole, leading the charge for unconditional renewal, said: "tying 
trade to human rights does not work. The policy has failed, the president should admit it", 
see USA Today (May 19, 1994) at lOA. Where one year earlier Clinton had issued an 
executive order saying MFN would be renewed only if China made "significant progress" in 
seven human rights areas, according to the State Dept, China's "overall human rights record 
in 1993 fell far short of internationally accepted norms". And where American jobs, 
investments (in Hong Kong) and consumer prices, according to the business community, 
would be severely hit by a trade war and China's aerospace market alone was estimated at 
$40 billion over the next two decades, pressure on President Clinton not to invite Chinese 
retaliation was considerable, see ibid. 
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in general of "control", and in the case of possible export of complete missiles 
and major subsystems (Cat. I items, "items of greatest sensitivity"), "there will 
be a strong presumption to deny such transfers", they agreed not to export any 
MTCR class ground-to-ground (surface-to-surface) missiles anywhere in the 
world, in other words an absolute global ban. 111 
On November 11, 1994, the Administration's waiver of the August 1993 
sanctions took effect. 
The above Chinese-U.S. understanding had been preceded by a House Space 
Subcommittee hearing entitled "Global Trade in Satellite and Launch Services". 
The focus of the hearing, held on September 29, 1994, was the status of the 
negotiations between the U.S. and China on the possible extension of the 1989 
launch trade agreement, whose 5-year term would expire on December 31. At 
the same time, the status of a similar agreement concluded with Russia on 
September 2, 1993, was discussed. And the hearing also served as a forum for 
senior members of the government and industry to talk with the Subcommittee 
about U.S. launch policy, U.S. export control laws and policy, and the 
competitiveness of the U.S. satellite and launch services industries in the global 
marketplace. 112 
Among the issues raised by the government participants in connection with 
China were the capacity and price conditions central to the agreement. 
Of the nine launches of satellites for international customers permitted by the 
agreement in the period 1989-1994 China would, based on current launch 
schedules, only perform four. 
The USTR representative concluded from this figure that 
"the Agreement would seem to have served its goal of permitting China the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it can deliver launch services meeting the exact standards of the 
international marketplace while recognizing the problems created by a transitional economy. 
Having given China the opportunity to compete, it was left to China to demonstrate its 
capabilities to the international community". (emph. add.). 113 
111. See China and non-proliferation, Fact sheet, Dept of State (Jun 3, 1997) <http:/lwww. 
state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-china_nonprolif_970603.html >. See also FEER (Oct 20, 
1994) at 20 ("Goodwill proliferates - U.S. and China sign missile, nuclear accords"), and 
AW/ST (Oct 10, 1994) at 24 ("U.S., China settle missile dispute"). In the context of this 
agreement, the US intended to promote eventual Chinese participation in the MTCR, see 
ibid. 
112. See Launch trade hearing 1994, supra note 77. See also Dennis Bumett, Global trade in 
satellite and launch services, report (Oct 13, 1994) hereinafter referred to as Bumett report, 
and, by the same author and Francesca Schroeder, Developments in U.S. bilateral launch 
service agreements, 19 ( 6) AIR & Space L. 326-331 ( 1994) hereinafter referred to as 
Bumett development. 
113. Statement by Donald Philips, Assistant USTR for Industry, Launch trade hearing 1994, 
supra note 77 
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It is remarkable to say the least that the total number of Chinese launches 
performed was presented, as per the emphasised line, as if China had been able 
to freely compete in an open market context on quality and price alone with 
its American and European counterparts. It would have been a more honest 
approach to the question of GWIC's sales successes if the effects of the 
(possible and actual) delays and refusals of export licenses for the satellites of 
their (potential) foreign clients would have been taken into account or at least 
have been mentioned as a factor influencing the competitive position of the 
Chinese. 
On the question of pricing the government was less satisfied. Although the 
extent of China's participation in the space launch market had been less than 
permitted by the agreement, the above government representative noted 
" ... we have been concerned about China's implementation of the "par pricing" standard 
throughout the six years of the agreement. The "par pricing" assessment is a difficult one. 
Each launch and each launch package offered in a competition may involve unique 
characteristics that require adjustments before a fair comparison can be made. However, 
China's compliance with the par pricing provisions remains a matter of ongoing concern 
to the U. S. commercial launch industry." ll4 
In view of that assessment, the government promised that this would be an area 
of attention in their discussions regarding a possible renewal of the agreement. 
An initial round of negotiations had already taken place a week earlier, in 
which these concerns had been raised, and follow-up discussions on these and 
other agreement-related matters would take place one month later. On the 
whole, however, USTR was reasonably happy with the way the Agreement 
had worked: 
"In 1989 when we first confronted this situation with China, there was no model upon which 
to draw in fashioning an agreement to balance these interests [i.e.a strong U .S. launch 
industry working in an international market place governed by agreements that address the 
complications caused by transitional economies, the integration of (Russia and) China into 
the world economy i.a. through access to world markets for their competitive goods and 
services, and access for the U.S. satellite industry to competitively priced launch services]. 
We believe that a review of the experience with the China Agreement demonstrates that 
it has worked reasonably well and is a proper basis from which to proceed to the negotiation 
of an extension of that Agreement". ll5 
The opportunity offered to the industry to vent their worries and frustrations 
about the government's laws and policies was not left unused. We will limit 
our review to some comments which are (also) of specific relevance to (the 
114. Id .. 
115. See Allgeier statement, Launch trade hearing 1994, supra note 77. 
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relations with) China and are believed to have contributed to set the stage for 
changes in the government's policies and practices. 
The sharpest criticism came from Hughes Electronics' Telecommunications 
and Space Sector, whose president spoke out strongly against the elements of 
protectionism found both in the launch trade agreements and in the current 
export controls: 
"Increasingly, our international customers have access to a number of high quality, very 
price competitive non-U .S. manufacturers and suppliers who dearly love to cature additional 
market share. Increasingly [those customers] object to current U .S. export controls as being 
irrational and unpredictable -and in some cases, they view U.S. export controls as 
discriminatory. 
We fear that our national export controls are having an adverse effect on our ability to 
compete in the international marketplace. In the case of China, for example, commercial 
communications satellite sales have been lost or foregone because of the uncertainty and 
delay in the U.S. licensing process and customer concern about future export license 
approvals". 
The Hughes official, mentioning the unilateral character of the August 1993 
sanctions imposed on China, the primary effect of which was to punish only 
the U.S. satellite industry, and the secondary effect was to place Hughes and 
other U.S. satellite manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage in the 
international market place. 116 
One of the solutions suggested was to move all commercial communications 
satellites, including encryption devices, perigee kick motors (and fuel) from 
the State Department's USML to Commerce's CCL. 
Hughes made another important point, of a more general character: over half 
the cost of a communications satellite in orbit was the cost of launching, and 
that percentage had been increasing over time because, where technology and 
productivity improvements had led at Hughes to a five fold increase in cost 
effectiveness, the cost of launch services had been relatively constant, partly 
because of the lack of launch vehicle competition if only Western launchers 
were made available for launch of the various types of satellites. 
So the manufacturers needed greater access to foreign launches at competitive 
prices. And also the customers, for cost, reliability and geo-political reasons, 
did not wish to be limited in their choice of the launch vehicle. In this 
environment, Hughes concluded, the Chinese and Russian launch agreements 
were damaging to the communications satellite industry (almost 10 times larger 
than the U.S. launch industry!): 
116. According to the official, German DASA filled the void created by the sanctions and 
concluded an agreement with the Chinese for the purchase and coproduction of commercial 
communications satellites, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, see Id. 
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"The agreements stifle competition because they place a floor on the prices that Chinese 
and Russian launch service companies can charge to customers. They limit launch vehicle 
supply by placing artificial quotas on Chinese or Russian launches at the very time that 
demand exceeds supply. They distort the marketplace by controlling geostationary satellite 
launches, but not low earth orbit satellite launches. Consequently, the agreements reduce 
the incentives for U.S. launch services to invest and restructure in response to changed 
markets and rapidly changing technologies. The agreements work to the advantage of the 
U .S. and European launch services industry, and to the disadvantage of the communications 
satellite industry". 
Hughes concluded that both quotas and pricing constraints should be abolished. 
These views were largely supported by other manufacturers, such as Space 
Systems/Loral and Motorola. On the other hand, the U.S. launch providers 
like McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta (the latter also a satellite 
manufacturer), saw the agreements as necessary for an orderly entry of non-
market economy launch companies into the market, and asked for more 
effective enforcement mechanisms. 117 One method, suggested prior to the 
hearing, took the form of a case-by-case USTR certification of Russia's and 
China's compliance with all aspects of the bilateral agreements before licenses 
could be issued for the export of satellites to either country for launch. 
Although there had been considerable debate on the latter proposal in 
Congress, the Administration was not prepared to add another regulatory 
barrier to the -already strongly criticized-export control process and on top of 
the enforcement measures available to USTR, because of the trade character 
of the agreements, under the Trade Act of 1974. 
Though the October 4 understanding and the lifting of U.S. MTCR sanctions, 
coupled with China's renewed MFN status should have cleared the air between 
the two countries, two developments created new (potential) tensions. 
First, the Republican victory in the mid-term elections of November 1994 
resulted in the most anti-Beijing, or more specifically "most pro-democracy, 
pro-Taiwan, pro-Tibet, anti-Chinese Communist Party and anti-People's 
Liberation Army Congress" in years.U8 Consequently, according to sources 
in Washington, the Clinton administration would have to deal with pressure 
from Congress to inter alia penalise Beijing for its arms-sale and human-rights 
policies. 
117. In his testimony, Peter B. Teets, President, Space Group of Martin Marietta, expressed his 
concern about enforcement: "There is little evidence of the Executive Branch's enforcement 
of these agreements despite the fact that in several instances the prices offered by non-
market economies were much lower than permitted in the agreements". He did not give 
examples. Lockheed, both a satellite builder and a launch company through its joint venture 
with the Russian company producing the Proton rocket (which was subject to the quota of 
the US-Russian launch trade agreement), saw the agreement as a handicap to i.a. Lockheed 
and a protection of the European launch competitor, Arianespace, see Id. 
118. See FEER (Dec l, 1994) at 14-15. 
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Secondly, and in probable violation of the above understanding, a continuing 
stream of intelligence showed the supply of missiles or missile components, 
training activities and visits of Chinese missile scientists and engineers to the 
Pakistani military base where the components had been delivered. 
Particularly if the supplies involved complete (MTCR Category 1) missiles, 
this would oblige the administration to impose heavy penalties on China. 
That possibility, which would undoubtedly create serious tensions between the 
two countries, was sufficient reason for the administration to refrain from hasty 
conclusions or actions as to the intelligence reports. 119 
As a consequence of both this U.S. government attitude and some restraint on 
the Chinese side, no more missile export related sanctions have been imposed 
on the Chinese since then. Nevertheless, China still has not joined MTCR, and 
it remains a matter of debate whether its interpretation of the MTCR 
limitations particularly in respect of Cat 11 technology and components fully 
corresponds with the views of the MTCR members, and more in particular of 
the U.S. In April1998, a senior State Department official, returning from talks 
with the Chinese on proliferation matters, stated: 
" ... [the Chinese] relationships in missile components and technology with Iran and 
Pakistan, in particular, lead us to be concerned about whether they have the same 
understanding we have about the specific scope of those undertakings ... the difficulty we 
have is in the detail. What we're trying to reconcile is our approach and their approach to 
actually controlling technology and components, which would generally fall under Category 
11. n!20 
After the September 1994 hearing the satellite manufacturers would further 
increase their efforts to get a fundamental change in the regulatory regime 
applicable to the export of their products. In April1995, following a visit from 
Hughes Electronics' CEO and newly appointed head of Clinton's Export 
Council to Secretary of State Christopher, the latter started an indepth 
interagency review of the export control role of the State Department with 
respect to satellites. 
3.1.4 The revised Agreement of 1995 
It took altogether 5 negotiating rounds to conclude a new seven-year bilateral 
agreeement extending disciplines governing continued Chinese participation 
119. See ibid. A nuclear arms control expert wrote in a conunentary: "We haven't really been 
tough on the Chinese", one senior official told us. "They pay lip service to the rules, but 
they still violate them -sometimes blatantly. The reason we are looking the other way is 
market potential", see lliT (Apr 25, 1995) at 8 ("From China to Iran as America watches"). 
120. See Holum briefing, supra Ch. 2, note 189, at 7. 
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in the international commercial launch market. On March 13, 1995, the two 
parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding international trade in 
commercial launch services, 121 which would govern the respective Chinese 
launches with effect from January 1, 1995. 
As its predecessor, it sought to carefully balance the interests and needs of the 
U.S. space launch, satellite and telecommunications industries. At the same 
time its (continued) aim was to "provide effective safeguards against disruption 
of the market for commercial space launch services while allowing for 
disciplined Chinese participation in the market. "122 
To further that aim and provide market stability, the resulting agreement again 
places quantitative limits and a price discipline on Chinese launch contracts. 
Where the previous agreement had provided for up to nine Chinese launches 
for international customers to geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) over a period 
of six years, the new agreement allows the Chinese eleven such launches 
through December 31, 2001, i.e. a period of seven years. Additionally, the 
1995 agreement includes provisions which allow for increases in this 
quantitative limit to address shortages in the supply of launch services for U .S. 
satellite manufacturers and users. 
The new agreement continues to require that Chinese launch prices must be 
"on a par" with prices offered by Western launch service providers for 
comparable launches, but specifies in more detail, along the lines of a 
provision already included in the U.S.-Russia launch trade agreement of 1993, 
when such pricing is presumed not to meet that requirement. 
Special attention is given to the new market for satellite launches into low earth 
orbit (LEO), one which did not exist in 1989, but already held great promises 
in 1995. However, the agreement does not place a specific limit on the number 
of commercial LEO launches. The Agreement also addressed the question of 
"leasing on orbit", which had arisen in connection with the application of the 
U. S.-Russia Agreement. 
In the following, we will briefly review the relevant provisions of the new 
agreement, insofar as they changed (the extent of) the rights and obligations 
of the parties. 
Scope 
The new Agreement made a distinction between on the one hand the 
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) and geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) 
121. The doe is available through USTR, <http://www.ustr.gov/>. 
122. See U.S. and China conclude new commercial space launch agreement, Press release 95-07, 
Office of the USTR, Executive Office of the President (Jan 30, 1995). 
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and, on the other hand, the low-earth orbit (LEO), the latter a "separately 
identifiable commercial market with its own particular characteristics". 
Both the specific pricing and quantity provisions of the Agreement were, for 
the time being, exclusively applicable to GEO/GTO launches. 123 
Quantity 
Market participation of Chinese launch providers is, for the period of the 
contract, i.e. seven years, limited to eleven principal pay loads to GEO or GTO 
for international customers. 124 
Four satellites, for which launch contracts had been signed prior to the entry 
into force of the new agreement, were considered to be covered by the 1989 
Agreement and therefore did not count for the purpose of the new 
Agreement. 125 
On the other hand, a new category of launches was included, namely any 
satellite launched by PRC providers that is entirely or "depending on the 
circumstances and facts of a particular case", primarily leased on orbit to 
international customers. The provision was first introduced in the U.S.-Russia 
Agreement of 1993, and sought to prevent a possible circumventing of the 
restrictions through the - unrestricted - launch of indigenous satellites for the 
benefit of foreign users (see Chapter 3.2.2 infra). 
123. Annex I, which contains the agreed definitions, gives the following meaning to the GEO: 
" ... an orbit approximately 19,400 nautical miles (35,900 kilometers) above the surface of 
the earth at the equator in which a payload completes one earth orbit in a 24-hour period, 
holding a fixed position above the earth." GTO is defmed as " ... a temporary orbit used to 
reposition a spacecraft or satellite into a geosynchronous earth orbit." LEO "means, for 
purposes of this agreement, any orbit below [GEO]. ",see paras. 8, 9 and 10 respectively. 
124. See art. II (B)(ii). Para. 11 of the Annex defmes principal payload as "a telecommunications 
satellite, or, in the absence of a telecommunications satellite, any other spacecraft or 
combination of spacecraft." International customer refers, according to para. 3 of the Annex, 
to "(a) any person, or any kind of corporation, company, association, venture, partnership, 
or other entity, whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, or privately or governmentally 
owned or controlled other than those institutions or entities which are owned or controlled 
by PRC nationals and provide telecommunications services primarily to the Chinese market; 
or (b) any governmental body, excluding the Government of the [U .S.] and the Government 
of the [PRC]; or (c) any international organization or quasi-governmental consortium, 
including but not limited to Intelsat, Inmarsat, or their respective legal successors; which is 
the ultimate owner or operator of a spacecraft or satellite or which will deliver a spacecraft 
or satellite to orbit for use by such ultimate owner or operator." 
The emphasized parts of the definition aim at including Chinese satellites launched by China 
for the (quasi-)exclusive use by international customers, see main text. 
125. Apstar II, licensed on Feb 1, 1994 and launched on Jan 26, 1995 (failed); Asiasat II, 
licensed on Jan 6, 1994 and launched on Nov 28, 1995; lntelsat 708, launched on Feb 15, 
1996 (failed) ; and Echostar I, licensed on Jan 6, 1994 and launched on Dec 28, 1995. 
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This quantitative restriction was based on a market (growth) estimate of 12 to 
13 GEO satellites per year over the seven year period, i.e. 84-91 satellite 
launches; the Agreement thus gave China the opportunity to acquire 12 to 13% 
of the launch market. 
As both parties realized the imperfection of this estimate, and a rigid limitation 
could seriously affect the fortunes of the satellite manufacturers and users, 
whether U.S. or others, a number of provisions were introduced seeking to 
provide for the necessary flexibility for the parties concerned, with respect to 
both the number of launches permitted and the proportional distribution of the 
launches over the contract period, the so-called " (anti-)bunching provision" 126 
during any two-year period of the Agreement. The PRC may make 
commitments in any three-year period of the Agreement consistent with 
subparagraph II (B)(ii) [dealing with the overall restriction for the full period]. 
The PRC shall seek to ensure that PRC launches of principal payloads for 
international customers are performed as scheduled in the original launch 
commitment". 
For that purpose, annual, semi-annual and special consultations all provided 
an opportunity to review the development and demands of the satellite launch 
market and the possibilities for the launch industry to meet those demands. 
The PRC and the U.S. consult annually with respect to the obligations in the 
Agreement, and, in particular, on the implementation of inter alia the quantity 
provision. Though this in itself could lead to the conclusion that the restrictions 
should be adjusted, the special semi-annual meeting foreseen for this particular 
issue would be the more appropriate occasion. Article IV.3 provides: 
"Semiannually, the limitation on the total number of satellites for international customers 
that may be launched by PRC providers of commercial launch services will be reviewed 
by both parties and, if appropriate, adjusted to reflect changes in the demand for launch 
services (including changes arising from a projected absence of Western launch availability 
over an extended period) upon request of the PRC in light of developments in the 
commercial launch services market". 
Two such developments are mentioned as justifying a raising of the quantity 
restriction or a reaxing of the "bunching provision" to satisfy the resulting 
change in demand: 
-(a) a development of the GEO launch market "significantly greater" than the 
estimated average over the life of the agreement of 12-13 launches per year 
(on which the quantity restriction is based); or 
126. Art.II (B)(vi) provides in part that the PRC "shall make its best efforts to prevent a 
disproportionate concentration of such commitments [i.e. to provide commercial launch 
services to international customers, during any two-year period of the Agreement. The PRC 
may make commitments in any three-year period of the Agreement consistent with 
subparagraph II(B)(ii) [dealing with the overall restriction for the full period]. The PRC shall 
seek to ensure that PRC launches of principal payloads for international customers are 
performed as scheduled in the original launch commitment". 
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-(b) "the development of a commercially viable project for satellite services 
that fundamentally changes demand for launch services". 
Any party may, by virtue of article IV. 2, ask for special consultations to 
discuss matters of particular concern. Such consultations "will be held" 
(presumably because a U.S. manufacturer or U.S. or international user alerts 
the U.S. government to the situation) if there is a proven absence of Western 
launch availability during the required launch period and the PRC has reached 
its quantitative limit or the "bunching provision" would prevent the Chinese 
from performing a launch. In such a case the U.S. may increase the quantity 
restriction or relax the bunching provision to permit the satellite to be placed 
on the PRC launch vehicle manifest for launch. 
By virtue of article IV.5, the U.S. may also independently, i.e. without 
consultations or agreement with the Chinese, come to the conclusion that any 
of the above conditions have been met and that consequently a raising of the 
quantity restriction or a relaxing of the bunching provision is warranted. 
Unless China objects, for which it has thirty days, the U.S. may take such 
action unilaterally. 
On top of the above provisions on the adjustment of the restrictions in certain 
situations, there is a semi-automatic adaptation foreseen in the Agreement 
which is purely based on the- forecasted -number oflaunches, i.e. the overall 
size of the launch market over a certain period of time: 
- if during the first 3 years of the agreement the average annual number of 
commercial launches is or, in the opinion of the two governments, is 
expected to be 20 or more (in stead of the estimated average 12 to 13 per 
year over the full period), the PRC's quantitative limit "shall be increased" 
from 11 to 13; 
- if this trend continues for a fourth year, in other words if an average of 20 
launches or more per year is (expected to be) attained during the first 4 
years, China's allotment will go up to 16 launches over the whole period 
of the agreement. 
With the above adjustable quantity provisions, an impressive flexibility, of 
particular importance to the U .S. and other launch clients, has been introduced, 
while at the same time reserving a fair share of the (growing) market for the 
U. S. (and European!) launch industry. Absent any other impediments or 
artificial restrictions, the Agreement gives the Chinese the opportunity to 
compete on quality and price with the other launch providers, both Western 
and non-Western, for a substantial part of the international GEO launch 
market. However, China's pricing of its launch services remains the subject 
of specific conditions and limitations. 
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Pricing 
The 1989 provision on pricing required the Chinese launch providers to sell 
their services "at prices, terms and conditions which are on a par with those 
prices, terms and conditions prevailing in the international market for 
comparable commercial launch services". ( emph. add.) 
The new agreement has a similar provision, but, in order to give a clear (-er) 
meaning to the two emphasized expressions, identifies and explains in detail 
the factors which have to be considered to compare the Chinese launch services 
with those offered by commercial launch service providers from market 
economy countries, including the U.S. 
The provisions of the respective article II.B (iv) cover two situations: 
1. the differential between a bid, offer or contract by a PRC launch service 
provider for a GEO launch and one by a commercial launch provider from a 
market economy country is less than 15%: in such a case it is assumed, unless 
information is provided to the contrary, that such a Chinese bid is indeed "on 
a par" with those of its aforementioned Western competitors, and no special 
consultations are needed; 
2. When this differential is greater than 15% "and [,] after taking into 
consideration the comparability factors described in Annex II, the U.S. 
believes that China's launch service prices are not consistent with subparagraph 
(iv) [i.e. are not on a par with Western prices], the parties shall have special 
consultations ["within thirty days of a request by the U. S. , to discuss the 
matter]". (emph. add.) 
Annex II lists six such factors for comparing or evaluating launch services in 
the international market. Such factors can often explain legitimate distinctions 
in the price offered by the Chinese for the launch of a particular payload 
relative to market economy launch companies. Each such factor mentioned may 
have a certain impact on the price the customer will have to pay to the 
Chinese; this impact is expressed in a cost range expressed in dollar amounts 
or percentages. In the end these "add-on's"will help to explain and justify a 
certain - low - Chinese launch price. 
The following pricing comparability factors are mentioned: 
- intended orbit: if the customer opts for launch into GEO, the Chinese 
launch company will have to additionally purchase a Perigee Kick Motor 
of $6-7 million; conversely, a launch into GTO may lead to a discount; 
- risk management: addresses differences in insurance prices for the customer, 
based on the type and success rate of the vehicle used and also on whether 
or not, additionally, political risks are insured; basically, insurance rates 
for PRC vehicles can be 1-4% higher than the rates for Western vehicles; 
- additional cost: integration and launch support cost (including e.g. 
transportation to and security personnel in China), estimated to range 
between $4 and 6 million; 
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- vehicle lift capability: ensures comparison of vehicle classes providing 
similar performance: there may be differences in vehicle prices from one 
class of performance to the next; 
- payment conditions and terms: the issue centers on the economics of the 
customer's financial condition, which will have an influence on whether or 
not favorable credit terms or flexible payment schedules may have to be 
offered; 
- lifetime: the use of some PRC launch vehicles can result in satellite lifetimes 
that are 1 to 2,5 years less than launches on market economy vehicles. 
Evaluation of this factor is complex (in some cases there is no impact on 
lifetime) and must be done on a cas-by-case basis. 
Consideration of the above factors may lead to the conclusion that the Long 
March price for a specific launch, which at first appeared not to be on a par 
with Western prices, after adjustment resulting from the application of the 
above criteria, can be considered as falling within the permitted price 
differential of 15%. 127 
Where the agreement with Russia still contained a 7.5% level for consultation, 
this set of quantified factors gave sufficient guidance to the U.S. and China 
for comparing the launch prices to enable the former to relax the level to 15%. 
One other pricing provision addressed a complaint voiced by U.S. and 
European launch companies about Chinese pricing behavior under the previous 
agreement, to wit the more than exceptional use of the "introductory price" 
argument for quoting a low launch price to its international customers. The 
Agreement now requires consultations and agreement between the two parties 
for the PRC to be able to offer an introductory price on only the first test flight 
of a new type of launch vehicle, and describes in detail, in the Annex, the 
criteria a launch vehicle has to meet to be considered a new type. Central to 
the definition in paragraph 13 is the criterion that a launch vehicle "must have 
significantly higher risk for the first launch than other launch vehicles already 
in production in order to qualify for a "test flight" price." And significantly 
higher risks, in the view of the parties, only result from major changes to high 
risk systems such as the propulsion or avionics systems. 
The LEO launch market received special attention, because of the advent of 
ambitious and (launch trade) promising satellite systems like Iridium and 
Globalstar on the one hand, and the absence of sufficient experience with the 
demands of that market and the effects on competition between the launch 
service providers on the other hand. Hence a set of principles to guide China 
and the U. S. government in stead of specific conditions with respect to quantity 
or pricing. 
127. A May 1997 USTR report cites violation of the pricing provisions of "a bilateral agreement 
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As for the latter, for the purpose of enabling the parties to compare prices as 
in the case of GEO launches, they agreed to undertake a detailed examination 
on a per payload basis, of the factors affecting the comparability of bids, offers 
or contracts for such services. 
In view of current predictions on growth in, and the structure of, the LEO 
market128 the U.S. recognized the possibility of a substantial role for the 
Chinese launchers in that market segment provided 'they behaved'. The PRC 
promised not only that its participation in the LEO market would be consistent 
with the provisions of the agreement and with significant U.S. participation 
in the development of that market but also agreed to take steps (as yet 
unidentified) "to ensure that such participation will be proportionate and non-
disruptive. "129 
The Agreement foresees consultations in case one of the parties (presumably 
the PRC) does not behave in accordance with the above, to ascertain the facts 
and take appropriate corrective action. The U.S. will judge the (potential) 
effect of the Chinese participation in the LEO market on the basis of inter alia 
the extent and growth of overall PRC and U.S. participation in the LEO 
market and, with respect to proposals to deploy LEO communications satellite 
constellations, the extent of participation by U.S., PRC, and third country 
launch service providers, in particular whether the non-market launchers 
collectively and per satellite constellation put more satellites into orbit than 
their market economy (i.e. U.S. and European) counterparts. Some more 
factors should also be taken into account. They are listed here not because they 
represent essential knowledge for understanding the U. S. -Chinese launch trade 
relationship, but because they encompass, in the absence of stricter rules for 
LEO launches, a broad set of generally worded, multi-interpretable facts and 
128. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation, in a May 1995 update of its 1994 LEO 
market assessment, saw as many as five LEO mobile communications satellite systems to be 
deployed in the 1995-2005 timeframe under its projected "high end" scenario. OCST made a 
distinction between "Big" LEO systems (for voice communications/hand-held phones) and 
"Little" LEO systems (for data transmission, paging or other services), and envisioned a 
deployment of a minimum of two big LEO systems and one little LEO system and a 
maximum of three big and two little LEO systems.ln the deployment phase this would lead 
to as many as 5 to 10 medium to large commercial launches per year, whereas in the 
maintenance phase of these projects, and additionally for launches of remote sensing, 
microgravity and other (scientific) payloads, 8 to 14 small vehicle launches could occur 
annually, see OCST sees growing market for low earth orbit satellites, DOT News release 
(May 18, 1995) <http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1995/orbit.htm". 
129. See art. II.B (iii)(b) Although prior to the China-US talks of 1994/1995 on the revision of 
the 1989 Agreement,CGWIC, an investor in Iridium Inc., had concluded contracts, both for 
the initial launch of 12 satellites through 6 Long March launches and for additional 
"maintenance" launches of a total of 10 satellites between 1998 and 2003, the revised 
agreement of 1995 did not mention the Iridium launches as agreed and covered by the 
agreement's LEO provisions. See, on the USD 3.37 billion Iridium system and the launch 





conditions which give the U.S. ample room for intervening in the competitive 
interaction between the Chinese and non-Chinese launch service providers, for 
the benefit of its launch companies, its satellite builders or its 
telecommunications firms: 
the extent of PRC and U.S. participation in the deployment; 
- launch scheduling requirements and the need to optimize launch vehicle selection to meet 
deployment or operational requirements; 
- the availability of competitively-priced market economy launches to meet these 
requirements; 
- opportunities made available to the parties for participation in the replacement market; 
- reasonable considerations by the proposed system operator regarding commercial risk 
sharing; 
- customers' requirements." 130 
Obviously, the above factors, to be properly addressed and used, would require 
a substantial amount of additional investigative work for the USTR/DOT 
Working Group, and 'LEO-focused' discussions between the parties. 
Consequently, at the first yearly consultation meeting as foreseen in the 
agreement, in July 1996, the U.S had three issues on its agenda: to reconcile 
the parties projections of the size of the global markets for GEO and LEO 
payloads, to review China's participation in competitive bidding for launch 
contracts, and to examine specific pricing issues for the burgeoning LEO 
market. 131 
As mentioned before, in order to give some teeth to the agreement, the U. S. 
attached great importance to the exchange of data, in particular on pricing and 
number of launch contracts. In practice, however, information on Chinese 
launches has not always been forthcoming. According to a U.S. Congressman 
in 1996, in the seven years since the 1989 Agreement, China only forwarded 
eight papers to the USTR's office. (But Russia, since its 1993 Agreement with 
the U.S., had not sent any information document at all). 132 Obviously, the 
U. S.' counterparts saw the information exchange as a rather one-sided 
obligation which they were prepared to meet in case of own need and certainly 
not without having the opportunity, during a meeting, to orally present and 
discuss the data. 
130. See art. II.B (iii)(c). 
131. See Dennis J. Bumett and David Lihani, U.S. national space policy and bilateral launch 
service agreements, Proceed. Coli. L. Outer Space 263-270 (1996) at 266. 
132. See Christina Gair, The global launch industry: new players enter the scene, Via Satellite 
44-55 (Oct 1996) hereinafter referred to as Christina Gair, at 50. 
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Enforcement of the agreement is dealt with under the friendly heading 
"[c]larification of rights and obligations" in its article V, and deals only with 
Chinese violations of the provisions. The reference to U.S. laws and 
regulations must be interpreted in the view of USTR as one to the Trade Act 
of 1974, which has been discussed before. 
Separate attention, under the same heading, is paid to the fact that this 
agreement does not in any way affect the right of the U.S., when faced with 
a license application for the export of a satellite to China, to take any action 
by virtue of the U. S. export laws and regulations which it deems necessary. 
This provision continues to subject the rights and obligations as agreed between 
China and the U.S. to the national security and foreign policy 'tests' of the 
Administration and Congress, and thus puts the importance of this instrument 
as a bilateral "regulator" of the trade in launch services, in perspective. 
The U.S. private parties concerned were happy with the results: both launch 
provider McDonnell Douglas and satellite manufacturers Martin Marietta and 
Hughes expressed their appreciation to USTR for striking a balance among the 
various competing interests. 133 
The right of the Chinese to launch U.S. and other Western payloads as laid 
down in the Agreement of 1995 have, until recently, not been interfered with 
through the imposition of any special (MTCR or other) sanction. 
This may be a result of restraint on the Chinese side with respect to missile 
sales or other behaviour deemed unacceptable by the U.S. Administration or 
Congress or of restraint on the U. S. side in its reactions to unwelcome Chinese 
actions or inactions, or of a combination of the two. 
Fact is that, with the Tiananmen sanctions legislation still in place, waivers 
of the export restrictions have been - routinely - requested and - routinely -
granted, until February 1998: according to an August 1998 report of the 
133. See MDD News release (Jan 31, 1995): MDD congratulates USTR Mickey Kantor on the 
new agreement. "The [USTR] struck a positive balance among the various competing 
interests in this emerging international market. The agreement provides for effective "rules 
of the road", thus ensuring the non-disruptive entry of China into the global satellite launch 
market; the MM news release of the same date: "Martin Marietta applauds USTR agreement 
with [PRC] on space launch services: Ambassador Kantor and his staff have successfully 
negotiated an agreement that balances not only our nation's long-term economic and security 
priorities, but also the interests of US manufacturers of commercial satellites and launch 
vehicles ... An attractive feature is the flexibility of the agreement, which addresses potential 
changes in the international commercial space market place". Hughes, fmally, released the 
following Jan 30 response to media inquiry: "Hughes is pleased with the positive changes 
that were agreed to last week by the [US] and China ... We expect that the next decade will 
be one of unprecedented growth for the commercial communications satellite industry. 
Access by the satellite industry to an increased supply of launch services is an important 
ingredient of its growth. Thus, the recent USTR action is a step in the right direction, 
though additional increases may be necessary". (emph. add.) 
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Congressional Research Service, since 1989, Presidents Bush and Clinton have 
issued 13 waivers for 20 satellite projects, based on 'national interest', on a 
case by case basis, to allow the export of satellites, increasingly for satellites 
used by China, not just launched from China (by virtue of the 1995 
Agreement). 134 
The latest Presidential waiver was granted on February 18, 1998. It concerned 
the export of Loral-built Chinasat-8 satellite for China's own use, and has 
become part of the Congressional 'transfer of high tech (expertise) to China'-
investigation, referred to in Chapter 2.3.4 and further discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.2 Russia 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Between October 1957 and April 1996, Russia and its predecessor until 
December 1991, the Soviet Union, performed almost 2,700 launches, an 
unsurpassed record number with an unequalled success rate of 92.87%. 135 
The technological eminence of the country in this field was, for many years, 
feared by the U.S. military and envied by the U.S. space establishment. 
The U.S. perception of the Soviet Union as, to use President Reagan's words, 
the "evil empire" or at least as the most heavily armed hostile country to be 
contained by the U.S., not only blocked the export of defense articles and 
services and dual-use goods and services to that country, it also prevented, 
until the early nineties, all major space cooperation which could possibly 
involve the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union, thereby also 
blocking such transfers to the U.S. (with the exception of the Apollo-Soyuz 
link-up in 1975). 
On the other hand the ambitious and costly space exploration and exploitation 
plans of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 136 coupled with such factors as 
growing scepticism of Congress and a diminishing interest in "footing the bill", 
made the idea of mobilizing Soviet space technology an increasingly attractive 
proposition, particularly in view of its high quality/ low cost image. 137 
134. See CRS China report 1998, supra note 104, at 10. 
135. See AW/ST (Apr 15, 1996) at 22. 
136. At the 20th anniversary of the Apollo moon landing, on Jul 20, 1989, President Bush 
announced his Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), which involved the completion of the 
Space Station, a return to the moon and a mission to Mars, and directed the National Space 
Council, chaired by the vice president, to determine the nature of this program, its cost and 
schedule and the possibilities for international cooperation, see Remarks by the President at 
20th anniversary of Apollo moonlanding (Jul 20, 1989), The White House, Off.of the Press 
Secretary. 
137. See on this subject Bzhilianskaya, supra Ch. 1, note 22. 
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An updated National Space Policy of November 2, 1989, embraced 
international cooperation in general, though with some caution as far as the 
Soviet Union's activities were concerned: 
" ... The United States will foster increased international cooperation in civil space activities 
by seeking mutually beneficial international cooperation in civil space and space-related 
programs. The National Space Council shall be responsible for oversight of civil space 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. No such cooperative activity shaH be initiated until an 
appropriate interagency revieW has been completed. "138 
That interagency review was made the more necessary when, less than half 
a year later, a private Australian company, the Cape York Space Agency 
(CYSA), aware of a worldwide shortage of launch services, proposed to build 
a launch site at Cape York, in Northern Australia, and to use upgraded Soviet 
Zenit launch vehicles for launches of satellites into GEO. CYSA needed 
technical assistance for this complicated project and found a division of United 
Technologies, U.S. Space Boosters, Inc. (USBI), prepared to contribute its 
know how to the venture. For that purpose, a Technical Assistance Agreement 
was concluded between the two companies, but in order to be able to thus 
"export" its knowledge, a "defense service", USBI needed a State Department 
license, which caused the matter to become a subject of interagency 
debate. 139 
Obviously, this approach, which would not involve export of satellites to 
Soviet territory, but to the terrritory of a trusted ally, had a strong appeal to 
most parties concerned. 
For the Soviets, who, though proudly owning and operating an impressive 
selection of reliable launch vehicles for both big and small loads, destined for 
either GEO or LEO, sofar had no access to the international launch market, 
this could be the first opportunity to sell their services for hard currency to 
the Western world. 140 
138. See Policy guidelines and implementing actions, National Space Policy (Nov 2, 1989), Fact 
sheet, the White House, Off. of the Press Secretary (Nov 16, 1989). 
139. Complicating the situation was the fact that the Congressional Tiananmen legislation of 1989 
sough to prevent the approval of license applications for launches of US-built satellites on 
Soviet- (and Chinese-) built launch vehicles, unless the President would report to Congress 
that such an approval would be in the national interest of the US (see Chapter 3.1, note 79); 
and Congress had additionally legislated that Technical Assistance Agreements would also be 
covered by this prohibition, see Marcia S. Smith, Space commercialization activities in the 
Soviet Union, CRS Report for Congress, 90-372 SPR (Aug 3, 1990) at 10. 
140. In 1982 the Soviet Union had concluded its first commercial launch contract, with India, for 
the launch of the latter's indigenously built IRS-1 remote sensing satellite; and another such 
agreement was signed between the same parties in 1988. No US components, so no US 
export controls, were involved. Although the Soviet Union had retained a US company to 
help in marketing its launch services in the US, US policy forbade the export of satellites for 
launch to their country, and not even exemptions from customs inspections and other 
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The Australian company saw an interesting launch market, which could be 
served from a launch site close enough to the Equator to have roughly the 
same advantages as Arianespace had with respect to GEO launches from its 
Kourou, French Guyana launch base. And both parties saw the U.S. company 
as a partner who, as a project manager, could help them, not only with 
technical/operational expertise but also by convincing the U.S. administration 
that the risk of unwanted transfer of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union 
would be minimal given Australian and U.S. controls at the launch site. 
The Cape York project prompted an administrative review of U.S. defense, 
trade and export control policy as it applied to the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, the Administration looked at the long term interests of the U.S. launch 
industry, and came, as in the case of China in 1988, to the conclusion that this 
export license request for the benefit of the Soviet launch industry gave the 
U.S. a perfect starting point for dealing now with future Soviet launch 
competition. 
As a result, on August 22, 1990, the President authorized the Secretary of 
State to approve USBI' s license application, provided certain agreements were 
concluded which were deemed necessary to ensure primarily national security 
interests. Specifically, the U.S. sought agreements to ensure that: 
"(1) [t]he U.S.S.R. will provide launch services (boosters, equipment, technology, or 
training) only from Cape York or any other single location [outside its territory!]; 
(2) [t]he U.S.S.R. and Australia will observe the [MTCR], and 
(3) U.S. regulations on technology transfer to the Soviet Union will be observed. 
To permit continued U.S. participation, the United States in the coming months will also 
be seeking agreements to ensure free and fair trade in the international commercial launch 
market." 141 
(In his Commercial Space Launch Policy of September 5, 1990, President Bush 
- rather prophetically in retrospect - emphasized that concluding such (launch) 
trade agreements and enforcing those agreements to limit unfair competition 
was only a short term action (which, in his view, just as continuing to use only 
U.S. manufactured launch vehicles for U.S. government satellites would affect 
competitiveness over approximately the next ten years). For the long-term goal 
of a free and fair market in which U.S. industry would be able to compete, 
"the [U.S.] should take actions to encourage technical improvements to reduce 
the cost and increase the reliability of U.S. space launch vehicles"). 142 
safeguards offered by the Soviets could change that position in the late eighties. 
141. See Statement by the Press Secretary on the US Commercial space launch policy (Aug 22, 
1990), Weekly Comp Pres. Does (Aug 24, 1990) at 1287. 
142. See Policy findings, Commercial Space Launch Policy, NSPD-2 (Sep 5, 1990) <http:// 
www .hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/nspd2.html >. See further Chapter 3.5 infra. 
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CYSA subsequently went bankrupt and another Australian company attempted 
to proceed with the idea, though without success either. Similar plans involving 
Australia and a Russian/Ukrainian launcher have later emerged from time to 
time, but did not materialize, usually for financial reasons. 
Important for the purpose of this study is not so much the fate of this one 
project, but rather the observation that can be made already at this stage, that 
the project set a trend through which Russia would distinguish itself from 
China, i.e. that of using international cooperation in the launch field, almost 
exclusively with U.S. companies, to foster and/or help the latter to bring about 
changes in U.S. launch trade policies. 
At least three important factors contributed to this difference in approach: 
1. the recognized excellence of Russian launch products and the interest of 
U.S. aerospace (and in particular launch-) companies in using or marketing 
these products; 
2. the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its economy (with ensuing 
financially-driven interest on Russian side to sell/make use of its space 
assets); and 
3. the concerns on the part of the U.S. administration that Soviet space, and 
in particular launch/missile, technology, if left unused or unassisted, would 
end up in the wrong hands. 
In 1991 I 1992 the Russians made a second attempt to enter the international 
launch market. As a founding member of the International Maritime Satellite 
Organization Inmarsat, it requested that its well-proven Proton launcher be 
used for the launch into geostationary orbit of the Inmarsat-3 communications 
satellite. The U.S. had sofar blocked such launches on the basis of its long-
standing policy not to grant export licenses for U.S. satellites and components 
to Russia (which would, as a result of the December 1991 break-up of the 
Soviet Union, now mean a launch from a Russian-run launch base in a third 
country, Kazakhstan) 
The above factors played an important role in changing the U.S. views. 
Additionally, the Bush administration remained interested in an agreement with 
this (other) "non-market economy" launch provider, to guide its entry into the 
launch market in a way that would not hurt the U.S. launch companies. 
Consequently, at the June 1992 Summit of President Bush and Russian 
President Yeltsin, the U.S. announced that it would grant a one-time exception 
to its export policy vis-a-vis Russia and allow the Inmarsat-3 launch. At the 
same time, the U.S. stated that, while no further exceptions would be granted, 
it was willing to start negotiations on the conditions for Russia's entry into the 
launch market. These discussions took place amongst considerable uproar about 
Russian sales of missiles and technology to India (see Chapter 2.3 supra). At 
the same time, heated discussions took place, both within the scientific and 
technical community and in the Adminstration and Congress, concerning the 
financial feasibility of the Space Station, with program costs through permanent 
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occupancy (then scheduled for 1999) ranging from USD 30 to 40 billion, and 
additional operating expenses, estimated by the time Clinton took office, of 
USD 2 billion per year for its full 30 years life time. 143 
While various and repeated redesigns, aimed at finding a cheaper version, 
continued to upset America's partners Europe, Canada and Japan, the possible 
Russian participation in the plan and the extent thereof became an increasingly 
important part of the U .S. Administration's national security and foreign policy 
based 'engagement' strategy vis-a-vis Russia. 
On September 2, 1993, vice-president Gore and the Russian prime minister 
Chernomyrdin agreed on a package-deal consisting of the following elements: 
- a 'merger' of the U.S. and Russian space station plans, 
- Russian adherence to MTCR and an amendment of its contract with India 
to prevent the transfer of missile technology, 
- U.S.-Russian space cooperation for an amount of - at least- USD 400 
million, the amount Russia would lose by reneging on its contract with 
India, 
- a launch trade agreement permitting Russian entry into the international 
commercial space launch market. 144 
3.2.2 The U.S.-Russia Launch Trade Agreement of 1993 
The Agreement in many ways resembles both the China Agreement of 1989 
and its revised version of 1995. 
inter alia because of that similarity we will not give an article by article, or 
subject by subject description of its provisions, but limit the discussion to a 
number of issues which, for various reasons, deserve some special attention. 
Quantity provisions: GEO/GTO launches 
Russian launch companies were allowed to contract launch services with 
international customers for a total of eight satellites, in addition to the Inmarsat 
-3 satellite already contracted for. While Russia's freedom of (sales) action was 
limited by an 'anti-bunching' provision, the above quota could be increased 
by launching two principal payloads in one launch: a maximum of 4 such dual 
launches could raise the original allotment of 8 to a maximum of 12 satellites. 
Additionally, a more favorable development of the international launch market 
could also result in an agreement to (further) increase the quotas. 
143. See, on the space station, Smith, CRS Report 1957-1993, supra Ch. 2, note 293 at 34 ("The 
U.S./Intemational Space Station Program"). 
144. See, for the texts of the resp. Joint statements and fact sheets, Gorove US Space Law, supra 
Ch. 2 note 55, at I.A.4 (a-2); also 4 (35) Space News (Sep 1993) at 1, 20. 
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The above quantity provision soon created some problems. One was caused 
by the Russian plan to launch an indigenous communications satellite and lease 
the total capacity to a foreign customer. U.S. launch providers saw this as a 
way to circumvent the capacity restrictions of the agreement, whereas the 
Russians considered leasing of satellites or satellite transponders a different 
market not governed by the agreement. To settle the matter, USTR published 
guidelines in early 1994, which confirmed the official U.S. interpretation that 
"[!]easing a satellite on orbit or satellite transponders does not remove a transaction from 
the terms of the Agreement. As a general rule, the Agreement applies to a contract calling 
for the leasing of a satellite on-orbit as to one requiring the launch of a satellite purchased 
by the customer. The definition of "international customer" as defined in the Agreement 
makes no distinction based upon the financing arrangement selected for the satellite. There 
will be no special consideration given to leased satellites launched solely for use by an 
international customer" .145 
Though the Russian delegates at an April 6, 1994 meeting of the two parties 
found the guidelines too strict and unfair, USTR upheld its interpretation, 
though exempting the case which started the discussion from the application 
of the "new" provision. 146 
The Russian complaint about the strictness of the guidelines was also triggered 
by another USTR interpretation affecting the launch quota, i.e. that of 
'contract': according to article IV, Russian launch providers may contract with 
international customers to provide launch services for the launch of up to eight 
principal payloads to GEO/GTO. Article I of the Agreement gives the 
following meaning to 'contract': 
"(i) to agree or commit to the provision of commercial space launch services such that a 
launch is effectively removed from competition in the international market, or (ii) any such 
agreement or commitment". 
145. See Guidelines for U.S. implementation of the Agreement between the US and Russian 
Federation government regarding international trade in commercial space launch services, 
USTR, Fed.Reg. Vol. 59. No.47 (Mar 10, 1994). The guidelines cover roughly the same 
issues as the 1989 guidelines pertaining to the US-China Agreement of 1989, such as the 
organization and tasks of the Subcommittee on (Russian) space launch services, the 
monitoring and data collection activities of the Working Group on Information, 
consultations, collection of information and enforcement. 
146. Russian officials contended that leasing Russian satellites launched by Russian launchers did 
not count as the launch of an international payload and thus should not be counted against 
the quota. US trade officials strongly disagreed, insisting that such launch opportunities 
should count against the quota on grounds that these launches should be open to international 
competition, see The national space transportation policy: issues for Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, US Congress, OTA-ISS-620 (May 1995) at 68. 
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The guidelines considered an option agreement or reservation for Russian 
launch services "entered into on or before September 2, 1993", to be equally 
covered by the above definition. This USTR interpretation affected Russia's 
contractual relationships with a U.S. and a European client: the deal with 
Space Systems/Loral of California consisted of one firm order and four 
options, the arrangement with Societe Europeenne des Satellites of 
Luxembourg covered one firm order and an undisclosed number of 
options. 147 In the Russian view, only the two firm contracts should count; 
the U.S. interpretation on the other hand would have resulted in the Russian 
launch quota being exceeded right from the start. Information on the settlement 
of this question could not be obtained. 
LEO launches 
Prior to the Agreement, Khrunichev Enterprise, a Russian investor in Iridium 
Inc. of Washington, had concluded a contract for the launch of 21 satellites 
for Iridium (out of a total of 73) through three Proton launches. These three 
LEO launches were specifically and separately permitted by the Agreement. 
The draftsmen could foresee possible further contracts for "maintenance" and 
replacement launches for the 66 satellite-Iridium system, and for other planned 
satellite constellations to provide global mobile phone or other 
telecommunications services. Consequently, provision was made for a case-by-
case consideration of Russian proposals for additional non-GEO launches, 
"where there are competing comparable commercial space launch 
services". 148 
Pricing 
Under the Agreement Russia was not supposed to charge more than 7,5% less 
than its "market economy" competitors. This provision did not apply to non-
GEO/GTO (e.g. LEO) launches. There, the general, vague, pricing criteria 
of the Agreement applied, i.e. that 
"[t]he contractual terms and conditions, including the price, of commercial space launch 
services offered or provided by Russian space launch service providers to international 
customers shall be comparable to the terms and conditions, including prices, for comparable 
147. See Space News (March 21, 1994) at 3 ("Proton venture nears sellout on agreement"). 
148. The definitions article of the Agreement gives the following meaning to the latter term: 
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offered to launch a spacecraft of the weight class that is the subject of a launch competition, 
taking into consideration specific factors that may be considered when evaluating the price, 
terms and conditions of such services, including, but not limited to, intended orbit, risk 
management, financing, satellite lifetime on orbit and integration costs", see art. I, para.5. 
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commercial space launch services offered by commercial space launch services providers 
from market economy countries, including the United States". 149 (emph. add.) 
In early 1995, serious concerns were voiced by Arianespace officials about the 
fact that Russian Proton launches were being offered to international customers 
for as much as 30 percent less than U.S. and European launch fees. 150 The 
Russian Space Agency, in its reaction to these claims, insisted that various 
hidden costs should be added to the figures used, to arrive at the "real price" 
and that, besides, the internal pricing in Russia was going up every month. 
But more important for the (outcome of the) discussion was the fact that 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation participated in the debate on the side 
of the Russians: since mid-1993, this major aerospace and defense company 
had a joint venture agreement with Khrunichev and Energia, two Russian 
companies involved in the manufacture of the Proton launcher. 151 
The resulting U.S.-based marketing company, Lockheed Khrunichev Energia 
International (LKEI), had taken over the sale of Proton launchers to 
international customers. 
LKEI offered substantial advantages to both sides: Lockheed, so far inactive 
in this field, had, with one stroke, entered the international launch market with 
a highly reliable launch vehicle. The two Russian companies had not only 
enlisted the sales skills and implied quality guarantees of a reputable U.S. 
aerospace firm, but had also acquired a powerful ally in their dealings with 
the U.S. government on such matters as launch quota, pricing, export licenses 
and all other aspects of the launch trade relations between Russia and the U. S. 
Together they formed a formidable new competitor to the incumbent U.S. 
launch providers and, more in particular, to Europe's Arianespace. (A contract 
and a launch reservation signed by LKEI after the entry into force of the 
Agreement, with PanAmSat and with Societe Europeenne des Satellites 
respectively, marked in each case the first time after a number of European 
launches that the company concerned decided not to use Arianespace's 
services). 152 
149. See art. V, para. 1. 
150. See 6 (1) Space News (Jan 1995) at 1, 20. 
151. The initial framework for the cooperation was agreed upon on October 30, 1992 and 
finalized on January 23, 1993. It started as Lockheed Khrunichev International in 1992; 
Khrunichev State Space Scientific & Production Centre, the manufacturer of Proton was 
joined in 1993 by Rocket & Space Corporation Energiya, which built the Russian Buran 
space shuttle, see Bzhilianskaya, supra note 137, at 326. 
152. In a written response to questions from the House Subcommittee on Space in May 1993, a 
high Lockheed official not only criticized the nascent launch trade Agreement (" ... [which] 
will enable LKEI to compete marginally in this commercial space market, constrained in 
sales and growth by the launch restriction . . . LKEI is fully prepared to compete on quality 
and responsiveness, rather than rely on artificial pricing and/or quota restrictions.") but also 
defended LKEI and a free launch market as "the most effective and quickest way for the 
U.S. to undercut Ariane's market share", see International competition in launch services, 
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Lockheed' s defense of the launch price had a familiar ring to those who had 
discussed Chinese Long March pricing. A Lockheed official stated: 
"You cannot simply look at the launch price ... You have to look at what is called the 
adjusted cost. This includes the risk of political upheaval, the costs of adapting the 
spacecraft to Proton and the added costs of launching from the Baikonur Cosmodrome [in 
Kazakhstan]. When all is said and done, our prices come much closer to the 7.5 percent 
figure". 153 
That 'special costs' had to be taken into account in the case of Russian 
launches was already recognized before the Launch Trade Agreement was 
concluded: in a Congressional hearing on "international competition in launch 
services" of May 1993, an official of COMSAT Corporation provided the 
following data as evidence of a highly competitive launch market place: 
"[Of the four lnmarsat-3 satellites] the first two ... will be launched on Atlas at a cost of 
$124.4 million and the third will be launched on Ariane 4 at a cost of $61.6 million. The 
fourth satellite will be launched ... on a Proton rocket ... [for] $36 million ... Additional 
costs will be incurred to pay for needed modifications to the satellite, political risk 
insurance, as well as a policy to insure against launch failure. The final cost of the launch 
is expected to reach $46 million". 154 
After the 'mega' -merger of Lockheed with the satellite manufacturer and 
launch vehicle builder Martin Marietta, in June 1995, LKEI became part of 
a bigger international launch provider created by the new Lockheed Martin 
company, International Launch Services (ILS), which would henceforth sell 
both the Proton and the Atlas launch vehicle to U.S. and (other) international 
customers and provide a very strong - international satellite and launch vehicle 
competition-driven - support for an increasingly liberalized launch market, at 
least as far as the U. S.-Russia launch trade agreement, and thus the 
international sale of Protons was concerned. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space, House Conunittee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (May 19, 1993), hereinafter referred to as 1993 Launch 
hearing at 159; " ... the niche Proton fills (4,000-6,000 lbs to GEO), is not a direct 
competitor to existing or currently proposed U.S. launchers." id., at 160. McDonnell 
Douglas was nevertheless far from happy with the advent of low-priced Protons in the 
launch market, id., at 153. 
153. See ibid. A European insurance broker agreed with the Russians and Lockheed that a Proton 
launch involved many special costs: "... insuring yourself against possible political 
instability in Russia will add substantially to the cost of your coverage ... Also, the costs 
increase the further away the launch is, because the market's judgment is that political 
instability in Russia is more likely as you go further out into the future." In this connection, 
one should also include the costs involved in the security arrangements to prevent transfer of 
satellite-related technology to the Russians. 
154. See statement Warren Y. Zeger, Vice President, COMSAT Corporation, hereinafter referred 
to as Comsat statement, id., at 126-127. 
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3.2.3 The 1996 Amendment 
Pressure on the part of the partners as of well as of other U.S. satellite 
manufacturers after the conclusion of the expanded agreement with China in 
March 1995, 155 and a December 14, 1995 Launch Trade Agreement 
concluded in the mean time with the Ukraine and benefitting a U.S.-Ukrainian 
launch joint venture (see Chapter 3.3, infra), created the momentum and 
justification for an amendment to the U.S.-Russia Agreement, eventually 
signed by U.S. Vice President AI Gore and Russian Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin on January 30, 1996, which increased Russia's launch allotment 
from nine GEO satellites to a maximum of twenty for the period through 
2000. 156 
At this stage of the 'game', protests against this increase oflaunch competition 
came only from McDonnell Douglas, the only U.S. manufacturer of large 
launch vehicles without a transnational joint venture involving one of the above 
countries, and from interests defending the State of Florida's Cape Canaveral 
launch base, the U.S.' only launch site for the satellites covered by the 
agreements. 157 
Russian companies concluded a number of agreements with other U.S. and 
European companies (see Chapter 1, supra), which served the double purpose 
155. In fact already in December 1994 the Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin during one of 
his regular meetings with vice president Gore, as joint heads of a U.S.-Russian commission 
on cooperation in space, science and energy, broached the topic of a relaxation of the 
capacity restrictions in view of an Ariane failure on Dec 1, the second in 1994: given 
Proton's own order book and the full use of Atlas' services in 1995 (and possible 1996) 
Russia - happily - foresaw a shortage of launch capacity for international customers, see 
5(48) Space News (Dec 1994) at 1, 21. 
156. See 7 (4) Space News (Jan/Feb 1996) at 8: "Russian [Space Agency] officials say their 
launch industry deserves at least the same treatment as that accorded to China".; also 7 (5) 
Space News (Feb 1996) at 3 ("New launch accord clouds Delta 3 future"). 
157. According to a Director of the Florida Space Business Round table, "U.S. policy-makers 
struggling to provide economic aid and arms reduction incentives to countries like Russia, 
Ukraine and China have found another valuable spinoff from the space industry. Through a 
series of recent bilateral agreements, they have turned the space industry into a tool for 
achieving U.S. foreign policy goals by providing these non-market economy countries with 
access to more than $1.5 billion in U.S.-commercial satellite launch business. By offering 
their impressive collection of rockets and other Cold War space technologies at artificially 
low prices, these nations are now positioned to capture half of the world's commercial space 
lauunch business, and perhaps all of Florida's ... The allocation of U.S. market share to 
foreign competitors, especially in such a strategically important industry, is consistent with 
our self-destructive history in other long-gone industries ... ", see 7 (5) Space News (Feb 
1996) at 19 ("Launch agreement locks out U.S. "). The author proposed, as a partial 
remedy, to require these countries to launch their rockets from Cape Canaveral to preserve 
U.S. jobs and put the spaceport infrastructure to its intended use. But an editorial 
commentary praised the U.S. government's decision as an important and long-overdue 
victory for the satellite industry, as it would provide more launch options and should keep a 
lid on launch costs, see id., at 18 ("Good news for Russia, industry"). 
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of bringing in foreign sales and marketing expertise (and additional revenues) 
and of foreign lobbying efforts aimed at discouraging U.S. and European 
governments from restricting the use ofRussian-built launch vehicles (or better 
still, to see these vehicles as part-Western assets to be employed unreservedly). 
Thus Russians participate in the U.S.-Ukrainian Sea Launch project, have 
joined forces with Arianespace in Starsem to promote their Soyuz, cooperate 
with DASA in Eurockot to sell modified SS-19 missiles and have joint ventures 
with both an American and a German company to market the two-stages 
Cosmos launch vehicle. 
Although in the exchange of data as prescribed by the Agreement, Russia so 
far was even less forthcoming than the Chinese (see Chapter 3.1 supra), 
Russian pricing practices have not given rise to disputes or complaints, a feat 
that can be largely attributed to the above alliance-relations with Western 
counterparts in general and with the U.S. companies in particular. 
3.2.4 The Satellite Technology Safeguards Agreement between Kazakhstan, 
Russia and the U. S. of 1999 
Prior to January 1999, each Russian launch from the Baikonur Cosmodrome 
in Kazakhstan involving U.S. satellites, equipment and data required the 
negotiation of a separate, trilateral technology safeguard agreement to prevent 
transfer of sensitive technology. 
A review of the experience gained with these agreements and new concerns 
and ideas, inter alia stemming from the 'China affair', led to trilateral 
discussions in Moscow which, on January 25, 1999, produced a new umbrella 
agreement to govern all future launches involving the three parties. 
The new agreement thus permitted the resumption oflaunches ofU.S. satellites 
from Baikonur, among which in particular the launch of four Globalstar 
satellites on a Russian Soyuz, sold by the Russian-French Starsem company. 
The latter launch, which took place in February 1999, had been delayed for 
three months because of the above export control concerns and the ensuing 
discussions. 
Under the agreement, the U.S., Russia and Kazakhstan commit to take steps 
necessary to preclude the unauthorized access to and transfer of protected 
technologies associated with the launching of U.S. satellites (and other 
satellites with U.S. components) by Russia from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. 
The agreement establishes controlled access to U.S. satellites and specifies 
procedures to ensure that U.S. DOD personnel can monitor U.S. technology 
in Russia and Kazakhstan also in the event of a launch failure of a space launch 
vehicle carrying U.S. satellites, equipment and data. 
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Although the agreement only addressed the technology safeguards aspect of 
the parties' relations, current U.S. non-proliferation worries and Russian trade 
interests had also formed part of the discussions, witness the following U.S. 
statement: 
"This agreement reflects the U .S. commitment to continued space cooperation with Russia 
and Kazakhstan because it is in our mutual interests. But our national security interests also 
require that we not go beyond the current quota for high-orbit launches until the problem 
of missile cooperation between Russian enterprises and the Iranian missile program is 
resolved. 
If Russia halts all sensitive technology transfers to the Iranian missile program, this 
agreement will pave the way to even greater space launch cooperation in the future. "157• 
The U. S. thus continues to link trade (concessions) and national security 
interests. 
3.3 Ukraine 
During the Soviet years, Ukraine's space industry played a key role in the 
Soviet space programs, right from the latter's origins in the 1950s, with 
particular emphasis on the design and manufacture of launchers, satellites and 
spacecraft guidance and control systems. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 brought about one third of its space industry under Ukrainian control, 
including the NVO Pivdenne or, in Russian, NPO Yuzhnoye design and 
production association in Eastern Ukraine. The latter space facility was the 
Soviet Union's largest manufacturer of space launch vehicles and missiles. 
According to one author, during the Soviet period, the establishment designed 
and manufactured twelve of the twenty types of Soviet ICBMs, several types 
of conventional launchers, among which the Tsyklon and the Zenit, rocket 
engines and a large number of remote sensing, scientific and other 
satellites. 158 Though the demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in fewer 
orders and a shrunken workforce, the facility still designs and produces 
launchers and satellites. 
The traditional high degree of interdependence between Ukrainian and Russian 
space industries can still be observed today in, for example, the manufacture 
of the Zenit launcher, the first stage of which has a Russian engine, made by 
NPO Energomash of Moscow. (And, as Ukraine has no launch base of its 
157.a See U.S. State Dept Fact Sheet, Satellite Technology Safeguards Agreement: Kazakhstan-
Russia-United States, Off. of the Spokesman, Moscow (Jan 25, 1999) <http://secretary. 
state. gov /www /travels/1999/ > . 
158. See Roman Krawec, Ukranian space policy- contributing to national economic development, 
11 (2) Space Policy 105-114 (1995) hereinafter referred to as Roman Krawec, at 106. 
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own, launches take place from the Russian-run Baikonur Cosmodrome in 
Kazakhstan) There appears to be little inclination on the the part of Ukraine 
to pursue a- costly and time consuming - independent course. On the other 
hand, export of space products and expertise and cooperation with Western 
companies are high priorities in Ukraine's space policy, 159 and the Zenit, a 
two-stage liquid-fuelled launcher capable of placing a payload of about 13.7 
tons into low earth orbit (LEO) is an important part of those plans. 
Though efforts are being made, with so far modest success, to commercialize 
the Zenit in its present form, the launcher is best known for its three-stage 
version, the Zenit-3SL, which is part of the innovative Boeing-led Sea Launch 
project. 
As briefly described in Chapter 1, Sea Launch will use a mobile floating 
launch platform, made from a converted offshore oil rig, that will operate in 
the east-central equatorial Pacific Ocean. The idea came from Boeing 
Commercial Space Company, part of the U.S. aircraft manufacturer, and 
Russian RSC Energia. Other partners are NPO-Yuzhnoye which produces the 
first two stages of the three-stage Zenit that will be launched from the 
platform, and K vaemer Maritime of Norway, which modified the launch 
platform in Stavanger and built the assembly and command ship in 
Glasgow. 160 Energia manufactures the third, upper stage of the Zenit, which 
will, inter alia, enable Sea Launch to put communications satellites into 
geostationary orbit. But with a Long Beach, California, homeport and the 
Pacific Ocean as the - flexible - launch area (the command ship will tow the 
platform to any location needed for a specific launch), Sea Launch does not 
have the same limitations with respect to payload options which land-based 
launch facilities have. Apart from the reliability of the well-proven Zenit and 
its comparatively low cost, this flexibility is one of its best sales arguments. 
According to a Sea Launch representative, "[t]he fact we can launch in any 
orbit, polar or equatorial, off the same launch platform affords the company 
the ability to stay with a single launcher". 161 
Scepticism existed from the start, not so much about the technical feasibility 
of the project, but more about its political and financial viability. Both 
concerns could be largely put to rest in December 1995, when Hughes Space 
and Communications ordered 10 firm launches over five years and an 
unspecified number of options from Sea Launch for its communications 
satellites. The value of the base contract plus the options was reported to be 
around USD 1 billion; Hughes, as a wealthy "anchor tenant" thus gave Sea 
Launch the desired financial support and credibility. 162 
159. See id., at 107, 108. 
160. Boeing owns 40% of the shares, Kvaemer 20%; the venture is organized under the laws of 
the Cayman Islands, BWI. 
161. See Christina Gair, supra note 132, at 50. 
162. See 6 (48) Space News (Dec 1995) at 1, 20 ("Sea Launch lands Hughes contract - ten-
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As for political support, on December 14, 1995 the U.S. and Ukraine initialled 
a launch trade agreement which allowed Ukraine entry into the international 
commercial launch market. The agreement, concluded in Vienna, gives 
Ukraine the right to launch five satellites to geostationary orbit through 2001, 
with an option for one additional launch if growth of the launch market over 
the next three to four years "beyond current expectations" justifies this 
addition. 
This rather modest basic allowance for the "Ukrainian space launch services 
providers", was expanded considerably for another beneficiary of the agree-
ment, the "integrated space launch services provider" . The latter was described 
as a U.S.-Ukrainian joint venture meeting certain criteria with respect to 
ownership, control and services. More specifically, to qualify as such a joint 
venture: 
- the U.S. partner must maintain control in fact; 
- the U.S. must be the source of a significant share of the goods and services 
employed in any launch; 
- a majority of the goods and services, including financing and insurance, 
must originate in market-economy countries; 
- the joint venture must receive a launch license from the DOT. 163 
In a Protocol to the Agreement, the U.S. and Ukraine agreed that the Sea 
Launch venture met the above criteria! 
This brought within the reach of Boeing and its partners eleven additional 
launches exclusively reserved for such qualified joint ventures, and, in case 
of a launch market development significantly exceeding current expectations, 
on top of that allowance an additional three launches. Sea Launch had thus 
received the U.S.' political approval for its venture and the go ahead for its 
launch activities for Hughes. 
As the U.S. Administration's initial hesitations to conclude this agreement had 
been in the field of transfer of U.S. satellite technology to Ukraine and of 
launch deal makes Boeing instant player in a crowded market"). 
163. See Fact sheet: commercial space launch agreement with Ukraine, Press release 95-91, 
Office of the USTR (Dec 14, 1995) <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1995/12/95-9l.html>, 
hereinafter referred to as USTR press release 95-91. As we saw in Chapter 2.2.2, the 
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 as amended authorizes the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue licenses authorizing commercial launches and the operation of 
commercial launch sites. The Secretary's authority is implemented through the FAA 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (AST, formerly OCST). By 
virtue of the Act and the Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, the FAA 
is authorized to license the launch of a launch vehicle when conducted in the US and 
launches operated by US citizens abroad. According to an April 1998 AST report, which 
gives a detailed description of the project and provides for an environmental assessment of 
the activities concerned, Sea Launch will initially apply for a launch-specific license, and 
later plans to apply for a launch operator license, see Sea Launch - environmental 
assessment (draft), [DOT, FAA, AST] (Apr 1998) <http://ast.faa.gov/reports/>. 
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Ukrainian missile (technology) sales to third countries, both matters were 
addressed (and linked to the agreement). 164 
First, though Ukraine had signed a joint memorandum with the U. S. in May 
1994 committing itself to abide by the MTCR guidelines and had stated its 
intention to join MTCR, the latter had not materialized. As we saw above, it 
has been the consistent policy of the U.S. to refrain from giving any assistance 
or support to the development of foreign launch capabilities, particularly where 
non-MTCR members are concerned, and, on the other hand, to seek MTCR 
membership of all countries which possess missile/launch technology. 
Additionally, the U.S. was, also in the case of Ukraine, concerned about the 
fate of the latter's space and defense industries if not used and/or assisted by 
the U.S. By giving NPO Yuzhnoye an outlet for its products, the U.S. hoped 
to prevent the sale of these products and particularly its military technology 
to 'rogue' countries in the Middle East and other regions of proliferation 
concern. 
At the same time, Ukraine was known to have a nuclear cooperation agreement 
with Iran, inherited from the Soviet Union, which included delivery of turbines 
for the Iranian nuclear program. The U.S. Administration, repeating the 
approach used vis-a-vis Russia, combined the above issues and interests and, 
in March 1998, after extensive discussions on these matters in relation to 
political, economic and trade issues, concluded an agreement on the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy (which compensated Ukraine financially and in kind for 
the loss of their Iranian contract) and a Satellite Technology Safeguards 
Agreement which, in the words of the Ukranian foreign minister "pave[ d] the 
way for Ukraine's participation in international commercial space projects 
including such large ones as the 'Sea Launch' and the 'Global Star'. At the 
same occasion, U.S. Secretary of State Albright confirmed that the U.S. 
supported Ukraine's immediate admission to MTCR, stating that "Ukraine's 
responsible missile non-proliferation policies will allow us to expand 
cooperation between our space agencies" .165 
164. The fact sheet appeared to mix the two issues: under the heading 'technology controls and 
export licenses', it stated: "-The U.S. and Ukraine will negotiate a Technology Safeguard 
Agreement to faciiitate the control on transfer of missile technology; -The U.S.and Ukraine 
recognize that a relationship exists between this agreement and Ukraine's fulfillment of its 
obligations regarding the transfer of missile equipment and technology ... " (a provision 
which mandated case-by-case reviews of US export licenses concluded the statement), see 
ibid. It was noted earlier that "[t]he main apparent stumbling block has been a US fear that 
assisting Ukraine in the development of launcher technology could lead to Ukraine selling 
missile technology abroad", see Roman Krawec, supra note 158, at 113. Note that the 
National Space Transportation Policy of Aug 1994 in its para. V ("Trade in commercial 
space launch services") contained the following principle/obligation: "(b) International space 
launch trade agreements in which the U.S. is a party must be in conformity with U.S. 
obligations under arms control agreements, U.S. nonproliferation policies, U.S. technology 
transfer policies, and U.S. policies regarding observance of the Guidelines and the Annex of 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
165. See Albright remarks at signing ceremony, Kiev, Ukraine (Mar 6, 1998) <http://secretary. 
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USTR, aware of severe criticism on the part of both McDonnell Douglas and 
the Florida space establishment, including its Congressional representatives, 
on this "sell out" of U.S. space launch interests (see Chapter 3.2.3 supra), 
emphasized in its press release the significant benefits of the agreement for the 
U.S. economy: 
"A project such as the Boeing Sea Launch project alone could generate several hundred jobs 
and could contribute to the conversion of idled domestic military facilities to productive 
commercial use . . . In addition, ... the agreement would further diversity the supply of 
launch services available to the $4 billion U.S. satellite industry, and would allow that 
industry to maintain its world leadership position". 166 
Although the Agreement also contained the usual provisions forbidding unfair 
pricing (with the well-known 15% threshold for GEO/GTO launches), 
distorting subsidies and government inducements to customers, in order to 
guarantee a "non-disruptive" entry of Ukraine into the launch market, there 
is little doubt that the U.S. government weighing the above national security 
and foreign policy (and satellite manufacturers') interests against the needs and 
concerns of McDonnell Douglas and the Cape Canaveral supporters, had 
clearly chosen for the former. And it may be assumed that the U.S. 
government was not ill-disposed to the establishment of an additional U.S.-led 
heavy-lift competitor for particularly Arianespace, in late-1995 still the market 
leader with a share of approximately 60 percent of all international commercial 
launches. 
A more cynical view, not supported by statements of any of the parties 
concerned, could be that, even if MDD would not survive this additional 
competition, the Department of Defense's military-strategic need for "assured 
access to space" would still be met through its "own" Titan IV, the space 
shuttle and the Atlas sold by Lockheed Martin's ILS. 
(And even the use of foreign launch vehicles through either Sea Launch or 
ILS, though against current U.S. policy, could still be considered on the basis 
of an exemption by the President in case of overriding national security 
needs). 167 
In December 1996, Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas, thus adding one of 
the most successful families of launchers, the Delta, to its "stable" and 
establishing itself as a mayor player in the domestic and international launch 
market. 
state.gov/www/statements/1998/980306a.html >. The ceremony included an exchange of 
diplomatic notes calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the protection of Ukranian 
technology which will be used in space cooperation. 
166. See USTR Press release 95-91, supra note 163. 
167. The 1994 National Space Transportation Policy provides in its para. VI: "(1) For the 
foreseeable future, United States Government payloads will be launched on space launch 
vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the President or his 
designated representative", see on this 'fly U.S.' policy, Chapter 3.4.4 infra. 
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Rockwell International Space Systems, the prime contractor and co-operator 
of the space shuttle, also had an agreement with NPO Yuzhnoye, to sell the 
Tsyklon launcher to Western customers for the launch of small to medium size 
satellites into LEO. At the end of 1996, Rockwell was bought by Boeing, an 
acquisition which gave the latter the possibility to - internationally - market 
the second Ukrainian launcher as well. Ukraine thus made a fast and- thanks 
to its alliance - smooth entry into the launch market. 
3.4 Europe 
3.4.1 ESRO, ELDO, ESA and the development of the 'Ariane' launch 
vehicle 
In December 1960, three years after both the Soviet Union and the United 
States had demonstrated their launch capabilities with the successful launches 
of Sputnik-1 and Explorer-1 respectively, a group of European scientists and 
officials from twelve European countries, met to discuss both the impact of 
this new technology on science as well as the threat of a 'brain drain' towards 
the United States as a result of the explosive - and attractive - development of 
science and technology in the latter country. Eleven states subsequently agreed 
to form a preparatory Commission with the task of setting up an organization 
for the promotion of space research through cooperation amongst European 
scientists. It took a number of difficult discussions, negotiations and meetings 
to arrive at the signing, on June 14, 1962, of the Convention for the 
Establishment of a European Space Research Organization. The Convention 
entered into force and the Organization, better known under the acronym 
ESRO, came officially off the ground on March 20, 1964 with the following 
member states: United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Spain168 With the ratification by 
Italy total membership came to- and remained- ten Western European states. 
The stated purpose of ESRO was "to provide for, and to promote, 
collaboration among European States in space research and technology, 
exclusively for peaceful purposes". 169 To that end, the Organization was to 
carry out a programme of scientific research and related technological 
activities. Apart from support of research and development as required for its 
programme and coordination of national research efforts, this also included 
the task to, among others, 
168. See A. Dattner, Reflections on Europe in Space - the first two decades and beyond, ESA 
publ. BR-10, Mar 1982, hereinafter referred to as ESA BR-10, at 5; also Nicolas M. Matte, 
Aerospace Law, Canada (1969), hereinafter referred to as Matte 1969, at 139. Text of 
ESRO Convention reprinted in Matte 1969, at 382-390. 
169. Art. 2 of the Convention. 
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(a) design and construct sounding rocket payloads, satellites and space probes, carrying 
instruments provided by Member States or by the Organisation itself; (b) procure launching 
vehicles and arrange for their launching; ... (h) make contractual arrangements for the use 
of launching ranges for rockets and satellites and other facilities available in Member or 
other States" .170 (emph. add.) 
Additionally, a separate provision on launchings stated: 
"1. The programme of the Organisation shall provide for the launching of: 
(a) sounding rockets; 
(b) small satellites in near earth orbits and small space probes; 
(c) large satellites and large space probes. 
2. The number of launchings shall be decided by the Council with a view to providing 
reasonable opportunities for scientifically valuable experiments, devised by Member States 
or by the Organisation itself, to be carried out. " 171 
It should be clear from the above that this scientific research organization was 
not meant to be involved in (the development of) launchers, except as a 
customer, for its satellites, and with the exception of its autonomous sounding 
rocket programme. Thus, where with for example ESRANGE in Northern 
Sweden ESRO had its own launching facilities for sounding rockets, it relied 
for the launch of its first scientific satellites on American Scout and Thor-Delta 
rockets launched by NASA under agreements concluded by the parties in 1964 
and 1966 respectively. 
The ESRO-NASA Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 1964 covered the 
launch of the ESRO I ("polar ionosphere") and 11 ("solar astronomy and 
cosmic ray") satellites under a cooperative arrangement between the parties, 
with each of them bearing the cost of its respective responsibilities and both 
of them exchanging all scientific information resulting from the program. In 
other words, under this arrangement, ESRO was not a launch customer but 
a partner in a cooperative program of space research, responsible for providing 
the experiment instrumentation, for delivering to the launch site two flight-
qualified spacecraft for each mission and analyzing the scientific data, whereas 
NASA, on the other hand, provided the Scout launch vehicles and conducted 
the launch operations free of charge172 
170. Art. 5 of the Convention. 
171. Art. 7 of the Convention. 
172. See Memorandum of Understanding between the European Space Research Organization and 
the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Jul 8, 1964) in: NASA 
news release no 67-110 of May 10, 1967 (includes description of the ESRO II spacecraft 
and subsystems and of the experiments envisaged, and also of the four-stage Scout launch 
vehicle which at that time had successfully completed 22 of its last 23 flights). The first 
launch under this program, that of the ESRO-II A on May 29, 1967, was unsuccessful due 
to failure of the third stage of the Scout rocket, but the remaining three Scout launches did 
not fail: ESRO-II B, also known as Iris, was successfully put in orbit on May 17, 1968, as 
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On the other hand, the arrangement of 1966, also in the form of an M.o.U., 
was the first under which a foreign country or space organization would obtain 
launchings for its satellites from U.S. launch ranges on a reimbursable basis, 
in other words the first sale of U.S. launch services to a foreign customer. To 
implement the M.o. U. for each specific launch, separate contracts would be 
needed setting forth detailed arrangements covering the resposibilities of the 
agencies involved and - of course - the cost per individuallaunching. 173 
The first such contract was signed on March 8, 1967 and involved the purchase 
by ESRO of a Delta launch later that year for the HEOS-A1 "Highly Eccentric 
Orbit Satellite" at a cost of around US$ 4 million. 174 
In the same half-decennium in which ESRO reached operational status, another 
European organization was born and developed its first teething problems, to 
wit the European Organisation for the Development and Construction of Space 
Vehicle Launchers, also known as ELDO. 
The history of this organization goes back to 1960, the year in which the 
British government, following a reappraisal of its strategic thinking, decided 
to terminate the development for military purposes of its 'Blue Streak' missile, 
and invited a number of European countries to consider the joint construction 
of heavy satellite launchers for peaceful space exploration, using 'Blue Streak' 
as a first stage. France, already at that time very much aware of the need for 
France and other European countries to have autonomous access to space, 
reacted with the offer of its 'Veronique' rocket, at that time close to 
completion and capable of launching light satellites, for the second stage of 
the proposed launcher. In early 1961, at a Conference in Strasbourg, a number 
of principles were agreed upon with respect to the organization's aims and 
purposes: thus, the first programme of the Organization would be the 
the first European satellite in that lofty position, followed by ESRO-I A ("Aurorae") on Oct 
3, 1968 and ESRO-I B ("Boreas") on Oct 1, 1969, see Twenty years of cooperation in space 
'64-'84, an ESA Report, Netherlands (1984), hereinafter referred to as ESA report 64-84, at 
3-5. 
173. See Memorandum of Understanding between the European Space Research Organization and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration concerning the furnishing of satellite 
launching and associated services (Dec 30, 1966) in: Yearbook of Air and Space Law 1967, 
Ed. in chief Rene H. Mankiewicz, McGill Institute of Air and Space Law, Canada (1970), 
at 346-348; NASA news release no 66-332 (Jan 4, 1967) ("ESRO plans purchase of launch 
services from Space Agency"). 
174. See NASA news release no 67-48 of Mar 8, 1967. On the politico-legal basis of the 1966 
M.o.U. the following launches of ESRO satellites took place: 
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-December 5, 1968, successful launch of HEOS-1 by Delta rocket; 
-January 21, 1972, successful launch ofHEOS-A2 by Delta-rocket; 
-March 12, 1972, successful launch of TD-1A by Delta rocket; 
-November 22, 1972, successful launch of ESR0-4 by Scout rocket. In fact, in the absence 
of a European launcher, US Delta rockets would be used by ESRO and its successor ESA 
up to and including Jul 1978, and, because of the failure of the first operational flight of the 
ali-European Ariane rocket in Sep 1982, a last Delta launch would be required in May 1983, 
to orbit the European Exosat satellite, see ESA report 64-84, supra note 112 ibid. 
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development of a three-stage launcher and an initial series of satellite test 
vehicles; the British and French governments would build the first and second 
stage respectively, and would offer the organization free of charge the know-
how already acquired by them in this field; test firings of the rocket, dubbed 
"Europa 1", would take place at Woomera in Australia; the rocket would be 
used for peaceful purposes only; 175 all technical information, generated by 
the Organization's work would be freely available to all members; and close 
cooperation would be sought with the European Space Research Organization 
in statu nascendi. 176 
The ELDO Convention itself was signed one year later, in London on March 
29, 1962 and entered into force on February 29, 1964. 177 The stated aim of 
ELDO was the development and construction of space vehicle launchers and 
their equipment suitable for practical, and explicitly only peaceful, applications 
and for supply to eventual users. 178 
The parties to the Convention, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Australia committed themselves to participation 
in the so-called "initial programme", i.e., according to art. 16 of the 
Convention, the "design, development and construction of a space vehicle 
launcher using as its first stage the [British] rocket "Blue Streak" and with a 
French rocket as its second stage". 
The Organization, once officially established, was to continue the study of 
future possibilities and the need for launchers and ranges and to report on its 
studies to the ELDO Council after two years. 
The preamble to the Convention conveyed both lofty principles and - in view 
of American and Soviet successes in the field - a sense of urgency with respect 
to the (coordination of the) activities as envisaged: 
"The States parties to this Convention; 
175. The notion of 'peaceful purposes', used in connection with outer space activities, had been 
introduced in United Nations parliance as early as November 14, 1957, when the General 
Assembly, inspired - and scared? - by the Sputnik launch one month earlier, adopted its 
Resolution 1148 (XII) on disarmament, which urged the States concerned to reach a 
disarmament agreement which, inter alia, would provide for the joint study of an inspection 
system "designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be 
exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes ... ". The establishment of the U .N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1959 and all resolutions and space-
related treaties emanating from that body in the following years further confirmed and 
integrated the concept of 'peaceful uses of outer space' in international politico-legal 
thinking; see for an early discussion of (the interpretation of) 'peaceful purposes' Matte 
1969, supra note 168, at 261-285; for the texts of the various U.N. resolutions adopted in 
the late fifties and early sixties on the subject, see id., at 363-381. 
176. See ESA report 64-84, supra note 172, at 114-115. 
177. Text reprinted in Matte 1969, supra note 168, at 391-405. 
178. Art. 2, ELDO Convention, supra note 177. 
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- conscious of the role which space activities are destined to play in the progress of 
science and technology; 
- convinced that a common effort undertaken without delay holds the best promise of 
achievements in keeping with the creative capabilities of their countries; 
- desiring to harmonise their policies in space matters with a view to common action for 
peaceful purposes; 
- having decided to co-operate in the development of space vehicle launchers and to study 
their scientific and commercial application; (emph. add.) have agreed ... " etc. 
Apart from a provision which granted the members the right to procure the 
launchers from the Organization for their own peaceful use at reasonable cost, 
the Convention, in its articles 10 and 11, paid some further attention to the 
commercial aspects of the venture: 
"Member States which propose to exploit commercially, either alone or in conjunction with 
non-Member States, a space vehicle launcher jointly developed under a programme of the 
Organisation shall give to all Member States which have contributed to the cost of that 
programme an opportunity to participate in such exploitation on reasonable terms". (art. 
10) 
"The conditions for delivery to States which are not Members of the Organisation, or to 
international organisations, oflaunchers and equipment developed by the Organisation shall 
be decided by the Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of this 
Convention" (art. 11) 
Article 14 required a unanimous vote in the Council for a decision on the 
delivery of launchers and equipment to third parties, no doubt because of the 
military-strategic importance of these 'dual use' goods. 
"Europa 1" was to be a truly international venture. Thus, where the 
Convention specified that for the execution of the 'initial programme' a British 
first stage and French second stage rocket would be used and the development 
firings of the first stage and of the complete launcher would be conducted at 
W oomera, Australia, a Protocol annexed to the Convention entrusted 
responsibility for the design, development and construction of the third stage 
of the launcher to Germany, the first series of satellite test vehicles, including 
the electronic equipment contained therein, to Italy, the down range ground 
guidance stations to Belgium, and the long-range telemetry links, including 
associated ground equipment to the Netherlands. 179 
The performance aims of the launch system to be developed, as proposed by 
the French and the British in 1961 and accepted for the Initial Programme, 
ranged from putting a large satellite of mass between 500 and 1000 kg into 
near-earth orbit, with the primary purpose of making astronomical observations 
179. See ESA report 64-84, supra note 172, at 24. 
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above the earth's atmosphere, to launching a satellite of the order of 50kg 
mass, in a high eccentric orbit reaching out to about 170.000 km, to carry 
instruments for the study of the sun's atmosphere. 180 Although, as we saw 
earlier, close cooperation with ESRO was supposed to be one of its guiding 
principles, there is no indication that ELDO, for the purpose of meeting 
customer needs with the right launcher, at that early stage actually consulted 
- in any structural way - with the ESRO scientific community to ascertain what 
the latter's priorities were. (It is open for debate to what extent this lack of 
contact between the European launch provider-to-be and its potential European 
customer had its roots in the different backgrounds and frames of reference 
of the initiators, to wit military (ELDO) and scientific (ESRO)). 
The Initial Programme aimed at launching a first satellite into orbit in 1968, 
but technical, organizational and financial difficulties caused delays right from 
the start, resulting in revisions of (parts of) the programme and of its execution 
schedule. Nevertheless, a number of successful firings of the 'Blue Streak' first 
stage took place in 1964 and 1965, followed by two equally successful 
launches of the complete three-stage launcher in 1966. In that same year, the 
first Conference of ELDO Ministers decided to redirect the programme 
towards the construction of a more powerful launcher, the "Europa II", 
capable of placing in geostationary orbit satellites of approximately 200 kg 
mass, which seemed better suited to future European requirements, particularly 
in telecommunications. 181 
It should be noted here that this shift from pure science programme oriented 
performance aims to ojectives related to application satellites was to a large 
extent influenced by the progress made in the United States in the field of 
communications satellites, and by Europe's involvement in the 
internationalization of the US system. Thus, when the United States, in 1962, 
proposed to create an international space telecommunications organization, 
Intelsat, their European counterparts felt the need to draw up a common 
European policy for the impending negotiations with the U.S. The ensuing 
European Conference on Satellite Communications ( CETS), which held several 
meetings in 1963 and 1964 to coordinate the negotiating positions of the 
individual European countries, did indeed create a single European voice in 
the negotiations. These culminated, in August 1964, in the signing of the 
Washington Agreement, creating the Intelsat Consortium or Interim Intelsat 
which later, in 1971, became the definitive International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization, after lengthy negotiations (in which CETS again tried, 
but with much less success, to play a coordinating and unifying role. 182 
180. ld.,at115. 
181. Id., at 25. 
182. See Michel Bourely, l'Agence Spatiale Europeenne, 1 Annals Air & Space L. 183-196 
(1976), hereinafter referred to as Bourely, at 188. 
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After the conclusion of the Intelsat Interim Agreement, the European side 
realized that, given the technological monopoly of the United States and its 
understandably dominant position in the interim Intelsat Organization through 
its domestic company Comsat Corporation, the adoption of a European 
communications satellite programme would bring about European solidarity 
in this field and a stronger European position vis-a-vis its Intelsat partners. 
Thus, in 1966, CETS mandated ESRO to conduct a detailed technical study 
of the project and to collaborate with ELDO as far as the resulting launcher 
requirements were concerned. Various committees of CETS at the same time 
studied the institutional, technical and economic implications of the project. 
As a consequence of the Europa II decision, the initial cost estimate (of Europa 
I) of US$ 210 million at 1962 rates, was raised to US$626 million. The Europa 
II mission - launching satellites into geostationary orbit - required a new launch 
base close to the Equator. For that purpose ELDO concluded an agreement 
with France to build such facilities in French Guyana. 
The - only partially successful - test launchings in the following three years 
- 1967-1969- brought ELDO further cost escalations and delays. The fact that 
each national government was responsible for its own contribution to the 
launcher and that the Secretariat of the Organization did not have clear overall 
managerial responsibility for the whole programme, undoubtedly contributed 
to the malaise. 183 
Still, in the face of growing European interest in an autonomous 
communications satellite programme, the ELDO Ministerial Conference 
decided in 1969 to undertake the definition phase of a new European launcher, 
capable of placing 750 kg into geostationary orbit, "Europa Ill". However the 
consecutive failures of the eighth test launch of Europa 1 in July 1969 and of 
the ninth one year later (the last launch from the Woomera base), and the 
failure of the first and only test launch of the Europa II rocket from the new 
launch base in Kourou, French Guyana, on November 5, 1971, gave further 
food to already existing doubts among a number of ELDO members about the 
wisdom of building launchers specifically for European use, particularly where 
183. Much later, in 1988, ESA's Director of Space Transportation Systems put it this way: "The 
decision to build a three stage launcher using existing nationally developed rockets for the 
first two stages turned out, in retrospect, to be a flawed concept . . . and from the demise of 
that concept, it was clear that the essential problem lay in the lack of an integrated approach 
to the development of a launcher rather than the lack of technical competence, within 
Europe", see Reaching for the skies, supra Ch. 2 note 142 at 1. In fact, already in 1966, the 
UK, under a sceptical labour government, made it clear that, for European launch needs, it 
favoured reliance on the U.S. 'Europe 1', in the British view at the time, would be 
obsolescent and uncompetitive in cost and performance with launchers produced by the U.S. 
by the end of the decade, see ESA HSR-18, supra Ch. 2 note 7, at 12. 
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- in comparison - decently prized alternatives were apparently available across 
the Atlantic. 
The United Kingdom in particular, in- as early as- 1968, appeared to have 
lost its interest in the progressive development of this venture beyond the first 
phase because of the level of (additional) expenditure required and the 
uncertainty of a reasonable economic return on its investment. 184 
With three European institutions, ESRO, ELDO and CETS, involved in 
- partially overlapping and financially competing - space activities, an 
understandable need for a form of coordination of both policies and 
programmes was felt and at first voiced at the 1966 Conference of ELDO 
Ministers. 185 
Two meetings of European mmtsters responsible for space matters, the 
European Space Conference, followed, and the latter one, attended by all 
members of the three institutions, in Rome, July 1967, passed two important 
resolutions concerning the future of the European space effort: 
a) the European Space Conference (ESC) would become a permanent body and 
meet at least once a year at ministerial level to work out and ensure the 
implementation of a coordinated European space policy; 186 
b) a programme committee was established to draw up an inventory of 
European space programmes, resources and facilities and to draft proposals 
for the establishment of a coordinated European space policy. 
However, in the four years that followed, it proved impossible for the ESC 
committees and ministers to agree on an overall European space programme; 
184. See Matte 1969 supra note 168, at 146. The same author, observing that cooperation 
between the member states was not achieved without difficulty, also refers in this connection 
to the U.K.'s problems with the level of its- fmancial- participation in the Organization, 
i.e. 38.7 % at the outset, which was later reduced to 27%; as of June 10, 1966 the 
following shares - in percentages - were allotted to each of the participants: Germany 27, 
U.K. 27, France 25, Italy 12, Belgium and the Netherlands together 9, ibid. 
185. An insider put this need for coordination substantially stronger, referring to "a total absence 
of institutionalized coordination between them" and asking the rhetorical questions "What's 
the use of making satellites without making sure that one has the means to launch them". 
What's the use of developing launchers without being concerned with fmding payloads for 
them? And what's the use of trying to establish a European stand on world 
telecommunications as long as Europe hasnot demonstrated that she can make something 
herself in this field?" It was an illusion, according to the same author, to expect effective 
harmonization of the activities of the three institutions concerned with neither the same goals 
nor the same membership, unless the problem would be addressed on a political level, 
leading to a complete and coherent European space policy, see Bourely, supra note 182, at 
189 (free translation from French). 
186. See - for French text of the respective resolution- Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (Netherlands Treaty Series), hereinafter referred to as NL Trb (1969), 51; 
participants in the ESC were: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Vatican State, United Kingdom and Switzerland. 
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this was mainly due to disagreement on launchers, application satellites, and 
the extent to which Europe should accept an offer from the USA to participate 
in the so-called 'post-Apollo' programme. 187 The above coincided with the 
difficulties experienced within the three separate institutions on programmes, 
organizational matters and, particularly, financial issues, which all combined 
in making progress slow. 
A particularly thorny question within ESRO turned out to be the wish of some 
member states to adapt the pure science orientation of the Organization to these 
countries' fresh interest in meteorological and communications satellites, both 
fields of space applications in which the USA had a clear headstart. The 
Convention's clear focus on science and science alone would in that case 
require a drastic revision of its provisions, particularly as, contrary to the 
existing framework, member states would then have the opportunity to 
participate only in such application programmes as they considered of interest 
to themselves. 
On December 20, 1971, the ESRO Council adopted a resolution calling for 
an amendment of the Convention to reflect this reorientation (from 
Organization-wide, obligatory and purely scientific activities to the 
development of application satellites in the framework of 'special projects' or 
optional programmes), and in November 1972 the Council approved the 
revised Convention. 
In the mean time, the European Space Conference, at its third meeting in 1968, 
concerned about the effect of the various CETS activities in the field of 
European communications satellites on the other European institutions, had 
decided to take this matter out of CETS' hands and refer it to ESRO and 
ELDO for concerted action. CETS consequently ceased all activity in 
1970. 188 
The 1971 decisions of the ESRO Council on the Organization's reorientation 
removed one of the major stumbling blocks for ESC agreement on a European 
space programme and on 20 December 1972, the European Space Conference 
decided that a new organization should be formed by amalgamating ESRO and 
ELDO. 
The need to integrate national space programmes into a European space 
programme and to strengthen European co-operation in space research and 
technology and their space applications and the high cost involved in any space 
activity of substance made the establishment of this single European space 
organization a logical step. 
As for the European space programme, the following projects were selected: 
187. See ESA report 64-84, supra note 172, at 28. 
188. Id., at 26-27. 
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- Spacelab, the European contribution to the U.S. post-Apollo programme 
- a maritime navigation satellite project, later called Marots, and 
- a new European heavy-lift launcher project, as proposed by the French 
government, 189 called Ariane, 190 to replace the Europa Ill project of 
ELDO. 
These projects came on top of the programmes which ESRO in its new set-up 
had committed itself to, with a strong - though not exclusive - emphasis on 
application satellites, namely Aerosat (aeronautical navigation), Meteosat 
(meteorological services) and OTS (telecommunications). 'On top of', because, 
for many years to come the new European Space Agency (ESA) would de iure 
not come into existence, which left 'revised' ESRO, on which the ESA 
constitution was modelled, as the formal entity charged with executing all 
European space programmes decided upon by the European Space Conference. 
Both from the political and the industrial/ economic point of view the Ariane 
decision was a sensible one: if Europe was to ensure its independence from 
those nations that had a launch capability and take its share of the international 
applications satellite and launch services market, it needed to possess its own 
competitive launcher. As we saw above, in Chapter 2.1.1.2, the U.S attitude 
vis-a-vis Europe, and more in particular the conditions it continued to attach 
to the provision of American launch services (as the French and Germans 
experienced with their Symphonie project and the application of the U.S. 
launch assurance policy of 1972), had made it abundantly clear that, for 
'assured access to space', Europe had to 'go-it-alone'. 
The December 1972 decision of the ESC to approve the carrying out and 
management, within the -temporary- framework of ESRO, of the Ariane 
development project meant not only the end of the Europa Ill programme, but 
also of Europa II, which now- in isolation - didnot make much sense anymore; 
without these two programmes, ELDO thus lost it 'raison d'etre' and, for all 
practical purposes, ceased functioning, though the Organization formally 
continued to exist until the entry into force of the ESA Convention in 1980. 
189. At the ESC meeting, the French minister responsible for space affairs had declared his 
Government's interest in a European launcher programme, proposing that France should 
provide the main part of the funding for, and assume the risks inherent in, the development 
of a launcher of the same capacity as the Europa Ill. France also suggested that the other 
partners in the ESC should fund at least 40% of the launcher development, see ESA BR-10, 
supra note 168, at 27. 
190. Ariane derives its name form Ariadne, Ariane in French, who, in Greek mythology, was the 
daughter of King Minos of Crete. She feel in love with Theseus and provided him with the 
thread which he used to fmd his way out of the Minoan labyrinth after slaying the monstrous 
Minotaur. "The modem Ariane takes satellites beyond the clutches of Earth's gravity, and 
Europe out of the labyrinth of dependency on others for launches", as ESA's Director of 
Space Transportation Systems put it poetically in 1988. See Reaching for the skies, supra 
note 142, at 1. 
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A further ESC meeting in July 1973 cleared the way for the conclusion, on 
September 21, 1973, of the "Arrangement between certain European 
Governments and the European Space Research Organisation concerning the 
execution of the Ariane Launcher Programme". 191 
The Ariane 1973 Arrangement distinguished two phases in the execution of 
the programme, a development phase and a production phase, the latter to be 
decided upon at a later date. 
The first phase, according to article 1 of the Arrangement, involved the 
development, including qualification, of launcher Ariane, "intended to place 
payloads of the order of 1500 kg in a transfer orbit and, with the assistance 
of a suitable apogee motor, to place satellites of the order of 750 kg in 
geostationary orbit". 
The development phase was to be executed within the framework of ESA, but 
pending the offiCial establishment of that Agency this phase would be 
undertaken within the framework of ESRO, and ESRO rules and procedures 
would apply to all activities concerned. 
Through the medium of ESRO, the participants entrusted the French Space 
Agency, the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)192 with the execution 
of the development phase, and ESRO with the control of this execution. 
191. Hereinafter referred to as the (Ariane 1973) Arrangement, NL Trb (1974) Nr. 192. The 
Arrangement was, by virtue of its art. 16, open for signature by the Member States of the 
European Space Conference from Oct 15, 1973 to Nov 30, 1973. At the end of November 
the following governments had signed the Arrangement: Germany, Belgium, Demnark, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the Director-General of ESRO. By 
virtue of art. 16, the Arrangement entered into force on December 28, 1973 for Germany, 
France and ESRO, the former two participants representing more than 75% of the total 
weight of the votes based on the amount of - financial - participation in the programme 
(France 62.5, Germany 20.12%); Spain (participation 2%) acceded to the Arrangement om 
May 28, 197 4, and ratifications by the following signatories formalized their participation: 
Sweden (1.10%) Jun 4, 1974, Switzerland (1.20%) Apr 29, 1975, Italy (1.74%) Oct 27, 
1975, Netherlands (2.00%) Feb 6, 1979, followed by Belgium (5.00%) and Demnark 
(0.50%), see NL Trb (1974), Nr. 192, NL Trb (1979) Nr. 23 and NL Trb (1980) Nr. 4. 
The exact date of the above ESC meeting, July 31, 1973 is considered -by ESA- the 
birthdate of Ariane, see (9) Reaching for the skies (1993), ESA's qua[r]terly publication on 
space transportation systems, hereinafter referred to as ESA transportation quarterly, 
editorial by the Director of space transportation systems, at 1: "On 30 July [1993], the 
'Ariane Family' celebrated the 20th anniversary of the decision to embark on the Ariane 
programmes. This decision was made on 31 July 1973 in Brussels after a major struggle 
between the European ministers responsible for space". 
192. A public scientific and technical establishment, CNES started its activities in 1962, and has 
since been responsible for implementing French space policy. CNES operates the Toulouse 
Space Centre (its main technical centre) and the Guyana Space Centre in Kourou. CNES has 
management responsibility for the major French space programmes in the industrial sector, 
acting as prime contractor for research and development projects and directing the 
operational systems, see Ariane, the European launcher, brochure Arianespace, 5th edition 
(1990). 
266 
The U.S. bilateral launch trade relations and agreements 
The Arrangement created a Programme Board, composed of representatives 
of the participants, with overall responsibility for the programme. 
The tasks of the Programme Board were to: 
a) control the implementation of the programme, 
b) monitor overall performance of the launcher, 
c) be kept informed of the distribution of the work among participants, and 
act as an appeal body for unhappy participants in this connection, 
d) approve the CNES launcher flight qualification report, 
e) lay down terms/conditions for participation by non-member states, and 
f) ensure that the Organisation establishes efficient coordination with the 
potential users of the launcher and defines the launcher and the payloads 
interface specifications. 
As for the production phase of the programme, it was also the task of the 
Programme Board to establish the elements necessary for the decision by the 
participants to eventually proceed to that phase. The participants in that 
phase would have to conclude a new arrangement concerning content, financial 
aspects and work distribution. 193 
The nine participants, willing to contribute their (financial) resources to - at 
least the first phase of- the execution of the Ariane launcher programme, i.e. 
France (by far the main contributor), Germany, Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, 
Italy, Swizerland, Sweden, and Denmark, committed themselves to two main 
objectives: 
1. " ... to give Europe a capability on its own at the beginning of the 1980's for placing in 
orbit geostationary satellites [of the order of 750kg], developed within the framework of 
[ESRO] or of the European States". 
With the Ariane launcher, the participants aimed at a potential market of 35 
to 50 satellites that European studies at that time foresaw for the decade - to -
come, consisting of purely European satellites, European satellites forming part 
of a world-wide system (the Intelsat Organization had ambitious goals for the 
attainment of which an extensive series of satellite launchings were a 
prerequisite!), and satellites for third-party requirements. 
2. " ... to define the launcher and organise its production in such a way as to achieve an 
economically competitive production cost". 
These cost were estimated on the basis of (an assumption of) two launches per 
year and "reasonable grouping of orders"; to this cost had to be added the cost 
193. See artt. 4 (Programme Board) and 5 (production phase) of the Arrangement. The new 




of transport to the Guyana launch base of propellants and of the launch team, 
whereas the portion of the maintenance costs of the Guyana Space Centre 
chargeable to the launch cost of a launcher would be the subject of a separate 
arrangement. 194 
The use of the Guyana Space Centre came under article 12 paragraph 2 of the 
Arrangement which provided: 
"Participants that own facilities that could be used for the purposes of the Ariane 
programme undertake to make them available for the said programme, on financial 
conditions limited to marginal cost reimbursement". 
To that effect France and ESA signed an agreement on May 5, 1976, which 
detailed the rules for the utilization of the said space centre and its launch 
pad.19s 
The planners saw a half year definition stage, beginning on July 1, 1973, 
followed by seven years for the actual development of the launcher, 
culminating in two development firings and two qualification firings. 
Thus, in the period 1979 to 1981 four test flights were carried out, the last one 
in December 1981 successfully orbiting a maritime satellite; whereupon the 
Ariane Programme Board declared the launcher, Ariane 1, to be 
operational. 196 It was calculated that Arianespace would, provided it would 
have sufficient capital and maintain a reasonable pricing policy, make a profit 
if an average of 4 launches per year over a 7 year period ( ± 30 launches from 
1983-1990) could be attained. 
Even before the first test flight had taken place, the Agency, 197 in April 
1978, had decided to manufacture and launch a first series of operational 
launchers, known as the 'Promotion Series', this in order to avoid a hiatus 
between the end of the development phase and the operationallaunches. 198 
194. See Annex A to the Arrangement, supra note 191. 
195. See ESA Council doe ESA/C (76) 39; this agreement, also known as the CSG 
Agreement, which also included provisions on the role CNES would play with respect to the 
management of the space centre, was to last until end 1980. Since then several protocols 
signed roughly every 2 years have extended the agreement to cover further periods. 
196. The following test launches took place: 
Dec 24, 1979, launch of the L 01 with the CAT Ariane technological capsule; May 23, 
1980, launch (failure) of the L 02 with CAT, Oscar 9 and German Firewheel satellite; Jun 
19, 1981, launch of the L 03 with CAT, Meteosat 2 and Indian Apple satellite; Dec 20, 
1981, launch of L 04 with CAT and Marecs A satellite, see ESA report 64-84, supra note 
172. 
197. As from May 31, 1975, ESRO had adopted the new name of European Space Agency. 
198. See ESA report 64-84, supra note 172, at 121. The manufacture of a 'complete' Ariane was 
a 3 year process, so to have launchers produced in time for the market in the early 1980's, a 
decision at the end of the 1970's was necessary. In fact, the talks started already in 1976, 
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Moreover, since it was felt that ESA's (development-)role did not make the 
Organization a suitable candidate for the actual manufacture, marketing and 
launch of the Arianes, the ESA Council also decided to entrust these activities, 
for operational launches after the Promotion Series, to a private company set 
up specifically for that purpose: Arianespace. 
To implement the above decisions and clarify the envisaged relations between 
the Parties in the Ariane 1973 Arrangement (and other interested 
Governments), ESA and Arianespace in this 'production phase', the national 
Governments concerned, "the Participants", signed a Declaration relating to 
the Ariane Launcher Production Phase in 1980, detailing the commitments of 
the Participants vis-a-vis Arianespace, the mission they entrusted to ESA, and 
the obligations they expected Arianespace to accept in connection with its 
challenging role as a private company selling launch services on their 
behalf. 199 
The Convention for the establishment of the European Space Agency had in 
the mean time been opened for signature on May 30, 1975, and signed on that 
same date by Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The Convention entered into force with the tenth ratification by France on 
October 30, 1980,200 thereby formally establishing ESA, but this did not 
prevent the members of ESRO and ELDO during those five years to use ESA 
as the de facto single space organization of Europe and adhere, to the greatest 
extent practically possible, to the provisions of the ESA Convention. In fact, 
immediately after the above 1975 Conference, the ESRO Council decided to 
change the name of ESRO and to execute, as from May 31, 1975, its activities 
under the name 'European Space Agency'201 and the Acting Director General 
but proved very difficult for 2,5 years, mainly because several member states were not 
prepared to pre-pay for the production of the launch vehicles when there was no certainty 
that, some years later, there would be any outside customers. 
199. The Declaration by Certain European Governments relating to the Ariane launcher 
production phase, hereinafter referred to as the Ariane Production Declaration of 1980, ESA 
Council doe. ESA/C (80) 8, was opened for signature on Jan 14, 1980; it was subsequently 
subscribed to by the following nine States: France Mar 19, 1980, Belgium Apr 9, 1980, 
Sweden Apr 10, 1980, Germany Apr 14, 1980, United Kingdom Apr 14, 1980, Italy May 
9, 1980, Spain May 31, 1980, Denmark Mar 3, 1981, Netherlands Nov 17, 1982; by virtue 
of its art. 4.3 (a) it entered into force on Oct 30, 1980, the date on which the ESA 
Convention entered into force. See - also for French/Dutch text, incl Annexes on initial 
Ariane launch prices as per art. 1.5 (b) and on fees to be paid by Arianespace per launch for 
the use of the CSG as per art. 3.5 of the Declaration- NL Trb (1982), Nr. 1; see also for 
French/English text without Annexes, 6 Annals Air & Space L. 723-737 (1981). 
200. The ratification process was slow as the following dates show: Sweden Apr 1976, 
Switzerland Nov 19, 1976, Germany Jul 26, 1977, Denmark Sep 15, 1977, Italy Feb 20, 
1978, United Kingdom Mar 28, 1978, Belgium Oct 3, 1978, Netherlands Feb 6, 1979, 
Spain Feb 7, 1979, France Oct 30, 1980, see NL Trb (1980) Nr. 198. 
201. For- French- text of this Council Decision of Apr 16, 1975, see NL Trb (1976) Nr. 33. 
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of ESRO was designated as the first Director General of ESA. Again, the 
ESRO Convention remained the legal basis for the de facto functioning of the 
new Agency until October 30, 1980. 
On that date, by virtue of articles 19 and 21 of the ESA Convention, the 
Agency took over all rights and obligations of both ESRO and ELDO, which 
latter Organizations at the same time ceased to exist through the termination 
of the respective Conventions. 
The 10 founding members of ESA were joined by Ireland and finally, in 1987, 
also by Austria and Norway. Finland, after many years of associate 
membership, became the Agency's 14th member on March 22, 1994. 
As for the purpose of ESA, we may quote article 2 of the Convention in full: 
"The purpose of the Agency shall be to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful 
purposes, co-operation among European States in space research and technology and their 
space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and for operational 
space applications systems: 
(a) by elaborating and implementing a long-term European space policy, by recommending 
space objectives to the Member States, and by concerting the policies of the Member States 
with respect to other national and international organizations and institutions; 
(b) by elaborating and implementing activities and programmes in the space field; 
(c) by coordinating the European space programme and national programmes, and by 
integrating the latter progressively and as completely as possible into the European space 
programme, in particular as regards the development of applications satellites; 
(d) by elaborating and implementing the industrial policy appropriate to its programme and 
by recommending a coherent industrial policy to the Member States". 
3.4.2 ESA 's European launcher policy 
By virtue of the above provision, ESA is responsible for research and 
development activities associated with space systems, including the 
development of launchers. 
With respect to the latter, article VIII of the Convention defines the obligations 
of the Agency, within the framework of its programmes, and of the States 
participating in those programmes, with respect to the use of the European 
launchers or space transportation systems: 
"1. When defining its missions, the Agency shall take into account the launchers or other 
space transport systems developed within the framework of its programmes, or by a 
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Member State, or with a significant Agency contribution, and shall grant preference to their 
utilisation for appropriate pay loads if this does not present an unreasonable disadvantage 
compared with other launchers or space transport means available at the envisaged time, 
in respect of cost, reliability and mission suitability. 
2. If activities or programmes under Article V include the use of launchers or other space 
transport systems, the participating State shall, when the programme in question is submitted 
for approval or acceptance, inform the Council of the launcher of space transport system 
envisaged. If during the execution of a programme the participating States wish to a 
launcher or space transport system other than the one originally adopted, the Council shall 
make a decision on this change in accordance with the same rules as those applied in respect 
of the initial approval or acceptance of the programme". (emph. add.) 
This 'Ariane preference provision' continues, up to the present day, to be the 
backbone of European 'internal' launcher policy, aimed at safeguarding the 
means of Europe's autonomous access to space. Further, the States 
participating in Ariane, in an effort to ensure that Europeans buy - and 
influence others to use- European launchers, made the following commitment 
in the Ariane Production Declaration of 1980 on preferential use: 
"[1.4.] (a) The participants declare that the Ariane launcher will be used for the Agency's 
activities in conformity with the provisions of article Vill.l of the ESA Convention. 
(b) The participants agree to take the Ariane launcher into account when defming and 
executing their national programmes and to grant preference to its utilisation except where 
such use compared to the use of other launchers or space transport facilities available at 
the envisaged time is unreasonably disadvantageous with regard to cost, reliability or 
mission compatibility. 
(c) The participants wiii endeavour to support the use of the Ariane launcher within the 
framework of the international programmes in which they participate and shall consult 
together to that end". 
On the assumption that the Participants' unilateral declaration under (a) above, 
though not directly committing ESA to act in conformity with article VIII.l 
of the Convention as quoted, does oblige the Participants in their capacity of 
ESA members to make the Agency act accordingly, and given the relative 
inescapability of the use of Ariane launchers for national space programmes, 
taken together with the participants' commitment under suparagraph (c) with 
respect to other - potential - international Ariane users (such as Intelsat, 
Inmarsat, (Interim) Eutelsat and - later - Eumetsat), this provision opened in 
principle a world-wide client base to the - preferred - product of Arianespace. 
In principle, because this 'buy European' clause does not guarantee that, where 
Europeans are involved, only Arianes will be used for 'their' national and 
international (including ESA) launches. 
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First, some Participants made reservations (re-)introducing an element of 
competition or at least taking away the suggestion of automatism in the 
granting- by or through Europeans -of launch contracts to Arianespace. The 
Unted Kingdom, for example, declared upon signature of the Declaration 
" ... that in the view of the United Kingdom in relation to paragraph 1.4 (a) of the 
Declaration there should be no commitment by the European Space Agency with regard to 
its programmes and activities to use Ariane where its price is more than 125% of the 
cheapest alternative launcher, and that before a launcher is chosen there will be a thorough 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of using Ariane compared with other 
launcher systems". 202 
It is believed that this latter approach, for a number of- early - years, was the 
tacitly agreed one within ESA. 
And as for their commitments with respect to national programmes, both 
Germany and Spain made clear that these could only apply to governmental 
programmes, leaving in principle private national entities free to contract with 
Ariane's competitors. Germany said: 
" ... the Government ... confirms that with regard to the procurement of Ariane launchers 
by German users the preference for Ariane launchers will be exercised in the spirit that the 
[German] Government will do its best, subject to its legal possibilities". 
And Spain declared: 
" ... The undertaking assumed in accordance with paragraph 1-4-b will be applicable only 
to those programmes under the responsibility of the Spanish Government" .203 
The above German reservation, and particularly the notion of the government's 
'legal possibilities', was put to the test in 1991, when Germany's state-owned 
telecommunications agency Telekom, after a bidding contest which pitted 
Arianespace against McDonnell Douglas, finally choose the latter company for 
the launch of its DFS 3 Kopernikus communications satellite. Telekom, with 
- one must assume - the support of the German government, maintained that, 
though having a semi-governmental status, it could take the above decision as 
a privately run company and without government interference; the Delta 
launcher was chosen on the basis of its - apparently substantially - lower price. 
Arianespace's view was that Telekom's links to the Deutsche Bundespost, the 
official government communications entity, made the contract a governmental 
matter outside the scope of the private commercial satellite (launch) market, 
creating the expectation that the Ariane rocket would be chosen, particularly 
202. See NL Trb (1982) Nr. 1, at 10. 
203. Id., at 10-11. 
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as two earlier DFS launches, in 1989 and 1990, had been Ariane launches. A 
Telekom spokesman at the time conceded that, as a general principle, with all 
things equal they would have chosen Ariane. 204 
The United Kingdom reportedly maintained the - even stricter - position that 
neither the provisions of the Convention nor the Ariane Production Declaration 
of 1980, could oblige its Ministry of Defense to chose Ariane for its own 
missions. Consequently, for the various launches of its Skynet military 
communications satellites, that Ministry felt free to choose between Ariane or 
its U.S. competitors on the basis of normal market criteria such as price, time 
and quality; both Ariane and U.S. launchers have been selected as a result. 
(For example, in 1990, a U.S. commercial Titan was used for the launch of 
a Skynet satellite). The fact that Skynet itself was part of the much larger 
U.S.-U.K military (technology) cooperation may have played a role in taking 
this approach. 205 
Secondly, the Participants' efforts to have other international space applications 
organizations in which they participate adopt the Ariane launchers for those 
organizations' launch requirements could be outvoted by other members and/or 
'neutralized' by the procurement provisions or policies of the organizations 
concerned. Thus, in global organizations, such as Intelsat and Inmarsat, in 
which the U.S. have a sizeable interest and concomitant voting power, the 
commercial and political interests of that country may often prevail: in 
Congressional testimony in 1993, an official of Comsat Corporation, the U.S. 
representative in both organizations, stated: "... historically, Comsat has 
worked hard to deliver launch and satellite contracts to U.S. manufacturers 
... For example, 71% of all Intelsat and Inmarsat contracts have gone to U.S. 
companies, along with 58% of the launches ... ". 206 
These and the other space organizations have laws and by-laws which contain 
competition-oriented procurement provisions. 
The Eutelsat Convention of 1982, for instance, provides in this respect: 
" ... the procurement policy of EUTELSAT shall be such as to encourage, in its interests 
and those of the Parties and Signatories, the widest possible competition in the supply of 
goods and services ... ; 
204. See 2 (34) Space News (Oct 1991) at 1, 20 and 2 (36) Space News (Oct 1991) at 4, 21; also 
3 (21) Space News (Jun 1992) at 8. 
205. And on Aug 27, 1989, the first U.S. commercially licensed orbital launch took place when a 
McDonnell Douglas Delta launched the British Marcopolo 1 broadcasting satellite, see 
Commercial Space Launch Services: the U.S. competitive position, Report prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress to the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov 1991), at 
XIII. 
206. See Comsat statement, supra note 154, at 125. 
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... procurement of goods and services for EUTELSATshall be effected by the awards of 
contracts, based on responses to open international invitations to tender ... ; 
Contracts shall be awarded in the best interest ofEUTELSAT, to bidders offering the best 
combination of quality, price, delivery time and other important criteria of relevance to 
EUTELSAT, it being understood that, if there are bids offering a comparable combination 
of the above-mentioned criteria, contracts shall be awarded with due consideration to the 
general and industrial interests of the Parties" .207 
Obviously, in the light of the above provisions, Arianespace will have to offer 
competitive launch contracts to be considered for the job, the more so as the 
national representatives in the above organizations will receive their - among 
others budgetary -instructions and guidelines from ministries and departments 
which are not (necessarily) involved in ESA/ Arianespace matters. 
One may nevertheless assume, on the other hand, that neither Arianespace nor 
the French government will fail to prevail upon the European organizations 
involved and their European members to first and foremost chose European 
when it comes to selecting a launcher, this moral obligation only to be set aside 
if circumstances leave no other choice whatsoever. Seen in that light, any 
action considered by Eutelsat or Eumetsat which may be interpreted as a claim 
for 'free launcher choice' will be viewed (and acted upon) with grave concern 
on the part of Arianespace and its backers. But, again, circumstances may 
leave the parties little choice. 
Thus, when Eutelsat, in early 1994, had to chose a launch vehicle for the 
launch in mid-1996 of its- yet to be built- "Hot Bird Plus" direct broadcast 
television satellite, it professed a strong Ariane preference, but was faced with 
a full 1996 Arianespace launch manifest; and although Arianespace did its 
utmost to accomodate Eutelsat, among others by increasing the monthly launch 
frequency, it was not able to offer Eutelsat a launch on the requested date, and 
the contract consequently went to General Dynamics; the cited reasons for this 
choice of the competing Atlas 2A rocket included "the schedule pressures of 
the Ariane manifest which cause delays and the highly competitive launch 
service contract offered by General Dynamics". 208 
207. See art. XIV, paras a, b and c, Convention establishing the European Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization "EUTELSAT", NL Trb (1983) Nr. 96; art XII b ii of the same 
Convention gives the 'Board of Signatories' the task to adopt procurement procedures, 
regulations and contract terms and conditions, as well as to approve procurement contracts, 
whereas art.17 of the so-called 'Operating Agreement' further specifies the rights and 
obligations of the above Board, including e.g. an exception to the rule of open international 
tendering if "procurement is required urgently in an emergency affecting the operational 
viability of any activities of EUTELSAT". 
208. See 5 (14) Space News (1994) at 3: "Eutelsat people are gnashing their teeth over the fact 
that if they cannot get an Ariane slot, they will have to use either Atlas, which is of course 
American, or Proton - for which they would have to sign with an American company, said a 
European Government official. "It bothers them that they should have to go to California [to 
LKE International] to buy a Russian rocket", see above Space News. See on Eutelsat's 
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Reportedly, Eumetsat showed unease over this 'buy European' pressure and, 
maintaining that it was in its own interest and that of its members to have free 
competition amongst launch service providers, visited China to talk about 
possible Long March launches of its meteorological satellites. In the beginning 
of 1994, they nevertheless committed themselves to have Meteosat 2 preferably 
launched with an Ariane. 
And also ESA itself will not always choose an Ariane for its missions. Thus, 
in 1993, the Agency selected a Russian Proton for the launch of its Integral 
(astronomical) science satellite in 2002, as the budget for this science mission 
did not allow for an Ariane launch: where the Russians offered to launch 
Integral free of charge in return for Russian astronomers joining the Integral 
Science team and thus access to the mission's results, the decision was not 
difficult (although it reportedly drew sharp criticism from the French 
government). 209 
"Exclusively peaceful purposes" 
As we saw earlier, by virtue of article 2 of the ESA Convention the Agency 
is required to limit itself in the pursuit of all its activities to "exclusively 
peaceful purposes". 
The Ariane Production Declaration of 1980, in its article 1.2, specifies, under 
the heading "commitments of the Participants", the objective of the production 
phase, i.e. 
"to meet the launch requirements of the world market subject only to: (a} the proviso that 
it is carried out for peaceful purposes in conformity with the obligations under the 
Convention and with the articles of the [Space Treaty of 1967] (b) ... " 
choice also 5 (16) Space News (1994) at 2, and AW/ST (May 2, 1994) at 22. 
209. See 5 (18) Space News (May 94) at 20, also for ESA science mission proposal involving use 
of a Taurus launcher in 2004. The agreement for the Integral launch was frnally signed by 
the Russian Space Agency on Nov 18, 1997, see ESA bulletin No. 92 (Feb 1998). The 
Exosat launch with a Delta in 1983 could be listed as an other example, although ESA, at 
the time, had little choice as, due to an Ariane launch failure, a European launcher was 
simply not available on the planned launch date. 
Further, the Cluster 2 mission, consisting of 4 satellites, will be launched in pairs by 2 
Russian Soyuz launchers procured through the European-Russian STARSEM consortium. 
And an ESA-NASA agreement of March 7, 1997 provides for the launch of the Columbus 
Orbital Facility on the US space shuttle in exchange for ESA hardware and services for 
NASDA, for the international space station. Finally, by virtue of an ESA-NASA M.o.U. of 
April 18, 1997, NASDA will launch ESA's Artemis telecommunications satellite, which 
ESA pays for by providing NASDA with data relay capacity through Artemis, see ESA 
bulletin No. 90, (May 1997). 
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A Committee was set up to determine whether, in the case of sales to a non-
member State or to a customer that does not come under the authority of an 
ESA Member State, any such projected sale would constitute use that runs 
counter to the above provision. A meeting of this Committee on a specific case 
could result in a prohibition of the sale which would be binding on 
Arianespace, with France, as the country which under the Space Treaty is 
responsible for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity 
with the provisions of that treaty, being required to undertake the necessary 
steps to ensure the proper implementation of the prohibition decision taken by 
the Committee. (see art 1. 6 (a) of the Declaration). 
Arianespace, the private company, was also requested to abide by this 
"peaceful purposes" objective, a commitment which was laid down in a 
separate Arianespace-ESA Convention of May 15, 1981: 
"Arianespace undertakes to conduct this production phase for peaceful purposes in 
conformity with the obligations of the [ESA Convention] and in conformity with the articles 
of the [Space Treaty]". 210 
The renewed Declaration of 1990 contains identical provisions, and so does 
the new ESA/ Arianespace Convention of September 24, 1992. 
The application of the above provisions could limit Arianespace's acquisition 
efforts amongst non-ESA member customers to the extent the interpretation 
of "peaceful" dictates. If, for instance, peaceful would be interpreted as non-
military, contracts for the launch by Arianespace of military communications, 
navigation and remote sensing (spy) satellites would not be allowed. In practice 
no such problems have arisen and the Committee never convened, because 
ESA follows the U.S. in interpreting peaceful as "non-aggressive", which 
allows for the launch of NATO and UK Skynet military communications 
satellites and e.g. the French Helios military observation satellite. 
The ESA Council, in the course of the years, when discussing or deciding on 
(the future of) the "European space transportation capability", paid increasing 
attention to Arianespace's competitive position and - consequently - to both 
the 'preferential use' provisions on the one hand and the relations with its 
competitors on the other hand. 
An example is the ESA Council of Ministers meeting at The Hague in 
November 1987, which adopted a resolution on the "European Long-Term 
Space Plan and Programmes" .211 The prime object of the plan, covering the 
210. See art. 3. 1 of the Declaration and art 2 of the Arianespace-ESA Convention, doe ESA/C 
(81) 11 of 4 Feb 1981. 
211. Another part of the resolution dealt with European participation in the U.S. Space Station 
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period 1987-2000, was for Europe to be able to send human beings into space. 
This so-called "manned space-capability" was to be built, according to the 
resolution, on an upgraded version of the Ariane rocket, on the Hermes re-
usable space vehicle and on participation in the U.S. Space Station. 
As for Europe's competitive position in the launch field, the Council 
reaffirmed, among others, the objective agreed at its previous (Rome 1985) 
meeting 
"to strengthen the European space transportation capability, meeting foreseeable future user 
requirements both inside and outside Europe and remaining competitive with space 
transportation systems that exist or are planned elsewhere; ... " (emph. add.) 
The Council at the same time expressed its agreement in principle with the 
undertaking of the Ariane 5 development programme and approved the 
execution within the Agency of this programme, starting on 1 January 1988. 
(The renewed Declaration of 1990, which entered into force May 1992, 
contains only one amendment to the 'preferential use' provision, i.e. the phrase 
"[t]he participant will endeavour to support the use of the Ariane launcher ... " 
was amended to read" ... shall endeavour", which is a correction in wording 
but not in meaning; the French and Dutch equivalents did not change, 
"s'efforcent" and "streven emaar" respectively. In fact the draftsmen did not 
dare touch this provision because of its sensitivity: the French may have 
wanted to make the text stronger and more effective, but knew that others, e.g. 
the U.K. and Germany, would strongly resist such efforts. 
The ESA Council meeting at Ministerial level in Munich in 1991, whilst 
- again -reaffirming the above 'space transportation capability' objective, and 
noting the success of the Ariane-4 operational launches and the progress made 
on Ariane-5 development, also paid attention to 
"the need for a European launcher system, for continuing support to the corresponding 
production programmes and for preferential use of this system by European user 
programmes, ... " (emph. add.) 
Concern over the launch-procurement policies of Eutelsat and Eumetsat, which, 
as we saw, do not automatically favour Ariane when it comes to choosing 
launchers for their satellites, but particularly deep worries over the impending 
entry of Russia into the international launch market made the ESA Council in 
July 1992 establish a "Working Group on Launch Services", which was to 
Programme: Council Resolution 10 November 1987, reprinted in European Space -on 
course for the 21st century, ESA pub! BR-39, France (1987), hereinafter referred to as ESA 
BR-39, at 9-13; also in (1) Space Policy 86-89 (1988). 
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recommend measures to deal with this threat and strengthen Arianespace's 
position in Europe. 
When the Inmarsat Board, in early 1992, discussed the procurement of 
launchers for its satellites, the U .S. representative proposed to award a number 
of the launch contracts to Russia. Background for this proposal was - apart 
from the attractive price of the Russian Proton- the U.S. concern over a 'brain 
drain' of space technology in general and launch technology in particular from 
'cash hungry' Russia to countries whose (thus) increased command of the 
technologies concerned would pose a security threat to the U.S. and its allies. 
The European representatives, unpleasantly surprised by this proposal 
-particularly as the remainder of the launches were to be performed by U.S. 
launch companies(!) - were able, with the assistance of a number of non-
European 'votes', to get a compromise adopted which gave one launch to the 
Russians, one to a U.S. company and one to Arianespace. This, however, did 
not in any significant way allay the fears of the ESA countries for the impact 
Russian entry into the launch market would have on the position of 
Arianespace. 
(It should be noted in this connection that with the advent of the Russians a 
second 'non-market economy' had entered the launch market: already in 1989 
the Chinese had received U.S. blessing to launch a limited number of western 
communications satellites, and this to the dismay of the Europeans. 
Additionally already for some time Europe and the U.S. had been engaged in 
discussions on the establishment of so-called 'rules of the road' which, as far 
as ESA was concerned should (but didnot!) result in the opening up of the U.S. 
Government market sofar reserved for U.S. operators only. It was the much 
smaller, international commercial market in which Arianespace would face 
additional international competition; a market in which the latter company had 
to earn the major portion of its living and had obtained a more than 60% 
share; a market finally, in which the advent of a virtual limitless number of 
well-proven, powerful, reliable and - most of all - cheap Russian launchers 
would have a disastrous effect on the preparedness of both parties' international 
launch customers, the international organizations and individual countries such 
as Thailand or Saudi-Arabia, to stick to their usual U.S. or European launch 
providers). 
The U.S. and its European counterparts therefore jointly agreed that this 
Russian entry had to be controlled in such a way that all parties concerned 
would have time to adjust to the new situation. The U. S took the lead and - as 
agreed by Yeltsin and Bush - started discussions with the Russians, while the 
ESA Working Group, with a sense of urgency, developed its findings and 
recommandations. 
The above should be seen in the context of ESA's attitude vis-a-vis Russia in 
general: in 1991, at its Munich meeting, the Council had already taken account 
of the "changes that have taken place in the overall political environment in 
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Europe" and in "the world political context" and the "new financial constraints 
within the Member States" and had come to the conclusion that "a widened 
international cooperation with other space powers, in the first instance in 
Europe" would help ESA to achieve "the best possible relationship between 
cost and effectiveness requirements"; in other words, in a time of reduced ESA 
budgets, Russia was seen as a welcome, high-level, low-cost provider of space 
technology and hardware. And in early 1992, ESA had started discussions with 
the Russian Space Agency on the latter's participation in a number of joint 
programs, such as crewed spaceflight. It was logical that ESA's experience 
with the above Inmarsat/Proton example of Russian market entry brought the 
launch policy issue into these space cooperation talks. 
The Working Group thus had to deal with, what one could call, both the 
'internal' and 'external' launch policy. There is nog public report available on 
the results of its activities. 
On October 23, 1992, the Council adopted a Resolution on European space 
policy on launch services. 212 Through this resolution the Council, 
"reaffirming its conviction that an essential condition of an autonomous, reliable and 
economical access of Europe to Space is the full access of the European launcher to an 
international commercial market on which conditions of fair competition prevail, ... 
considering that the appearance of factors likely to destabilise the world market for launch 
services, and in particular the advent of new governmental operators on conditions that do 
not meet the normal economic criteria of private sector operators, represent further 
difficulties that could seriously jeopardise the future of the Ariane launchers and their 
production, 
reaffirmed a set of basic principles "which embody Europe's desire to have the means of 
autonomous access to space", on which European space policy on launch services is based, 
and 
invited the member states to reaffirm these principles "by following a concerted policy and 
by jointly defining corresponding measures for putting them into effect". 
These principles, in essence, boiled down to the following: 
- the Ariane launchers constitute a strategic element for Europe's autonomous 
access to space; 
- their availability at the lowest possible cost to ESA and its member states 
is best served by the widest possible marketing of Ariane around the world; 
in other words, the more launchers Arianespace sells at acceptable prices 
the cheaper they become for Europe; 
- it is therefore important to ensure "the continued existence of a sufficiently 
large market" and Ariane's access to that market "on terms that do not 
penalise it in advance"; 
212. ESA/C/CIII/Res. 2 (Oct 23, 1992 (Final)). 
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- in that connection [Ariane 'participants'] grant preference to its utilisation 
for their national programmes, and 
- try (jointly) to get Ariane used in international programmes in which they 
participate; and 
- contribute to the funding of the Guyana Space Centre. 
On November 10, 1992, the ESA Council meeting at Ministerial Level in 
Granada, adopted a Resolution on the implementation of the European Long-
Term Space Plan and Programmes, which in its Chapter V, entitled "European 
Launcher Policy", repeated Ariane's status as a "strategic asset providing 
Europe with autonomous access to space", to be preserved as a "vital 
component of Europea space policy and of the Long-Term Space Plan", 
reaffirmed the above space launcher policy principles, invited the Member 
States to give preferential treatment to Ariane for their own missions and those 
of European and international bodies in which they participate, in accordance 
with the Ariane Declaration of May 21, 1992, and to encourage 
telecommunications satellite operators to do likewise. 
The Council finally invited the Director General to contribute to the conclusion 
of an agreement with the governments of other space-faring nations to ensure 
fair conditions in the launcher market. 
The result was not (yet) an agreement on 'rules of the road' with the U.S., but 
an EU-Russian launch trade agreement concluded in June 1993.213 
Further action by the Council to reconfirm/ legally underpin the preferential 
use concept, in ESA parliance referred to as "European launcher policy", came 
in early 1994, when, at the SPC meeting of February 22, 1994, "the ESA 
Executive was asked to provide a brief summary of the Agency's launcher 
policy". 
The issue remains a sensitive one, witness the conspicuous absence of any 
useful written or oral information on the subject since that year. 
3.4.3 U.S.-European 'rules of the road' 
Efforts by both parties to arrive at a common understanding on 
(non-)permissible government involvement in commercial launch activities go 
back to the TCI case of 1984 in which USTR investigated allegations that 
Arianespace, through various kinds of subsidization by the European (ESA) 
213. See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement 
between the [EEC] and the Russian Federation on space launch services, COM(93) 355 final 
(Jul 22, 1993); on this agreement see Chapter 3.4.3 infra. 
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governments, had been able to 'dump' its launch services on the U.S. market 
to the detriment of the infant U.S. launch industry. 
After that case had come to rest following the U.S. President's 1985 
determination that the ESA members' treatment of Arianespace did not differ 
sufficiently from U.S. treatment of U.S. launchers (primarily the shuttle) to 
warrant action against the Europeans, both parties retained an interest in 
discussing each other's practices in order to determine whether these could 
form the subject of an arrangement curtailing excesses of the other side. 214 
Attention focused at first primarily on the matter of subsidization, and, more 
in particular, on the areas in which and the extent to which such subsidization 
by the other party could be established, such as, for example, in R & D, 
launch bases and facilities, and insurance. 
The main target on the part of ESA, in the first five years active in this field 
without asking for or being the beneficiary of European Commission 
intervention or interest, was the U.S. civil and military government market 
which, through its sheer size and its being off-limits to foreign launchers, in 
ESA's view was a perfect example of an indirect subsidy. The U.S., in return, 
continued to be more interested in establishing a pattern of unfair subsidization 
of Arianespace and, additionally, sought to obtain fair trade commitments from 
the ESA governments similar to the ones they would impose on China and 
Russia. (The important difference of course was that it was neither legally nor 
politically feasible for the U.S. to even try to use its export controls to force 
the ESA-countries to behave in accordance with U.S.-preferred standards.) 
On-and-off contacts of an informational character (each party probably trying 
to find a weak spot in the defense of the other) did not yield much result, and 
were in the late eighties overtaken by a number of developments involving the 
threat of new non-market competitors. In chronological order, the following 
positions and initiatives were taken. 
The Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) reported in 1987: 
"[The Europeans] reproach the U.S. that government launch facilities are put at marginal 
cost at the disposal ofU.S. companies for commercial launches .... The U.S. in turn have 
accused Europe of subsidizing launching costs. ESA retorts that in the case of Arianespace 
the cost of launches is proportionally shared between governments and commercial 
customers, including the cost of launching facilities. Already in 1985, Europe asked the 
214. As USTR's Allgeier noted in testimony at the Congressional launch hearing of 1993, 
"[n]evertheless, the determination did not endorse European practices and did take note of 
the lack of international standards for government conduct in the launch services market and 
the problems which that absence caused", see Allgeier testimony, 1993 Launch hearing, 
supra note 152, at 16. 
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U.S. to start negotiations for defining new rules for commercial launch competition. No 
official answer has yet been given but the U .S. is now willing to start negotiations. "215 
And indeed, in June 1987 the USTR called for the opening of discussions to 
ascertain whether there was a basis for subsequent negotiation of an agreement 
on rules of the road with respect to launch services. 
Europe responded positively, and, at the end of July, an initial consultative 
meeting was held in Washington and a second one in Paris in October of the 
same year. The WEU Assembly supported ESA with a recommandation to the 
WEU Council proposing that the Council: 
"[t]acilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that 
it has at least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by: 
- concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining 
principles according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of 
the costs borne by the governments, particularly those relating to launch sites; 
- making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet 
launchers proposed on the world market if such offers continue to be made without 
reciprocity and at a cost which does not respect commercial principles";215 
The talks were of a clearly exploratory nature. As an ESA official would later 
report: 
"The talks which began with representatives of the U.S. Administration in 1987 (with the 
USTR in particular) on commercializing launch services have made it possible to become 
more familiar with the practices used on either side and to identity the bases for opening 
negotiations on a common code of conduct ... ". 216 
In 1988, the U.S. informed ESA about its dealings with China and informally 
submitted its draft agreement on trade in launch services to the Europeans. 
Some discussion took place, not so much on the principle of a controlled entry 
of China into the international launch market, as on the effectiveness of the 
provisions embodying that control: for instance, ESA was not very happy with 
the high number of launches the U.S. was prepared to grant the Chinese and 
felt uneasy about the vagueness of the pricing provision ('on a par') and the 
ensuing difficulty to enforce it. Also the clauses on 'behaviour' in the market 
did not create much enthousiasm on the European side, where such provisions 
were considered as more appropriate between countries with the same basic 
market philosophies. ESA would have preferred a simple, low quota. 
The Chinese agreement confronted ESA for the first time with the phenomenon 
of U.S. political expediency vis-a-vis a third country resulting in increased 
215. See WEU Assembly Report 1987, at 80. 
216. See G. Lafferanderie, European Space Agency in 1988, 14 Annals Air & Space L. 491-499 
( 1989), at 497. 
282 
The U.S. bilateral launch trade relations and agreements 
competition for Arianespace in the market place. Its worst fears came true in 
this respect when, in 1990, Great Wall Industry of China had severely undercut 
its bids for the Arabsat launch contract and thus - in its view - violated the 
pricing provision of the U. S. -China Agreement. European protests lodged with 
USTR did not bring the swift and effective enforcement action on the part of 
the U.S. authorities which ESA and its members had hoped for. It also made 
them aware of the relative low place on the U.S. list of political priorities 
which the protection of the U.S. launch interests in the international 
commercial launch market occupied. And that put in perspective the reliability 
of the U.S. as a 'protector' of common commercial launch interests. It also 
made Europe aware of the necessity of having regular discussions with the 
U. S. Administration to arrive at a common stand in these matters. 
Talks in 1990 and 1991 did bring more exchange of information, but no 
agreement on rules of the road between the U.S. and Europe. To a large 
extent, this was caused by the wide divergence of views on the purpose of such 
an agreement. But the waking up of the European Community authorities and 
their professional interest in trade in services, given its general mandate and 
the ongoing discussions on the subject in the GATT Uruguay round of 
negotiations, certainly played a role as well. 
It took the European Commission and ESA some time to come to a workable 
understanding about their respective tasks and responsibilities. USTR noted: 
"A major effort to reach agreement on standards for government involvement in the 
commercial space launch market, begun in the summer and fall of 1990, faltered at the end 
of 1991 when the [ESA] and the European Community Commission were unable to resolve 
internal European differences over the responsibilities of these organizations for policies 
on commercial space launch" .217 
And ESA reported: 
"Throughout the year the [ESA Washington] office was also involved in the ongoing 
consultations with the USA aimed at establishing 'rules of the road' governing the type and 
level of support governments should provide to the fledgling commercial launch industry 
in Europe and the USA. These consultations would continue into 1992" .218 
Similar U.S. launch trade initiatives vis-a-vis the Russians in 1992 to some 
extent forced the issue, and, because of Arianespace's and ESA's concerns 
about the 'newcomers', changed the focus of the U.S.-European talks. As 
Arianespace observed, 
217. See Allgeier testimony, supra note 214, at 17. 
218. See ESA Annual Report 1991, at 191 
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"International trade concerns in space transportation, initially focused on the so-called 'rules 
of the road' discussions between the U.S. and Europe (represented by ESA ... ), have 
necessarily been broadened to address the issues raised by the entry of the PRC and Russia 
into the space transportation market place. The question that must be faced today is whether 
the Western launch service providers are prepared, and properly supported by their 
respective governments, to meet this challenge" .219 
When the U.S. invited 'Europe' to join the talks and work on a tri-partite 
arrangement, the interest of the European Commission in joining the 
negotiations was regarded as a welcome increase of the political level and clout 
of the European team. 
The down-side was twofold: the relationship between ESA and the EU, and 
the latter's mandate to represent these ESA (including non-EU members') 
interests needed urgent clarification; and the ESA launch interests would 
become part of the overall - bilateral and multilateral - trade interests of the 
EU and thereby subject to compromises, trade-offs and - in general- to the 
possibility of changing priorities. 
The ESA Council at its 1992 Council meeting in Granada, reaffirmed Ariane's 
status as "a strategic asset providing Europe with autonomous access to space", 
to be preserved as a "vital component of European space policy", thus making 
clear that it would strongly resist and resent any threat to its continuity. As 
referred to earlier, the Council therefore invited the Director General 
"to contribute in close cooperation with both the Member States and the competent bodies 
of [the] European Communities, to the conclusion of an agreement, ot other form of terms 
and conditions, with the governments of other space-faring nations to ensure fair conditions 
in the launcher market". 220 
And, also in 1992, the European Commission had made it clear again that it 
wished to play a role and take its political responsibilities in Europe's 
international (trade) relations, though it was intentionally vague on the way 
in which it would handle this task given ESA's traditional position as Europe's 
space policy spokesman. 221 
In the perception of the Americans, this joining of European forces did not 
really improve the latter's effectiveness in their bilateral talks and prevented 
219. See Heydon, President, Arianespace Inc., USA, European trade perspective, at 4th Annual 
Symposium on the law & outer space, Georgetown University, Washington (Oct 16-17, 
1992). 
220. See Resolution on the implementation of the European long-term space plan and 
programmes, Chapter V ("European launcher policy"), ESA Council meeting at Ministerial 
level, Granada (Nov 10, 1992), 
221. See The European Community and space, challenges and opportunities, COM (92) 360 final 
(Sep 23, 1992), and see infra on the Commission's role. 
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the trilateral discussions from getting off the ground. The USTR participant 
gave the following report to Congress, quoted here in full because of the clear 
presentation of the issues and divergencies involved, as perceived by the U. S.: 
"Shortly after we [=the US] began our discussions with the Russians [i.e. around September 
1992], our European counterparts in the BC and ESA reconciled their internal differences 
and expressed an interest in joining our talks with the Russians. We were hopeful that we 
had an opportunity to resume our efforts to achieve our goal of a multilateral agreement. 
We scheduled a preliminary round of discussions with the Europeans just before our 
December [1992] meetings with the Russians. 
Unfortunately, those contacts with the Europeans revealed insufficient interest on their part 
in reaching an agreement that would address our central goal of establishing standards for 
government support during the various phases of launch activity-development, production 
and operations. The Europeans also linked agreement on "rules of the road" to access to 
government launch procurements in the U.S .... 
Our December [1992] discussions with the Europeans as well as consultations with them 
just prior to our most recent discussions with the Russians suggest that any interest Europe 
may have in a multilateral agreement is focused on strictly limiting Russian access to the 
market. 
With regard to the general market principles of importance to us in any agreement with the 
BC and ESA, the Europeans urged us to eliminate those elements of our proposal to the 
Russians addressing the limitation of subsidies and adoption of other market - oriented 
disciplines as unacceptable to them. I regret to say that there does not appear to be any near-
term prospect for a significant shift in this European position" .222 
A few words on the role of the European Commission in these bilateral talks. 
From more than one side it had been suggested to get the European 
Commission, with its considerable political standing and experience in 
'external' trade matters, involved in space matters in general and in launch 
trade matters more in particular. 223 In a 1991 report of a former ESA official 
222. See Allgeier testimony, supra note 214, at 22-23. At a May 4, 1994 meeting in Washington, 
Richard Scott, DOT's Associate Director for Commercial Space Policy and International 
Affairs was quoted saying: 
"[l]aunch trade talks with the Europeans are on hold ... pending a determination by the 
Europeans as to who should be the US counterpart in the talks, the European Union or the 
[ESA]", see 22 (1&2) J. Space L. (1994) at 35. 
223. On Jun 18, 1987, the European parliament had adopted a Resolution on European space 
policy which called on the Commission "to initiate the process [of working out a coherent 
policy on space activities]" and supported ESA in its efforts to achieve autonomous space 
capabilities on behalf of Europe and concluded that "without autonomy in space operations 
Europe will be unable to derive full economic benefit from the scientific discoveries and 
technological innovations which it makes in this sector". See Resolution in 4(1) Space Policy 
89-90. In response to this invitation, the Commission, on Jul 26, 1988, issued its first 
Communication on the subject, entitled "The Community and Space: a coherent approach", 
Commission Report, COM (88) 417 final (Jul 26, 1988). 
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it was stated that "[t]he sale of launch services is an area in which the EC must 
help to achieve fair international market conditions for European industry, in 
the current situation principally Arianespace". 224 
The European Commission's September 1992 (second) Communication to the 
Council on the matter showed a qualified willingness to play a more active role 
in space political matters, while at the same time being careful about ESA 
sensitivities with respect to its independence and traditional spokesmanship on 
all European space matters. 
Particularly the French space establishment, which saw Arianespace very much 
as a French 'weapon' against U.S. space launch hegemony, and was 
-understandably- deeply worried about the U.S. introducing foreign low-cost 
competition into the market, pleaded for European Community assistance in 
launch trade matters. One of the French concerns was based on the experience 
ESA and Arianespace had with the 'relaxed' way in which the U.S. had 
reacted to Chinese violations of the pricing terms of the launch trade 
agreement. That failure to enforce conditions, which for Arianespace were 
important safeguards against unfair competition, was a not very reassuring 
indication of the way the U.S. would deal with the Russians. Hence, the 
French demand, taken over by the other ESA members, to ask the European 
Commission to negotiate a launch trade agreement with the Russians, imposing 
pricing and quantity restrictions, which would thus bind the Russians 
independent from (the validity of) any agreement concluded with the U.S. The 
Commission did not have the authority to use defense-related export 
That Communication identified a number of weakness of Europe's space efforts up to 1988, 
one of which was dependence on the US in some areas: for example "we have not yet begun 
to develop very heavy or recoverable launch vehicles, a factor which may limit our future 
autonomy in the exploitation of space", said (then) vice-president of the Commission, Karl-
Heinz Narjes in an article, Space and the European Community, 5 (1) Space Policy 59-64 
(1989) at 59. The most important weakness the European Commission identified was "the 
lack of a cogent and comprehensive European space policy ... " (id. at 60). The Commission 
saw there an important role for itself to enhance the "political credibility" of Europe's space 
effort and "to ensure that the activities of those involved in the space industry remain 
consistent with Community law with regard to competition policy, trade policy ... and other 
areas of Community competence" (ibid.) (emph. add.). 
As a consequence the Commission set up a coordination mechanism with ESA, in the form 
of joint working groups on, inter alia, telecommunications, industrial competitiveness and 
international relations (in which international launch services policies were reviewed and 
coordinated), see Madders & Thiebaut, Two Europes in one space: the evolution of relations 
between the [ESA] and the [EC] in space affairs, 20(2) J., Space L. 117-132 (1992) at 128. 
224. See Gibson Report, Sep 1991, at 11. The author further argues that" ... European would-be 
[space industry] exporters should ... be able to rely on some political support coordinated 
through the EC ... EC attention needs to be continuous and should cover the whole range of 
space activities, rather than being of the "fire brigade" variety, whenever there is a 
particularly inflamed international trade issue involving space . . . The panel has been 
encouraged by the Commission to look for ways and means for the EC to complement the 
efforts of ESA and others in the space field", id., at 26, 28. 
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regulations, such as MTCR controls, as a 'big stick' vis-a-vis the Russians, 
but where both ESA and the EC were engaged in important cooperation talks 
with Russia, there were sufficient 'incentives' for the latter to conclude an 
agreement with Europe with roughly similar provisions as the U.S. had 
demanded (and would formalize in September 1993). 
In July 1993, Commissioner Leon Brittan of DG I, after negotiations with the 
Russians and consultations with the U.S. on the contents, submitted the 
resulting agreement to the Council of Ministers. 225 The Council, however, 
was, inter alia on the instigation of the French(!), for both political and legal 
reasons, unwilling to take action on the Commission's proposal, and the 
agreement was therefore never formalized. 226 
The European Commission continued to intensify its involvement in the 
strategic and economic aspects of space, though always treading carefully so 
as not to upset ESA. As it noted in its more recent (third) Communication to 
the Council and the European Parliament of December 1996: 
"As space contributes both to the industrial competitiveness of Europe and to the 
improvement in the quality of life of its citizens, the European Union cannot be indifferent 
about space developments. This does not mean that the [EU] should substitute for relevant 
bodies, notably [ESA], in formulating the European space policy but the [EU] should 
contribute to the full development of the space policy and take into account the space 
dimension in the formulation and implementation of the policies mentioned in the Treaty 
[of Rome]''. 227 
The Commission saw as one of its primary tasks to "work towards an open 
and competitive environment as the basis for a strong European industry ... 
[and] to use its competence to ensure a level playing field within Europe and 
beyond" .228 (emph. add.) 
With respect to space launch services, the Commission noted the need to 
maintain Europe's leadership position in the commercial space launch market 
against increasing competition coming from both advanced U.S. launchers and 
225. Commission Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement 
between the [EEC] and the Russian Federation on space launch services, COM (93) 355 
final (Jul 22, 1993). 
226. The legal argument was based on doubts as to the so-called "exclusive competence" of the 
Commission to conclude agreements concerning trade in services. In Dec 1994 the ECJ 
determined that this competence was not exclusive, but one shared with the member states, 
see Opinion 1194 re the Uruguay Round Treaties (1995), 1 CMLR 205. 
227. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - The 
European Union and space: Fostering applications, markets and industrial competitiveness, 
COM (96) 617 final (Dec 4, 1996) hereinafter referred to as EC communication 1996, at 2. 
228. See id., at 10. 
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from (the entry into the market of) launch vehicles from Russia, Ukraine and 
China. Both this considerable increase in supply and the sometimes extremely 
low prices quoted threatened in the Commission's view to destabilize the 
market. 
Of importance to our discussion in general and to the issues raised in this 
Chapter in particular, is the observation of the Commission, through which 
this body clearly submits its candidacy for leading further talks on rules of the 
road with both the U.S. and the other launch providing countries, and the two 
issues the Commission identifies as crucial to the European launch industry: 
"A fundamental condition for the maintenance and further development of European space 
launch services is a degree of market access similar to that offered in the EU and the 
existence of fair trading conditions". 229 
As for the latter, the Commission expressed its conviction, shared by the 
European launch industry, that it should be in Europe's interest to start 
exploring the possibility to discuss and establish basic rules, 'rules of the 
road', for the conduct of open and fair competition among the most important 
launch providers. In the Commission's view this discussion (and the resulting 
rules) should include the issues of public support to this industry as well as 
balanced access to each country's domestic market. 
The Commission clarified what it saw as one of its main targets when 
discussing the issue of 'public support': 
"Such negotiations should include the US, whose industry benefits at an extraordinary and 
unequalled level of governmental support and military programmes, as well as emerging 
suppliers like Russia, Ukraine and China" .230 
(The Commission could safely assume that U.S. governmental support and 
military programmes far exceeded the level Arianespace was accustomed to 
or could hope for in Europe.)231 
One of the problems the Commission still faced was to arrive at a common 
long term strategy with the EU member states and, in particular, "to reach a 
practical solution for the conduct of international negotiations". The 
Commission, obviously, had not yet come to terms with the member states on 
a workable negotiating mandate, and, for the sake of ensuring fair competition 
229. Id., at 24. 
230. See ibid. 
231. As the Communication elaborated, "[l]aunch systems and propulsion also benefit from 
important spill overs between the military and civilian sectors. The US industry has long 
benefited from such spillovers in the commercial markets, thanks to a military space budget 
which is over forty times Europe's", id., at 25. 
288 
The U.S. bilateral launch trade relations and agreements 
with third countries, therefore insisted that "an institutional compromise [be 
found] for the conduct of [such] international negotiations" .232 
That situation, until today, has remained unchanged. 
As for the issue of market access, the Communication formulated the following 
more specific objective: 
" ... not only to ensure that there are no restrictions for space launch services provided for 
civilian uses, but also that there are no nationality conditions attached to space launch 
services provided to governmental entities. The latter are frequent in countries such as China 
and the USA, whereas the EU has an open market. This should be addressed primarily in 
WTO, where the GATT covers space launch services". 
The question of 'nationality conditions' or the reservation of the government 
market to national launch companies, which prevents foreign comapnies from 
selling their services in that part of the market, partly already discussed in 
paragraph 3.4.2 above, deserved and will receive some further attention in the 
following paragraph. The question of the (possible) application of GATT, or 
rather GATS, to space launch services will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
3. 4. 4 'Fly U. S. ' versus 'fly Europe' 
The U.S. President's national space policy of February 1988 already directed 
the government agencies involved in space to purchase commercially available 
space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible. That the policy meant 
"U.S." goods and services followed from a provision in the same document 
dealing with the goals of the U.S. space transportation policy, one of which 
was "to encourage to the maximum extent feasible, the development and use 
of United States private sector space transportation capabilities " More 
specifically, the policy stated: 
"Civil government agencies will encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, a domestic 
commercial launch industry by contracting for necessary EL V launch services directly from 
the private sector or with DOD." 
Apart from the addition of the last three words which to some extent 
undermined the principle in the first part of this provision ("to some extent", 
because the private sector built the ELV's for DOD), it expressed the 
232. See id., at 28. In a "preliminary draft Council resolution" attached to the Communication. 
the Commission repeated its proposal on the two main issues: "The Council calls on the 
Commission to pinpoint and propose, in cooperation with the Member States and the 
partners concerned, activities to obtain the opening of the markets of the main third 
countries and to help establish a set of international rules to guarantee conditions for 
balanced competition in the market for spacecraft launching services", id., draft res., 
operative para. 9. 
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assumption that, with a domestic launch service commercially available and 
meeting the mission requirements in a cost-effective manner, a government 
agency would have to choose that domestic service. (One may also assume that 
any deviation from that policy in practice would be quickly noted and assailed 
by the U .S. launch industry). But it should be realized that the policy primarily 
aimed at promoting the services of the domestic commercial launch industry 
(to replace government launches) rather than promoting domestic (as opposed 
to foreign) launch services; the resulting text, however, served both purposes. 
An updated version of the national space policy was issued in November 1989; 
it repeated - often verbatim - the above guidelines. 
But President Bush's commercial space launch policy of September 1990 went 
one step further. As one of the actions needed for dealing with international 
competition, and, more specifically, affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. 
launch industry 11 over approximately the next ten years 11 , the policy identified 
(apart from launch trade agreements) 
"the continued use of U.S. manufactured launch vehicles for launching U.S. Government 
satellites", 
and the policy therefore ordered, as one of the implementing actions: 
"U.S. government satellites will be launched on U.S.-manufactured launch vehicles unless 
specifically exempted by the President". 233 
The U.S. commercial space policy guidelines approved by President Bush on 
February 12, 1991, again affirmed the general policy of encouraging U.S. 
government agencies to purchase commercial space products and services to 
the fullest extent feasible, and reconfirmed the applicability of the 1989 
National Space Policy and the 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy (which 
contained the specific 'fly U.S.' clause). 
In the meantime, in 1990, Congress had taken the initiative to adopt legislation 
to formalize the Administration's above commitment with respect to the use 
of U.S. commercial launch services. The Launch Services Purchase Act of 
1990, after having praised the benefit for the U.S. commercial launch industry 
233. The Policy was drafted at the time of the Cape York project, which involved Russian 
Protons launched from Northem-Australia's Cape York, with as U.S. firm's assistance. The 
Policy stated on this point that it (the policy) "is completely consistent with, and provided 
the policy framework for, the President's August 22, 1990, decision regarding participation 
by a U.S. firm in Australia's Cape York space launch project". The wording of the 
implementing action was chosen, one must assume, to allay any defense or national security 
driven fears that in the framework of the Cape York project 'sensitive' payloads would be 
launched with a Russian launch vehicle. 
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of Federal purchasing of U.S. private sector goods and services, including 
launch services, provided: 
"Except as otherwise provided int his section, the [NASA] shall purchase launch services 
for its primary pay loads from commercial providers whenever such services are required 
in the course of its activities". 
NASA could get out of this requirement, on a case by case basis, if its 
Administrator determined that: 
"(1) the payload requires the unique capabilities of the space shuttle; 
(2) cost effective commercial launch services to meet specific mission requirements are not 
reasonably available and would not be available when required; 
(3) the use of commercial launch services poses an unacceptable risk of loss of a unique 
scientific opportunity, or 
(4) the payload serves national security or foreign policy purposes". 234 
Where the same Act also reiterated the ban on space shuttle launches of 
commercial payloads, it served the dual purpose of NASA henceforth using 
commercial launch services instead of its 'own' vehicle (the space shuttle) or 
DOD launchers, and using domestic instead of foreign services. 
Obviously, the U.S. launch companies saw this policy as vital to their survival, 
and any exception to the rule was seen as (potentially) setting a threatening 
trend. The discussion that took place on the issue during the 1993 
Congressional hearing on 11 international competition in launch services 11235 , 
provided an illustration of that point. 
A good example is the statement of the Martin Marietta Space Group 
President, which, apart from its demagogic aspects, reflected current thinking 
among the launch providers about the need of having a guaranteed business 
base: 
"In order to assure our country's access to space for critical missions, we should continue 
the current policy which requires that U .S. government pay loads, whether military or civil, 
be launched aboard U.S. launch vehicles. In this way, a sufficient and predictable business 
base will ensure the viability of our domestic launch industry. If we permit the erosion of 
that base, we risk a repetition of the Challenger aftermath, when our ability to launch key 
payloads was jeopardized by an unforeseen event. Can we assure our citizens and our 
234. See Sec. 201-205, Pub. L. 101-611 (NASA Authorization Act 1991) (Nov 16, 1990), at 
Sec. 204(a)-(b). 
235. See 1993 Launch hearing, supra note 152, at 34. See also the TCI claim of 1984 with 
USTR against the ESA-members' subsidization of Arianespace which inclued the issue of 
the latter's protected home market, in Chapter 2.2.2 supra. 
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military men and women overseas that we will always be able to use space, as we did in 
Operation Desert Storm, to multiply the effectiveness of our forces and save lives in the 
bargain? If we permit our access to space to become hostage to the goodwill of a foreign 
country, the answer to that question will not be affirmative. "236 
The Subcommittee on space, which organized the hearing, submitted written 
questions to all participants. Three related questions were: "Should the U.S. 
continue to uphold the policy that U.S. government pay loads must fly on U.S. 
launch vehicles? Isn't this policy a form of entitlement program for the U.S. 
launch vehicle business? If not, why not? Should an exemption be granted to 
allow scientific research spacecraft to fly on foreign launch vehicles?" (one 
example of the latter mentioned involved an American scientific instrument 
launched on a Russian Tsyclon in the framework of U.S.-Russian scientific 
cooperation). 
In the answers of the U.S. launch companies, frequently reference was made 
to the foreign practice (European, Russian, Chinese, Japanese) of reserving 
government loads to national launchers. No distinction was made between the 
European policy and practice on the one hand, and the policies of its 
competitors on the other hand. Nor was any reference made to the substantial 
difference in size of the respective government markets concerned. As 
McDonnell Douglas (MDD) stated in response to the above questions: 
"There is no question that this is the only practical policy to assure a reasonable chance of 
survival against the highly subsized international competition. It is imperative that the U.S. 
not relax on this policy ... This is the standard by all international launch system players 
in the world. We cannot force the Europeans to require U.S. access to European 
government missions. The same applies to Japan, PRC, and the Russians ... The Europeans 
have a policy of flying government satellites only on Ariane. The Russians and Chinese 
don't make exceptions- they donot buy U.S. launch services for their government science 
missions ... [launching U.S. scientific research spacecraft on foreign launchers] should be 
done only on a fair basis and ... US launchers [should] continue to have the opportunity 
to place foreign science pay loads into orbit. "237 
Lockheed, though also not afraid of a bit of demagoguery, gave a more 
nuanced view, which reflected its recent teaming up with the Russians in LKEI 
and, therefore, the need to make the market, available to 'its' foreign launcher 
Proton as large as possible. Apart from agreeing to exemptions for scientific 
payloads, Lockheed stated: 
236. See id., at 34. 
237. See id., at 157. 
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"Serious consideration should be given to pay loads of national security import. All others 
should enjoy an unconstrained market economy, for the consequences of not doing so will 
force nations like Russia to sell their missile technology to "unfriendly" countries. "238 
General Dynamics, producer of the Atlas family of launchers, and very 
succesful in the government launch market, was as adamant as MDD, giving 
an 'absolutely' to the first question asked by the Sucommittee: 
"Every other country in the world with launch capability restricts their government pay loads 
to their launch vehicles whose development they have previously funded. The Arianespace 
Board of Trustees has requested recently that the European countries be required to use 
Ariane for all European satellites--both government and commercial" .239 
Fact is, as we saw earlier, that the ESA Council, in November 1992, had 
adopted a resolution inviting the member states to give preferential treatment 
to Ariane for their own missions and those of European and international 
bodies in which they participated. On the other hand, indeed, ESA, by virtue 
of the Convention that created the organization, was to give preference, when 
defining its missions, to using "launchers or other space transport systems 
developed within the framework of its programmes", though with an important 
escape clause: "... if this does not present an unreasonable disadvantage 
compared with other launchers or space transportation means available at the 
envisaged time, in respect of cost, reliability and mission suitability. "240 
Articles in the trade press at the same time, though literally correct, created 
a strong impression that it was at least practically unavoidable for the various 
European parties to use the Ariane: 
" ... ESA member states are expected to favour the European launcher for government-
funded payloads ... Moreover, pressure is placed on European PTT's and international 
organizations such as Eumetsat and Eutelsat to use Ariane." (emph. add.).241 
In this connection, it is interesting to see what happened in practice in this 
period. As Middleton notes in his knowledgeable article on the subject: 
" ... but in reality seventeen contracts [of the 20 payloads launched by Arianespace in 1992 
and 1993] were won by Arianespace in international competition, a rather better record than 
the U.S. over this period [i.e. 28 of the 36 spacecraft launched in 1992 and 1993 were 
reserved for launch by American companies]. "242 
238. Id., at 161. 
239. Id., at 173. 
240. See art. VII (1) ESA Convention, and discussion in Chapter 3.4.2. 
241. See 4 (25) Space News (Jul 1993) at 5, 10. 
242. See Bruce Middleton, The US commercial space launch industry: policies for survival, 20th 
national space symposium, session competitive launch capabilities (April 1994), hereinafter 
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And, as the same trade press rightly noted two years later, though ESA used 
Ariane exclusively for its launches except for occasional science satellites 
developed bilaterally with the U.S. or Russian governments, the individual 
European governments and also the European telecom agencies were quite 
another matter: both simply looked for the best deal: 
"European government authorities have no set of rules that require that they use Europe's 
Ariane rocket. By contrast, both NASA and [DOD] are required by law to use American 
vehicles." (emph. add.)242a 
So, despite the 'invitation' of the Granada Council, countries like Norway and 
the U.K. followed the precedent set earlier (in 1992) by German Telekom, by 
contracting with MDD for the Delta launch of their government satellites.243 
And, as we saw earlier, ESA itself, when confronted with financial or 
scheduling problems has, from time to time, chosen foreign launchers for its 
missions. 244 
It should be noted further in this connection that, where the U.S. government 
has more launch options with both the government vehicles, shuttle and DOD 
launch vehicles, and the private launch companies (as long as they use U.S.-
built launchers, it is somewhat easier to maintain the principle of "fly U.S." 
The real test would be in a case of financial or scheduling handicaps as ESA 
has experienced and would appear to be more vulnerable to anyhow. 
Clinton' s 1994 National Space Transportation Policy's guidelines on the matter 
were both a confirmation of the prevailing policy and a reflection of the views 
expressed in the 1993 Congressional hearing. The two 'pillars' of the 'fly 
U.S.' policy were maintained. 
"U. S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available U .S. space transportation 
products and services to the fullest extent feasible that meet mission requirements and shall 
not conduct activities with commercial applications that preclude or deter commercial space 
activities, except for national security or public safety reasons. 
For the foreseeable future, United States Government payloads will be launched on space 
launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the President or his 
designated representative". 245 
referred to as Middleton, at 11, 12. And see Ch. 1.1 for some additional relevant figures. 
242a See infra, note 243, ibid. 
243. The UK Defense ministry's Skynet and Norwegian Telecom's Thor 2A direct broadcasting 
satellite, see 6 (44) Space News (Nov 1995) at 1. ("Ariane agrees to cut ESA's launch 
fares"). 
244. For examples, see (text to) note 209. 
245. See paras IV ("Commercial space transportation guidelines") and VI ("Use of foreign launch 
vehicles, components and technologies") respectively, 1994 Space transportation policy, 
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The 'scientific cooperation' exemption already implicitly included in the above 
Launch Services Purchase Act of 1990 was further expanded: 
"This policy does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds 
basis to support the following: flight of scientific instruments on foreign spacecraft, 
international scientific programs, or other cooperative government-to-governmentprograms. 
Such use will be subject to interagency coordination procedures." 
President Clinton's 1996 National Space Policy still contains the provision that 
U.S. government agencies "shall purchase commercially available goods and 
services to the fullest extent feasible ... ", but a specific 'fly U.S.' article is 
missing. This does not indicate a shift in policy (yet): a request on the part of 
Israel in 1997 to get an exemption from the 'fly U.S.' policy for its Shavit 
launcher was turned down, 246 and there is no indication that other requests 
would be honoured. 
A more challenging proposition would be a similar request on the part of ILS 
or Sea Launch with respect to the use, for a government satellite launch, of 
the Proton or Zenit respectively. In so far as the policy is meant to protect the 
U.S. launch companies, a request form these same companies, Lockheed 
Martin or Boeing, as sellers, through the above joint ventures, of the 
respective foreign-built launchers, should not create insurmountable problems. 
Where the policy's purposes include the safeguarding of national security, 
these could form an obstacle depending on the character of the satellite and 
on the launch vehicle or launch facility used (with Sea Launch, operating from 
a platform on the high seas, being in a better position than ILS whose Protons 
are launched from Kazakh territory). 
The chance of Arianespace getting an exemption from the policy in the near 
future would, in the light of the above, appear to be remote. 
The Commercial Space Act of 1998, which was signed by President Clinton 
on October 28, 1998, also addresses the issue of federal acquisition of space 
transportation services. 247 Though it basically covers the same ground as the 
Launch Services Purchase Act of 1990, three elements in the most recent piece 
of legislation should be highlighted: 
supra Ch. 2, note 307. 
246. See AST Special Report 1997, infra Ch. 4, note 11, at 2; see also supra Ch. 1 (text to) note 
23. 
247. See Commercial Space Act of 1998, P.L. 105-303 (H.R. 1702, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
House passed Oct 6, 1998, Senate passed Oct 9, 1998), Title 11 - Federal acquisition of 
space transportation services, Sec. 201-206. 
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1. the requirement that NASA purchase launch services from commercial 
providers is now extended to the Federal government as a whole, thereby 
also including DOD/USAF which - by pleading national security reasons -
was so far allowed to use its own launch vehicles: it may continue to do so, 
but only on a case-by-case basis, if the Secretary of the Air Force 
determines that the use of U. S. commercial services "is inconsistent with 
national security objectives", in other words, as an exception to the rule; 
2. NASA's concern that the legislation would limit its possibilities to freely 
cooperate in international scientific programs (which may involve one party 
building the scientific satellite and the other launching the spacecraft on a 
no-exchange-of-funds basis) was met by the adoption of language which is 
very much in line with (the exception to) Clinton's 1994 'fly U.S.' policy; 
3. The Federal government has to acquire the necessary launch services from 
"United States commercial providers", which are defined as: 
"A commercial provider, organized under the laws of the United States or of a State, which 
is (A) more than 50 percent owned by United States nationals; or (B) a subsidiary of a 
foreign company ... " 
with category (B) subject to a number of specific stringent criteria. ' 248 
Where the Act does not address the question of the country of manufacture of 
the launch vehicle, it does not infringe upon Clinton's 'fly U.S.' policy, which 
includes the President's freedom to exempt U.S. companies from the 
'manufactured-in-the-V .S.' requirement. The U .S. President "or his designated 
representative" therefore retains the option to allow a U. S. company which 
offers services using foreign launch vehicles to contract for the launch of a 
U. S. government payload. The above definition's strictness makes it doubtful, 
however, whether Boeing-led Sea Launch or Lockheed Martin-led ILS would 
qualify. 
248. Sec. 201 (a) reads: "In general. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Federal 
Government shall acquire space transportation services from United States commercial 
providers whenever such services are required in the course of its activities. To the 
maximum extent practicable, the Federal Government shall plan missions to accommodate 
the space transportation services capabilities of United States commercial providers." 
Sec.201 (b) lists a number of specific exceptions, and it is up to the NASA Administrator or 
the Secretary of the Air Force to determine that a specific case does indeed fall under any of 
those exceptions and allows for the use of another launch provider. 
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One may conclude that there remains a clear difference between the 'nationality 
conditions' prescribed, and applied in practice, by ESA and the Arianespace 
participants on the one hand, and those adhered to by the U. S. on the other 
hand. 
'Fly U.S.' has, de iure and de facto, reserved a very substantial part of the 
total market, as described in Chapter 1, for U.S. launch providers, whereas 
'fly Europe', lacking a comparable legal and political 'power' and government 
market, has had (and continues to have) a rather limited positive effect on the 
competitive position of Arianespace. 
3.5 Liberalization of U.S. bilateral launch trade controls 
Bush's Commercial Space Launch Policy of September 5, 1990 formulated the 
Administration's long-term goals with respect to the international trade in 
launch services in a way which showed both the U.S. government's traditional 
commitment to free trade principles, while on the other hand recognizing that 
neither the U. S. launch companies nor the trade environment in which they 
operated were ready yet for that freedom: 
"The long-term goal of the United States is a free and fair market in which U.S. industry 
can compete. 
To achieve this, a set of coordinated actions is needed for dealing with international 
competition in launch goods and services in a manner that is consistent with our 
nonproliferation and technology transfer objectives. 
These actions must address both the short-term actions (which will affect competitiveness 
over approximately the next ten years) and those which wiii have their principal effect in 
the longer term (i.e. after approximately the year 2000). 
In the near term, this includes trade agreements and enforcement of those agreements to 
limit unfair competition. It also includes the continued use of U.S.-manufactured launch 
vehicles for launching U.S. Government satellites. 
For the longer term, the United States should take actions to encourage technical 
improvements to reduce the cost and increase the reliability ofU .S. space launch vehicles." 
(emph. add.) 
The above policy statements were made in a year in which: 
- the U.S. had 3 main ELV-providers, General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, 
and McDonnell Douglas, which were not very successful yet in the 
international commercial launch market; 
- Arianespace was the dominant foreign competitor, apparently acting in a 
way which the US considered not sufficiently in accordance with "principles 
of free and fair trade" (because, as the Policy announced as one of the 
implementing actions, the U.S. government "will enter into negotiations to 
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achieve agreement with the European Space Agency (ESA), ESA member 
states, and others as appropriate, which defines principles of free and fair 
trade." (As we saw earlier, the primary US complaint about ESA was the 
perceived subsidization of Arianespace); 
- CGWIC, a so-called non-market launch provider had entered the market in 
1989 through a bilateral launch trade agreement (a "special case because 
of the absence of market oriented pricing and cost structures" which needed 
"a transition period during which special conditions may be required"); 
- the USSR, Australia and USBI launched the Cape York project, also 
requiring a special agreement, though primarily to deal with security 
aspects. 
In these circumstances it can be considered both farsighted of the Bush 
Administration and in keeping with U. S. traditional macro-economic principles 
to aim at the long-term goal of free and fair trade and to see the selected 
protective measures as only temporary. 
The only real long-term solution in that free market thinking (if one wants the 
indigenous industry to survive) is, according to the Policy, cheaper and more 
reliable US launchers which can compete in a free and fair market. As direct 
subsidization did not belong to the government's 'tools', the Policy limited 
itself to requiring the government agencies to "actively consider commercial 
space launch needs and factor them into their decisions on improvements in 
launch infrastructure and launch vehicles aimed at reducing cost, and 
increasing responsiveness and reliability of space launch vehicles.", a form 
of support which in European eyes came in practice rather close to 
subsidization. 
But the main message appeared to be: the U.S. government will liberalize, 
'free' the launch market as soon as the U.S. launch companies are strong 
enough. 
Clinton repeated the "long-term goal of the [US] to achieve free and fair trade" 
in his 1994 National Space Transportation Policy, and also appeared to make 
a distinction between non-market launch industries and 'other' (market) launch 
industries: 
"A long term goal of the [US] is to achieve free and fair trade. In pursuit of this goal, the 
U.S. Government will seek to negotiate and implement agreements with other nations that 
define principles of free and fair trade ... , limit certain government supports and unfair 
practices in the international market, and establish criteria regarding participation by space 
launch industries in countries in transition from a non-market to a market economy." (emph. 
add.)249 
249. See 1994 Space transportation policy, supra Ch. 2, note 307, para. V ("Trade in 
commercial space launch services"). 
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The emphasized part of the quoted provision appeared to refer primarily to the 
market economy launch industries, i.e. Arianespace, which, in 1994, was both 
very successful, having captured about 60 percent of the international 
commercial launch trade market and (therefore?) suspected of being able to 
undercut U. S. launcher pricing because of the subsidies it had received from 
ESA. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. launch companies had become considerably stronger 
since 1990 and further consolidation of the aerospace industry was underway. 
At the same time, also the qualification of Russia and China had undergone 
a subtle change: both had been promoted from non-market economies/ launch 
providers to "countries in transition from a non-market to a market economy", 
which reflected the enormous changes in attitudes and/ or economic 
performance in the two countries and higher, and therefore less threatening 
pricing of their launch companies. 
When President Clinton, in September 1996, issued his new national space 
policy, U.S. launch companies had further strengthened their position, both 
by domestic mergers and acquisitions and by alliances with Russian companies. 
"Booming" business in both the GEO and the new and very promising LEO 
launch market combined with the right range of vehicles to cater for the 
resulting demands, coming on top of a still guaranteed and sizeable military 
and civil government launch market, created the expectation that the U.S. 
launch industry's share of the commercial market would increase at the 
expense of Arianespace. Moreover, the alliances concluded with the Russian 
and Ukrainian launch industries had turned the bilateral restrictions, though 
already considerably liberalized, into impediments for both the U.S. satellite 
manufacturing and the launch industry. (And the latter's main competitor 
continued to be Arianespace anyhow!) 
In this environment, the Administration could conclude that the U.S. launch 
industry was strong enough or approaching that state fast enough to announce 
steps to move away from international launch quotas altogether. Thus, the 
national space policy stated: 
"Free and fair trade in commercial space launch services is a goal of the United States. In 
support of this goal, the United States will implement, at the expiration of current space 
launch agreements, a strategy for transitioning from negotiated trade in launch services 
towards a trade environment characterized by the free and open interaction of market 
economies. The U.S. Trade Representative, in coordination with the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy and the National Economic Council, will develop a strategy to guide 
this implementation. "250 
250. See Clinton space policy, supra Ch. 2, note 352, at Commercial space guidelines, para (5). 
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Before we conclude on the basis of the above that, at the end of the year 2001, 
there will be free competition between the launch industries of the parties to 
the agreements, and including Europe and Japan, a closer look at the above 
text is warranted. It reveals a number of express or implicit caveats and 
conditions which have to be fulfilled: 
- two strategies will have to be ready by 2001: 
the administration needs a strategy for transition to implement, and USTR 
has to develop a strategy to guide this implementation; 
- the period for transition and the conditions applicable during the transition 
have - understandably - been left open; 
- the goal is free and open interaction of market economies: if one of the 
countries concerned does not deserve that qualification, it may not deserve 
the promised free trade; 
- if one of the countries concerned is found or suspected not to practice fair 
trade principles itself, it may not deserve the promised free trade either; 
- as the U.S. government has repeatedly expressed its preference for 
multilateral rules of the road, it may insist on having these in place before 
the launch trade agreements are permitted to lapse; 
- where the parties to the launch trade agreements are already subject to and 
accustomed to the rules of the road embodied in those agreements, and 
would probably accept the same general rules (though obviously without 
specific pricing or quantity restraints) in a new, multilateral form, Europe 
has never showed any inclination to subject themselves to similar behavioral 
guidelines (And Europe's attitude would undoubtedly influence Japan's 
position); 
- Europe's acceptance of any rules of the road would probably be linked to 
two conditions, first, that the present practices of - indirect or direct -
support to Arianespace are accepted as a matter of fact, and secondly, that 
the U.S. government market is opened to Arianespace, in other words the 
withdrawal or substantial relaxation of the 'fly U.S.' policy; 
- it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would open this large and lucrative market 
to its most important competitor in return for the kind of fair trade 
commitments now found in the launch trade agreements, a quid-pro-quo that 
not only the U.S. launch industry but also Congress would probably 
brandish as an unprecedented and one-sided sell-out of U.S. interests (and 
which the security community would insist on limiting to non-national 
security related government payloads); 
- this U. S. attitude would hardly be influenced by the prospect of full access 
for U.S. launchers to the government markets of Europe: the difference in 
size and importance is simply too large to make such a 'swap' an acceptable 
proposition; 
- an additional impediment would be that, in a multilateral 'rules of the road' 
arrangement the same opening awarded to Europe would have to be given 
to - and would anyhow be claimed by- the other countries' launch 
companies. 
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It would appear that any steps/measures in the coming years in the direction 
of the policy's goal will continue to depend on the uninterrupted good 
performance of the U.S. launch companies, which in turn depends on a 
combination of continued U.S. government preferential treatment, a growing 
satellite (LEO and GEO) launch market, reliable and competitively priced U.S. 
launchers and 'good behaviour' on the part of the competitors. 
The commitment is there and the Administration has already been working on 
a post-launch trade agreements regulatory regime,251 but the road to 
liberalization of the launch market through the complete removal of the above 
bilateral constraints is still a long - and, as a result of the 'China affair', 
twisted - one and may not take the international launch industry home until 
way after 2001. 
This brings us to a broader question, to be addressed in the next Chapter, i.e. 
once the launch trade agreements have been terminated, may the international 
launch providers, to the presumed benefit of their clients (the satellite 
manufacturers and the satellite owners/users) expect to operate in a "trade 
environment characterized by the free and open interaction of market 
economies", in other words, will there be "free and fair trade in commercial 
space launch services"? That is both a matter of definition, of perception and 
of the realities of remaining laws, policies and practices affecting the freedom 
of the trade in launch services of present and prospective launch providers. 
251. See 9 (29) Space News (Jul 1998) at 2. The Administration's response to the May 1998 
'China affair' in Congress has kept the offices concerned too busy to produce a first draft of 




"Free and fair" trade in launch services: 
requirements and prospects 
The primary question to be addressed here may well be: who decides on the 
content or meaning and the required extent of 'freedom and fairness'? If one 
believes in the adage "where you stand on the matter depends on where you 
sit", it makes sense to first have a look at the U.S. (parties') perspective, 
because of the U.S. authorship of the above expression as well as in view of 
its strong, if not decisive, role in the establishment of the regulatory 
framework of the international launch industry. A distinction will be made 
between, on the one hand, the main industry parties or commercial interests, 
such as the satellite owners/operators, the satellite manufacturers, the launch 
providers and the private spaceport operators, and, on the other hand, the 
regulators and policy makers, i.e. the U.S. Administration and Congress. 
Further, the position of the main non-U. S. launch providers will be reviewed, 
followed by a brief discussion of possible legal remedies available to U. S. and 
foreign parties. 
4.1 U.S. parties' views and perspectives 
4.1.1 U. S. industry 
4.1.1.1 Satellite operators 
Among the satellite operators one finds e.g. international (global) organizations 
like Intelsat and Inmarsat, regional organizations like Eumetsat or Eutelsat, 
private international consortia like US-led Iridium, Globalstar or Teledesic, 
domestic government telecommunications agencies or domestic private satellite 
companies. They: 
1. buy a satellite from a manufacturer and, separately, buy the launch service 
from a launch company, or 
2. buy a satellite-in-orbit from the manufacturer (the manufacturer builds and 
sells the satellite, including transportation into orbit which the manufacturer 
arranges with the launch company, or they 
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3. lease the whole or part of the transponder capacity of a satellite, orbited by 
or on behalf of another owner or user, who makes an arrangement as under 
1 or 2. 
Only in case 1, does the satellite operator find himself in a direct contractual 
relationship with the launch company. In the other two cases, the performance 
of the launch company is the concern of others, though obviously the outcome 
of the latter's negotiations with the launch companies will affect inter alia the 
price the satellite operator has to pay. 
The demands, hopes and concerns of these users of launch services do not 
differ in principle from the users of e.g. banking, air transportation or 
telecommunication services. 
They all demand availability, quality at a decent price, performance reliability, 
predictability of services and related conditions in the future, 
they hope for anticipation, thinking along, innovation, on the part of the launch 
service providers, and 
they are concerned about a (possible) lack of the above. 
Though one should not totally exclude the possibility that a monopolist 
transport company whether subsidized or not consistently meets these 
expectations, there is abundant evidence in economic theory and practice (and 
in human nature) that competition between transport companies (as between 
companies in other (service) industries), providing choice for the customers 
(and thus a risk for the companies concerned to lose those customers) 
substantially increases the likelihood that the customers' expectations will be 
met, or at least that efforts to that end will be more consistent and determined. 
Customers, therefore, in principle prefer competition among their service 
providers. 
Satellite operators contracting for the launch of their satellites will prefer a 
choice of launch companies to find the optimal mix of quality and price, so 
they can provide their own customers with, what the latter perceive as, an 
optimal mix of quality and price. 
On the assumption that competition is good for the consumers of the service 
branch concerned, a satellite operator would not be happy with a - mono - or 
oligopolistic situation in the launch branch, which may result when 
- there are more launch companies, but each of them occupies a specific 
segment of the market (e.g. one GEO launch company, one LEO launch 
company, one for polar orbit launches, one for heavy satellites, one for 
small satellites), and/ or 
- there are more launch companies which, however, do not really compete. 
The preferred situation is then: 'real' competition in each segment of the 
market. 
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Has that been achieved to the satisfaction of the users in their capacity as direct 
contract partners with the launch industry? The U.S. satellite manufacturers, 
the traditional counterparts of the launch industry, may provide some answers. 
(An additional reason for looking at the manufacturers' position is the blurring 
of lines between the latter and the satellite (system) operators, with e.g. Loral 
Space and Communications, for 42 percent, eo-owning Globalstar, Motorola 
participating for 25 percent in Iridium and Hughes owning 81 percent of 
PanAmSat and fully owning its own proposed Spaceway satellite system). 
4.1.1. 2 Satellite manufacturers 
The above expectations of the satellite operators as users of launch services 
are shared by the manufacturers. And, as, apart from the large satellite owner 
conglomerates, such as Inmarsat or Iridium, many individual clients will opt 
for a satellite-in-orbit contract with the satellite manufacturer, the latter has 
traditionally been, and still is, a major contract partner of the launch 
companies. The views and actions of the U.S. manufacturers, inter alia 
because of their economic clout and high tech/innovation image, have been and 
continue to be of vital importance to the development of the launch industry 
and to the way policy makers and regulators deal with the latter industry. And 
where, as observed above, there is a growing tendency of manufacturers also 
to develop or participate in satellite telecommunications services industries and 
consortia, there is added reason to pay serious attention to the views of this 
high profile growth industry. 
As we saw in the previous chapters, the U.S. manufacturers, and in particular 
Hughes Space and Communications and Space Systems/Loral, have been very 
critical in the past decade of the limited availability of launch services. 
Because of their unhappiness about quality, performance, consumer orientation, 
cost, and sophistication of available launchers and also in view of their 
commercial vulnerability, priority being given at government launch facilities 
to U.S. government (national security and/or foreign policy) launches, they 
(1) put pressure on U.S. launch companies to modernize/upgrade their 
products, (2) put pressure on the U.S. Administration to assist in the 
development of new launchers through public/private partnerships, 
NASA/DOD led research and development, and/or 'anchor tenancy', and (3) 
turned to foreign launch companies: European, Russian, Chinese and, more 
recently Ukranian. Apparently, Arianespace was not sufficiently available, so 
the U.S. manufacturers saw with relief China and Russia also offering their 
launch products (even though it was largely uncharted territory they were 
entering). 
Apart from thus, in principle, having more launch options available, and at 
- at least initially - substantially lower prices, the manufacturers also 
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confronted the U.S. launch companies, at a vulnerable stage of their 
development with low-cost competitors and with additional concerns about their 
competitive position. This, in the manufacturers' view, had the added 
advantage of 'jump-starting' U.S. launcher innovation. 1 
But the introduction of foreign companies into the game brought also a major 
handicap, i.e. the unavoidable entry into the equation of national security and 
foreign policy elements in the form of laws, policies and practices, both on 
the part of the Administration (State Department, Commerce, DOD) and of 
Congress. 
The Administration, as we saw earlier, had, and continues to have, inter alia 
the following national security concerns: 
- satellites are defense articles or 'dual use' goods and should in principle not 
be exported to Russia and China for use or for launch; 
- using foreign launchers is indirectly making them more efficient and, where 
launchers and missiles share the same technology, there is an, at least 
indirect, proliferatory element involved; 
- the use of foreign launchers undermines US companies' competitive position 
and may affect 'assured access to space', a military-strategic, national 
security and foreign policy goal of the U.S. 
But there were also important national security (e.g. non-proliferation) and 
foreign policy (e.g. 'engagement') considerations favouring the use of these 
countries' launch services. 
Congressional concerns concentrated on the potential effects on the U.S. 
industry and related U.S. (regional) economic activity and the ensuing loss of 
U.S. launch-related jobs on the one hand and on old or more recent 'bad 
behaviour' on the part of China and Russia on the other hand, with a tendency 
to punish these countries, or at least not reward them by allowing exports of 
high tech satellites, and resulting launch revenues, to these countries. 
As a result, the U.S. manufacturers' launch contracts with these foreign 
companies have been subjected to and restricted by 'payload controls' in the 
form of launch trade agreements, export regulations requiring specific licenses, 
existing laws which require the Administration to sanction the Chinese and the 
Russians for various forms of bad behaviour by restricting export of satellites, 
l. According to a Hughes official in an October 1998 address, "one of our hopes in launching 
from countries overseas has been that we could help wake up the American launch industry. 
They have not been competitive. In the last 15 years, while the cost of satellites has come 
down by a factor of 30 or more, the cost of U.S. satellite launches has risen", see Michael 
T. Smith, Chairman and CEO, Hughes Electronics Corporation, Deregulation: the key to 
realizing the promise in satellite communications, luncheon address (Oct 28, 1998) <http:// 
www .hughes.cornlspeeches/smith/smith _98 _10 _ 28 _itp.html > hereinafter referred to as 
Smith Deregulation 1998. 
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and ad hoc Congressional sanctions, usually affecting export of high tech 
products, including satellites and satellite components to these countries. 
In the mean time, inter alia as a result of intense and continuous lobbying and 
pressuring on the part of the manufacturers: 
- the launch trade agreements have been progressively liberalized, 
- the Administration has made a commitment (in 1996) to terminate these 
agreements altogether, 
- commercial communications satellite export licensing was transferred to 
Commerce (in 1996), and 
- unilateral export controls and sanctions received bad publicity as - in many 
cases - ineffective and damaging to the U.S. industry. As a result, there 
seems to be a movement in Congress to reconsider the effectiveness of 
unilateral sanctions as a policy tool. 2 
At the same time, the U.S. launch industry has gone through a major 
restructuring exercise resulting in a small number of powerful players, 'fit, 
willing and able' to confront foreign competition. 
Additionally, impressive satellite orders from the satellite operators, both 
incumbent and new (LEO) satellite system operators, and the long term 
confidence this expansionist and 'up-beat' behaviour of the operators has given 
to the manufacturing industry, have resulted in turn in a demand on the latter's 
part for guaranteed future launch capacity. Hughes Space and Communications 
(and to a lesser extent Space Systems/Loral) has thus been able to play a 
crucial anchor tenant's role with respect to the development of three new 
launcher systems, the Delta 3 and the Zenit, both Boeing-led projects and the 
Japanese H-2A. In all three cases, a sizeable order for future launches created 
the necessary financial basis and 'official' customer backing necessary to 
confidently proceed with the launcher manufacturing process and attract other 
clients, and thus make the new launch product a viable undertaking. 
With these 'investment' actions, the manufacturing industry has played an 
important role in creating more choice of launchers, a more diverse product 
range and more competition. 
But if, in fact, the launch trade agreements are on the way out, will there be 
real competition in each segment of the market to the satisfaction of the 
manufacturers? 
If the answer is affirmative, but only because of foreign launcher availability, 
the question then is whether the present U.S. laws, policies and practices are 
sufficiently conducive to, or at least not interfering with, the use of foreign 
launches to make the latter a real alternative for the satellite manufacturers' 
launch needs. Put more bluntly: do the Administration and Congress assist (or 
2. As reported in Smith Deregulation 1998 supra note l. 
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'back off'!) sufficiently to make the foreign component of competition in all 
launch market segments work? 
This latter question addresses the extent to which the manufacturer may limit 
his criteria for selecting the launch company to quality, price and schedule 
only, whether the launcher is domestic or foreign. 
Secondly it addresses (through the measure of predictability, consistency and 
efficiency of the government's policies and practices) his reliability vis-a-vis 
his clients: can for instance Hughes Space and Communications (and its client) 
count on the agreed execution of the Long March, Proton or Zenit launch of 
the client's satellite with the same confidence as a competing foreign satellite 
manufacturer like Aerospatiale or DASA when it concerns the agreed Ariane 
(or Long March) launch of its client's satellite? 
Finally, the above question also concerns the extent to which the U.S. 
government permits the (further) development of foreign launchers (to be) used 
by U.S. clients. 
In fact, the answer to the question, based on the evidence we have reviewed 
so far, appears to be: no. 
First, the export control laws have been liberalized towards China, Russia and 
Ukraine, but the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act 
still cover the export of launch vehicle components and technology, satellites 
and important satellite components, and, though all commercial satellites were 
transferred to Commerce for export licensing purposes, this did not remove 
national security and foreign policy considerations from the licensing process. 
And the 1998 decision of Congress to - again - put the State Department in 
charge of this licensing and impose special, restrictive conditions on exports 
to China, turns back the clock altogether. 
These controls in their present form, do affect the reliability and effectiveness 
of the manufacturer in the latter's deals with its customers. 
Secondly, the various 'semi-automatic' sanctions laws, such as the Jackson-
Vannick amendment or the Tiananmen-related sanctions do create (potentially 
competition-distorting) elements of uncertainty and unpredictability in a U.S. 
satellite manufacturer's 'life of a salesman'. 
Thirdly, sanctions spontaneously imposed by Congress on, what one could 
frivolously call, the 'rogue country of the month' (and/or directed at other 
interests of a regional-economic, parochial, partisan or even xenophobic 
nature) are a handicap for the satellite manufacturing industry. The 
considerable - satellite and launch technology transfer related - Congressional 
excitement which erupted in May 1998 and the ensuing draft legislation 
intended to forbid or restrict satellite exports (for launch or use) to China and 
even to prevent U.S. contributions to the safety and reliability of the Long 
March - for inter alia U.S. satellites! - is a case in point. 
Finally existing foreign launch companies continue to be prevented from 
improving their products through MTCR-based U.S. export restrictions. 
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In an April 1997 speech, a Hughes official, citing the dramatic (real and 
projected) growth of civil, military and commercial satellite systems in all 
orbits, stated that "it is imperative that America increase its access to all types 
of launch vehicles and to new launch sites. "3 
Hughes saw a major role for the U.S. government in growing global launch 
vehicle supply, and credited the government for a number of related positive 
actions in this connection, such as the transfer of commercial satellite export 
licensing from State to Commerce, which the official believed, would 
"significantly speed and boost foreign sales." 
But he also mentioned several U.S. government policies and practices 
regarding launch vehicles which "continue[ d) to threaten America's supremacy 
in commercial space." 
Under the heading "[a]bolish antiquated technology transfer restrictions", two 
examples were mentioned. One concerned the delay in the development of the 
Japanese H2A launch vehicle caused by the State Department holding up, for 
MTCR-related reasons, the export to Japan of U.S. Thiokol solid rocket 
boosters. As the same official had stated half a year earlier, "[i]ndustry 
desperately needs the H2A. "4 
Apart from the Thiokol issue, which had been solved in the meantime, Hughes 
mentioned a USD 2.4 billion contract with ICO Global Communications of 
London to build a 12-satellite MEO system for global handheld mobile 
telephony, "a major win, especially in the face of tough European competition 
from companies like Aerospatiale, Alenia, DASA and Matra Marconi." But, 
in stead of celebrating the win, the company now had to "tackle the policies 
and bureaucracies at Defense, Congress, and State. For example", observed 
the Hughes official, "the Technical Assistance Agreement we applied for last 
September still hasn't come through. As a result, our ICO customer can't even 
attend the design meetings where we discuss how their satellites will interface 
3. See John S. Perkins, Vice President, Launch services acquisition, Hughes Space and 
Communications International, Inc., Achieving the promise of space by increasing the 
world's supply of commercial launch vehicles (Apr 2, 1997)<http://www.hughes. 
cornlspeeches/perkins/perkins _97 _ 05 _promise.html >, hereinafter referred to as Perkins 
1997. 
4. See John S. Perkins, Launch vehicles: keeping the U.S. satellite industry competitive (Oct 8, 
1996) <http://www .hughes.cornlspeeches/perkins/perkins _10 _ 8 _96.html > hereinafter 
referred to as Perkins launch vehicles 1996. The speaker had earlier explained that the 
Ariane 4 and the Proton were the only heavy-lift launch vehicles available to Hughes: "With 
its near-monopoly, Ariane is able to keep its prices high.", and access to Proton was still 
limited by the launch trade agreements. As for the reasons for needing the H2A, he said: 
"First, with its heavy-lift capacity, maximum payload lift to GEO would double from about 
four tons to eight. Second, industry needs Japan's Tanegashima spaceport to relieve our 
launch facility gridlock. And, finally, the H2A will make the commercial satellite launch 
market more competitive. By going outside its own country for components to America's 
Thiokol, in fact Japan can give us a lower cost launch vehicle." 
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with their launch vehicles." And he ended: "But how likely is it that foreign 
customers will buy American satellites and launches when our government 
imposes such stringent controls?" 
In that connection, Hughes repeated a plea for full access to all launch vehicles 
and launch sites and expressed his concern about U.S. policies limiting 
American access to many foreign launch vehicles, both for technology transfer 
reasons and to protect the U.S. launch vehicle market: "[a]ll such policies are 
out of date and counterproductive . . . Today, market demand argues loudly 
against foreign launch vehicle quotas of any kind . . . these quotas should be 
removed immediately." 
Where the satellite manufacturer knows that the various policies will not 
change overnight, if at all, he addresses the domestic offer of launches and 
launch pads. As for the latter, there is severe criticism of for instance the 
availability of Cape Canaveral for commercial launches. To quote Hughes 
again: 
"For example, competition for pad time from a growing number of defense and NASA 
launches. Lack of sufficient launch pad capacity, stemming primarily from too much time 
spent on pad for each launch. Plus range exercises and Shuttle landings that preclude 
concurrent launches. Excessive turnaround time. And, most importantly, an immobile site 
that lacks much-needed flexibility for fuel-efficient equatorial launches as well as launches 
into inclined orbits ... I was ... surprised to hear ... that the government is contemplating 
whether to charge industry for the upkeep of launch facilities. Now, it seems, we may be 
expected to pay for maintaining facilities that not only are inefficient and outdated, but that 
also disadvantage us by their low throughput and high costs related to their unfavourable 
location ... 
America's ability to compete successfully in the world's fast-growing commercial satellite 
launch marketplace will depend on how quickly and how appropriately it can adapt to the 
unprecedented changes already well underway in the global comsat environment. Today, 
hundreds of new commercial LEO's are being constructed on assembly lines. At Hughes, 
construction time for our HS 601 model has gone from 36 months to less than 18. What 
this means is that turnaround time on the launch pad will need to be measured in days rather 
than weeks. Also, greater versatility in launch sites is a must, so that all orbital planes can 
be accessed with maximum cost- and fuel-efficiency. "5 
On the credit side of the Cape Canaveralledger, the manufacturer lists, apart 
from a long and successful history of operations, two factors of a regulatory 
nature: location in a politically stable country, and for U.S. satellite 
manufacturers, "a much easier time obtaining export licenses". 
5. See Perkins launch vehicles 1996, supra note 4, at 1 and 2. 
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It must be obvious by now that, as a result of the above laws, policies and 
practices, the preferred situation for the U.S. manufacturer is a full array of 
competitively priced, 'fit, willing and able' U.S. launchers and launch sites 
to choose from, and available independent from national security and foreign 
policy-inspired government interference. 
As far as launch sites in the U.S. is concerned, as we saw in Chapter 1, there 
is a promising development of, on the one hand, a more private launch 
industry focused attitude on the part of the Federal launch sites; and, on the 
other hand, of the establishment of new commercial spaceports primarily 
competing for commercial launch activities. 
Though most of these projects have been and are being (partially) supported, 
financially or in kind by the USAF and/or NASA and/or state governments, 
as far as management and launch priorities is concerned they are nevertheless 
private enterprise-oriented and cater to all clients, both from the private sector, 
the manufacturers and satellite operators, and from the government, without 
specific preferences or priorities. 
On the other hand, these projects, with the possible exception of Spaceport 
Florida, are not destined for the use of heavy launchers of the Atlas or Proton 
type, and therefore for the time being offer only an indirect relief for the users 
as, once in full operation, they take away other traffic from, and thus create 
more room at, the government launch sites for GEO launches with heavy 
launch vehicles. 
As for increased choice of domestic launch vehicles in the medium to heavy 
lift range, one project promises a measure of relief for - also - the commercial 
launch customers, i.e. the government (USAF) paid launch vehicle 
modernization program called EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle). 6 
Hughes, in April 1997, did not see the EELV - which is intended to be the 
Federal government's only medium-, intermediate and heavy-lift ELV launch 
system for years to come- "as currently conceived" (i.e. before USAF's 
decision to have two competing launch companies share the contract) as an 
adequate solution to its launcher needs: "In fact, it could prove detrimental. 
But there is still time for Washington to re-think the EEL V". 7 Apart from 
asking for (more) assured funding, a quick and steady development, a design 
and manufacture enabling horizontal processing to minimize on-pad and turn 
around time, and more launch pads, the Hughes spokesman particularly 
attacked the plan to use the EELV to replace (most) Atlas, Delta and Titan 
rockets for government launches in the early 2000s: 
"Satellite customers who contract with U .S. manufacturers often do so because of our access 
to such proven launch vehicles as Delta, Atlas, and Titan. By enhancing our large 
6. See Chapter 1, supra. 
7. See Perkins 1997, supra note 3. 
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complement of these existing launch vehicles with the addition of EEL V and related 
infrastructure, we could more quickly launch the world's LEOs, MEOs, and GEOs. This 
would give U.S. industry an even greater marketing edge".8 
The demands (or hopes) of the manufacturer are understandable: don't throw 
away the old EL V' s because the more reliable launchers there are available 
for the launch market, the better it is for the clients (or, at least, don't stop 
producing the old launchers before the new ones have fully proven 
themselves). This approach would require parallel developments and continued 
production of old and new launch vehicles, probably both logistically and 
financially unrealistic for any length of time. The transition from the current 
fleet to the evolved version is of course the most risky part of the operation, 
not only for the Air Force, but for the private customers as well: the latter 
would be hard hit by the termination of the production of the current launch 
vehicles if there is not a seamless transition to the new generation of launchers, 
the more so as, in such a case, pressing national security-driven launch 
requirements on the part of the governmental customers would probably lead 
to the latter requisitioning any remaining domestic launch capacity to the 
detriment of the commercial customers. 
Mid-1998 program adjustments appear to largely meet the wishes of Hughes, 
as far as capacity and flexibility are concerned. 
With the original USAF requirements for the three vehicles of each family of 
launchers in the order of 1.845 kg (small), 3.860 kg (medium/intermediate) 
and 11.000 kg (heavy), both Boeing and Lockheed Martin planned to produce 
medium/intermediate launchers with a lift not exceeding about 5.000 kg; this 
however would not be sufficient to cater for the newest 5.000-6.500 kg 
commercial satellites being envisaged for production after the year 2000. 
Encouraged by the satellite manufactures and driven by the ambitious plans 
of their foreign competitors (including the Russian and Ukrainian partners they 
represent(!)) Boeing and Lockheed Martin have in the meantime decided to 
increase the capacity of their medium, intermediate launchers with (solid-
propellant) strap-on motors, to serve adequately this upper end of the 
commercial market. 9 
Although the heavy-lift vehicle may still be needed for the largest military 
satellites, and could also be designed to carry a dual load of lighter satellites, 
the effect of the above intermediate launcher adaption on the need for two 
competing heavy-lift vehicles (and the reaction of the two companies thereto) 
is unsure at this stage. But the U.S. satellite manufacturers will feel more 
comfortable with the revised plans, also because it will reduce their 
8. Id. 
9. See Space News Online (Sep 7, 1998) at 1 ("Firms revise plans for Eelvs/Redesigns could 
allow for large commercial payloads") 
<http://www. spacenews.members/sarch/sarch98/sn0907m.htm > 
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dependence on foreign-built vehicles (whether marketed by U.S. companies 
or not). 
The program does provide a (long-overdue) modernization to the domestic 
launch product through a (long-wished) government sponsorship and anchor-
tenancy. And it does seem to bring to the manufacturers the preferred situation 
of real domestic competition in at least the most important segment of the 
market. But, apart from creating apprehension on the part of the remaining 
non-subsidized U.S. launch companies (to-be), this government sponsorship 
also brings government demands and priorities and government dependence 
which is one of the things the private customers would prefer to stay away 
from because of the uncertainties it entails. 
Foreign launch competition thus continues to be vital for the interests of the 
U.S. satellite manufacturers. As a consequence, the feasibility of their 
preferred form of 'free and fair trade in launch services', i.e. the freedom to 
sell satellites and to choose launch providers both within and outside the U. S. , 
will continue to be dependent on the way the U.S. government treats the 
manufacturers' foreign customers and their foreign launch providers. 
4.1.1. 3 Launch providers 
Not only have the lines between U.S. satellite manufacturers and satellite 
system operators blurred, also the two remaining major U.S. launch 
companies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, are aerospace conglomerates which 
also manufacture satellites and participate in satellite systems. 
Boeing produced the highly successful Global Positioning System (GPS) 
satellites for the Air Force, and will take advantage of its experience with that 
project (encompassing up to 33 satellites including spares, at a potential value 
of approximately USD 1.3 billion) when it designs and builds (and eo-invests 
in) the new 17 satellite Ellipso global satellite communication system for 
mobile telephone and data transmission. 
Lockheed Martin also produces satellites and has recently acquired Comsat 
Corporation. 
Both companies have an interest in making their launch businesses profitable. 
At the same time 'their' satellites have to reach orbit within the preferred time 
frame. This situation creates already a more 'nuanced' attitude vis-a-vis each 
other and towards their competitors: as manufacturers or operators they may 
need the services of those same competitors to get their own satellites into 
orbit, particularly if their EELV launch families become (partly) 
complementary instead of fully competitive. With the fierceness of domestic 
competition to some extent mitigated by joint projects such as the eo-
management of the space shuttle and eo-production of the USAF EEL V, and 
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because both Boeing and Lockheed Martin have concluded partnerships with 
Russian and Ukrainian competitors respectively, serious competition will be 
primarily limited to the Chinese GWIC's Long March, the European Ariane 
5 and the Japanese H2A. These will all be capable of putting tomorrow's 
heaviest satellites into geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). 
As we saw earlier, Hughes' order of Delta 3, Sea Launch Zenit 3 SL and 
Japanese H2A launchers, and its hopes for a soonest operational status of the 
Ariane 5, are intended to cover its future launch needs, in particular for the 
newest generation of bigger and heavier communications satellites, such as the 
HS 702, weighing up to 5.200 kg/11,464 lb, which is too heavy for the 
Ariane 4 and for the present Atlas, Delta, Long March and Japanese H2launch 
vehicles. 
The GTO clients demand heavier lift and, given the importance of that market, 
they will get the launch vehicles they demand. 10 
The newest and most promising market for all launch providers is that of the 
LEO satellite constellations. In 1997, both Iridium and Orbcomm began full-
scale deployment of their respective systems, with 46 satellites of the 66 
Iridium satellites and 8 of the 28 Orbcomm constellation launched. Iridium 
used six Delta 2 launches for a total of 30 satellites, two Protons for 14 
satellites and one Long March for 2 satellites. Orbcomm used its 'mother's' 
(Orbital Sciences Corporation's) Pegasus launcher. At the end of 1998 both 
systems had reached full operational status with all satellites functioning in 
their planned orbits. With hundreds of satellites in the coming years waiting 
to be launched into LEO orbit, both for initial start-up of the various satellite 
constellations and to replace satellites which have served out their useful life 
or malfunction, this is the booming (non-government!) market in which both 
the heavy-lift launch providers and their light-to-medium-lift vehicle colleagues 
will be competing. 
It is this market which has prompted both the above established launch firms 
and a number of newcomers to autonomously develop dedicated launch 
vehicles or to conclude alliances with companies who have those launch 
vehicles already available. Thus, in the U.S., Orbital Sciences developed the 
air-launched Pegasus for max. 1,000 lb LEO satellites and Lockheed Martin 
the Athena 1 (1,760 lb). In the same league, Russia produced the START 
(1,500 lb). And also Kistler and its RLV colleagues will eventually be active 
in this market. 
10. With a (FAA-COMSTAC) scenario of some 25 GEO/GTO and 15 other medium-to-heavy 
launch vehicle launches per year over the next 12 years, it would be commercially suicidal 
for the launch providers not to comply, see Ch. 1, (text to) note 3a. 
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For the medium-sized satellites destined for that orbit, Starsem, sells the 
Russian Soyuz launch vehicle. And the Russian-German joint venture 
Eurorokot will market the Russian Rockot launcher based on an SS-19 missile. 
Japan and India will be active in this market too (though the latter will continue 
to be severely hampered in its sales efforts by its strained relations with the 
U.S.). 
The existence of this still relatively modest number of large, medium-sized and 
small launch providers in the LEO satellite market and the competitive picture 
resulting therefrom begs the question of the regulatory regime which the U.S. 
launch companies concerned would like to have applied thereto in the context 
of 'free and fair trade in international launch services'. Domestically, the gap 
between the "big two" and (most of) the other U.S. (prospective) launch 
providers has widened as a result of the generous EEL V grants given to the 
former. The latter are 'not amused'; in testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the following comment was made: 
"By funding programs such as the ... (EEL V), and threatening to fund a commercial 
Venture Star, the government is actually impeding progress in the commercial launch 
industry. 
The private capital markets perceive EELV and Venture Star as government-funded 
competitors to any private launch venture. That dries up investment capital for companies 
such as Kelly Space & Technology, Kistler, Rotary Rocket, Pioneer Rocketplane, and 
others. 
The government should not fund development of a new launch vehicle if it is to be used 
for commercial purposes". 11 
And an editorial in a leading aerospace journal, highly critical of the 
government's policy to let these major companies compete for government 
launch service contracts with the small- unsubsidized- U.S. launch companies 
without taking into account the subsidies awarded to the former, called it 
"a declaration of war on the small U .S. companies that are trying independently to develop 
new commercial boosters ... it looks like the government is trying to run the little guys off 
the road" .12 
The days of launch quota would seem to be almost over and it will be difficult, 
with the number, diversity and international character of the launch providers, 
11. See Michael S. Kelly, testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 
Space, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Mar 5, 1998). 
12. See AW/ST (Jul20, 1998) at 66 ("Stacking the deck against innovative launch companies"). 
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to establish defensible normative prices which would have to be taken into 
account when contracting for such LEO launches. 
The two large U.S. launch operators, given their solid competitive position, 
may be expected, in the absence of bilateral launch trade agreements, to raise 
the issue of 'rules of the road' only if confronted with particularly aggressive 
sales efforts on the part of the Japanese or of a European-Chinese alliance yet 
to be established. The smaller players may want to strictly limit the number 
of missiles-turned-launcher entering the market, whether domestic or foreign 
owned or - like the large launch operators - prevent foreign competitors (in 
their 'league') from using cheap, subsidized U.S. launch facilities. But they 
will not be in a position to demand bilateral constraints of the type that is now 
slowly on the way out. To the extent the smaller players occupy rewarding and 
promising niche markets they may be expected to be taken over eventually by 
the established major aerospace firms. 
The U.S. launch firms are well-positioned to take advantage of the present 
international and domestic regulatory environment governing the trade in 
launch services. Their only problem at this stage would appear to be the way 
Congress views the national security aspects of their alliances with foreign 
launch providers (e.g. Sea Launch) and the strict controls the Administration, 
as a consequence, has been forced to apply thereto. 
4.1.1. 4 Spaceport operators 
Government launch sites or spaceports have - traditionally - been primarily 
oriented towards government needs and government priorities. 
When - during the EL V commercialization drive of the mid-1980s - they were 
made available to private launch providers, DOT was able to slowly increase 
the private enterprise focus of the two government launch site operators, 
NASA and DOD. However, where the government pricing policy was a 
generous one, with only incremental costs charged to the new users, the 
government agencies operating the launch sites continued to put a higher 
priority on 'their' (often) national security and foreign policy driven launches 
than on meeting the expectations of the private customers which they were 
asked (in the absence of private spaceports) to accommodate as well. 
This somewhat uncomfortable dual government role, the governmental launch 
site monopoly and the increasing needs of the launch service providers caused 
by the substantial growth (forecasts) of the satellite launch market all combined 
to give the impetus to private spaceport development initiatives in the U.S. 
and/or by U.S. interests abroad. (The Cape York project involving a U.S. 
managed Australian launch base for Russian Proton launches was probably the 
first such move of a U.S. firm, but its background was not so much 
unhappiness with the available U.S. launch sites or with the launch priorities 
of the government agencies concerned, but rather the lack of sufficient launch 
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providers and the wish of Australia to be involved in the launch business, 
joined by Russians looking for a non-Russian launch site to avoid or mitigate 
U.S. export restrictions) 
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 foresaw and provided for this 
development, and, as we saw in Chapter 1, DOT in the mean time has issued 
commercial launch operator's licenses to the operators of four such spaceports 
as required by that Act. 
Although from the point of view of an optimal use of available resources one 
may wonder whether a combined government/private customer base would not 
be preferable, a separation of launch pads avoids the complications of an 
operator trying to please two masters with different requirements and priorities, 
and is, apparently, as unavoidable as the separate existence of military airbases 
and commercial airports. 
Commercially operated private U.S. spaceports (will) have a straightforward 
and simple mission: to become (and remain) profitable and provide 
shareholders value, which means attracting as many U.S. and foreign launch 
companies as possible. 
Understandably, the U.S. spaceports are the U.S. launch companies' natural 
allies when it comes to preventing, or at least limiting, launches of U.S. 
satellites by foreign companies from foreign launch sites (at least in so far as 
the U. S. launch firms concerned do not have a financial stake in their 
respective foreign competitors). 
But the U.S. launch companies will be less than happy with a situation where 
they compete with foreign launch providers which, by using U. S. commercial 
spaceports, have levelled the playing field to an uncomfortable extent. 
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) in the past has objected to foreign, i.e. 
Israeli, use of U.S. spaceports because this would amount to U.S. tax payers 
(through the Federal support of the government launch site involved) assisting 
foreigners in competing with U.S. launch companiesY 
Obviously the U.S. government has the freedom to approve or disapprove, for 
national security, foreign policy or other (budgetary/federal support) reasons, 
this foreign use of its own launch sites. But the government's arguments for 
rejecting foreign use of private spaceports will have to be of a different nature 
13. See 8 Space News (Feb 17-23, 1997) at 1 ("Israel spurs policy debate with bid for U.S. 
launches"). As the FAA-AST notes in a 1997 report on newly emerging space nations, 
"[c]urrent United States law calls for commercial users to pay only the marginal cost of 
[US] launch ranges. The rest of the expense of maintaining these sites is borne by the 
taxpayer and ultimately, in part, by commercial entities like OSC. Foreign users would not 
bear these additional expenses.", see The worldwide growth of launch vehicle technology 
and services, Special Report, 2nd Quarter 1997 Report, [DOT-FAA-AST], hereinafter 




and will not fail to draw sharp reactions from the 'client-starved' spaceports 
concerned (whose FAA licences do not address the nationality of the 
- potential - users). 14 
One may anyhow expect the private spaceports to vigorously defend their case 
as a logical consequence of their version of 'free and fair trade' in launch 
services. 
4.1. 2 U. S. Government 
4.1. 2.1 Administration 
The U. S. administration is both a regulator and a customer of the U. S. launch 
industry's services. That dual role creates diverging and sometimes conflicting 
interests. 
A U. S. government agency acting as a customer will share most of the above 
expectations of the manufacturers and operators. When it comes to flexibility 
of the launch provider they will even be more demanding than the commercial 
customer. A sudden regional conflict, disaster or activity of a military, national 
security or foreign policy related nature (e.g. Tsjernobyl, Gulf war, Indian 
nuclear tests, Kosovo etc.) may require the immediate launching of additional 
remote sensing, intelligence and other communications satellites. The 
government's launch services demands, both planned (long term), and ad hoc 
(short term), have to be met by the space shuttle, DOD's own launch vehicles 
and the private sector. With the current and projected shortages of heavy-lift 
launch vehicles, which the government needs for its various GEO satellites, 
it shares the above parties' concerns about the availability of efficient, low-cost 
launch capability, and it has one additional handicap, i.e. the self-imposed 
obligation to only use U.S.-built launch vehicles and the 1998 Commercial 
Space Act's insistence on the use of U.S. operators. 
As a customer the government believes in competition, both domestic and 
foreign, to get the required quality at a decent price and all the other benefits 
brought about by free trade. 
But the ultimate consequence of free trade and free competition, i.e. the 
survival of the fittest producer(s), is only acceptable to the U.S. if a U.S. 
launch industry belongs to the survivors. This is the consequence of another 
role of the administration, i.e. that of the guardian of national security. The 
14. According to the FAA-AST, groups concerned with the Florida Spaceport have pushed for 
both Shavit and Proton launches from Florida in the hope of raising the number of launches 
from Florida sites, see above AST Special Report 1997, at 3. They could refer to the 
agreement signed between Russia's STC Complex with SpacePort Canada which provided 
for launches of the former's Start launchers from a new spaceport in Churchill, Manitoba, 
see ibid. (The difference with the US situation is off course that Canada does not have an 
indigenous launch industry that could be threatened by the Start operations). 
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latter role requires assured access to space, which means access controlled by 
the U.S. and thus provided by government entities and/or U.S. citizens. 
The U.S. launch companies are an established part of and play a crucial role 
in providing this assured access to space. That limits the government's 
application of traditional economic concepts to this industry. Yes, the launch 
companies should not have a monopoly. They should be subject to the rigors 
of the market to keep them on their toes, quality and cost/price-wise. In that 
connection, Arianespace is, as such, a welcome competitor, and so are the 
launch providers from Russia, China and Ukraine. Up to a point. The U.S. 
domestic launch industry's existence should not be seriously threatened, 
because assured access to space should not be compromised. Hence the launch 
trade agreements' quotas and price conditions. 
The 'coming of age' of the U.S. launch industry in the past few years, the 
result of a combination of (government and private, domestic and international) 
customer demands, competition from Arianespace and the other foreign launch 
providers, and industry consolidation, has given the government sufficient 
confidence in the continuity of the private launch companies to yield to various 
pressures (from the foreign countries concerned, from the satellite 
manufacturers and from the U.S. launch companies which teamed up with 
affected foreign launch providers to jointly sell the latter's products) to 
liberalize and, at the beginning of the next century, not to renew the 
agreements in their present restrictive form. The two private U.S. companies 
on which the administration now relies for (part of) its launch needs, Lockheed 
Martin and Boeing, are both high tech aerospace conglomerates of such 
strength and financial resilience that they can be trusted to be and remain fit, 
willing and able to compete with the foreign launch companies and continue 
to provide assured access to space to the U.S. government. Their joint 
activities for the government, both as operational managers of the Space 
Shuttle (the United Space Alliance) for NASA and as EELV 
developers/manufacturers for the Air Force, combined with their assured 
government launch business under the 'fly U.S.' policy, further strengthen 
their position and make the U.S. government's steps towards a liberal launch 
trade regime both philosophically right and commercially and strategically 
(practically) risk-free. An additional reason for the administration to feel 
reasonably relaxed about the consequences of this liberalization is the existence 
of the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Ukrainianlaunch alliances which, as long as they 
last, channel part of the benefits of liberalization back to the U.S. 
What remains for the U.S. administration to decide on as a regulator is the 
regime that should produce or induce 'fair trade' behaviour on the part of the 
above countries' launch providers after the termination of the agreements. 
Little is known about the work that has been done so far by USTR, the State 
Department, Commerce, DOT and the White House OSTP on the matter. One 
must assume that the principles that should be adhered to will not be materially 
different from those already embodied in the launch trade agreements and 
319 
Chapter 4 
discussed in the respective paragraphs. (The 'big sticks' to enforce adherence 
will remain the Trade Act and, though not meant for that purpose and therefore 
ultimately counter-productive, the export control legislation.) 
The problem at this stage is probably one of a more domestic nature, i.e. the 
sharpened awareness of Congress of the various issues involved (U. S. satellite 
and launch know how and non-proliferation, U.S. jobs, the export regulatory 
roles of State versus Commerce, and the influence of the manufacturers on the 
administration's policy making in this area) in the wake of the May 1998 China 
affair discussed earlier (and further explored hereafter). As a result of the 
sometimes heated and, at least partially, partisan discussions on the advisability 
of having U.S. satellites launched by the Chinese, there will likely be little or 
no progress on the matter of the post-launch trade agreements regulatory 
regime for some time to come. 
4.1. 2. 2 The U. S. GATS approach 
This leaves the relations with Europe to be dealt with in a way which produces 
or does not prevent a 'free and fair trade' in launch services. Apart from 
bilateral 'rules of the road' discussed earlier, the possibility of liberalization 
of launch services through the General Agreement on Trade in Services ( GATS) 
has been envisaged in the past. 
GATS is a set of multilateral, legally-enforceable rules covering international 
trade in services. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of world trade 
negotiations ( 1986-1994). The Uruguay Round led to the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), an intergovernmental organization which aims at 
free(er) world trade. Another result of the Uruguay Round was a set of 
agreements, viz. the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (which 
includes the GATT and other agreements such as those on agriculture, textiles, 
subsidies etc.), the above GATS and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Apart from those agreements, to which 
all WTO members are parties, there exists a separate set of 4 agreements to 
which not all WTO members are parties, i.e. the so-called Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements; one of these latter agreements is the Agreement on Government 
Procurement. 
GATS covers all service sectors and services. The Agreement operates on three 
levels: the main text containing general principles and obligations; annexes 
dealing with rules for specific sectors; and individual countries' specific 
commitments to provide access to their markets. 
The main principles of the Agreement include (but are not limited to): 
-Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment, which means treating one's trade 
partners equally. In other words, if a country allows foreign competition in 
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a sector, equal opportunities in that sector should be given to service providers 
from all other WTO members. This applies even if the country has made no 
specific commitment to provide foreign companies access to its markets. MFN 
applies to all services, but WTO members have been allowed, be it only once 
(at the time of the GATS finalization), to list specific exemptions to the 
principle vis-a-vis certain (groups of) trade partners; these exemptions are 
temporary: they will be reviewed after five years (in 2000) and will normally 
last no more than 10 years. The exemption lists are part of the GATS 
agreement. 
- national treatment, giving foreign service providers the same treatment as 
one's own national service providers, is only applicable (in GATS) where a 
country has made a specific commitment to provide access to its own market. 
Exceptions to c.q. limitations of the principle are allowed. 
(Other principles require for example that governments must publish all 
relevant laws and regulations and that these regulations be objective and 
reasonable). 
Individual countries' commitments to open markets in specific service sectors 
are the result of multilateral negotiations (which will often include, or be 
preceded by, bilateral talks on specific conditions). The commitments, once 
agreed upon, are listed in so-called "schedules", which contain also the 
exceptions and limitations to the market access thus granted. 
After the U.S. government, in 1996, had deregulated the domestic 
telecommunications market for U. S. telecommunications providers(' carriers'), 
it started to push for adoption of the same pro-competitive principles in the 
international telecommunications market. The worldwide acceptance of these 
principles through a WTO agreement would on the one hand open up the U.S. 
(satellite) telecommunications market to foreign operators, and thus expand 
choices, stimulate innovation and lower prices for the benefit of the U.S. 
consumers; it would on the other hand open protected foreign domestic markets 
to eager U.S. telecommunications and satellite industries. 
When, on February 15, 1997, the U.S. and 68 other countries, together 
representing more than 90 percent of the $600 billion global 
telecommunications market did reach agreement on the opening of this market, 
this WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services (WTO Basic 
Telecom Agreement) was greeted as a victory of the principles of free 
competition, fair rules and effective enforcement as enacted in the above U. S. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 15 
15. See statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt concerning WTO agreement on telecom 
services (Feb 15, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/st021597.html> The FCC, 
in November 1997, adopted new rules to liberalize market access for foreign 
telecommunications providers, incl. in particular foreign satellite systems licensed by WTO 
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The WTO Basic Telecom Agreement entered into force on February 5, 1998 
for, inter alia the U.S. , the European Communities (and the individual 
member states), Japan, India, Brazil and Israel. 16 
The momentum created by the agreement has also led to the development of 
the so-called Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Arrangements, designed to ensure 
that terminals associated with GMPCS systems will be able to transit borders 
and "roam" freely. At the end of 1998, more than 100 administrations and 
industry members had already signed the MoU. 17 
The ensuing liberalization of global telecommunications through the opening 
of national markets to international competition has gone hand in hand with 
a convergence of domestic telecommunications companies with those of other 
nations to form multinational alliances, in order to enlist additional capabilities, 
create synergies and share the risks and - huge - costs involved. 
The result of this regulatory and strategic revolution is a phenomenal growth 
of the global telecommunications industry (with a strong U.S. presence), an 
increasing need for sophisticated and reliable communications satellite systems 
and - unavoidably - a corresponding requirement for sufficient, reliable, 
decently-priced, on-time transportation services to get the satellites into their 
proper orbits. 
Which brings us to the - possible - application of the above GATS principles 
to the trade in launch services. 
First, in the absence of a specific commitment to provide foreign launch 
companies access to its satellite launch market, the U. S. will still be bound by 
the MFN principle. 
members, consistent with the U.S. commitments in the above WTO agreement, see 
Commission liberalizes foreign participation in the U.S. telecommunications market (IB 
Docket Nos. 97-142 and 95-22), Report No. IN 97-36 (Nov 25, 1997) and Commission 
adopts procompetitive market opening policies for foreign satellites (IB Docket 97-111, CC 
Docket 93-23), Report No. IN 97-37 (According to the latter doe, in Feb 1997, the U.S. 
and 49 other nations made binding commitments in the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement to 
open satellite markets to competition) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Intemational/News_ 
Releases/ 1997 /nrin7041 and 7042.html > . 
The two above FCC orders entered into force in early Feb 1998. 
16. See for text <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/tel2.htm>. And see Schedules of 
Commitments and Lists of Article 11 Exemptions to be annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (Jan 29, 1998)<http://www.wto.org/new/gbtoff. 
htm>. Fourth Protocol to GATS, 33 ILM 1167 (1994). 
17. See <http://dettifos.fcc.gov:8080/beta/doc-search/opasrchV2.cgi>. And see FCC News, 
International Bureau reports on developments in international telecommunications markets, 
Report no. IN 98-58 (Nov 19, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Intemational/ 
News Releases/ 1998/nrin8041.txt>. 
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This provides the WTO members' launch companies with equal opportunities 
to offer their services in the U.S. launch market. "Equal" is to be read here 
as equally good or equally bad. 
MFN thus obliges the U.S. government to treat the launch companies ofWTO 
members India, Israel and Japan in the same way as Arianespace or vice versa. 
A launch trade agreement concluded with any one of these WTO members 
would not stand if it meant a less favourable treatment of the respective 
member as compared to the other WTO members; conversely, it would have 
to be extended to all other WTO members if considered more favourable than 
the treatment the latter were accustomed to. 
MFN also means that, if non-WTO members such as China, Russia or Ukraine 
receive a better U.S. treatment - in the sense of more opportunities to offer 
their launch services in the U.S. market- than Cl: WTO member, e.g. India, 
the latter may claim the same better treatment from the U. S. 
And, finally, China, Russia and Ukraine, in view of their non-membership at 
present lacking the legal means to invoke the MFN principle vis-a-vis the U. S., 
would, upon becoming a member, be able to benefit from this GATS principle 
and expect equal opportunities in the U.S. launch market. 
In 1994, the above, seen in the context of the existing launch trade agreements 
with the latter three countries and possibly in view of similar agreements the 
U.S. may have envisaged concluding with the European Union and Japan, was 
sufficient reason for the U.S. government to make an MFN exemption for 
"space transportation". 
In its filing, the U. S. government referred to the quota and price restrictions 
embodied in - unspecified, i.e. also future - bilateral launch trade agreements 
and, as to the condition creating the need for the exemption, mentioned the 
"need to prevent disruption of competition in the international space launch 
market" .18 
The U.S. thus made clear that it wished to remain free to discriminate in this 
field between its trade partners, in this case between WTO and non-WTO 
members. As the MFN exemption was clearly meant to maintain the validity 
of the launch trade agreements with the latter, the MFN treatment of the 
former, with whom no launch trade agreements had been concluded, remained 
unaffected. 
18. The U.S. filed an exemption for "Transport Services; Space Transportation", and, under the 
heading "Description of measure indicating its inconsistency with Article II' described its 
launch trade agreements as "[q]uantitative restrictions and price disciplines in certain 
bilateral agreements on the launch of satellites in the international commercial space launch 
market", see Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions (U.S.) (Apr 15, 1994). Europe did 
not take an MFN exemption because, as we saw earlier, it had not formalized its launch 
trade agreement with Russia. Japan, as a matter of principle, did not take a MFN exemption 
either, info Eur. Commission, DG I (Dec 11, 1998). 
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Before one concludes that India is entitled to demand the same treatment as 
Arianespace and Japan in the U.S. market, it should be realized that the GATS 
provides for a security exception which the U.S. could- and probably would-
invoke in case of such a demand (or complaint). 19 
In the past, the GATT/GATS panels have been treating this exception with 
caution, generally retreating whenever it was invoked. 
Secondly, for France/ Arianespace to be able to invoke e.g. the national 
treatment principle, an explicit commitment on the part of the U. S. to provide 
foreign access to its launch market would be required. 
Such a commitment would provide equal access to the U.S. market for all 
WTO members with launch companies, automatically including new WTO 
members: thus, if China would join WTO, the then existing commitment would 
apply and override the MFN exemption and the more restrictive arrangements 
which that exemption covers. 
An additional benefit of national treatment would be the - possible -
availability of high quality U .S. spaceports, both federal and private ones, to 
all respective foreign launch companies. This would be of particular interest 
to WTO members with launch capabilities but limited ground facilities, such 
as Israel and Japan. It must be assumed, however, that the U.S. would hesitate 
opening up the subsidized federal launch sites to foreign competitors, and 
would phrase its commitment accordingly. 
During the Uruguay Round, the European Union, in bilateral discussions with 
the U. S., raised the issue of liberalization of commercial space launch services 
through the application of GATS, and suggested that the U.S. (and of course 
also Europe and the other space launching countries) make a commitment as 
referred to above. The U.S. reaction was far from enthusiastic, reportedly 
because the U.S., inter alia, felt uneasy about the effect their commitment and 
the ensuing application of all GATS general principles and specific provisions 
would have on their position with respect to the policy of reserving the 
government market for U.S. launch providers ('fly U.S.' policy). 
19. See GATS, art. XIV bis ("Security exemptions"): 1. "Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed: 
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(a) to require any Member to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests: (i) relating to the supply of services as carried 
out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military establishment; (ii) 
relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 2 " 
GA TS text at < http:www. wto.org/wto/services/gatsintr.htm > . 
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This may or may not be a valid worry; the fact is that the GATS Agreement 
specifically provides that the provisions on MFN, market access commitments 
and national treatment do not apply to "government procurement". 20 
(In fact, government procurement has always been omitted from the scope of 
the GATT, but was dealt with in separate agreements with effect from 1981.) 
In parallel with the Uruguay Round discussions, talks on this issue took place 
as well, and resulted in a separate plurilateral Agreement on Government 
Procurement of 1994 (GPA) which entered into force on January 1, 1996 for 
inter alia the U.S., the European Community and its (15) individual member 
states, Japan, Israel and about 10 other WTO members. 21 
As a consequence, for the U. S., the national treatment and non-discrimination 
principles to be found in art. Ill of the GP A, apply to - in principle - all U. S. 
government agencies' procurements. The "core" provision reads as follows: 
"1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide immediately and 
unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products 
or services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; and 
(b) that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party. "22 
Among the many government agencies which have been listed by the U.S. as 
entities which procure in accordance with the provisions of the GP A, both 
NASA and DOD are mentioned. 23 
20. See art. XIII: "l. Articles 11, XVI and XVII shall not apply to laws, regulations or 
rquirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in 
the supply of services for commercial sale. 
2. There shall be multilateral negotiations on government procurement in services under this 
Agreement within two years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement". 
21. For the text of the Agreement, see WTO, Government Procurement <http://www.wto.org/ 
wto/govt/agreem.htm> hereinafter referred to as WTO government procurement. In the 
U.S., the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465, 19 U.S.C. Sec.3501 et seq.), 
through amendments to the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979 (19 U.S.C. Sec. 2511 et 
seq.), authorizes the President to implement US obligations under the GPA. As a 
consequence, a number of laws and regulations, e.g. the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 
CFR parts 1-99) have been amended to implement the GPA principles, see Notification of 
national implementating legislation, communication from the US, WTO, Committee on 
government procurement, GPA/23 (Jul 15, 1998}, hereinafter referred to as US GPA 
notification. 
22. See WTO government procurement, supra note 21 Para. 2 of the same art. requires the 
same treatment for locally-established suppliers irrespective of the degree of their foreign 
affiliation or ownership or the country of production of the good or service. 
23. See US GPA notification, supra note 21, Appendix 1, Annex 1 ("Central government 
entities which procure in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement"), GPA/LLS/1 
(May 15, 1998). 
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However, the U.S. has explicitly excluded from the application of the 
Agreement: 
"[a]ll transportation services, including Launching Services".24 
The "fly U.S." laws, policies and practices of the U.S. government are thus 
not affected by the above Agreement on Government Procurement. Similarly, 
neither the European Commission nor Israel nor Japan have included launch 
services in their lists of services for GP A application. 25 
As the U.S. government showed no inclination whatsoever to either reconsider 
the exclusion of launch services from the GPA, or to make a GATS 
commitment with respect to access to its commercial (non-governmental) 
launch market or to withdraw its GATS MFN exemption, the EU did not 
pursue the matter. (ESA/ Arianespace, for whose benefit the EU initiative was 
taken, was of course primarily interested in the 'fly U.S.' part of the story). 
What then are the implications of the above for the prospects for a free and 
fair trade in launch services? 
After the U. S. launch trade agreements with China, Russia and Ukraine have 
lapsed, the question remains whether the U.S. wants to grant these countries' 
launch companies access to the U.S. commercial non-government launch 
market to the same extent as - traditionally - provided to Arianespace. There 
are two reasons why this is an unlikely scenario: first, because of the non-
market economy 'label' of the countries concerned, the U.S. is less than 
confident in their 'fair market behaviour'. Secondly, the national security 
element continues to play a very important role in the U.S. (trade-)relations 
with these countries and requires specific (ad hoc) controls to which the 
European trade partners do not have to be subjected. This will remain so even 
after the present Congressional excitement about the security aspects of 
Chinese launches (of U.S. satellites) has subsided. 
This makes any general liberalization of launch services through a U.S. GATS 
commitment unlikely for some years to come for WTO membership of the 
three countries concerned would then in principle open the U.S. market to 
these countries in a way comparable to Europe's access. And, on the European 
side, it would add a number of important GATS principles but no additional 
markets, such as the government market Arianespace is after. 
24. See id, Appendix 1, Annex 4 ("Services")(the transport services concerned are further 
identified as Central Product Classification Categories (CPC) 71, 72, 73, 74, 8859, 8868, 
Universal List of Services, doe. MTN.GNS/W/120), GPA/LLS/1 (May 15, 1998); a note 
extends this exclusion to "[t]ransportation services, where incidental to a contract for the 
procurement of supplies". 
25. See WTO doe GPA/W/35 (Feb 5, 1997) ("Loose-leaf system for the appendices to the 
Agreement") at EC, Japan and Israel, Annex 4 respectively. 
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Europe/ESA/Arianespace's wish to have access to the U.S. government launch 
market is also unlikely to be met through withdrawal of the U.S. 'launching 
services' exclusion from the GPA. As we have seen, the U.S. government 
(both Administration and Congress) and the launch companies attach great 
importance to 'fly U. S.' for national security, economic (jobs!) and commercial 
reasons. This in itself is already sufficient justification for the U.S. to keep 
the status quo. Additionally, the corresponding full availability of the European 
government market is of much more limited commercial value for U. S. launch 
companies and therefore provides little incentive for agreement on mutual 
access. 
One may conclude at this stage that - in the absence of specific developments 
or initiatives - liberalization of the trade in launch services through the 
GATS/GPA mechanism is unlikely to materialize for some time to come as 
it provides the main player in the game, the U.S., with few benefits which 
could compensate for the ensuing loss of the national security and commercial 
controls they are now able to exercise in this field. 
A final word on the Administration's attitude towards new non-U.S. entrants. 
There appears to be no intention whatsoever on the part of the Administration 
to lower the technological threshold to entry of the launch market by relaxing 
the MTCR controls on the export of launcher technology. As we have seen 
in the cases of Brazil and Japan, even membership of the MTCR group does 
not imply (increased) access to the technology required to create or improve 
an indigenous launch capability. U.S. and international MTCR controls are 
credited (by the Administration) with having slowed down the development 
of launch industries in India, Israel and Brazil. The reasons for this policy have 
been discussed. The effect thereof is that the number of 'players' will not 
increase until either the U.S. or other MTCR members relax their controls or, 
alternatively, until launcher technology has been so popularized that the 
controls have become ineffective. One could imagine the latter to happen in 
connection with a further increase in the use of small, further miniaturized 
LEO satellites requiring small launchers for initial launch and replacement 
purposes. The economies of such an endeavour would however remain 
doubtful as long as sufficient operators are available and satellite export 
controls can be used to deny a new operator the payloads for his launcher. 
The concept of 'free and fair trade' in international launch services, in the U. S. 
Administration's view, clearly applies to the current, conveniently small, 
'stable' of domestic and foreign launch providers for years to come.26 
26. A re-emergence of the space shuttle as a commercial player has been briefly considered 
recently, but the idea was shelved, and, in the light of the history of the EL V development 
as discussed above, quite rightly so (unless the shuttle is totally privatized). For the same 
reason, a sizeable (commercial) use of converted missiles by the U.S. government is not to 
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4.1. 2. 3 Congress 
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have, through the years, paid 
serious and constructive attention to the development of the U.S. private 
commercial launch industry. 
The Committees and Subcommittees dealing with space matters have repeatedly 
reviewed the various domestic and international aspects of the launching 
business, and, through hearings at various stages of the industry's 
development, have collected (and challenged) the views of the government 
agencies concerned and of (other) experts from the industry, in order to put 
their mandated or voluntary stamp on laws, policies and practices which, 
domestically, have an effect on jobs and the economy and internationally 
involve countries and entities which may already have attracted Congressional 
attention for other reasons. 
The Arms Export Control Act prescribes which export license applications 
submitted to the State Department require Congressional notification for 
possible (dis-)approval. The Tiananmen crackdown brought Congressional 
sanction legislation which continues to require the U.S. President to notify 
Congress in each individual case that he waives, in the national interest, the 
prohibition to export U. S. -built satellites to China for the purpose oflaunching. 
Congress supported the launch industry by creating legislation to formalize the 
DOT's responsibilities with respect to the regulation and supervision of the 
launch companies (the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984) and to limit 
liability of the industry vis-a-vis the government and third parties (the 1988 
amendments to that Act). Moreover it created additional government (NASA) 
business for the launch industry through the adoption of the Launch Services 
Purchase Act of 1990. And, finally, in July 1998, Congress approved a new 
Commercial Space Act (H.R. 1702) which inter alia provides the FAA with 
licensing authority (which it lacked so far) over the next generation private 
reusable launch vehicles (RLV's), including in particular their reentry into the 
earth's atmosphere. The bill was introduced in the House by the Chairman of 
the House Science Committee with the following remark: 
" ... this legislation, if enacted, will create a stable business environment in which the 
commercial sector can raise capital, develop a business plan, hire employees, and offer a 
space good or service with the expectation that the government bureaucracy won 't keep 
changing the rules." (emph. add.)Y 
Similarly, the Senate Report on the same bill, endorsing the President's 
National Space Policy of 1996 particularly where it referred to the 
government's role to create a stable and predictable environment for the U.S. 
be expected. 
27. See The Insider news, AIAA (Jun 1998) ("Space commercialization: pushing ahead in 
Congress") <http://www .aiaa.org/bulletinljune98-space-comm.html >. 
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commercial space industry, justified the enactment of the legislation inter alia 
as follows: 
"Like any young industry, the commercial space industry is vulnerable to the sudden 
changes of government policy. H.R. 1702 is necessary to ensure consistency in government 
policy so that commercial space business can grow with the relatively reliable assurance 
that government policy will not change" .28 
But the same Congress is also quick to impose or require the imposition of 
sanctions on countries which have violated standards of conduct which 
Congress considers appropriate or desirable. 
Such sanctions may interfere with the business of both the satellite 
manufacturers and the U.S. launch providers; in the short term, because a 
specific contract may be affected by a specific sanction, and in the long run, 
because the U. S. companies' reliability as a contracting party may be 
undermined, resulting in their clients going elsewhere for the same product. 
In a more general way these sanctions may also interfere with the 
Administration's foreign policy vis-a-vis a specific country or group of 
countries. In all these cases the imposition of a sanction or the threat to do so 
creates an element of unpredictability and uncertainty as to both commercial 
dealings and official policies. 
Finally, these sanctions may share the fate of similar actions on the part of the 
Administration, i.e. that, because of their unilateral character they are not only 
ineffective, but also endanger the competitive position of U.S. industry and 
- depending on the cause and the target - risk alienating trade partners or allies 
asked to support a cause they don't believe in or join a sanction they consider 
inappropriate or uncalled for. 
In Chapter 2.3.4 supra some attention was given to the detonation of nuclear 
devices by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and the sanctions the U.S. imposed 
in response thereto. These sanctions were mandated by Sec. 102 of the Arms 
Export Control Act, the so-called Glenn Amendment, which, upon 
determination by the President, as reported to Congress, that India and 
Pakistan violated the Act, required the President to implement seven specific 
sanctions: 
- terminate bilateral assistance 
- terminate all foreign military sales and financing 
- terminate Munitions List licenses 
- deny credit guarantees and financial assistance by inter alia Ex-Im Bank 
financing 
- prohibit U.S. banks from making any loan or providing any credit to the 
government of India or Pakistan, and 




- prohibit exports of specific goods and technology subject to export 
licensing. 
As a result, both the State Department and Commerce implemented changes 
in U.S. export control policy for India and Pakistan. Thus, the State 
Department revoked all licenses and approvals for the export (and temporary 
import) of all defense articles and defense services on the USML to or from 
India and Pakistan, including licenses/authorizations for manufacturing, 
technical assistance and distribution agreements. 29 The Commerce 
Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) for example, on June 
22, 1998, published a list of sanctions which included the following restrictions 
on exports: 
"For nuclear and missile-related items and entities of concern: 
- BXA will deny all export and reexport applications for dual-use items controlled for 
nuclear or missile nonproliferation reasons under the Export Administration Regulations 
[(EAR)] to all end users in India and Pakistan. 
- Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), BXA will publish a list of 
Indian and Pakistani government and private entities involved in nuclear and missile 
activities. All exports and reexports of all items subject to the EAR will be prohibited 
to these listed entities. "30 
The restrictions included a 'presumption of denial', because of their broad 
commercial and possible proliferation applications, of exports of computers 
exceeding a certain capacity to (non-)government entities involved in nuclear, 
missile or military programs and of all controlled U.S.-origin dual-use items 
to Indian and Pakistani government entities involved in military activities. 
A BXA official, in a July 1998 speech, called the Glenn amendment 
"a rather rigid, pre-determined legislative mandate ... [which] gave us very little flexibility 
to tailor these sanctions to the circumstances ... Although we did our best to both fulfil the 
legislative requirements and avoid making these sanctions counterproductive (only time will 
tell if we succeeded), the Glenn amendment is certainly an example of the faults of 
predetermined mandatory sanctions. "31 
29. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Public notice 2825, Revocation of munitions exports 
licenses and other approvals for India, eff. May 13, 1999, Fed. Reg. Vol 63, No 97 (May 
20, 1998) at 27781; and Public Notice 2835, Revocation of munitions exports licenses and 
other approvals for Pakistan, eff. May 30, 1998, Fed. Reg. Vol63, No 116 (Jun 17, 1998) 
at 33122. 
30. See U.S. sanctions on the export of dual-use goods to India and Pakistan, U.S. [DOC, 
BXA] (Jun 22, 1998) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ind-pak.htm>. 
31. See Update 98 remarks, Roger Majak, Ass. Secretary for Export Administration, DOC (Jul 
7, 1998) hereinafter referred to as Majak Update 98 rernarks<http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ 
press/98/RogerUPDS. html > . 
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This remark reflected a sentiment also heard in other Commerce statements, 
some of which have been quoted already. From a speech held in the same 
period for the same industry audience, one could distil remarks such as: 
"[We should focus controls on ... choke-point technologies [only] ... That is why 
Congressional action last year [in 1997] imposing new constraints on the export of high 
performance computers is so frustrating ... Congress is missing the point of export controls 
Some of you may see the bill [i.e. the new Export Administration Act] as a cap on your 
ability to make further progress in a more hospitable Congress. I'd urge you to see it instead 
as a floor that wi11 build in protection against a less friendly Administration and Congress. 
That such protection is needed is illustrated by the Congressional attack on our computer 
policy . 
... other issues we continue to face [such as] ... the periodic surprises Congress puts on 
the table. 
[we should] better coordinate our sanctions policy. We are driven to sanctions in cases like 
Cuba and Iran, often because of the Congress, but also by our determination to condemn 
and modify, if we can, behaviour we find unacceptable. "32 
Noting that there would undoubtedly be further efforts to impose sanctions, 
Commerce reported that several additional measures were currently pending 
in Congress, the most far-reaching of which, the so-called religious persecution 
legislation promoted by the Christian Coalition and primarily directed at China, 
would impose expanded export restrictions on governments declared to be 
engaged in such activities. In the meantime, a bill which would have imposed 
mandatory sanctions on Russia because of weapons-related sales to Iran was 
vetoed by the President. In a press briefing at the State Department, a 
spokesman harshly criticized the legislation: 
"We think the bill's rigidity, inflexibility and lowering of the standard for what would 
require sanctioning ... would open the door to a whole series of sanctions at the very time 
that the Secretary and the President are trying to make clear and hope Congress understands 
that these series of sanctions proposals coming out of the Congress harm our ability to 
conduct foreign policy, tie the Secretary's and the President's hands behind their back and 
make it harder to achieve the objective. "33 
32. See Reinsch, Update West 98, supra Ch. 2 note 262. 
33. See U.S. Department of State, daily press briefing, DPB#76 (Jun 24, 1998) <http:// 
secretary. state. gov /www /briefings/9806/980624db.html > . 
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4.1.2.4 The 'China affair' and the Strom Thurmond Act on satellite export 
controls 
The most recent Congressional actions in this connection concern (again) 
China. As briefly alluded to in Chapter 2.3.4, the Congressional storm 
involves a number of issues, some of which are interrelated: 
1. In February 1996, the failure of a Long March launch resulted in the 
destruction of a Loral-built Intelsat 708 satellite; (a) one of the circuit 
boards containing encryption information, considered sensitive, was not 
recovered from the remains and may have ended up in Chinese hands; (b) 
(the conclusions of) the report of a committee of experts assisting the 
insurance company in determining the cause of the failure fell into Chinese 
hands through the Loral expert in that committee, which was cause for a 
criminal investigation against that company into possible violation of the 
Arms Export Control Act (for illegal transfer of sensitive technology; The 
New York Times (NYT), in April1998, cited a classified Pentagon report 
that reportedly concluded in May 1997 that American expertise was 
transferred to China that significantly enhanced the reliability of its ballistic 
missiles and that U.S. national security was harmed. 
(In a similar case involving Hughes, the latter shared with the Chinese its 
analysis of a 1995 crash of a Long March carrying the Hughes-made Apstar 
2 satellite. Hughes had cleared this assistance (amounting to a transfer of 
technology) with Commerce but not with State, which should have been the 
proper procedure); 
2. In February 1998, with the criminal investigation still under way, Loral 
obtained again a license for the export to China (for Long March launch) 
of a Chinasat-8 satellite (through a Presidential waiver of the Tiananmen 
sanctions). Some Republicans questioned the appropriateness of granting 
the license at this stage and, following NYT suggestions to that effect, saw 
a link between this license and donations to the Democratic party on the 
part of Loral' s Chairman; 
3. In 1996, the Clinton Administration approved the sale of an advanced 
Hughes satellite system to Singapore-based but Chinese (co-)owned Asia 
Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT), including an export license 
for the first two satellites. Given the characteristics of the satellites, 
(Chinese) military use of the satellites is possible raising the question 
whether that sale should have been approved at all. Should the license be 
renewed after the satellites, in the meantime, have been made more 
powerful/sophisticated through the addition of an improved antenna with 
special characteristics? 
4. In November 1996, the Clinton Administration transferred the licensing of 
commercial communications satellites from State to Commerce. Has this 
change resulted in a degradation of the protection for U .S. national security, 
and was this transfer 'encouraged' by Chinese and U.S. satellite industry 
'offers which the U.S. President could not refuse'? 
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5. Was the 1988 decision to grant export licenses for U.S. satellites to China 
for Long March launches, thus providing the Chinese access to the 
commercial launch market, a sensible decision, given (a) the loss of USD 
hundreds of millions, if not billions, in launch revenues for the U. S. launch 
companies as a result thereof, (b) the improvement of the Long March 
performance and reliability, and (c) the possible use of that know-how for 
the improvement of China's ballistic missiles. 
Congressional hearings on the totality of these issues showed on the one hand 
the difficulty to reconcile proponents of the U.S. commercial interests and 
those giving priority to national security and non-proliferation, with very little 
real debate between the two sides. On the other hand, the various parochial 
and (more and more) partisan dividing lines made for heated and less than 
constructive debates, frustrating both to the Administration and the satellite 
manufacturing industry. 
Two pieces of legislation were introduced in the House, both seen as a serious 
threat to the latter industry and as dangerous and counterproductive sanctions, 
interfering with foreign policy, by the Administration: one would impose an 
outright ban on the shipment of any U.S.-built satellite to China, the other 
would reverse Clinton' s decision of 1996 and transfer the licensing of satellites 
back to the State Department. 
In October 1998, Congress decided to indeed return, with effect from March 
15, 1999, commercial communications satellites to the Munitions List for 
export licensing by the State Department, 34 with tightened national security 
controls and reporting requirements. 
Section 1513 of this Strom Thurmond Act provides: 
"(a) Control of satellites on the United States Munitions List-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all satellites and related items that are on the 
Commerce Control List of dual-use items in the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 
part 730 et seq.) on the date of enactment of this Act shall be transferred to the United 
States Munitions List and controlled under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C.2778). 
(c)Effective date-
(1) Subsection (a) shall take effect on March 15, 1999, and shall not apply to any export 
license issued before such effective date or to any export license application made under 
the Export Administration Regulations before such effective date. "35 
34. See Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (H.R. 
3616), signed by Pres. Clinton on Oct 17, 1998, Pub. L. 105-261, hereinafter referred to as 
Strom Thurmond Act, Sec. 1513. 
35. See Title XV -Matters relating to arms control, export controls, and counterproliferation, 




President Clinton, in a statement on the day of signature of the Act, expressed 
strong opposition to this provision, and argued: 
"This change is not necessary to ensure effective control of U.S. export of satellites and 
could hamper the U.S. satellite industry. The Congress repeatedly supported the transfer 
of satellite licensing jurisdiction to the Department of Commerce long before I ordered the 
transfer in 1996. I strongly urge the Congress to demonstrate its support for a strong 
domestic satellite industry by passing remedial legislation to halt this transfer of jurisdiction 
prior to its effective date. "36 
The President, in fact, said two things: 
first, that the national security and foreign policy focus of the State Department 
would not result in more effective satellite export controls, but would affect 
the competitive position of the U.S. satellite industry; 
secondly, that this regulatory change came about because Congress, rather 
unexpectedly, changed its long-held views on the matter: a hardly veiled 
presidential accusation of unpredictability of Congress. 
Comments on the part of the U.S. aerospace industry centred on the cost of 
red tape resulting from these and other possible tightened high-tech sales rules. 
For example, the American Electronics Association and the Satellite Industry 
Association (SIA) argued that "tougher rules, along with lengthy license-
approval procedures, will cost U.S. companies huge amounts of business. And 
in the end ... sales will go to European companies over which the U.S. has 
no control. "37 The added time resulting from the State Department handling 
the licensing of satellite exports would come from the limited staff available 
for the new task, but could also be attributed to the much more active role of 
Congress in overseeing items on the Munitions List. This could add two to six 
months to the process and, according to SIA, could cost the operator of a USD 
100 million satellite as much as USD 9 million a month in lost revenue. 38 
The American Aerospace Industries Association, in a statement on the transfer, 
expressed extreme disappointment, particularly since the Congressional reviews 
on the 'China question' had not yet been completed, and added the following 
comment on behalf of the U.S. companies concerned: 
36. Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Oct 17, 1998) 
<http: I lwww .pub. whitehou se. gov luri-resii2R ?urn: pdi: I I 
oma.eop.gov .usi19981101191IO.text.1 >. 
37. See WSJ (Dec 18, 1998) at 1 ("House Panel may urge tighter rules for exports of high-
technology gear"). 
38. Ibid. In a "white paper" sent to administration officials and lawmakers in the same period, 
ISA spelled out some of the other cost incurred in the new system, such as a less favourable 
tax treatment, i.e. a reduction of the tax break from 5.2% to 2.6%. 
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"Commercial satellites are not weapons systems and there are numerous safe guards in place 
to protect U.S. technology during the pre-launch and launch process. State, Defense and 
Commerce are all involved in any decisions under the current procedure, as they should 
be, and the new law will not change this. What it will do is preclude U.S. companies from 
selling communications satellites to any country to which the law prohibits the sale of 
weapons systems, even if a U .S. launcher is used. It will also delay the licensing process, 
as Congress will have to be notified of any foreign launch of a U.S. satellite, even by the 
Europeans, which have launched U.S. satellites for many years. 
It is extremely poor policy to restrict the sale of commercial products by treating them as 
though they were banned weapon systems. "39 
A few months after the adoption of the above legislation, DOD submitted a 
report to the Senate on Hughes' technical exchanges with the Chinese. The 
December 7, 1998 document alleged that Hughes, in an effort to prove that 
not its satellite but the Long March launch vehicle had caused the 1995 launch 
failure, "with the blessing of the Commerce Dept., may have passed sensitive 
technical information or know-how to the Chinese during its investigation of 
the Apstar accident. "40 The investigation's conclusions were reported, inter 
alia, to have identified the need for modifications in the Chinese launch vehicle 
fairing design and launch operations, to have provided China with details about 
the satellite design and some manufacturing/inspection practices and with 
insight into U.S. diagnostic techniques for assessing defects and launch vehicle 
satellite design. The DOD report placed significant responsibility for any 
improper technology transfer on the Commerce Department which apparently 
had not imposed any limits on the Hughes/Chinese investigation and had failed 
to consult with DOD on whether the documents shared by Hughes with China 
contained information that should not be released to the Chinese. 
39. Statement by John W. Douglas, AlA President, on the transfer of licensing authority of 
commercial communications satellites to the State Department's munitions list (Sep 18, 
1998) <hnp://aia-aerospace.org/homepage/jwdstmt2.html> When Clinton, in 1996, 
transferred the export controls from State to Commerce, the AlA supported these changes 
for the following reasons: "First, the EAA does not require notifying Congress of specific 
major transactions, while the AECA does - a process that can involve considerable delays. 
Second, there are export control sanctions geared toward defense articles, which catch any 
dual-use items on the AECA list. Finally, under the old regulations - where some 
commercial [aircraft] engines and satellites were controlled by Commerce and others by 
State - companies that worked with the same countries and similar technologies found 
themselves controlled by two different bureaucracies and two sets of regulations. The new 
regulations should eliminate this problem.", see 1 (4) AIA Update (Oct 1996) ("President 
clarifies export control jurisdiction for aerospace products") < hnp://aia-aerospace.org/ 
homepage/nu1_ 4.html>. 
40. See AW/ST (Dec 14, 1998) at 38 ("Pentagon plans new look at China tech transfer"). 
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The DOD report however concluded that the possible benefits to Chinese 
missile programs resulting from the above exchange of information "did not 
likely alter the strategic military balance between the U.S. and China. "41 
At the same time, the Pentagon noted that the available documentation, on 
which it based its report, had not been complete, and that definitive judgement 
on the matter had to await a further thorough study conducted together with 
the State Department. The latter concluded in early February 1999 that "the 
1995 'tutorial' by Hughes resulted in significant improvement to China's rocket 
program and that the lessons were inherently applicable to their missile 
programs as well. "42 
The above Administration action was overtaken by a report approved by a 
select House Committee (a bi-partisan committee of Representatives with 
- mostly - a national security background, which had been instituted in May 
1998 after the above New York Times article had disclosed details on Hughes' 
and Loral's 'high tech' assistance to the Chinese). Although the classified 
contents of the January 1999 report, the 'Cox Report', were not released, it 
was confirmed by witnesses and intelligence officials who worked with the 
Committee that the report agreed with the above assessments by the Pentagon 
and the State Department that information shared with Chinese scientists by 
Hughes and Loral had improved Beijing's ability to launch satellites and 
ballistic missiles. 43 
41. Ibid. In fact, according to the Washington Post of Jun 7, 1998, already in March 1997 the 
USAF's National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) concluded in a classified report that Loral 
and Hughes provided expertise that helped China to improve the guidance systems on its 
ballistic missiles and that U.S. national security was damaged. The NAIC report was 
supported by the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) and sent to 
DOD's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), the State Department and the 
Justice Department. A classified DTSA report of May 1997 on the issue reportedly 
concluded that Loral and Hughes had illegally transferred expertise to China that 
significantly enhanced the reliability of its nuclear ballistic missiles and "United States 
national security had been harmed". In September 1997 the Department of Justice began an 
investigation into these allegations; in 1998, the Department also started a preliminary 
inquiry into whether political donations influenced Pres. Clinton's approval of the export of 
(Loral) satellites to China, see China: possible missile technology transfers from U.S. 
satellite export policy - background and chronology, CRS Report for Congress, 98-485 F 
(Aug 13, 1998) at 6, 23 and 27 resp. 
42. See WSJ (Feb 23, 1999) ("Bipartisan rocket security report"). 
43. Ibid. In May 1999, an unclassified, redacted version of the Cox Report was released: U.S. 
national security and military/commercial concerns with the People's Republic of China 
<http://www.house.gov/coxreportl>. The text of the relevant 'Overview' part of the 
Report (sub D) reads as follows: "In the aftermath of the three failed satellite launches since 
1992, U.S. satellite manufacturers transferred missile design information and know-how to 
the PRC without obtaining the legally required licenses. This information has improved the 
reliability of PRC rockets useful for civilian and military purposes. The illegally transmitted 
information is useful for the design and improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles 
as well". The Committee, whose full name is the Select Committee on U.S. National 
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, chaired by 
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In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that the Administration decided, on 
February 22, 1999, to disapprove the sale of the Hughes commercial 
communications satellite to the APMT consortium. This took the form of a 
notice of intent on the part of Commerce dated February 24, to deny the export 
licenses necessary for the deal to go through. Though the Commerce 
Department was still in charge of licensing the export of these satellites, and 
favored the sale, both Defense and State, and other (intelligence) agencies 
concerned, objected both to the launch by the Chinese and to the control of 
the satellite in orbit by the Chinese, the latter because of the commercial and 
technological benefits that would alledgedly accrue to the Chinese military, 
through its use of the satellite. 
As a result, APMT, in April 1999, cancelled its contract with Hughes. 44 
Rep. (R) Cox, in its 700-page report, also came with other, far more explosive revelations 
on Chinese military and economic espionnage, and the theft of military technology, 
including nuclear weapons design. The Committee held 33 closed hearings, taking testimony 
from intelligence officials, industry executives and nuclear-weapons experts. The Committee 
made 38 recommendations for legislation or executive orders to address the 'policy failures' 
of the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations in this field, covering such policy 
categories as security at weapons laboratories, the handling of sensitive intelligence data and 
export controls. A February 1999 White House response to the Cox recommendations 
announced inter alia the establishment of end-to-end monitoring of launch campaigns (and 
failure investigations) and the collection, and distribution to State, DOD, Commerce and 
CIA, of all documents authorized for release to China. In addition, DOD will form a Space 
Launch Monitoring Division "with a cadre dedicated to make sure sensitive technology 
doesn't leak when U.S.-built satellites are launched from China", see AW/ST (Feb 15, 
1999) at 21. In the meantime, the Senate Intelligence Committee is engaged in a similar 
investigation, and is already reported to also criticize Hughes for its dealings with China; 
this may lead to further Congressional suggestions to tighten export controls. 
44. See Space News (Apr 26, 1999) at 26 ("Hughes struggles to avoid layoffs/tries to minimize 
effects of APMT satellite contract cancellation"); see also AW/ST (Mar 29, 1999) at 3, 27 
("Hughes races to save APMT deal"); the article quotes Majak, the assistant secretary of 
Commerce for export administration as saying that a change of launchers for the APMT 
satellite "might be a basis for revisiting the govermnent decision." If correct, this would 
suggest that the govermnent agencies concerned attach more importance to preventing a 
repetition of the original Hughes 'crime', i.e. the transfer of launcher-technology relevant 
know-how through the satellite-launcher interface, than to denying the Chinese military the 
benefits of sophisticated satellite communications through the use of the Hughes satellite. 
According to the same article, however, another govermnent official had emphasized that the 
Chinese launch was just one of many factors in the decision not to approve the export 
license. A Hughes spokesman said in this connection that the choice of launchers remained 
up to the customer, i.e. APMT. Finally, a Congressional source was reported to have called 
a reversal of the denial "about as popular with Congress as the idea of inviting the president 
to be the keynote speaker at the Republican convention in 2000", see ibid. A related case is 
that of the Loral-built Chinasat-8 bought by China. The export of the satellite was approved 
on February 18, 1998 after President Clinton had waived the Tiananmen sanctions under 
P.L. 101-246 for this satellite. The delivery of the satellite in April 1999, as contractually 
agreed, is, notwithstanding that approval, being delayed because of new federal reviews 
based on the tightened 'high tech' export controls, see WSJ (Apr 2, 1999) ("Loral says 
reviews of sales to China delay new satellite"). 
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On March 15 the State Department's amendments to the ITAR went into effect. 
These amendments, made necessary by the Strom Thurmond Act, re-designated 
commercial communications satellites and related items on the U.S. Munitions 
List (USML). 
Briefly, the rule change provides for USML coverage of all spacecraft, except 
NASA's International Space Station, including 
" ... all satellites, and all spacecraft technical data, as well as all components, accessories, 
attachments, and related technical assistance, including without exception, all launch support 
activities (e.g. technical data provided to the launch provider on form, fit, function, mass, 
electrical, mechanical, dynamic, environmental, telemetry, safety, launch pad access, and 
launch parameters, as well as interfaces for mating and parameters for launch). "45 
The amendment requires special additional export controls in the case of the 
export of any U.S.-origin satellite or related item or any controlled defence 
service "associated with the launch in, or by nationals of, a country that is not 
a member of [NATO] or a major non-NATO ally of the United States ... "46 
These special controls are two-fold, i.e. 
( 1) all licenses and other requests for approval require a technology transfer 
control plan (TTCP) approved by DOD and an encryption control plan 
approved by the NSA. The TTCP must require any U.S. person or entity 
involved in the export to notify DOD in advance of all meetings and 
interactions with any foreign person or entity that is a party to the export; 
(2) the U.S. person concerned must make arrangements with DOD for 
monitoring services (paid by the former and to be performed by the latter), 
which will cover all discussions on, and activities with respect to, the satellite 
'from the cradle to the grave', in fact from the design phase up to and 
including the launch of the satellite and the possible launch failure. 
As for the latter, for an investigation into, or an analysis of, a failure of a 
launch in a foreign country (including a post liftoff failure to reach proper 
orbit), a separate license is required and all special controls enumerated above 
apply. 
45. See 22 CFR Parts 121 and 124 (Public Notice 3011), Amendment to the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (/TAR): Control of commercial communications satellites on the United 
States Munitions List, eff. Mar 15, 1999, Fed. Reg. Vol64 No 54 (Mar 22, 1999) at 13679-
13681, supplementary information. 
46. The Public Notice mentions the 'established' NATO partners, (accidentally?) leaving out 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which officially joined NATO on March 12, 
1999. Under the heading "major non-NATO allies" the following countries are mentioned: 
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Although the above special export controls do not apply when (nationals of) 
NATO members and major non-NATO allies launch U.S.-origin satellites and 
components (as the Act does not contain such a requirement), 
"such export controls may nonetheless be applied, in addition to any other export controls 
required under this subschapter, as appropriate in furtherance of the security and foreign 
policy of the United States. "47 (emph. add.) 
Finally, the amended IT AR require a license for the export of technical data 
to insurance providers and underwriters in order to obtain or satisfy insurance 
requirements. 
Both before and after the entry into force of the above amendments to IT AR, 
U.S. satellite (component) manufacturers and foreign companies alike 
expressed serious concerns about the effects of this legislation. 
The U.S. companies predictably emphasized their worries about the absence 
of binding deadlines for the processing of the license applications combined 
with the significantly increased size of the commercial satellite market and a 
shortage of trained staff at the State Department to deal with all resulting 
applications; that and the requirement of Congressional notification for certain 
defence articles could significantly lengthen the licensing process and thus 
further hurt their competitive position vis-a-vis their foreign competitors. 48 
PanAmSat, a satellite service provider, complained that the increased export 
requirements were making it more difficult for the company to exchange 
technical data with its launch providers, provide satellite information to 
customers so they can make business decisions and work with international 
insurance underwriters. 49 
The latter aspect needs special attention as it will be difficult to obtain 
insurance coverage for satellites from insurers if the latter do not get a 
complete and timely insight into the technologies used. And the same applies 
to the post-accident investigations by or on behalf of the insurers for the 
settlement of claims. !TAR's requirement for a license for the export of 
technical data pertaining to the satellite to non-U.S. insurance underwriters 
complicates doing business with foreign- in practice mostly European -underwriters. 50 
47. See Sec 124.15 ("Special export controls for defense articles and services controlled under 
category XV: space systems and space launches"), at (a), (b), and (c). 
48. See AW/ST (Feb 22, 1999) at 24-25 ("Satellite builders fear export nightmare"); "The 
timeliness of export license reviews could be the deciding factor in a non-U.S. customer's 
decision whether to purchase a satellite from an American or European supplier." (A chart, 
accompanying the article, showed that almost half of the commercial GEO satellites on order 
at Hughes, Lockheed Martin and Loral, 28 on a total of 60, were from non-U.S. 
customers). 
49. Ibid. 
50. See Space News (Apr 5, 1999) 1, 20 at 20 ("Satellite buyers blast U.S. rules -American 
firms face irate customers"). 
339 
Chapter 4 
A point of major and obvious concern to the U.S industry is the exclusive 
'national security and foreign policy' basis for the licensing decisions of the 
State Department, which, in the plans of that Department as submitted to 
Congress, would not be subject to review by Commerce. 
And, of course, as a result of these tightened controls, the non-U.S. satellite 
builders, in particular the Europeans, would surely be the beneficiary, 
according to the U.S. companies concerned. 51 (That conclusion is being 
disputed as too simple by the European industry, in view of the fact that it is 
hard to find European satellites that do not have U.S. components in them, and 
these components are also subject to the stricter controls.52) 
But the most threatening aspect for the industry is not so much the legislation 
in itself, ill-advised and damaging as it may be, but the climate of uncertainty 
if not fear that has been created by the (handling of) the affair. Thus, in the 
Summer of 1998, the Administration was clearly intimidated by the above 
Congressional criticism and intent on refusing to give Congress further food 
for national security concerns, whether real or imagined. This resulted in 
embarrassing State Department actions preventing the Russian and Ukrainian 
Sea Launch partners from continuing technical talks with Boeing on the project 
and, as previously referred to, holding up Hughes Space and Communications' 
technical discussions with its customer APMT, and delaying approval of the 
saleY 
In a critical commentary, the trade press spoke of "the Clinton administration's 
overreaction to complaints from highranking members of Congress ... ", and 
observed: 
"The criticism has created a climate of fear so intense that officials at State, Defense and 
Commerce are scrutinizing even routine communication between U.S. companies and their 
customers in countries that are close U.S. allies, such as Canada and France."54 
The result of this scrutiny, combined with a dispute between State and 
Congress about (lack of) funding for the Department's additional licensing 
staff, has been "an enormous backlog of applications that grows with each 
51. See AW/ST (Feb 22, 1999) at 24-25. 
52. See Space News (Mar 15, 1999) 4, 20, at 20 ("U.S. export rules draw fire -European 
Commission seeks evidence to lodge protest"), hereinafter referred to as European 
Commission protest. 
53. See Space News Online (Jul 20, 1998) at 2 ("Russians, Ukrainians barred from Sea 
Launch") <http://www.spacenews .. members/sarch/sarch98/sn0720r.htm>; also Space 
News Online (Aug 17, 1998) at 14 ("Sea Launch Snafu") <http://www. 
spacenews .. members/sarch/sarch98/sn0817p.htm> and id. (Aug 24-30, 1998) ("Ouster of 
Hughes is painful APMT option") <http://www.spacenews.com/smembers/sweek/ 
index.html>. And, in Winter 1998/1999, as a result of the above, even the -normally 
smooth - launch contacts between Hughes and Arianespace became more complicated. 
54. See Space News (Apr 5, 1999) at 14 ("A bungled transition"). 
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passing day." The whole situation, according to the same commentary, 
"paralyzes the U.S. satellite industry and makes it difficult for manufacturers 
to engage in any business activity that involves clients outside the United 
States." In fact, the industry sees the government measures and control 
practices as a general crackdown on space related exports. As a result, during 
April 1999 an increasing number of U.S. companies reportedly felt obliged 
to seek alternatives in the U.S. for their- originally -foreign launch plans and 
U.S. satellite (component) manufacturers refrained from bidding for contracts 
offered by foreign clients. 55 
Both Canada and Europe in the meantime voiced their concern about the effect 
of the IT AR changes and the accompanying tightening of controls and 
enforcement which were already noticable before the amendments entered into 
force. 
Canada, thanks to its special defence economic relationship with the U.S., had 
been exempt from many of the provisions of the IT AR. Thus, for most defence 
articles and services no U.S. permits for export to Canada were required. 
To the dismay of the Canadian Defence Industries Association (CDIA), which 
published an assessment of the proposed ITAR amendments, the new ITAR 
reflects an abrupt departure from that special relationship. According to that 
report, 
"[t]he proposed changes to the ITAR will significantly increase the requirement for export 
licensing to Canada, negatively impact both US and Canadian defence firms, and present 
challenges to Canada-US relations on the national security, diplomatic, and international 
trade levels. "56 
More in particular, because of the inclusion of all spacecraft and commercial 
satellites, remote sensing satellites, Canada's speciality, will also be covered. 
As the report noted, 
"Canada has developed a global expertise in the design, development, and operation of 
remote sensing satellites, but since there is a degree of US technology in the Canadian 
product, then that technology and everything related to it comes under the IT AR. Moreover, 
55. See Space News Online (Apr 13, 1999): "Final Analysis Inc. is taking extra precautions [by 
checking into alternative launch plans using U.S. rockets] as it seeks a U.S. government 
license to export [LEO] communications satellites for launch on Russian Cosmos rockets."; 
"Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp ... declined to bid on two recent opportunities to sell 
advanced satellite imaging systems [to South Korea] ... because of the ongoing government 
crackdown on space-related exports." And, as the same issue reported, U.S. RLV firms see 
benefits from the export clampdown: "As long as there is a perception of difficulty in 
getting export licenses to launch satellites outside the [U.S.], U.S. reusable launch vehicle 
(RLV) builders [such as Kelly Space and Technology] see a heightened opportunity to book 
launch orders." 
56. An assessment of the proposed changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(!TAR) (Feb 26, 1999), CDIA <http://www.cdia.can/assessment.htm>, at l. 
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since the major shareholder of Canada's leading firm in this technology area is a US firm, 
then DOS could undertake to control the marketing of Canada's remote sensing technology 
and related products. The bottom line is that virtually all of Canada's space industry will 
be redefined as "military products and technology" and the control of a significant part of 
that industry assumed by the Department of State. ""57 
The report makes a number of other observations worth mentioning in the 
framework of an evaluation of the effects of U.S. laws, policies and practices 
on the (free) trade in launch services: 
(1) it sees "a growing protectionist sentiment in the US" as a background 
contributing factor to the IT AR update; 
(2) with its unilateral change of the rules of the export control game, the U .S. 
government introduces a risk factor in that Department of State approval for 
export permits for Canada cannot be accepted as a given. In fact, the resulting 
increased cost and delays may be so much of a hassle "that it will not be in 
the interest of the US firms to engage Canadian suppliers"; 
(3) finally, and maybe most importantly, an observation shared by other U.S. 
allies affected by the measures: 
" ... DOS action implies a determination that Canada cannot be trusted. "58 
Other companies outside the U.S., regular customers of the U.S. satellite 
manufacturers, voiced similar complaints. One European company, Societe 
Europeenne de Satellites (SES), the Luxembourg-based operator of the Astra 
direct-broadcasting satellite system, addressing a space insurance conference, 
said that he could not understand why the new U.S. procedures apply to 
NATO members and other U.S. allies in the same way as they apply to China: 
"[t]he policy should not affect U.S. allies. There should be some differentation introduced 
into the way the law is enforced. "59 
The European Commission, raising the issue with the U.S. administration on 
behalf of the European satellite manufacturing industry, shared that view, but 
added a more thorny dimension, namely that of trade and protectionism. 
According to a Commission official, 
57. Id., at 2. 
58. Id., at 3. An article in Space News on the Canadian report explains that "State proposed 
stiff revisions to ITAR [affecting Canada] in response to growing concerns that Canadian 
policies governing the export of U.S. made equipmentand technology are lax. U.S. officials 
are particularly worried about exports of restricted American-made military products that 
end up in countries such as China, Iraq and Iran", and mentions two (foiled) attempts, see 
Space News (Mar 22, 1999) 1, 19, at 19 ("Export rules worry Canada") . 
59. See Space News (Apr 5, 1999), at 20. 
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"[i]f it is strictly a national security issue in Washington, then of course European companies 
should not have to run a gantlet of restrictions."(emph. add.)60 
Europe's suspicion that the rationale for this Congressional legislation is at 
least partially trade-related was fuelled by language of the Strom Thurmond 
Act, such as: 
"It is the sense of Congress that--
··· (7) the United States should pursue policies that protect and enhance the United States 
space launch industry ... "61 
That trade-aspect is even more prevalent in the sections dealing with controls 
specifically directed at China. 
For example, Sec. 1512 of the Act requires the President to certify to the 
Congress at least 15 days in advance of any export to China of U.S. missile 
equipment or technology that 
"(1) such export is not detrimental to the United States space launch industry; and 
(2) the missile equipment or technology, including any indirect technical benefit that could 
be derived from such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch 
capabilities of the People's Republic of China." 
The interesting conclusion one can draw from this provision is that, not only 
is there a strong bias against China's GWIC becoming a safer, more efficient, 
and thus more competitive, launch provider (regardless of whether it has U.S. 
clients or not!), but also that the notion of (export of) civil launch equipment 
or technology is totally absent, which implies that, in the view of Congress, 
the latter simply does not exist as a good or service distinct from the military 
version. (The alternative interpretation, that the export of U.S.-made civil 
launch goods and services to China is not mentioned and is therefore possible 
without having to meet the above criteria, is less likely because of the above-
noted bias against China becoming a better launch provider.) 
Sec. 1515, entitled Report on export of satellites for launch by People's 
Republic of China, requires that any Presidential waiver of the Tiananmen 
satellite export restrictions to enable China to launch a satellite of U.S. origin 
or related items should be accompanied by a detailed justification setting forth, 
apart from a limited number of security-related items (such as "the reasons 
why the proposed satellite launch is in the national security interest of the 
60. See European Commission protest, supra note 52, at 4. 
61. Sec.l5ll. Sense of Congress, Strom Thurmond Act, supra note 34. Adding to their concern 
was the news that preparations for an Ariane launch of six Loral-made Globalstar satellites 
had to be halted because the required Technical Assistance Agreements, traditionally a rather 
routine matter for the European and American companies concerned, had not (yet) been 
approved by the State Dept., see Space News (Mar 1, 1999). 
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United States"(!)), the following, impressively exhaustive, amount of economy 
- and trade - related information: 
"(5) The impact of the proposed export on employment in the United States, including the 
number of new jobs created in the United State, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result 
of the proposed export. 
(6) The number of existing jobs in the United States that would be lost, on a State-by-State 
basis, as adirect result of the proposed export not being licensed. 
(7) The impact of the proposed export on the balance of trade between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China and on reducing the current United States trade deficit 
with the People's Republic of China. 
(8) The impact of the proposed export on the transition of the People's Republic of China 
from a non-market economy to a market economy and the long-term economic benefit to 
the United States. 
(9) The impact of the proposed export on opening new markets to United States-made 
products through the purchase by the People's Republic of China of United States-made 
goods and services not directly related to the proposed export. 
(10) The impact of the proposed export on reducing acts, policies, and practices that 
constitute significant trade barriers to United States exports or foreign direct investment in 
the People's Republic of China by United States nationals. 
(11) The increase that will result from the proposed export in the overall market share of 
the United States for goods and services in comparison to Japan, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Russia. 
(12) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness of the People's Republic of China 
to modify its commercial and trade laws, practices, and regulations to make United States-
made goods and services more accessible to that market. 
(13) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness of the People's Republic of China 
to reduce formal and informal trade barriers and tariffs, duties, and other fees on United 
States-made goods and services entering that country." 
It would be tempting to predict whether the President's report will succeed in 
providing a sufficiently satisfactory justification to prevent a Congressional 
rejection of a specific future U.S. satellite export to China. However, a 
detailed analysis per sub-heading clearly would fall outside the scope of this 
study. In any case, it would not change the overall conclusion the above 
provisions unavoidably lead to, namely that Congress, through the use of a 
veritable plethora of economic and trade-related criteria (in addition to national 
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security-based conditions) strongly discourages- and wants to discourage -the 
use of Chinese launch services for orbiting U.S.-made satellites. 62 
In fact, the Strom Thurmond Act has all the characteristics of a Congressional 
sanction imposed on the U.S. satellite manufacturers, the U.S. administration 
and the People's Republic of China. 
An interesting question in this connection is whether the Act, whether seen as 
a sanction or not, will be effective. In other words, will it serve e.g. its 
national security-related purposes. 
Part of the answer lies in the extent of foreign availability of the goods and 
technologies controlled by the Act. Another part lies in the export control 
behavior of the respective foreign authorities. For, as has been observed 
before, national controls of one country are basically only effective in two 
cases: 
a) when other countries' companies can not deliver comparable goods and/or 
services, 63 or 
b) when comparable goods are available in other countries, but the authorities 
concerned apply the same/comparable export controls as the first controlling 
country. 
The first question is therefore whether China will be able to buy commercial 
communications satellites from other countries. 
The answer is, in principle, yes: both European (e.g. DASA, Alenia and 
Aerospatiale) and Japanese companies (e.g. Mitsubishi, Toshiba, NEC) have 
the ability to manufacture these satellites. In fact, the U.S. commercial satellite 
industry now controls about 75% of the world market, and Europe (with 
between 20% and 25%)64 and Japan share the remainder. As for sales to 
62. The result of this Act may thus approach the purpose of a related bill which was (re-) 
introduced in the 106th Congress as H.R. 281 "[t]o prohibit the export to the [PRC] of 
satellites and related items" (Jan 6, 1999), Sec.l of which read: "Notwithstanding any 
provision of subtitle B of title XV of the [Strom Thurmond Act], or section 902 of the 
Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note), 
no satellite of United States origin or related items may be exported to the [PRC]." (emph. 
add.) On the above date the bill was referred to the House Committee on international 
relations; until April 1999 no action had been taken. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query 
etc.>. 
63. A Commerce report mentions some measures which are not subject to foreign substitution 
such as denial of a U.S. quota, withdrawal of port privileges or landing rights, and actions 
in international fmancial institutions to withhold loans and assistance, which cannot be 
undone or overcome by the target country, see 1999 Report on foreign policy export 
controls, U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration <http://www.bxa.doc. 
gov/PRESS/99/Repts/ForeignPolicyTOC.html> hereinafter referred to as BXA 1999 report, 
at 2. 
64. The U.S. percentage comes from the US Satellite Industry Association, see Clayton 
Mowrey, USA Today Search (Feb 23, 1999) ("U.S. denies satellite sale to China") 
<http://www .usatoday .corn!>; it tallies roughly with an - older - EC estimate which gave 
the European industry a 20-25% market share in the satellite manufacturing sector, see The 
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China, up to mid-1997, the U.S. accounted for 50% of all communications 
satellite and related equipment sales (with an estimated potential purchase by 
the Chinese of USD 3 billion over the next 10 years). 65 
The same affirmative answer should be given to the related question, namely 
whether other foreign buyers which choose an - uncertain - Chinese launch of 
their U.S. satellite will be able to, henceforce, buy non-U.S. satellites to avoid 
those launch uncertainties. 
As a senior Commerce official said after the denial of the Hughes satellite sale 
to China, 
"U.S. manufacturers could face difficulties in the worldwide market for commercial 
communications satellites if they cannot get licenses or if other countries perceive the [U. S.] 
companies will face trouble getting licenses."66 
The Satellite Industry Association, at the same occasion, put it more bluntly: 
"You're going to kill the golden goose ... You're creating a situation where the perception 
is you can't get a license or it's difficult to get a license67 
There is no doubt it will benefit the European satellite manufacturing industry, because it's 
going to be easier for customers to procure satellites from European suppliers. "68 
European Aerospace Industry- Meeting the global challenge, COM (97) 466 fin., European 
Commission, Brussels (Sep 24, 1997), at 1. The Japanese companies so far mainly produced 
for the Japanese market. That global competition, mainly between U.S. and American 
companies, is stiff can be also be deduced from the Canadian satellite manufacturer Spar 
Aerospace's decision to leave the satellite business: " ... Spar was not willing to make the 
investments necessary to bring its satellite divisions to the competitive level of the large 
U.S. and European companies", see Space News (Feb 15, 1999) at 16 ("Without satellites 
Spar expects profit in '99"). 
65. Statement by AlA President Don Fuqua at the occasion of the House vote on the renewal of 
China's MFN status (Jun 24, 1997), AlAA Legislative Update, Vol 3, No 2 (Jul 1997) 
<http://www.aiaa.org/policy/legupdate-07977.html> Another figure in this connection: of 
the 20 'Tiananmen waivers' granted by Presidents Bush and Clinton up to and including the 
February 18, 1998 waiver for the ChinaSat 8 manufactured by Loral, 15 concerned U.S.-
built satellites and 5 foreign-built satellites (with U.S. components), see Presidential satellite 
waivers and other related launch information, AlA (Jun 8, 1998) <http:/!aia-
aerospace.org/homepage/china _table l.html > the latter figures donot distinguish between 
satellites bought by China on the one hand and launched by China for a foreign buyer on the 
other hand. 
66. USA Today Search (Feb 23, 1999) ("U.S. denies satellite sale to China") <http:/!www. 
usatoday.cornl>. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Space News (Mar 15, 1999) at 8 ("Industry officials fear repercussions of license denial"). 
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In the same article, AlA vice president international affairs Johnson is quoted as follows: 
"Furthermore . . . European satellite builders could benefit from the perception among 
potential customers that U .S. satellite builders are less reliable because they cannot be sure 
launch plans will stay intact. Customers with many millions of dollars tied up in a single 
"Free and fair" trade in launch services: requirements and prospects 
And an editorial comment in the trade press of mid-1998 stated: 
"What sanctions will do is diminish U.S. influence over Chinese policy and help 
manufacturers in Europe and Japan sell satellites to China. U.S. sanctions aginst China 
would also mean higher launch prices throughout the world. Sanctions could also bring an 
end to U.S. dominance in satellite manufacturing."69 
But a comment made by a senior administration official at the occasion of the 
official rejection of the Hughes satellite sale to China put the foreign 
availability issue in perspective. He speculated that 
" ... the Chinese would likely move quickly to obtain a similar satellite from Europe, in part 
to drive home their ability to circumvent American restrictions and reward non-American 
competitors. However it appears unlikely that China could acquire technology as 
sophisticated as that offered by Hughes."70 (emph. add.) 
The question indeed is whether the products which are available in other 
countries are comparable, in quality/sophistication, price and delivery times 
with the U.S.-manufactured ones. 
Other views appear to echo the above opinion that the U.S. manufacturers, in 
particular undisputed market leader Hughes, make superior satellites: 
The Department of Commerce, reporting on the effectiveness of export 
controls, observes: 
"Although the United States is the world's leader, other countries produce commercial 
communications satellites ... "71 (emph. add.) 
And, similarly, in the trade press: 
"Though the U.S. still holds an enviable lead in satellite technology, Europe is pushing to 
catch up"72 (emph. add.) 
spacecraft cannot afford the uncertainty of not knowing when, or even if, a launch will be 
permitted by U .S. regulators .. " And an Australian spacebusiness expert said: "Anything that 
damages their [i.e. European and Asian satellite manufacturers'] competitors helps them ... 
The history of the U.S. space industry is dotted with government decisions which have 
advantaged the United States ' competitors, and this would appear to be another one." 
(Middleton, Asia Pacific Aerospace Consultants). 
69. Space News Online (Jun 8, 1998) at 18 ("The illusion of sanctions") <http://www. 
space news ... members/sarch/sarch98/sn0608i.htrn > . 
70. WSJ (Feb 23, 1999) ("Citing security, U.S. spurns China on satellite deal"). 
71. See BXA 1999 report, supra note 63, at 96. 
72. AW/ST (Jan 25, 1999) at 57. 
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In fact, non-American satellite producers are seen as lagging behind in all of 
the above three aspects, quality, price and delivery times, as illustrated by the 
following approximate 'grading' figures (based on a 'best buy' grade of 100 
















Though these figures suggest a less than complete foreign availability, it should 
be realized first, that not all foreign customers necessarily require - or can 
afford - the most sophisticated satellites, and secondly that the fast delivery 
time and other advantages of a U.S. satellite may be offset by the uncertainty 
about the delivery actually taking place within the agreed timeframe. In that 
sense, the Strom Thurmond Act brings a competitive advantage to the non-
U.S. manufacturers, the more so, since an increase in orders for the latter will 
undoubtedly have a positive influence on both quality, price and delivery times 
of the satellites they build (and thus further increase foreign availability!). 
Will the European manufacturers thus simply replace their U.S. competitors, 
thereby rendering the Strom Thurmond controls practically ineffective? A mere 
affirmative answer would ignore the fact that the countries concerned are 
signatories to both the W assenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime which provide guidelines for national export controls on 
satellites and missile/launcher technology. 
The question then is whether, and if so to what extent these countries will 
support this tightening of U.S. controls, in particular in respect of exports to 
China. 
There are many reasons why that scenario is unlikely. 
First, one should remember that in both W assenaar and MTCR the traditional 
partners of cold war times, forming the nucleus of both regimes, have been 
joined by other countries not sharing that same background and having their 
own alliances or relations with other countries outside the membership. This 
complicates the task of identifying - new - common threats and determining 
-new- common answers thereto. 
73. To avoid any misunderstanding, a lower grade means, per resp. category, a lower quality, a 
higher price and a longer delivery time. According to a RAND expert who provided the 
above grading on a non-attribution basis, the disparity is such that, in practice, "if not for 
U.S. export control delays, there would likely not be much of a contest in many cases", 
(Mar 4, 1999) (e-mail to author). A European and a Japanese satellite expert interviewed by 
the author both gave substantially higher grades for quality/sophistication to their own 
satellites. 
348 
"Free and fair" trade in launch services: requirements and prospects 
Secondly, Wassenaar, like its predecessor CoCom, has always treated 
commercial communications satellites as 'dual-use' goods and technologies, 
irrespective of- changes in- U.S. national categorization. 
Further, W assenaar does not see or treat China as a country of special concern, 
and it is unlikely that the Hughes case as such will change that status. 
A unanimous W assenaar decision to tighten controls on those satellites or to 
treat China as a higher security risk would then only be feasible if the 
confidential parts of the Cox Committee report, made available for that 
purpose to at least the other satellite-selling Wassenaar members, would reveal 
that the sale to and/or the launch by China of Western communications 
satellites brought dramatic consequences in the field of regional/ global security 
and/or missile proliferation. There is, at this stage, no indication that such 
information is contained in the report. 
Obviously, the export self-interest of the members concerned, coupled with 
doubts on their side about the 'purity' of the national security rationale behind 
the legislation and suspicions about partizan and sinophobe (and trade!) 
considerations influencing its adoption, would also tend to discourage any 
Wassenaar-wide tightening of satellite export controls vis-a-vis China.74 
Finally, coming back to the self-interest of the satellite-manufacturing 
Wassenaar members, U.S. military/intelligence information on the adverse 
effects of satellite sales to China or launches by China would have to be very 
convincing indeed to neutralize two crucial arguments favoring the continued 
use of Chinese launch services and the continued sale of satellites to China, 
namely 
a) the size and importance of the Chinese market for communications satellites, 
which cannot be ignored by any serious satellite manufacturer, and 
b) the limited availability of alternative launch capacity which would result in 
the disruption of satellite launch plans and delays of satellite-based 
telecommunications projects of both U. S. and foreign system operators. 75 
74. The U.S. administration is quite aware of the fact that, regardless of the China affair, 
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement do not necessarily share the same views on and/or 
interpretations of the obligations the regime entails. As the BXA 1999 report, supra note 63, 
observed, "[m]ost producers of commercial communications satellites ... are members of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement and are controlling these items as dual-use items (albeit with widely 
divergent licensing policies)." (emph. add.) 
75. The AlA, responding to the bill which would have prohibited U.S. satellite launches on 
Chinese rockets altogether, said: "[a]s alternatives to the Chinese Long March rocket are not 
available for two to three years, launch plans for U.S. telecommunications satellite 
consortiums will be disrupted giving foreign competitors an advantage in controlling the 
skies", Commercial satellite exports to China, AlA (Jun 4, 1998) <http://aia-aerospace. 
org/homepage/china_exports.html> Mid-1998 U.S. companies had booked options for 10 
Long March launches in addition to 4 U.S. satellites on backlog, see Satellite launch fact 
sheet, AlA (Jun 3, 1998) <http://aia-aerospace.org/homepage/china_facts.html>. In an 
editorial, Space News warned that, in addition to increasing launch prices throughout the 
world, "sanctions limiting Russian and Chinese commercial launch activity would create 
such a scarcity of launchers that some projects would have to be delayed, probably for years 
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Where multilateral and bilateral efforts vts-a-vis European eo-members to 
support stricter U.S. controls on satellite exports will therefore probably fail, 
the U.S. administration has one 'big stick' left, i.e. the strict enforcement of 
export controls on key U.S.-made satellite components used by non-U.S. 
satellite manufacturers. 
Earlier, reference was made to the Canadian Defence Industries Association's 
concern about the fact that the U.S. technology used in Canadian remote 
sensing satellites would bring the sale of those satellites under the - new -
IT AR export controls. 
A similar observation was made by the European satellite industry in reaction 
to the entry into force of the IT AR amendments: 
"It is hard to find European satellites that do not have U .S. components in them, and these 
components are also subject to the stricter controls ... In some cases there are only two 
manufacturers of a given component and we need the U .S. companies to assure our supply 
chain. I suppose in a few years we could replace U.S. suppliers, and in a few years we 
could see extra business if U .S. exports are shut down. For now, we have a problem. "76 
Obviously, the extent to which the U.S. will, ot threatens to, make use of its 
component export controls affects the freedom the countries concerned have 
or perceive having to make their complete satellites available to buyers or 
launch providers of which the U.S. disapproves. 
On the other hand, while such a measure could, in the short term, in principle 
be effective in making non-U.S. satellite manufacturers follow the strict U.S. 
approach, its use risks creating a major trade conflict with important trade 
partners and (NATO) allies such as Europe and Japan. 
Additionally, it will only further strengthen the resolve of the foreign 
governments concerned, already fuelled by the uncertainties and ambiguities 
inherent in the present system, to become totally self-sufficient in satellite 
components or, to use the expression commonly used in this connection, to 
"design out" U.S. parts or components, a possibility recognized by both the 
U.S. industry and the administration. 77 
... [And t]here are only a handful of launch pads around the world and many of them are 
operating near capacity", Space News Online (Jun 8, 1998) at 18 ("The illusion of 
sanctions") <http://www .spacenews ... members/sarchlsarch98/sn0608i.htm > . 
76. Space News (Mar 15, 1999) at 4, 20 ("U.S. export rules draw fire -European Commission 
seeks evidence to lodge protest"). And see note 65 supra (Tiananmen waivers for 5 foreign-
built satellites with U.S. components: these include DASA and Aerospatiale products). 
77. AlA's vice president for international affairs Johnson was reported to have said that 
"European executives had told him they plan to design U.S.-made components out of their 
satellites to avoid the hassle of new restrictions", AW/ST (Mar 29, 1999) at 37. The BXA 
1999 report, supra note 63, apart from seeing "conflicts with key allies" as part of the costs 
that come with unilateral sanctions, also remarks with regard to the recently imposed 
unilateral trade sanctions on India and Pakistan, that exporters have provided examples of 
Indian companies who have announced they will no longer do business with U.S. companies 
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One could conclude that the stricter, the more poorly targeted, broader or 
indiscriminately used or more doubtfully justified the unilateral controls turn 
out to be, the sooner they are undermined by the countries and companies 
affected, through 'go-it-alone' and independence-driven initiatives and the 
ensuing self-reliance. Unilateral controls thus dig their own graves. 
Although the other non-U.S. launch service providers do not face the same 
draconic restrictions as China, there is sufficient evidence in the letter and 
spirit of the above provisions to conclude that, notwithstanding the national 
security origin and purpose of this piece of Congressional legislation, it 
discourages, as an accepted by-product, the use of any foreign launch services. 
Whether the administration will relax the new export restrictions and, if so, 
vis-a-vis which countries, depends to a large extent on the (lobbying) activities 
of the victimized American and foreign companies and the latter's 
governments. Furthermore, the threat of another trade war with the EU or 
problems with the countries concerned in their capacity of NATO partners 
could influence the administration's thinking on the matter. 
But most of all it will depend on how Congress's views on the real or 
perceived national security and economic threats evolve - this includes the 
distinction between the two -, which emanate from doing (space) business with 
foreign countries. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the Congressional treatment of this issue 
is that the parochial, partisan and sometimes downright xenophobic character 
thereof leaves little room for compromise and reinforces the unpredictability 
of the laws, policies and practices with which the U.S. aerospace companies, 
whether engaged in the sale of satellites or launch services or in the 
procurement of launch services, have to cope. 
Though Congress is the place where the various views, interests and priorities 
of the American people, companies and other entities, should be heard 
(whether on human rights, religion, WMD proliferation, minorities or other 
matters), it is the use of sanction legislation which, apart from its testimonial 
character and (possible) interference with Administration policies and 
strategies, has a strong 'rogue of the month' character which increases the 
and are designing out U.S. parts and components. "This "designing out" phenomenon, as 
has been frequently noted, can damage the position of U.S. exporters beyond the loss of 
markets in the sanctioned country itself." Similarly, Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of 
State, in 1997 testimony before a House Committee, quoted from studies which not only 
pointed to cases of 'designing out', but also to reports "that foreign firms have intentionally 
switched R & D away from the U.S. to Europe because of a desire to avoid sanctions 
problems", see Remarks before the U.S. [H.R.] Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee (Oct 
23, 1997) <http://www. state.gov /www/policy _ remarks/971 023 _ eizen _ house.html > , 
hereinafter referred to as Eizenstat 1997. 
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uncertainties U. S. exporters in general and high tech aerospace companies in 
particular have to face. 
Congress, on the one hand endorsing a "stable and predictable environment 
for the U.S. commercial space industry", in its actions appears to move into 
a direction opposite to liberalization and thus constitutes a barrier to increased 
'free and fair trade' in international launch services as the concept is seen by 
the Administration and by the customers. 
A few final words on the increasing use of the sanctions 'weapon' as such. 
According to the President's Export Council, sanctions have been imposed 
more than 60 times since 1993 alone, more than in the preceding 80 years 
since World War I. This does not include nearly 100 state and local sanctions 
measures that are pending or already in force, creating additional complexity 
and obstacles for exporters. 78 
In a recent article on sanctions, appropriately headed "Addicted to sanctions 
- At this rate, the whole world will face U.S. penalties", the author submits 
that "[n]o other country on Earth opts for sanctions as often as America ... 
[they] currently affect more than 70 countries, home to two thirds of humanity 
••• " 79 The author continues with the following observation: 
" ... in city councils as in Congress, it is often emotion and short-term political calculation 
that drive the action, rather than confidence in the long-term success of sanctions." 
And he quotes a Representative trying to reform the sanctions process: 
"A wave comes over this institution ... You get a kind of rage here that develops over some 
conduct, and economic sanctions are the result. "80 
As observed before, the danger lies in other countries refusing to join (because 
of 'sanctions fatigue'), resulting in only U.S. suppliers getting a reputation for 
unreliability and losing business to overseas competitors: "In 1995 alone, 
unilateral sanctions cost the U.S. economy an estimated $15 to $19 billion and 
up to 260. 000 jobs", quotes the same author the Institute for International 
Economics, a non-profit Washington think tank. 
But one of the most serious aspects in the framework of this study is not so 
much the ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions (which have so far never been 
submitted to a cost-benefit analysis), but the way these are used by Congress 
78. See Majak, Update 98 remarks, supra note 31. According to Smith, Hughes' CEO, 
probably using the same source, since WW 11, Congress has passed more than 100 pieces of 
legislation that include economic sanctions, 61 of which have passed during President 
Clinton's administration. "And 26 more unilateral sanction bills are pending in this 
Congress.", see Smith Deregulation 1998, supra note l. 
79. See U.S. News & World Report 30-31 (Jun 15, 1998) at 30. 
80. See ibid. 
352 
"Free and fair" trade in launch services: requirements and prospects 
to make or influence ad hoc foreign policy. As a spokesman for Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms is quoted: 
"All of these sanctions are essentially a vote of no confidence in the administration to 
achieve these [foreign policy] goals by other means. "81 
If we look again at the discussions in Congress about the Chinese launch 
issues, at the ensuing legislation and at the consequences thereof for the space 
(launch) industry, the above quote reflects a tendency which does not create 
much confidence in a constructive, predictable and even-handed approach 
towards the U. S. launch and satellite manufacturing industries' concerns and 
expectations with respect to their trade with foreign countries. The results of 
these Congressional actions seriously reduced prospects for a free(er) trade in 
launch services. 
4.2 The position of the main foreign 'market economy' launch 
providers 
To what extent does the free and fair trade 'a I' Americaine' provide an 
acceptable and workable environment for the U.S. launch companies' main 
foreign competitor, Arianespace? 
4. 2.1 Arianespace 
First, it should be recalled that it was primarily U.S. protectionism which led 
to the creation of Arianespace. If the U.S., in the early 1970's, had not 
attached restrictive conditions to the launch of European satellites, the incentive 
to 'go-it-alone' would have been much weaker, particularly as the European 
wish to have access to space was not so much based on overriding military or 
'national' security considerations, but rather on the wish to be, also in the 
promising space (applications) field, economically and scientifically, and of 
course also politically, independent from other countries. A more forthcoming 
U.S. government attitude might have convinced Europe to stick to the -
undoubtedly much cheaper- practice of buying launch services from the U.S. 
Second, 'assured access to space' is now as much an article of faith in Europe 
as it is in the U.S. Whether based on a combination of the above 
considerations alone or also on 'national prestige' or perhaps even - originally -
Americanophobic feelings, this principle will determine European policies and 
reactions to any threat to Arianespace's continued existence. 
81. See id., at 31. 
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Third, to the extent the U.S. laws, policies and practices have worked against 
the interests of e.g. the U.S. satellite manufacturers by limiting their choice 
of foreign - 'non-market economy' - launch companies and/or by imposing 
sanctions on (potential) foreign customers, they benefited Arianespace. 
On the other hand, the controlled entry of the new launch providers from 
China, Russia and Ukraine, the increasing access of these companies to the 
international commercial launch market and the future termination by the U.S. 
of the capacity quota and price restrictions all mean extra competition for the 
U.S. launch companies, but much more so for Arianespace. This is partly 
because the U.S. companies have concluded alliances with Russian and 
Ukrainian counterparts which not only strengthen their competitive position 
in the commercial launch market but also return part of the liberalization 
benefits to the U.S. companies. And, where the U.S. companies have an 
assured 'captive' government market of substantial proportions, Arianespace 
operates and has to survive in the international commercial launch market, 
making that company more vulnerable to any new (U.S.-assisted) entrants. 
Fourth, though the U.S. launch companies have the benefit of not only 
guaranteed government service contracts ('fly U.S.') but also government 
production contracts (EELV), this is not necessarily a permanent advantage. 
For one thing, to the extent the government has taken the initiative and pays 
a large part of the bills for EELV research and development it also 'calls the 
shots'. The launch companies rightly foresee important commercial benefits 
to be derived from the use of the EELV on the international market, but, both 
in the R&D stage and in the operational phase, they will have to please two 
masters, with priority understandably going to the Department of Defense. 
That in itself is not necessarily a major handicap, apart from the risk that either 
the Administration or Congress changes its priorities (with the yearly 
Authorization and Appropriation battles in the latter forum providing every 
opportunity for members of Congress to challenge or attach conditions to 
DOD's support for this program). And, conversely, where the market has been 
shifting more and more to the private commercial customers, meeting the 
demands of the latter with respect to the product becomes of crucial 
importance, and, consequently, possible adaptions to the design brought about 
by DOD demands will make the launch companies more vulnerable to 
(potential) consumer discontent and counter-demands. 
The growing importance of the private commercial market, both for the GEO 
and MEO/LEO, has also the effect of diminishing the relative importance of 
the U.S. government market. This may not in the short term reduce European 
apprehension about a playing field which, because of the absence of a 
comparable military and civil government contract base, is far from level, but 
it does in the longer term tend to even out the differences, and, in so far as 
private customers are still more difficult to please, gives, in the meantime, 
Arianespace to some extent an advantage in the experience gained in that 
market. 
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Fifth, apart from having merged into aerospace conglomerates of considerable 
technological and financial strength, the U.S. companies have also broadened 
their product base and opened up additional markets through the alliances 
concluded with Russian and Ukrainian launch providers. Arianespace, by 
comparison, is a very small company, operating separately from - and without 
semi-automatic 'family support' of- the large European aerospace companies. 
The combination of its limited size and financial elbow-room on the one hand 
with the company's focus on the international commercial market on the other 
hand dictate that, in the short term, its product base can only be widened and 
its market access increased to any appreciable extent by the conclusion of 
alliances with foreign launch partners. Where Arianespace has so far concluded 
only arrangements of limited scope with Russian and Indian launch entities, 
the European company could consider concluding strategic cooperative 
agreements with another non-aligned launch provider, such as the China Great 
Wall Industry Corporation. 
In the present China-related political environment in the U.S., a link-up of a 
U.S. launch company with CGWIC would be fraught with legal and political 
problems and uncertainties, affecting the U.S. company's continued freedom 
to do business with the government and with the U. S. satellite manufacturers 
and operators. And, with the major U.S. launch companies already engaged 
in joint ventures with Russian counterparts and thus possessing launch 
capabilities fit for all sectors of the market, there would be little inclination 
on the U.S. side to engage in this kind of politically sensitive partnership. 
A company like Arianespace, owned by European interests and incorporated 
in France, is of course also subject to Wassenaar and MTCR-based controls. 
But, in practice, national security and foreign policy considerations will play 
a much less prominent role in the national interpretation and application of 
these controls than in the U.S. There is, consequently, -and apart from 
'constitutional' differences -little chance that Europe will share the U.S. view 
based on these considerations that the launch of Western-made satellites by the 
Chinese should be discouraged to prevent the transfer of satellite and launcher 
know-how to the latter or that launcher cooperation with China is not an option 
because of its inherent relevance for missile development. Arianespace would 
therefore be in a much better position to establish an alliance with the Chinese 
launch company and to offer their combined respective products to the 
international market. And the Strom Thurmond Act surely provides some 
strong incentives to the Chinese to seriously consider this possibility. 
It must be assumed, though, that the same Sinophobic attitude of Congress 
which presently affects both U.S. launch companies and the satellite 
manufacturers and operators, could also result in U.S. government challenges 
of Arianespace's position as a competitor in the U.S. market, at present still 
free to attract commercial (non-governmental) clients (though - at least 
temporarily- affected by the Strom Thurmond controls). The fact of a 
European-Chinese alliance as such would create misgivings on the part of the 
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U.S. government in view of the possibility oflaunch and/or satellite technology 
exchanges between the partners. 
The joint sale of Long March vehicles along the lines of the U .S. -Russian joint 
ventures would, if involving U.S. satellites, of course face the full array of 
U.S. export control-related restrictions without the mitigating effect of U.S. 
company lobbying. 
A possible way out of the latter problem, insofar as it is caused by launches 
taking place from Chinese territory, would be the Cape York inspired variant 
of having Long March launches performed from the Guyana space center, 
which, in the context of export controls, is more 'friendly' French territory. 
(One must assume that the absence of a direct U.S. company interest in such 
a set-up would reduce the U.S. government's interest in fostering the 
regulatory and practical viability of U.S. non-governmental payloads being 
launched through this arrangement. On the other hand, Arianespace could 
probably count on the support of the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry for 
an alliance which would introduce European quality control standards and sales 
(support) practices into the Chinese launch business, making the Long March 
a more feasible alternative to U.S. launches than it is at present.) 
Is there a possibility for Arianespace to join forces with a U.S. launch 
company? Its most valuable asset (apart from the Ariane family of launchers 
and its international customer base) is the Kourou Equatorial launch base, 
which would be an attractive 'dowry' for any U.S. launch company engaging 
in, or aspiring to engage in, GEO launches. Given Boeing's equatorial launch 
opportunities through Sea Launch and Lockheed Martin's cooperation with the 
Russian Proton builders, this would appear to leave the various smaller 
(upcoming) launch companies as potential candidates for an alliance with 
Arianespace, possibly along the lines of the latter company's arrangements with 
ISRO/ Antrix or with the Russian Soyuz manufacturers. One major aspect to 
be taken care of would be that a joint venture type of arrangement would have 
to provide for such ownership/control by the U.S. company concerned that the 
latter would not risk loosing its American 'nationality' which would have 
predictable consequences for its right to carry government payloads under the 
'fly U.S.' policy and legislation. 
Sixth, though at various occasions in the past, U.S. launch companies, with 
the support of members of Congress have made pleas for agreeing on rules 
of the road with Europe (read: curtailing Arianespace's successful competitive 
efforts), there is at present little inclination on the U.S. side to either start 
bilateral or multilateral talks to that end. Where subsidization would 
traditionally be one of the subjects brought on the table by the U.S. side, it 
would at this stage of the 'game' be rather counterproductive to initiate 
discussions on the issue, the more so as, in that context, the European side 
would undoubtedly raise not only the government subsidy aspects of the EEL V 
program, but also, as it has done in the past, the issue of 'fly U.S.'. 
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Finally, the U.S. regulatory environment, though for the time being dominated 
by national security considerations which even affect European companies, will 
be more and more influenced by fast-growing, increasingly powerful, private 
satellite manufacturing and satellite system operators' and communications 
conglomerates, which, whether they are eo-owner of U.S. launch companies 
or not, will have a higher priority than that of the protection of or restrictions 
on any specific 'national' or other launch company: the satellites have to get 
into orbit and start earning money, and timely and reliable transportation at 
a decent price therefore has to be assured. That, in the longer run, will 
determine, more than anything else, the U.S. government's regulatory 
approach towards 'free and fair trade in international launch services'. 
Arianespace would appear to be well positioned to play a successful and 
profitable role in that environment. 
The company's weakest point - apart from the lack of a large captive 
government market - is probably the fact that it does not (yet) form part of an 
aerospace conglomerate of a size, scope and financial clout comparable to 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin. It will undoubtedly require considerable time 
and (regulatory) effort for the European launch service provider to further level 
the playing field by allying with the European aerospace industry whose 
restructuring is in statu nascendi (and long overdue). That, and maintaining 
its commercial and operational flexibility during the process, will be its 
greatest challenge for the years to come. In the meantime, it will have to rely 
on the European Union's political clout and determination to fight those aspects 
and effects of U.S. export controls which are patently trade-related and/or 
competition distorting. 
4.2.2 Japan 
What is Japan's position in this regulatory environment? 
It has been noted before that, for many years, Japan's access to space was 
dependent on U.S. launch technology, with a corresponding U.S. say over its 
commercial use. The resulting limitations were sufficient reason for Japan to 
'go-it-alone' and develop the H-2 launch vehicle, indigenously built, but very 
costly and therefore unfit for the commercial market. The urgently felt need 
for a stronger and cheaper version has led to the purchase of a U.S. engine 
to power the H-2A, resulting in a return to a measure of U.S. dependence in 
the form of- primarily non-proliferation related - export licence conditions. 
These conditions will not stand in the way of Japan's access to the international 
commercial launch market, but form nevertheless a possible means for the 
U.S. (Administration or Congress) to exert some influence on Japanese 
behaviour. With a 'national security-neutral' status comparable to Europe's, 
-with concomitant effects of Strom Thurmond type U.S. controls- Japan will 
probably only be faced with U.S. government measures if its competitive 
behaviour clashes with the U.S. concept of free and fair trade in launch 
services (which would imply a situation in which RSC consistently and 
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successfully underbids its U.S. competitors- both in the U.S., worldwide and 
in the Japanese market- and the U.S. satellite manufacturers and operators 
would have sufficient alternatives not to be unduly worried by trade sanctions 
involving restrictions of Japanese access to the U.S. launch market.) 
Though there is a long history of U.S.-Japanese trade conflicts resulting from 
aggressive marketing of Japanese products, it falls outside the scope of this 
study to predict if and to what extent Japan's launch company, once the H-2A 
is fully operational, will show such sanction/retaliation-inviting behaviour vis-
a-vis its U.S. competitors. Although in the mean time the Japanese have 
already concluded H-2A launch contracts with both Hughes and Loral, it still 
has to prove the operational and commercial viability of this launch vehicle, 
both domestically and abroad. 
The delayed and limited availability of launchers and launch windows will, for 
some years to come, determine to a larger extent the level of impact of Japan 
on the international commercial launch market than the U.S. laws, policies and 
practices in this field. 
4.2.3 India 
There is also India, a prime example of a country whose launch industry has 
been curbed in its development by national security and foreign policy-inspired 
U.S. restrictions and sanctions. 
One must assume that, even after the Glenn amendment sanctions have been 
withdrawn, the U.S will continue to treat India as a proliferation hazard 
because of its missile program and its strained relations with Pakistan. MTCR-
related controls may be expected to remain in place, affecting the development 
of India's launch industry. But, as we saw before, India's long-standing 
determination to 'go-it-alone' (with, at least in the past, a little help from its 
friend Russia), was actually strengthened by the restrictions on the transfer of 
foreign launch technology. To become self-supporting in both LEO and - in 
the near future - GEO satellite launches, in these circumstances, is nevertheless 
a major accomplishment. However, the rationale for both the MTCR controls 
(i.e. to prevent missile programs from getting 'off the ground') and for the 
restrictions on the export of other high tech goods such as satellites (i.e. to 
prevent certain countries from becoming smarter and better (militarily) 
equipped than considerations of national/regional security and foreign policy 
would dictate) will continue to result in the Indian launch industry's 
development being hampered by the forced lack of cooperation with foreign 
launch (technology) providers and will prevent U.S. satellite manufacturers 
and operators from concluding launch contracts with India's Antrix 
Corporation or with Arianespace for the use of the Indian PSL V (or, in the 
future, its GSLV). 
The recent Congressional concerns about the national security aspects of 
Chinese launches of U.S. satellites and the adoption of the Strom Thurmond 
Act have made that abundantly clear. 
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4.3 Legal remedies against (the effects ot) U.S. controls? 
An interesting question at this - late - stage is that of the possible remedies 
against (the effects of) the U.S. laws, policies and practices. 
The answer to this question is of interest to at least two distinct groups, the 
U.S. companies on the one hand and the foreign companies and countries 
concerned on the other hand, in other words the domestic and the foreign 
parties. 
4.3.1 U.S. law 
As for the former, though it is both interesting and challenging to investigate 
the national remedies available to the satellite manufacturers and launch 
companies vis-a-vis the U.S. government in connection with its laws, policies 
and practices as reviewed in the preceding chapters, it falls largely outside the 
scope of the present study and will, therefore, be treated in a limited way only. 
Chapter 2.3, which dealt with (U.S.) satellite and missile technology export 
controls, explained the regulatory framework within which U.S. companies, 
engaged in the manufacture and export of high tech aerospace products, have 
to function. 
In fact, every U.S. citizen, whether a natural or juridical person, who 
concludes a contract which involves the export of 'arms', 'munitions', 'defense 
articles', dual use goods or technologies, knows- or is supposed to know -that 
the AECA and/or the EAA applies to his (intended) transactions. He also 
knows that those Acts give broad powers to the State Department and 
Commerce respectively to apply in full, or not to apply at all, c. q. to suspend 
or modify any or all of the export regulations concerned, on national security, 
foreign policy or other grounds. Moreover, certain categories of defense 
articles cannot be exported without prior notification to Congress, with the 
concomitant right of Congress to approve or disapprove the export, or approve 
subject to conditions. Additionally, the above Acts require the imposition of 
sanctions, inter alia in the field of high tech exports, on countries which have 
violated MTCR standards of behaviour. 
That is why U.S. satellite manufacturers and U.S. launch service providers, 
whenever they conclude a contract which involves the export of their goods, 
technologies and services, will include a clause which emphasizes that the 
contract is subject to all U.S. laws and regulations relating to exports. Thus, 
for example, a Martin Marietta - Intelsat launch service contract of 1987 
provided: 
"This contract is subject to all United States Jaws and regulations relating to exports and 
to all administrative acts of the U.S. Government pursuant to such Jaws and regulations. "82 
82. See art. 22.1, Contract for commercial launch services of Aug 10, 1987 between Martin 
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Not only do the U.S. firms concerned know (and take into account) that these 
laws and regulations apply, they also have to accept the risk that the 
(application of the) regulations may be amended or suspended, either by 
Congressional intervention or by new Presidential policies. (Also in this regard 
the space business, because of its high political profile and its national security 
and foreign policy aspects, is a high risk activity, which U.S. companies 
nevertheless engage in because of the (potential for) high rewards). The above 
cited risk is usually handled, in more recent contracts, under an 'excusable 
delays' clause, which would exclude liability for delay in performance by 
either side arising from acts of any governmental authority (in its sovereign 
or contractual capacities), including inability to obtain any necessary export 
licenses, unavailability of launch ranges, requirements for clearance times 
between launches, inability to obtain necessary and appropriate third party 
liability insurance, etc. 
In the above regulatory and political environment, there appears to be 
practically no room for challenging the legality of the U.S. government's 
regulatory measures, policies and practices in this field, or for demanding 
compensation for the adverse consequences thereof. 
In fact, in the light of the above contractual provisions which discourage 
customers from suing their contractors, it is not surprising that it is difficult 
to find any suit in the U.S. arising from government action, such as the 
imposition of sanctions on foreign governments or companies, affecting the 
sale of satellites or other space hardware or the provision of launch services. 83 
Marietta Corp. and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization Intelsat, text 
in Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space -Problems of law and policy 
(2nd ed.) 310-319 (1997) at 319. 
83. After the August 1994 expiration of the Export Administration Act (EAA), the 
administration proposed a revised EAA based on a number of principles which took account 
of the changes which had taken place in the world in the political, technological and security 
field since the adoption of the EAA of 1979. Particular emphasis was put on balancing the 
overall goal of the new act, namely the prevention of WMD proliferation, with "the growing 
dependence of our own military on strong high technology companies here at home 
developing state of the art products and, in turn, those companies' need to export to 
maintain their cutting edge." This, in the view of Commerce, required - apart from inter 
alia the establishment of a clear preference for export controls exercised in conjunction with 
the multilateral nonproliferation regimes- increased focus "on our own economic security 
by greater discipline on unilateral controls" and "expanded rights !for exporters] to petition 
for relief from ineffective controls ... ", ( emph. add.) a so-called "unfair impact provision". 
A Congressional bill of 1996, the Omnibus Export Administration Act of 1996, H.R. 361, 
was largely similar to the administration's proposal, and also contained an "unfair impact 
provision" which clarified exporters'rights to petition for relief from burdensome and 
ineffective export control requirements; however, unlike the administration's proposal, it 
failed to include ineffective controls and competitive disadvantage as grounds for such 
petitions, see On reauthorization of the Export Administration Act, William Reinsch, 
testimony before the House international relations committee, Subcommittee on international 
economic policy and trade (Mar 3, 1999) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/99/EAAReauth. 
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4.3.2 Space law 
As for the foreign parties, we will look beyond the U.S. -China, Russia and 
Ukraine launch trade agreements which all explicitly subject the rights and 
obligations contained therein to the U.S. export laws and regulations. The 
parties concerned know and have accepted that each individual case of a U.S. 
satellite export (for launch by any of the three countries concerned) will be 
dealt with in conformity with these laws and regulations and will only be 
licensed if the U.S. interpretation/application of these laws and regulations so 
allow. 
To determine what remedies, in the non-contractual sphere, affected countries 
may have in the face of the above U.S. laws, policies and practices, one may 
consider first the relevant lex specialis of international law, i.e. the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty. 
The main provisions a 'victimized' country would find on the subject are the 
preamble and articles 1, 3 and 9. These provisions and some additional ones 
in the Treaty all emphasize two important guiding principles of space law as 
formalized by the Treaty, i.e. that of the the "common interest of all mankind" 
in the exploration and use of outer space, the equal right of all states to engage 
in such exploration and use and the requirement that such exploration and use 
should be carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries", 
and, additionally, the principle of (international) cooperation. The 'core' 
provision is Article 1, which reads as follows: 
"The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree 
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration 
and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial 
bodies. 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation 
in such investigation" .84 (emph. add.) 
html>. Neither of the two regulatory measures have become law so far, and the present 
Congress clearly does not give a high priority to the expansion of U.S. exporters' rights in 
the field of export controls. 
84. The preamble of the Space Treaty reads, in part: ... "recognizing the common interest of all 
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of 
all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, desiring to 
contribute to broad international cooperation both in the scientific as well as the legal aspects 
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The general question, which has been debated ever since the Space Treaty 
entered into force, revolves around the extent to which this provision obliges 
states with space capabilities and space programs to share the benefits derived 
there from with non-'space-faring' nations (in practice in particular the 
developing countries). The latter always maintained that the above provision 
was intended to go further than allowing every country and its citizens to buy 
space-derived products and services in the market place at a price determined 
freely by the space-power(s)' companies concerned. And that, being able to 
become a member of Intelsat, install satellite communications groundstations 
and buy mobile phones, navigation systems, or groundreceivers for remote 
sensing satellite pictures, or leak-proof space pens, or arrange for a space-
burial, though undoubtedly amounting to a sharing in the benefit of space 
exploration and use, still did not reflect the letter and spirit of the above 
Treaty. Those countries believed "that the practical value of article 1 laid in 
international cooperation in space activities. It was only through such 
cooperation that the benefits of outer space activities could be realized by all 
States". 85 
The conclusion that article 1 obliged the space 'haves' to engage in space 
cooperation with the space 'have-nots' found no sympathy with the former, 
who maintained that such an interpretation of the 'benefits' provision would 
infringe upon their sovereign right to choose whether, with whom and how 
to cooperate. Since 1986, for some ten years, the members of the UN 
committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, and more in particular of its 
legal subcommittee, have discussed a set of principles which would give more 
'teeth' to the above provision to the benefit of the developing countries, while 
still respecting the rights of the space 'haves' to decide in each specific case 
on the identity of the partner and the extent of the space cooperation. 86 
(This discussion, far from having a negative impact on space cooperation in 
practice, may in fact have contributed to an increase in cooperative ventures: 
through the years, the number, size and scope of bilateral and multilateral 
space cooperation programmes have been impressive. 87 From this very 
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes ... " Art. 3 provides: "States 
parties to the treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, 
including the Charter of the [UN], in the interest of maintaining international peace and 
security and promoting international cooperation and understanding." Finally, art. 9 states: 
"In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
States parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual 
assistance ... " Note that there is a certain emphasis on scientific cooperation, basically the 
only type of space cooperation between the Western world and the communist countries 
realistically possible in the 1960's. 
85. See Jitendra S. Thaker, The development of the outer space benefits declaration, XXII-I 
Annals of Air and Space L. 537-558 (1997) hereinafter referred to as Thaker 1997, at 539. 
86. See id., passim. 
87. See e.g. Highlights in space -Progress in space science, technology and applications, 
international cooperation and space law 1997, A.AC.105/691, U.N. Office for Outer Space 
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phenomenon the argument arose that the formulation of guiding (binding) 
principles on space cooperation was - apparently - superfluous). 
The discussion on the contents ofthe principles also made clear that the 'space 
powers' do not see article 1 of the Space Treaty as creating a legal obligation 
to give, share or cooperate when it comes to their space goods, services and 
technologies. And the end-result, a Declaration adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, reflects two basic considerations of a French-German proposal to 
the Committee along that line, i.e. (1) States are free to determine all aspects 
of their cooperation, and (2) States will choose the most efficient and 
appropriate mode of cooperation in order to allocate resources efficiently. 88 
The Declaration, also referred to as the "Outer space benefits declaration", 
does encourage States with space capabilities to share the benefits thereof 
through cooperation with interested countries, and more in particular with 
developing countries, but it does not create nor aim at creating a legal 
obligation to do so. In fact, its adoption reinforces the view supported by 
doctrine that article 1 of the Space Treaty does not create such an obligation 
either. 89 
Applied to launching, an activity covered by the term "exploration and use of 
outer space", the above position would result in a negative answer to the 
question whether the article imposes an undisputed obligation on the U.S. 
government to 
(a) share its launch technology with other countries ("all countries"), and/or 
(b) permit such other countries to launch U.S. satellites, and/or 
(c) permit any of those countries to perform launches from U.S. spaceports. 
(And, for all practical purposes, 'other countries' would include, a fortiori, 
foreign private companies, on whose rights and obligations the Space Treaty 
is largely silent). 
It should be recalled in this connection that the above activities also fall under 
the general heading of 'trade', which, if one approaches the matter from 
another angle, raises the question whether States have the right to discriminate 
Affairs, U.N., New York (1998). 
88. See Thaker 1997, supra note 85, at 551, 553. On Dec 13, 1996, the UNGA, by Resolution 
51/122, unanimously adopted the Declaration on international cooperation in the exploration 
and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all States, taking into particular 
account the needs of developing countries; for text, see id, App. 1, at 556-558. 
89. See e.g. Bin Cheng, The 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Thirtieth anniversary: "In Article 1 of 
the Space Treaty on the subject of international cooperation, the space powers paid lip 
service to the developing countries. Some countries have ever since tried very hard to give 
Article 1 an excessively literal interpretation involving a legally binding obligation. Such 




in foreign trade between recipients of their goods and services and between 
the countries they wish to procure goods and services from. The answer to that 
question is yes, unless they have specifically agreed to impose limitations on 
that right. The prime example thereof is the 'package' of agreements concluded 
under the WTO umbrella. States decide whether and to what extent they give 
up the right to discriminate, between nationals and foreigners and amongst 
foreigners. And, though they increasingly liberalize world trade in goods and 
services, States do so after a weighing of the pro's and con's and starting from 
the legal principle that they don't have to give up their right to discriminate 
(i.e. the right to choose whom to trade with). 
From that perspective, the above question may be phrased differently, viz. did 
the United States (or any other State for that matter) explicitly, that is, by 
becoming a party to the Space Treaty or to any other multilateral or bilateral 
agreement or arrangement, commit itself to trade with certain (or all) countries 
in specific (or all) sectors of the space industry. 
As we saw above, the Space Treaty does not take away the right of member 
States to choose partners, to decide with whom to cooperate and share 
knowledge or whom to trade with. And the veritable plethora of bilateral 
agreements on space cooperation concluded since the advent of the space age 
has not changed the voluntary character of that cooperation. 
The above brief GATS review has shown that the U.S., party to the GATS 
and the GP A, has refrained from making a commitment with respect to launch 
services and has excluded these services from the GPA. It had and continues 
to have the right to do so. An important reason for the U.S. approach is 
national security, a concept which in internationalibus is one of the most 
effectively used justifications for not trading (in certain goods/services) with 
certain countries. 
In that connection, another arrangement should be recalled, that of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime of 1987/1993. The MTCR which aligns and 
coordinates national missile and launch technology export controls and in fact 
created a common -national/regional/global security motivated- 'we don't 
want to trade in these goods and technologies with you' front against all 
outsiders. Both this multilateral regime and the national export control 
regulations of the MTCR countries re-emphasize the right of countries to freely 
choose the parties they wish to do business with, a fortiori when it concerns 
goods, services and technology which, because of their high tech, dual-use 
character, possible or intended use and/or the identity of the end-user, bear 
a clear national security stamp. 
In other words, it cannot be substantiated that there exists an obligation for 
space launch 'haves' to share launch technology, through sale or cooperation, 
with a space launch 'have-not', whether friend or foe. 
Nor is there an obligation for satellite manufacturing countries to permit the 
sale and export of their satellites to a foreign customer or to license the export 
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of their satellite - whether government or privately owned - for the purpose 
of launching by a foreign entity. 
Finally, nothing in present international/space law infringes upon the right of 
a State to decide whether and if so, under what conditions, a spaceport, which 
is domestically (government or privately) owned, operated and/or licensed, 
may be made available to foreign launch providers. 
What remains to be discussed then is whether the above state of affairs is one 
that needs or deserves to be challenged or, alternatively, is acceptable as a 
status quo. This question will be dealt with in the last part of this study, the 




Conclusions and recommendations 
There is little doubt that the U.S. export controls, discussed in the preceding 
Chapters, intend to serve a respectable purpose, i.e. that of national and global 
security. 
This involves controls on the flow of goods and technologies that (may) serve 
as weapons and a careful monitoring of the in -and export and R & D 
behaviour of other countries, either because they are known or suspected to 
be - potential - producers and sellers of these goods and technologies, or 
because they import these goods and technologies thereby creating a threat to 
U. S. , regional or global security, peace and stability. 
In this connection, terrorist (-supporting) countries are of particular concern 
and are therefore subject to special scrutiny. 
To the extent that other countries, allies of the U.S., share the same goals and 
perceive the same threats to the attainment of those goals (e.g. proliferation 
of chemical weapons or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), they will follow or 
support the U.S. in taking such measures as export restrictions, sanctions or 
other common actions. 
The U.S.' role as the sole super power and global security guard, taking and 
initiating the measures it deems fit, commands respect rather than universal 
love. 
But that respect may find its limits in a number of situations: first, in cases 
where disagreement arises about the type or extent of the danger ( e.g. the sale 
of computers or encryption to Pakistan) or about the identity of, c.q. the threat 
posed by, the targeted 'villain' (e.g. Cuba), or again about the severity of the 
measures proposed (e.g. restrictions on the export of satellites to China). The 
U. S. may also expect less respect and support for its actions or decisions when 
other than security considerations have influenced the choice of the measures 




The first-mentioned situation, and the way it effects the U.S. export control 
measures and sanctions, has already been highlighted in this study. 
We will focus here on the second situation mentioned above, before coming 
to a number of conclusions and recommendations. 
The U.S. government's missile control policy aims at minimizing the risk of 
missile proliferation. That is a worthy goal. But the policy also denies 
countries, which seek to obtain a civil launch capability for peaceful purposes 
(the launch 'have-nots') the possibility to acquire the necessary launchers or 
launch technology, even when there is virtually no chance that this technology 
be used for military missile programs. 
The U.S. government's justification for refusing to transfer launch technology 
to a country, when the latter has no missile program whatsoever which could 
benefit from the launch technology obtained, is that, because it is very difficult 
to turn a civil launch program into a commercially viable industry, there is a 
risk that either the technology will be turned to military uses in the receiving 
country after all or that it will be sold to third countries of the 'rogue' and 
'missile-loving' type. 
This reasoning has, of course, a touch of arrogance because it assumes (as 
almost inevitable) foreign governments' motivations and behaviour. It is also 
assumes that, basically, no country can be trusted with this technology. The 
inevitable result is a near total absence of cooperation in this field of civil 
space technology, a blocking of (foreign-based) innovation in the 'art' of 
launching, and a 'freeze' of the number and variety of launch providers world-
wide. 
Similarly, the U.S. government's controls of the export of satellites, including 
satellite components and technology, aim at keeping sophisticated means of 
telecommunications out of the hands of (the military establishment of) countries 
which are seen as a possible threat to regional/ global peace, security and 
stability. That is, as such, a respectable goal. 
But where these controls are used as a means to limit market entry and access 
and impose conditions in the form of capacity and price controls on foreign 
launch providers, another element is introduced, namely that of the unilateral 
regulation of international competition. Though these latter controls, in the 
form of bilateral launch trade agreements, have been gradually relaxed, and 
were in fact - slowly- on the way out, the recent 'China affair' again has 
shown that the mix of security and trade considerations, coupled with partisan 
politics and the always present threat of sanctions, has resulted in a trade-
unfriendly environment, where unpredictability is the rule and both U.S. 
satellite manufacturers and operators and, in particular, foreign launch 
providers are the predictable victims. 
The combined effect of the above phenomena is that under the 'security' 
umbrella, the U.S. government has adopted acts, formulated policies and taken 
enforcement actions, which have the, partly intended and partly unintended, 
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effect of preventing or at least severely limiting international development, 
innovation, cooperation and competition in the field of launch technology and 
launch services. 
It could be argued that this is not necessarily bad, for two reasons: first, 
because - roughly speaking - national/ global security is more important than 
international technology and trade development, and second because there is 
a cornucopia of promising technological approaches and developments, 
particularly in the U.S., but also, albeit to a lesser extent, in Europe and 
Japan, which will take care of all present and future space transportation needs. 
Thus the restrictions imposed on other - prospective - launch providers are of 
only marginal importance to the development of the exploration and use of 
outer space. 
The .first argument presupposes that specific U.S. security purposes are indeed 
more important and are indeed being served. In other words a careful weighing 
of aims and means has taken place, and the end result is, on balance, a positive 
one. At best, this is unproven. And not only the U.S. 'security establishment' 
and the trade, industry, science and technology representatives, but also 
America's friends and allies may have sharply different views, as inter alia 
the China affair has shown. We will revert to this matter below. 
The second argument is of crucial importance to the future of the space launch 
service industry and its customers. It presupposes that the development of 
launch activities is in good hands, namely those of the incumbents, and that 
the latter will be in a perfect position to adequately meet all present and future 
space transportation needs. In other words, (to add a dash of demagogy) the 
collective scientific and technological knowledge of the rest of the world is 
considered to be irrelevant for the development of innovative, higher quality, 
and lower cost launch services: briefly, there is no need for new players and 
more competition. 
Once again, there is a certain arrogance in this latter argument, but it is the 
understandable arrogance of the (launch) 'haves'. An important reason, though, 
to challenge that position, is the fact that the launch industry is a service 
industry: apart from having to meet the demands of governments in such areas 
as military and civil communications, including global positioning/navigation 
services and meteorological/geological/environmental remote sensing, it serves 
the - fast deregulating - worldwide telecommunications industry, the 'global 
information super highway' in statu nascendi (already in 1997 valued at some 
USD 550 billion and forecasted to grow to USD 1 trillion in the year 2000), 
of which satellite communications form a core part. 1 
Additionally, the U.S. government's Global Positioning System will 
increasingly be used by the aviation, automobile, marine and (other) private 
1. See State of the Space Industry, 1997 Outlook, supra Ch. 1, note 1, at 41, 42. 
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consumer sectors, and by the year 2000 the GPS industry's growth (since 
1996) is anticipated to exceed 500 percent. 
Also, satellite remote sensing produces increasingly sophisticated images 
which, computer-enhanced, provide crucial information for the oil and gas 
industry, forestry, agriculture, mining, mapping, water management etc. 
The space infrastructure, i.e. satellites, including spaceports and ground control 
operations as well as the launch vehicles, are a crucial part of these new, 
dramatically developing, space hardware-dependent service industries, just as 
the launch part, which has been calculated as representing only about 10 to 
15 percent of the total value of the space infrastructure through the years, is 
a crucial service within that space infrastructure. 
Whether the respective launch companies perform according to expectations, 
now and in the future, is something their above - increasingly demanding -
clients will determine. 
In that connection it should be recalled that the presently available launch 
service providers offer a combined product which, notwithstanding important 
internal differences in performance, has been repeatedly depicted, by 
government and private customers alike, as unreliable, inflexible and much too 
expensive. This is still the situation today. In a relatively short period of 9 
months ending early May 1999, the U.S. experienced six significant launch 
failures with combined satellite and launch vehicle losses totalling USD 
3. 5 billion. These failures affect both government and private customers' space 
programs.2 As for the cost of launching, NASA's stated goal is to reduce the 
cost of putting payloads into low-earth orbit from USD 10,000 per pound in 
1998 to USD 1,000 per pound by 2007 and USD 100 per pound in the year 
2022;3 an indication of how this agency thinks about the present cost of 
launching. 
It must be clear that, notwithstanding abundant availability of U. S. launcher 
know-how and experience, additional efforts by non-U.S. launch industries, 
both existing and new, are neither superfluous nor a luxury. 
We come to the following conclusions and recommendations: 
The commercial/financial interests and the national and international economic 
importance of the earlier-mentioned U.S. and global 'clients' are so much 
bigger than those of the launch companies serving them, that the following 
suggestions appear justified: 
2. NYT (May 12, 1999) at 1 ("Series of rocket failures unnerves U.S. space launching 
industry"). 
3. See NASA's aeronautics/space goals, AW/ST (Oct 19, 1998) at 40. 
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1. The development of the launch industry should not continue to be artificially 
restricted to, or oligopolized by, the launch companies of one country or of 
a very limited number of countries. Neither should it remain fundamentally 
dependent on and subjected to national security-inspired but in reality largely 
nationalistic laws, policies and practices which also address other, not security-
related interests and concerns. 
2. A) In the 'trade versus national security' battle that is inherent in the above 
suggestion, it is, in the absence of any noticeable pro-trade initiative on the 
part of the U.S. government so far, the responsibility of the U.S. telecom 
industry and the other U.S. clients of the launch industry -using data which 
document and substantiate their actual and forecasted importance for the U.S. 
economy- to pressure the U.S. government, i.e. both the Administration and 
Congress, to show the utmost restraint in using 'national security' as an 
argument for taking such measures as (i) forbidding U.S. launch companies 
to engage in bona fide civil launch cooperation - involving the exchange of 
launch know-how- with foreign companies, whether existing commercial 
launch companies or launch 'have-nots' with peaceful civil launch aspirations, 
(ii) forbidding or severely limiting U.S. satellite manufacturers to exchange 
such satellite-launch vehicle interface information with foreign launch 
companies as will permit the latter to improve their services to the benefit of 
their U.S. and foreign clients, and (iii) severely limiting and discouraging the 
use of foreign launch companies through the imposition of price and capacity 
restrictions on some of those foreign launch companies and through - the threat 
of - strict application of export controls or sanctions. 
B) In view of the global character and scope of the satellite constellations and 
the international telecom conglomerates using these systems, it is evident that 
the latter should join the U .S. telecom industry and put similar and concurrent 
pressure on the U.S. government. In that connection reference could be made 
to the dramatically increasing importance of their industry for the global 
economy, brought about by the liberalization of global telecom, initiated, 
through WTO, by the same U.S. government. 
At the same time the telecom parties concerned should formulate the launch 
(quantity, quality and price) requirements necessary to accommodate the 
expected growth of their industries and to meet the expectations of the 
consumers relying on their services. 
3. The above would also imply that serious consideration should be given by 
these industries to promote, either through GATS (by way of a U.S. 
commitment with respect to launch services) or - initially - on a separate 
multilateral basis, the adoption of a 'national treatment' arrangement with 
respect to the use of (private) U.S. spaceports. This would enable foreign 
launching states and entities to perform launches from the safe and well-
equipped U.S. facilities on the same conditions as the U.S. launch companies. 
Similar offers, outside GATS, on the part of Brazil and Australia, though the 
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spaceports or facilities concerned may not be fully comparable in sophistication 
and value-for-money, have set a precedent in this connection. 
Another logical step to be promoted in the context of a wider availability of 
launch services for the public and private clients and the creation of more free 
competition between the international launch companies, would be the opening 
up of the U.S. government civil, i.e. non-military, non-'national security-
sensitive' satellite launch market to foreign launch providers, to be 
accomplished either through a corresponding amendment of the U.S. launch 
services exclusion in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or 
- initially - on a separate multilateral basis. 
We will refrain from using exhortative "the WTO should ... " language. In 
fact, we mention the use of the WTO arrangements as instruments of change 
with some hesitation, for the following reasons. 
First, it has been noted that launch services have not - yet - been liberalized 
to the same extent as the industries they serve. In fact, there is today a notable 
absence of a pro-competitive international environment for launch services. 
This will prove to be a serious handicap for the WTO Basic Telecom 
Agreement realizing its full potential. That in itself, both for reasons of 
principle and for practical purposes, provides already ample justification for 
a serious effort on the part of the same countries concerned, to accomplish at 
least a start of liberalization of launch services during the new round of WTO-
GATS discussions which start in November 1999. In particular the U. S. should 
feel that responsibility, having pushed so hard for the global adoption of its 
'free competition and fair trade' principles to be applied to international 
(satellite) communications through the above agreement, and continuing to 
energetically spread that gospel. 4 
An additional reason for strongly favouring a WTO approach would be the 
legally binding effect of the resulting treaty arrangements and the predictability 
and stability this would bring for the U.S. and foreign industries concerned 
(as compared to the present situation in the U.S. in this field). 
But, it is at this stage difficult to predict whether the U.S. government will, 
at that occasion, act in the interest of the international telecommunications 
4. The Chairman of the FCC, in a March 1999 statement before a Congressional Committee 
outlining his agenda for the rest of 1999, submitted, inter alia the following points: " ... 
promote competition in all sectors of the marketplace ... continue to de regulate ... ensure 
broad access to communications services and technologies . . . foster innovation . . . we will 
advance these concepts worldwide, serving as an example and advocate of 
telecommunications worldwide ... and aggressively work on the worldwide adoption of the 
WTO Agreement for Basic Communications" (emph. add.), see Statement of William 
Kennard, Chairman FCC before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the 
Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, on the FCC's FY 2000 budget 
estimates (Mar 25, 1999) <http://www .fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/ 
stwek917 .html > . 
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industry and, perhaps, offer a commitment to provide foreign access to its 
commercial satellite launch market. 
This difficulty to predict has two reasons: first, a detailed analysis of WTO 
rules and practices, including members' practices in the field of commitments, 
national security escape-clauses, exemptions and quid-pro-quo bargaining, 
would have to form the basis for a serious discussion of the various scenarios 
and possibilities with respect to government action in the WTO context in the 
field of the trade in launch services: this falls outside the scope of this study. 
A second reason is the fact that any action or initiative on the part of the U.S. 
government during the next round of negotiations will necessarily be preceded 
by domestic (soul-searching and) decision-making on the advisability of 
changing the prevailing approach. In other words, the political will of each 
individual member state, and in this case in particular of the U.S., is decisive 
for the chances that change occurs, whether through WTO or through other 
means. 
That brings us back to the domestic 'national security versus international 
trade' battle and to the ensuing views of the U. S. Administration and Congress 
on the advisability of changing any of the relevant laws, policies and practices. 
4. The above state of affairs in the U.S. forces all parties interested in change 
to distinguish between measures based on real, realistic and serious national 
security concerns on the one hand and measures not belonging to that category 
on the other hand. 
Clear examples of the latter are: 
- the bilateral launch trade agreements with China, Russia and the Ukraine, 
in so far as they regulate market access, pricing and other aspects of market 
access and market behaviour; 
- government policies which forbid or restrict the use, for commercial launches 
by foreign launch companies, of U.S. federal launch facilities or private 
spaceports; 
Other examples belonging to the same category are: 
- 'fly U.S.' laws and policies in so far as they apply to civil government 
satellites and forbid the launch companies of e.g. NATO members and major 
non-NATO allies access to that market; 
- 'Strom Thurmond' treatment of all commercial communications satellites as 
arms or munitions for export licensing purposes, at least in so far as they 
include satellites with a relatively low level of sophistication, destined for 
'friendly' nations or destinations; 
- 'Strom Thurmond' based controls on the launch of U.S. commercial 
communications satellites by foreign launch providers in so far as the latter 




- 'Strom Thurmond' based controls on the launch of U.S. commercial 
communications satellites by China in so far as conditions are attached to 
export licenses which are of a strictly economic, trade or other 'non-national 
security' -related character; 
Of a somewhat different nature, but nevertheless falling in this category 
because of the relatively low national security 'content' of the measures, are 
the following: 
- measures which forbid, restrict or sanction a U.S. satellite manufacturer, 
which has received a permit for the Long March (or Proton) launch of his 
commercial communications satellite, to discuss such satellite-launcher 
interface aspects as will assist the Chinese (or Russian) launch provider in 
improving the chances for a successful launch of the U.S. satellite into the 
proper orbit; 
- measures which forbid, restrict or sanction quality control discussions 
between a U.S. launch company and his Russian and or Ukrainian partners in 
joint ventures using Russian or Ukrainian launch vehicles. 
Obviously, the transfer of missile technology or launch technology to terrorist 
countries or other countries posing a threat to national, regional or global 
security is, as such, a matter raising serious national security concerns. But 
on the scale of such national security /weapon proliferation concerns there is 
a vast difference between this case on the one hand and, for example, launch 
(technology) cooperation between a U.S. launch company and its non-military 
counterpart from e.g. a NATO country on the other hand. 
Both MTCR and the respective U.S. Administration policy emphasize that 
bona fide peaceful national space programs or international cooperation in such 
programs should not be impeded by MTCR (-based) controls, as long as such 
cooperation could not be used for or contribute to delivery systems for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
The U.S. however, as we have seen earlier, in 1996 added a national criterion 
which is not only patronizing but also of doubtful relevance for national 
security purposes: 
"For MTCR countries we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs which 
raise questions from a proliferation and economic standpoint." (emph. add.)4a 
In the light of a dearth of new, ambitious, and innovative launch companies 
outside the U.S., the emphasized clause seems inappropriate and, as one of 
the measures with a low national security content, fit for review. 
4a. See Ch. 2 supra, (text to) note 352. 
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Of course, the above should not be interpreted as an attempt to disqualify 
serious U.S. national security concerns, but rather as an effort to separate the 
wheat from the chaff. 
This serves two purposes: 
first, to have the telecom industry and other users of launch services focus on 
those elements in the above government measures which should - and, from 
a national security point of view, could - be singled out for the purpose of 
liberalization; 
second, to increase the likelihood that national measures which address real, 
realistic and serious national security concerns will be followed and supported 
by U.S. allies. For, as we have observed before, the more blunt, 
oversimplified or 'polluted' - by other than national security considerations, 
aspects or consequences - these national controls are, 5 the less international 
support for those measures can be expected. 
And where, as we saw before, other members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
MTCR and NATO, but also non-members of these arrangements possess both 
satellite and missile/launch technology and may see important economic, 
scientific, technical or political benefits in cooperating with one another in 
these fields - without necessarily fully sharing the U.S. security concerns -
there is ample reason for the U.S. authorities to make a major effort in 
selecting only those objects or targets for measures of control or sanctions 
which will command respect and support from their friends and allies. 
The overall effect of the above (lobbying) efforts should be a change in U.S. 
policy from "do not transfer sensitive or dangerous high tech goods and 
technologies to any foreign countries, unless ... " to "promote space launch 
cooperation and competition, unless ... "6 
5. In the words of a U.S. State Department official, "like applying a meat cleaver where laser 
surgery would be more appropriate", see Eizenstat 1997, supra Ch. 4, note 77. 
6. One of the dilemmas the regulators wilJ continue to grapple with is that of the 
identical/similar characteristics of launch vehicles and missiles. In the China affair, there 
was, and stilJ is, no unanimous agreement among various U.S. experts about the military 
(missile) benefits for China of the transfer of U.S. satellite and -possibly- launch 
technology information. But if the question is phrased along the lines of the MTCR, i.e. 
could the technology be used for WMD delivery systems, it is difficult, given important 
similarities of the technologies concerned, to answer in the negative. But, in fact, that would 
apply to many technologies unrelated to launch vehicles. It therefore makes more sense to 
look at the potential user, the relationship between the parties concerned and the 
sophistication of the programs involved to estimate how big the chance is that launch 
technology cooperation will substantiaJly benefit a missile program of concern. Is the missile 
program of a NATO partner of concern to the U.S.? If not, civil launch cooperation with 
that country should not pose a problem. An example comparable to Hughes' alleged transfer 
of technology to Long March is the situation which may result from the launch on the Indian 
PSLV of 3 foreign satellites, Korean (Kitsat-3), German (DLR-Tubsat) and Belgian (Proba), 
see Space News (Apr 5, 1999) at 16; the satellite-launcher interface information exchange 
may, if the Hughes analogy is used, result in a more reliable performance of the Indian 
launch vehicle and that knowledge could be transferred to India's missile program. Whether 
that indeed happens, and if so whether that is serious enough to discourage the three 
375 
Chapter 5 
More than anything else, that will set the stage for a responsible liberalization 
of the international trade in launch services. 
5. As for the economic and trade aspects of the matter, a comparison with the 
ongoing liberalization of international air transport, and the U.S. role in that 
development, may be useful. 
This transport activity is different from launching or space transport, in the 
sense that it is bilaterally regulated between states on the basis of the principle 
of a state's sovereignty over (the use of) its airspace, as compared to the 
launch activity's legal basis, the freedom- and free use -of outer space, a res 
communis omnium which is not subject to claims of sovereignty. On the other 
hand the international trade in launch services, seen from the U.S. perspective, 
shares with international air transport the characteristic that the U.S. 
government exercises sovereign control over foreign access to the U.S. market 
(of satellites to be launched and launchers to be sold, including the respective 
technologies and components). Thus, the U.S. government, in both cases has 
a considerable influence on the operational and/or commercial well-being of 
the foreign companies concerned. 
Until some ten years ago, international market access was, with few 
exceptions, only obtainable for airlines through bilateral, inter-governmental 
negotiations characterized by protectionist concepts such as quid-pro-quo, 
'equal exchange of economic benefits' and 'equal capacity', which would 
usually lead to a bilaterally exchanged access for the national airlines 
concerned to the other party's air transport market at a level determined by 
the weakest or least interested party. Where that latter party, in many cases, 
would be the least dynamic, least innovative, and, (also) in its own perception, 
least prepared for the effects of free market forces, the end-result was a system 
of restrictive bilateral treaties, stifling competition and short-changing the 
customer in quantity, quality and price of the transport products available to 
him. 
The U.S. was the first country with a large aviation market to, initially only 
domestically, but later also internationally, 'deregulate' aviation, by removing 
protective domestic and international rules and regulations, in order to expose 
the industry to the harsher environment of free(r) competition and market 
forces. 
This has fundamentally changed the (composition and behaviour of the) 
American and international airline industry. 
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least. A similar question can be asked concerning - the dangers of - the Arianespace-Antrix 
agreement of Oct 1998 on mutual sales of small payload capacity on India's PSLV and 
Europe's Ariane respectively. In the end, only technical developments resulting in civil 
launch technologies becoming unfit for missile applications would give the guarantees and 
certainties sought by the national security establishments; a concerted effort to that effect 
may therefore be worth considering. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The U.S.' reasons for changing its regulatory approach towards this service 
industry may contain lessons which could be used for the liberalization of the 
launch industry. 
The underlying principle for 'deregulation' was the long-standing U.S. trade 
philosophy of free trade ('let the market, the customer decide'), which is seen 
as giving those companies the best chances for survival and prosperity which, 
in free competition with other companies and with minimal regulatory 
interference, consistently please the customer with the best quality at the lowest 
price. 
The application of that principle in internationalibus, however, was (and is) 
not an automatic one, but depended in the case of aviation on such factors as 
(a) the perceived level of maturity and survivability of the U.S. airlines 
concerned, (b) the benefits deregulation or liberalization of market access 
would bring to these airlines (compared to what it would bring in competitive 
benefits to foreign airlines) and (c) the benefits for the (American) public and 
the national economy. 
On the basis of the positive outcome of its appraisal, the U.S. government (not 
the U.S. airlines!) saw sufficient reason in the late seventies to actively 
promote aviation deregulation internationally, and has continued to do so ever 
since. 
Applying the above U.S. approach to the space launch field, we have at an 
earlier stage, in Chapter 4, come to the conclusion that the U.S. launch 
companies are sufficiently mature and equipped to meet foreign competition. 
We also indicated above our belief (which is partly based on the same 
economic rationale that led to the adoption of WTO/GATT and GATS 
principles and is reinforced by the experience gained with international 
deregulation in the field of air transport), that free(r) competition in space 
transport will benefit important growth industries such as global 
telecommunications which depend on space hardware and space transport, and, 
as a result, will also benefit U.S. state, national and global economies. 
The above aviation parallel (in addition to the U.S.' official pro-liberalization 
stand with respect to trade in another important category of services, namely 
that of telecommunications), would appear to support the conclusion that the 
U.S. government should take its first decisive steps towards liberalization of 
the launch industry. 
There is one element however, that would also have to be addressed, as it may 
stand in the way of a soonest U.S. launch liberalization 'move', namely the 
absence of substantial foreign launch markets that would become available to 
the U.S. launch industry through market access liberalization, comparable to 
the U.S. private and, in particular, the government satellite launch market to 
which foreign launch providers would get access: as long as the latter market 
is far superior in size and value, one cannot expect the U.S. launch companies 
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to enthusiastically espouse the idea of a 'swap' of access to government 
markets (particularly if one also takes into account the fact that the European 
government markets are not as closed to U.S. launch companies as the other 
way around). 
There are a number of arguments why that imbalance in new launch 
opportunities should not prevent the U.S. government from moving ahead: 
one, if the U.S. government follows the aviation precedent, it will again place 
a higher value on the application of free market principles and the benefits 
these entail in the long term for the national economy, than on a short term 
- unattainable - quid-pro-quo for its launch industry; 
two, also in international air transport the benefits of international deregulation 
at first mainly accrued to the foreign airlines which obtained access to the 
important and rich U.S. market, rather than to the U.S. carriers (hence the 
initial resistance of the latter against this form of international deregulation); 
three, the relative importance, in size and value, of the U.S. government 
satellite launch market is slowly but definitely decreasing as compared to the 
private commercial satellite launch market; and it is in the latter market, and 
more in particular in the LEO satellite systems market that the U.S. launch 
providers are catching up with their main competitor, Arianespace; 
four, the U.S. launch companies are part of and/or participate in aerospace and 
telecommunications conglomerates; the latter, as customers, (must) see the 
advantages of additional competition and innovation in the international launch 
market, brought about by wider access to all sectors of that market. 7 
In conclusion, we suggest that the time is ripe for the first solid steps on the 
part of the U. S. government towards a liberalization of the international trade 
in launch services along the lines as indicated above. Further, it is primarily 
up to the aforementioned 'space hardware' -dependent communications and 
other launch service user-industries - those which are most immediately 
affected by the consequences of the present U.S. laws, policies and practices 
7. In the context of the aviation parallel, two additional developments in the U.S. are worth 
noting because of their possible application to the (de-)regulation of the launch business: 1. 
the adoption by the DOT of the so-called Undeserved Airports Policy of 1990: this policy 
allowed foreign airlines - under certain conditions, but outside the usual bilateral quid-pro-
quo bargaining process- access to those secondary U.S. airports which had no (U.S. or 
other) direct airservices with the country of the foreign airline concerned. The adoption of 
the policy was the result of a concerted lobbying effort on the part of the respective airport 
and state authorities and was based on the argument that international airservices would 
stimulate the local and regional economy; though launch services are different in many 
aspects, the economic (jobs!) argument as such is a valid one, which should be explored by 
the U.S. spaceports looking for (foreign) clients; 2. with the advent of international airline 
alliances involving U.S. and foreign carriers, the American fly U.S. rules applicable to 
aviation have been interpreted so as to allow, under certain conditions, U.S. government 
traffic to be carried by the foreign alliance partner concerned; with the same caveat as 
above, this approach is worth exploring by both Hoeing's Sea Launch and Lockheed 
Martin's ILS. 
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in this field - to take the necessary initiatives to convince both the 
Administration and particularly Congress that these steps are long overdue. 
At the same time it is in the interest of the U. S. government, both in its quality 
of guardian of free trade principles and of customer of the launch industry, as 
well as in its role of 'global security guard' - in the field of export controls 
dependent on other countries to properly perform its job -, to make a strict and 
precise distinction between measures exclusively aimed at addressing 'with laser 
surgery' real, realistic and serious national/global security concerns on the one 
hand, and all other measures on the other hand. Only in that way, may the 
U.S. government hope, in its enlightened selfinterest, to be able to promote 
trade in launch services and at the same time meet essential security needs. 
According to the author Naisbitt, telecommunications and information 
technology are two of the three "paradigm industries" which will drive the 
service-led economies of the 21st Century. 8 
Also from that point of view, it is justified to analyse as a matter of priority, 
in both national and international fora, the effects of the present regulatory 
regime, as described in this study, on the development of the launch industry 
and, consequently, on the development of these paradigm industries. Such an 
analysis should include forecasts as to the consequences for these industries 
of the various possible liberalization scenarios envisaged. 
We briefly return to the need for increased international cooperation and 
competition between the U.S. and foreign launch companies, both incumbents 
and new, to make two final points: 
1. The history of- the effects of- U.S. refusal or hesitation to transfer launch 
technology to foreign countries and/or its insistence on attaching strict 
conditions to the use thereof, has taught us that it is at best doubtful whether 
this has indeed effectively, and also in the long term, prevented the 
development of civil and/or military launch systems in the countries concerned. 
Europe, Japan, India and Brazil are, as we saw, examples of countries which, 
in stead of being discouraged by the U.S. attitude, rather felt confirmed in the 
view that they should 'go-it-alone', and, where necessary, look for other, less-
8. John Naisbitt is the author of Megatrends 2000 and Global Paradox. According to the 
author, the third 'paradigm industry' is travel and tourism, as approvingly noted (and 
quoted) by the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) in its Millennium Vision. The 
WTTC, a global coalition of about 100 CEO's from all sectors of the travel and tourism 
industry, including transportation, has a solid reputation for promoting the liberalization of 
international aviation and telecommunications and, in that connection, the abolishment of 
trade barriers and protectionist policies, on the basis of - particularly - economic analyses, 
see <http://www.wttc.org> passim. The WTTC could be an interesting ally of the above 
space hardware dependent industries in underpinning and promoting the liberalization of the 
international satellite launch industry. 
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principled partners for assistance. Similar recent reactions, on the part of 
Europe, have been observed in the field of global navigation satellite systems 
and military observation (spy) satellites: also in these cases, an - apparent -
overdose of foreign policy or national security-inspired cautiousness on the part 
of the U.S. only results in the countries concerned going their own way. 
One may wonder whether - this - history has not taught us that a transfer of 
space (launch) hardware and/or technology, embedded in a peaceful space 
cooperation program, in the end would prove to be a more effective method 
to address missile proliferation worries and make the world a safer place to 
live. 
2. To the extent that national security-based American policies maintain the 
gulf between U.S. space 'haves' and foreign 'have nots', and thus widen the 
technological and economic gap between the two groups, such policies have 
at the same time a peace, security and stability threatening effect. That affects 
not only the economic, political and security interests of the U. S. but also the 
corresponding interests of the world community at large. 
For that reason in particular, the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
and of the Outer Space Benefits Declaration of 1996, quoted in the previous 
Chapter, appeal to member states to engage to the maximum extent possible 
in international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. In fact, 
that is the central theme, the spirit of space law as a lex specialis of 
international law. 
Laws, policies and practices, which virtually exclude cooperation in a sector 
of the above space activities, violate that spirit. 
That should provide the framework for U.S. government efforts geared at the 
establishment of an international regime which does deserve the title "free and 
fair trade in launch services" . 
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS- SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
DE INTERNATIONALE HANDEL IN LANCEERDIENSTEN 
De effecten van de Amerikaanse wetgeving, beleid en praktijk op 
haar ontwikkeling 
1. 
De indrukwekkende Satumus V die Neil Armstrong en zijn collega's op de 
maan zette kan beschreven worden als een raket of als een vervoermiddel. 
Dat is geen kwestie van woordkeus maar van perceptie. 
Een militair ziet de raket als een symbool van zaken als macht, agressie, 
zelfverdediging, overwinning, nederlaag. In de ogen van zijn burger-collega 
is het voomamelijk een middel om passagiers en vracht te vervoeren. 
Beide hebben gelijk, zoals het gebruik van raketten in de praktijk aantoont. 
Afhankelijk van het soort gebruik noemen we de raket in het Engels een 
"missile" (als hij bestemd is voor het dragen van militaire explosieven, m.a. w. 
als wapen) of een "launch vehicle", een lanceervoertuig (als hij niet-militaire 
transport taken verricht); alle op dit moment in gebruik zijnde lanceervoer-
tuigen, met uitzondering van de Space Shuttle, zijn "expendable", 'wegwerp'-
voertuigen, d.w.z. slechts geschikt voor eenmalig gebruik. "Launching", 
lanceren, kan dus zowel een militaire als een civiele activiteit zijn. Het belang-
rijkste verschil in de praktijk is dat het civiele lanceren bedoeld is om voor-
werpen, voomamelijk satellieten, in de ruimte te plaatsen, terwijl de missile 
een gronddoel heeft. 
Het gemelde verschil in perceptie, gebaseerd op feitelijk of beoogd gebruik, 
ziet men ook bij andere types vervoermiddel, zoals vrachtauto' s en vliegtuigen. 
Vrachtauto's kunnen manschappen vervoeren of militair materieel, en niet 
militaire versies worden gebruikt voor busdiensten of verhuizingen. Een B-52 
vervoert bommen, terwijl de Boeing 747 passagiers en vracht vervoert. 
2. 
De oorsprong en achtergrond van het lanceren is duidelijk militair-strategisch 
van aard. Het begon allemaal met missiles en met ideeen over militair gebruik 
van de ruimte. 
En, hoewel de gebroeders Wright geen militaire luchtvaartuigen ontwikkelden 
heeft de luchtvaart een soortgelijke achtergrond. Maar in de loop van zo'n 
driekwart eeuw heeft de luchtvaart zich grotendeels ontdaan van haar militaire 
'erfenis', in die zin dat de gebruikers ieder hun eigen weg zijn gegaan. Zo is 
er aan de ene kant een militaire luchtvaartindustrie met wereldwijde lucht-
machtgebruikers ontstaan, terwijl zich anderzijds een grootschalige wereldwijd 
opererende commerciele luchttransport industrie heeft ontwikkeld, waarin 
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honderden luchtvaartmaatschappijen uit vrijwel alle soevereine staten actief 
zijn. 
De internationale commerciele luchtvaart is een service industry. We gebruiken 
die term om aan te geven dat de luchtvaart zich met- internationale - dienst-
verlening bezighoudt. Dit impliceert dat luchtvaartmaatschappijen er niet aan 
ontkomen zoveel mogelijk de wensen van klanten te vervullen, enerzijds om 
te voorkomen dat ze overstappen naar de concurrent, anderzijds omdat de 
luchtvaart in zijn totaliteit de wereldeconomie dient. 
De internationale burgerluchtvaart is een commerciele activiteit die van vitaal 
en onmisbaar belang is voor de wereldhandel en voor de wereldeconomie. 
Daarmee is het militair-strategische aspect van deze activiteit zodanig ver-
dwenen dat overheidsregelsring, gebaseerd of gericht op militair-strategische 
of (nationale) veiligheidsgronden, geen rol speelt in haar - verdere - ontwik-
keling en ontplooiing. 
Zoals we zullen zien in deze studie heeft de internationale commerciele lan-
ceerindustrie dat stadium nog niet bereikt. 
3. 
De internationale commerciele lanceerindustrie staat op een kruispunt. 
De handel in lanceerdiensten groeit met sprongen. De eisen van de prive-
ondernemingen die van deze diensten gebruik maken, vooral grote telecommu-
nicatiemaatschappijen en conglomeraten, vormen meer en meer de drijvende 
kracht achter de ontwikkeling van de lanceerbedrijven. En deze laatste willen 
graag aan die eisen voldoen, zoals het een 'normale' dienstverlener betaamt. 
Maar aan de andere kant wordt het reilen en zeilen van deze dienstverlener 
nog sterk bepaald en beinvloed door de militair-strategische en ''national 
security" aspecten van het lanceren en de houding die op grond daarvan 
tegenover deze industrie wordt ingenomen. 
Ten behoeve van hun klanten willen de lanceerbedrijven zich als normale 
dienstverleners kunnen opstellen, maar in de praktijk laten een aantal belang-
rijke 'spelers' waarvan zij afhankelijk zijn dit nog niet toe. 
Dit conflict tussen belangen van nationale (en wereld-) veiligheid enerzijds en 
internationale handel anderzijds, en de wijze waarop dit de ontwikkeling van 
de internationale handel in lanceerdiensten beinvloedt, is het centrale thema 
van deze studie. 
De speler die hierbij het meest centraal staat is de Verenigde Staten. Niet 
zozeer vanwege de indrukwekkende omvang en het belang van haar civiele en 
militaire ruimtevaart industrie, inclusief de lanceerbedrijven, maar vooral 
omdat- meer nog dan in de luchtvaart- de wetgeving, het beleid en de daden 
van de Amerikaanse overheid en haar interactie met de andere binnenlandse 
en buitenlandse spelers van grote invloed blijken te zijn op de ontwikkeling 
van de commerciele lanceeractiviteiten van andere landen. 
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Dit brengt ons bij het startpunt en de eigenlijke reden voor deze studie. 
4. 
Zoals hierboven aangegeven speelt de intemationale telecommunicatie industrie 
een steeds belangrijker rol als aanjager van de ontwikkelingen bij de lanceer-
bedrijven. De omvang van de markt van te lanceren satellieten wordt vooral 
bepaald door groeiende telecombehoeften, op het gebied van o.a. data trans-
missie, mobile telefonie, fax en intemet verkeer. Andere activiteitengebieden 
waarbij steeds meer gebruik wordt gemaakt van satellieten, zoals meteorologie, 
astronomie, geologie, landbouw en geografie, vergroten deze commerciele 
markt nog verder. (Daarnaast is er ook nog de omvangrijke markt van over-
heidssatellieten (militair en civiel), zij het dat het woord 'markt' hier in zoverre 
misleidend is dat de respectieve overheden de lancering van hun satellieten 
meestal reserveren voor de nationale lanceerbedrijven.) 
Alles bij elkaar, zo is de verwachting, zullen er in de komende 10 jaar zo'n 
honderd commerciele satellieten per jaar gelanceerd moeten worden. 
Men zou op grond daarvan verwachten dat een flink aantal concurrerende 
lanceerbedrijven staat te springen om lucratieve lanceercontracten te sluiten 
met de satellietfabrikanten - die vaak de satelliet plus lancering in een pakket 
aanbieden - of met de kopers van de satellieten. 
In feite is er weliswaar een aantallanden met een eigen lanceerindustrie en een 
keuze aan lanceervoertuigen, maar bij nader onderzoek blijkt de daaruit 
resulterende concurrentie, en dus de keuze voor de klanten, gering, en wel in 
een aantal opzichten. 
De huidige aanbieders zijn de V. S., Europa, Rusland, China, Ukraine, Japan, 
India, Israel en Brazilie. Daarvan hebben de V.S. en Rusland het meest 
gevarieerde aanbod aan lanceer-'families' en lanceerbases, waaruit de klanten, 
afhankelijk van het gewicht, de omvang, de gewenste locatie in de ruimte van 
de satelliet, en de kosten, de juiste combinatie kan kiezen. 
En de geografische en socio-politieke varieteit en spreiding van bovenstaande 
lanceerlanden geeft de even gevarieerde klantenkring ook de nodige keuze. 
Maar waarom bieden alleen deze staten lanceerdiensten aan? Waar zijn de 
concurrerende lanceerbedrijven van landen als Zuid Afrika, Argentinie, 
Taiwan, Zuid Korea, Iran, Saoedi Arabie, en Australie? 
En waarom domineren de V. S., met de lanceerbedrijven van Lockheed Martin 
en Boeing, en Europa, met Arianespace, de intemationale lanceermarkt, terwijl 
bijvoorbeeld Rusland en China, ondanks hun grote ervaring op lanceergebied, 
in commerciele zin ver achterblijven bij deze koplopers? Waarom is de 
Ukraine nog maar net in de markt begonnen en moet Japan, ondanks zijn 
technologische prestaties, in feite nog beginnen? En India, met zijn geavan-
ceerde ruimtevaartindustrie en zijn eigen lanceerbedrijf, verricht wel lance-
ringen om in eigen behoeften te voorzien, maar is nog niet actief op de wereld 
markt, terwijl Israel in samenwerking met een Amerikaans bedrijf lanceer-
contracten sluit, maar nog weinig succesvolle lanceringen heeft weten te 
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verrichten. En waarom vliegt de Braziliaanse Veiculo Lancador de Satellites 
nog niet? 
Kortom, waarom zijn er zo weinig volwaardige spelers in deze veelbelovende 
markt, waar zijn de nieuwkomers en is er sprake van enige innovatie buiten 
de V.S.? En, tenslotte, waar blijven de ovemames en mergers, c.q. de allian-
ties in deze sector van de handel in diensten? 
Deze vragen zouden wellicht ongesteld zijn gebleven - en deze studie onge-
schreven - als de luchtvaart niet als ijkpunt en vergelijkingsmateriaal voor de 
auteur beschikbaar was geweest. 
Immers, in die sector is het gebruikelijk dat een soevereine staat zich incom-
pleet voelt zonder een eigen nationale luchtvaartmaatschappij. Er zijn vele -
meer of minder- rationele argumenten om de oprichting of instandhouding van 
een eigen maatschappij te bevorderen, varierend van economisch-commerciele 
(toerisme, nationale economie) of strategische (eigen verbindingen in geval van 
nood) redenen, tot overwegingen van nationaal prestige of regionale dominan-
tie, en diverse mengvormen daarvan. Zelfs 'just fun' kan een reden zijn! 
In al die gevallen, en onafhankelijk van de motivatie van de overheid of de 
prive entrepreneur in kwestie, zal de toekomstige luchtvaartondememer 
vliegtuigen aanschaffen, bemanningen, technische en verkoopstaf rekruteren, 
een luchthaven van de nodige apparatuur voorzien en toestemming vragen aan 
de luchtvaartautoriteiten van de beoogde buitenlandse bestemmingen om 
commerciele operaties op de desbetrejfende landen te mogen uitvoeren. 
In de intemationale luchtvaart zijn het vaak niet zozeer de technisch-opera-
tionele of zelfs financiele barrieres die aan de start of het succes van een 
luchtvaartbedrijf in de weg staan, maar veeleer het hierboven gecursiveerde 
regulatoire aspect. Condities of beperkingen, opgelegd door buitenlandse 
overheden, kunnen zowel het betreden van de luchtvaartmarkt als het ver-
overen van een aandeel in die markt in de weg staan. En hoe vitaler het belang 
van een eigen luchtvaartmaatschappij in de ogen van een nationale overheid 
is, des te meer zal deze geneigd zijn door bescherming, in de vorm van het 
buitensluiten of beperken van buitenlandse concurrenten, het overleven van de 
eigen maatschappij te garanderen. (W aarbij overigens vaak voorbijgegaan 
wordt aan het feit dat bescherming en 'survival of the fittest' in de Darwinis-
tische zin van het woord haaks op elkaar staan). 
Met deze achtergrond, en metals gegeven dat de V.S. internationaal de meest 
invloedrijke speler op het gebied van satellietfabricage en -export en van 
lanceeractiviteiten is, ligt het voor de hand te onderzoeken of en, zo ja, in 
hoeverre Amerikaanse wetgeving, beleid en praktijk de ontwikkeling van de 
intemationale handel in lanceerdiensten heeft beinvloed c.q. nog steeds bein-
vloedt, en dan vooral door het opwerpen van zodanige hindernissen voor 
buitenlandse lanceermaatschappijen dat deze niet of slecht in staat zijn de 
intemationale commerciele lanceermarkt te 'betreden' of daarin marktaandeel 
te veroveren. 
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Daarnaast dient de vraag beantwoord te worden in hoeverre (de praktijk van) 
de resulterende regulatoire omgeving voor de betrokken partijen werkbaar en 
acceptabel is, gegeven de grote en diverse belangen die op het spel staan. 
Tenslotte dienen aanbevelingen geformuleerd te worden die een bijdrage 
kunnen leveren aan de oplossing van de gesignaleerde 'pijnpunten', d. w.z. die 
aspecten en consequenties van de Amerikaanse praktijk welke, met inacht-
neming van de andere belangen (zoals national security), niet werkbaar en 
acceptabel zijn voor de internationale lanceerindustrie en haar klanten. 
5. 
Gegeven het doel van de studie is het allereerst van belang de markt te identifi-
ceren waarin de lanceerbedrijven actief zijn, m. a. w. de bedrijven die satellieten 
fabriceren en de satellietkopers en -gebruikers; de laatste groep wordt in 
toenemende mate gedomineerd door internationale telecommunicatiesatellieten 
consortia met wereldwijde ambities en grootse projecten, zoals Iridium, 
Globalstar, Teledesic en anderen. Tegen de achtergrond van deze plannen en 
van de wijze waarop bedrijven als Hughes, Aerospatiale en andere satelliet-
makers op deze plannen inspelen, bekijken we de prestaties van de bestaande 
lanceerbedrijven in de V.S. en daarbuiten en de wijze waarop ze zich voor-
bereiden op de dienstverlening die in de toekomst van hen verwacht wordt. 
Interessant is in dit verband het gegeven dat de satellieten die voor de geosta-
tionaire baan, op ongeveer 36.000 km hoogte, bestemd zijn steeds groter en 
gecompliceerder lijken te worden, terwijl de lage aardbaan (Low Earth Orbit, 
LEO), waarvan de meeste bovengenoemde consortia gebruik maken, vraagt 
om lanceringen van aanmerkelijk kleinere satellieten, maar wel, in de aan-
vangsfase, met aantallen van 4 tot 12 tegelijk. De meer incidentele vervanging 
van LEO satellieten creeert daarnaast een markt voor kleinere lanceervoer-
tuigen. Hoofdstuk 1, waarin deze zaken worden behandeld, besteed ook 
aandacht aan de lanceerbases die door de diverse lanceerbedrijven gebruikt 
worden, en signaleert de opkomst in de V.S. van nieuwe 'spelers', nl. de 
particuliere 'spaceports' naast de bestaande federale faciliteiten die sinds het 
begin van de ruimtevaart door NASA en het Ministerie van Defensie werden 
gebruikt. Een aantal interessante samenwerkingsprojecten, o.a. tussen Lock-
heed Martin en een tweetal Russische bedrijven en tussen Boeing en een 
Russisch, Ukra'iens en Noors bedrijf, beide gebruik makend van niet-Ameri-
kaanse lanceerexpertise, en daarnaast ook Europees-Russische en Europees-
Indiase samenwerking van wat beperktere omvang worden hier ge'introduceerd. 
Ten slotte komen de mogelijke praktische barrieres voor een lanceerbedrijf in 
oprichting (gebrek aan technologie, hoge kosten, beperkt inzicht in de markt, 
dominante positie van de marktleiders enz.) ter sprake en wordt gekeken naar 
de problemen die een bestaande lanceerindustrie kan hebben, zoals bijvoor-
beeld onvoldoende marketing en verkoop ervaring. 
Het zal niet verbazen dat reeds in dit stadium geconcludeerd kan worden dat 
er, afgezien van deze - mogelijke - barrieres van praktische aard, ook belem-
meringen en hindernissen in de sfeer van overheidsreguleringen zijn. Deze zgn. 
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regulatory impediments komen in de volgende hoofdstukken gedetailleerd aan 
bod. Daarbij staat vooral de Amerikaanse praktijk centraal. 
6. 
Om te begrijpen hoe de huidige regulatoire omgeving voor de intemationale 
lanceerindustrie is ontstaan, is het nodig terug te gaan in de historie, en in 
chronologische volgorde de ontwikkeling van het Amerikaanse denken te 
volgen en analyseren over de inzet van ruimtevoertuigen voor militaire en 
civiele, en uiteindelijk ook commerciele, doeleinden. 
Interessant is het in dat verband te zien hoe de praktijk van overheidslance-
ringen (door NASA en het ministerie van Defensie) met lanceervoertuigen 
gekocht bij de eigen fabrikanten, in de tachtiger jaren overgaat in het meer en 
meer afnemen van lanceerdiensten van grotendeels dezelfde bedrijven. Dit was 
in de Amerikaanse marktfilosofie (de combinatie van private enterprise en 
concurrentie levert betere producten en diensten dan de overheid) uiteindelijk 
onvermijdelijk. Maar bovendien had de ramp met de Space Shuttle Challenger 
in 1986 duidelijk gemaakt dat assured access to space, een paradigma geba-
seerd op nationale veiligheid en buitenlandse politiek, beter gediend werd door 
een varieteit aan efficiente en goedkope lanceermiddelen naast de Shuttle. 
En tenslotte was de Europese Ariane, een lanceervoertuig waarmee intema-
tionaal aan de weg getimmerd werd, een geduchte concurrent gebleken voor 
de Amerikaanse overheid op de intemationale markt, en diende de Ameri-
kaanse industrie gestimuleerd te worden om deze taak over te nemen. Het 
resultaat is een aantal wetten en beleidsmaatregelen, die enerzijds de Shuttle 
beperkten tot overheidslanceringen en anderzijds de Amerikaanse lanceer-
industrie beter wapenden voor de intemationale concurrentie. 
Daartoe werd o.a. binnen het Department of Transportation een Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation opgericht, kreeg de industrie gesubsidieerde 
lanceerfaciliteiten en werd de aansprakelijkheid voor schade aan derden door 
de overheid beperkt. 
7. 
In een aantal Hearings van het Congres vonden - soms heftige - discussies 
plaats over de toekomst van de Amerikaanse lanceerindustrie. Uit deze discus-
sies en uit de wetten en het beleid die daarvan het resultaat waren kan een 
aantal 'rode lijnen' gedestilleerd worden. 
Ten eerste, de overheersende plaats die de begrippen 'nationale veiligheid en 
buitenlandse politiek' daarbij innamen en die vrijwel altijd reden waren om 
voor een sterke en veerkrachtige nationale lanceerindustrie te pleiten. Ten 
tweede, de gecompliceerde relatie tussen de Amerikaanse overheid, de Admi-
nistratie, en het Congress, die vaak verschillende prioriteiten en 'agendas' 
blijken te hebben, met soms onvoorziene gevolgen voor de eigen lanceer-
industrie en voor de relaties van de V.S. met het buitenland op dit gebied. Ten 
derde, de conflicterende belangen van de Amerikaanse lanceerindustrie ener-
zijds en de Amerikaanse satellietenindustrie anderzijds: de laatste streeft, ten 
behoeve van haar eigen klanten, naar een zo groot mogelijke varieteit aan 
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lanceerbedrijven en zal daarom het gebruik van buitenlandse bedrijven niet 
schuwen, sterker, ter bevordering van de kwaliteit en verlaging van de kosten, 
internationale concurrentie op dit gebied zo veel mogelijk stimuleren. 
8. 
Er is een type regels dat qua invloed op het wel en wee van de betrokken 
industrieen alle andere in de schaduw stelt, nl. die welke de export van wapens 
en strategisch-relevante goederen en technologieen aan controles onderwerpen. 
Zowel in de V. S. als in andere landen wordt daarbij een onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen enerzijds wapens en anderzijds 'high tech' -goederen en technologieen 
die zowel voor militair als civiel gebruik geschikt zijn. In de eerste categorie 
vallen militaire raketten, maar ook de ruimtevoertuigen waarmee satellieten 
worden gelanceerd. Tot de tweede, zgn. sensitive 'dual-use', groep behoren 
vele uiteenlopende zaken zoals nachtkijkers, computers, allerlei precisie-
apparatuur, en ook communicatiesatellieten. 
Het idee achter deze controles, ontstaan tijdens de koude oorlog, is dat het in 
het nationale veiligheidsbelang is om een technologische voorsprong op de 
vijand te houden en dus om te verhinderen dat bovenvermelde goederen en 
technologieen in zijn handen komen. In 1949 creeerde de Westerse wereld 
daartoe het CoCom regime, dat er op toezag dat Westers strategisch materiaal 
niet in Communistische handen viel. De betrokken lidstaten stemden hun 
nationale exportwetgevingen op elkaar af, hanteerden dezelfde lijst van geresti-
tueerde goederen en bezaten een vetorecht als een andere lidstaat (toch) een 
dergelijk goed naar een communistisch land wilde exporteren. 
In 1987 kwam daar een ander regime bij, het zgn. Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), dat zich vooral richtte op het restricteren van de export van 
militaire raketten en andere middelen om massavernietigingswapens te trans-
porteren. Ook dit is een van oorsprong Westers regime, bedoeld om het aantal 
landen dat over deze wapens beschikt zo klein mogelijk te houden. En ook hier 
betreft het een afspraak, geen verdrag, om de nationale wetgeving en de 
exportvergunningen praktijk zo veel mogelijk op een lijn te krijgen. Dit niet 
alleen om een gemeenschappelijk 'security' front tegenover de op bewapening 
beluste - potentieel vijandige - buitenwereld te handhaven, maar ook om 
concurrentievervalsing te voorkomen. Immers als het ene land een lucratieve 
export blokkeert en de industrie van een ander land neemt het contract over 
en levert de strategische goederen onbekommerd aan de afnemer, dan levert 
dit een ongerechtvaardigd handelsvoordeel op voor het exporterend land. In 
het Wassenaar Arrangement dat in 1996 het koude oorlogsinstrument CoCom 
verving, is van een vetorecht geen sprake, en wordt er uitgegaan van het 
verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel van de betrokken land en en onderlinge openhartig-
heid ten aanzien van het nationale exportgedrag. 
9. 
Hier wordt een belangrijk deel van de problematiek duidelijk, zowel nationaal 
als internationaal. Enerzijds is het in het belang van nationale economieen om 
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zoveel mogelijk te exporteren, anderzijds is er een veiligheidsbelang dat een 
verbod op of beperking van export van specifieke goederen wenselijk maakt. 
De vraag is dan hoe de diverse landen met deze tegenstrijdige belangen 
omgaan. In de V.S., waar export controles al bestaan sinds de Burgeroorlog, 
woedt deze strijd in volle hevigheid tussen, ruwweg, de lucht- en ruimtevaart, 
computer- en elektronica-industrie en het 'nationale veiligheidsestablishment', 
met wisselende winnaars en verliezers. Het is in dit verband noodzakelijk te 
weten dat er twee nationale wetten zijn die dit gebied regelen, nl. de Arms 
Export Control Act, die het State Department autoriseert om vergunningen op 
het gebied van wapenexport te verlenen, en de Export Administration Act, die 
aan het Department of Commerce de verantwoordelijkheid heeft gegeven om 
de export van strategische 'dual-use' goederen te reguleren. Commerce heeft 
in zoverre een dubbele loyaliteit dat enerzijds het nationale veiligheidsbelang 
gediend moet worden, terwijl anderzijds de handelsbelangen van de V.S. 
gediend moeten worden. Commerce is daardoor in de praktijk een 'regulator' 
en een bondgenoot van de Amerikaanse exportbedrijven. 
Dat missiles en lanceervoertuigen, als wapens ("munitions"), onder State 
Department controle vallen is tot nu toe geen punt van debat geweest. Wel 
heeft dit Department, na een intensieve lobbycampagne van de industrie onder 
leiding van Hughes, in 1996 de controle over commerciele communicatie-
satellieten, tot dan toe beschouwd - voor exportvergunning-doeleinden - als 
wapens, moeten afstaan aan Commerce. Zoals we later zullen zien, leidde een 
spionnageschandaal waarin China was betrokken er al in 1998 toe dat deze 
beslissing van de President door het Congres ongedaan werd gemaakt. 
Intussen heeft zo de toepassing van deze export controles een grote en, vooral 
door de verschillende opvattingen binnen het Congres en die tussen het Con-
gres en de Administratie, wisselende en onvoorspelbare invloed op het wel en 
wee van de Amerikaanse satellietenbouwers, de Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven, 
en bun buitenlandse collega's. En uiteraard op de klanten die satellieten willen 
kopen en een lanceerbedrijf zoeken dat bij hun behoeften past en niet primair 
bij de wensen van het Congres of de Administratie. Want een punt van belang 
is bier dat buitenlandse politiek, en de verschillende visies op wat acceptabele 
en wat onacceptabele handelspartners zijn, in deze problematiek een grote rol 
is gaan spelen. 
Zo wordt de vraag of Amerikaanse communicatiesatellieten naar China of 
Rusland mogen worden geexporteerd om vandaar gelanceerd te worden er niet 
alleen een van toepassing van de exportwetgeving, maar ook een die binnen-
en buitenlandse handelspolitieke aspecten heeft en daarnaast mensenrechten, 
nonproliferatiegedrag en democratisch gehalte als additionele punten van 
afweging binnen het Congres en de Administratie (en tussen deze twee) 
meebrengt. Daarmee hebben ook partijpolitieke overwegingen bun entree in 
deze problematiek gemaakt. 
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10. 
Met het juridisch-politieke kader aldus in kaart gebracht, kijken we naar de 
wijze waarop de V.S. in concreto met de vier belangrijkste concurrenten van 
haar lanceerindustrie is omgegaan, nl. (de lanceerbedrijven van) China, 
Rusland, Ukraine en Europa, waarbij China en Rusland vooral aandacht 
krijgen vanwege de politieke 'lading' die de relaties met de V.S. in het alge-
meen maar ook op dit specifieke gebied hebben. Beide landen zochten toegang 
tot de internationale commerciele lanceermarkt en beide vonden de Ameri-
kaanse exportwetgeving m.b.t. satellieten op hun weg. De dominantie van de 
Amerikaanse satellietenmakers en van de fabrikanten van belangrijke satelliet-
onderdelen was zodanig in 1988 dat China zich gedwongen voelde toegang tot 
de lanceermarkt te 'kopen' met het accepteren van een overeenkomst tussen 
de beide overheden waarin zowel de hoeveelheid lanceercontracten als de te 
hanteren lanceerprijzen voor China werden vastgelegd. 
Dit was geen garantie voor China's markttoegang: de exportwetgeving bleef 
een 'case-by-case' beoordeling op normen van nationale veiligheid en buiten-
landse politiek van elke te exporteren Amerikaanse satelliet voorschrijven. En 
Tiananmen betekende dan ook een onmiddellijke opschorting van de bestaande 
exportvergunningen en de lopende procedures. 
Deze zaak toonde bovendien de macht en de - gedeeltelijk partijpolitiek 
gedreven - wens van het Congres om wetgeving aan te nemen gericht op China 
die verder ging dan de Administratie wenselijk achtte, een fenomeen dat tot 
op de dag van vandaag een complicatie vormt in de relaties V.S.- China, maar 
ook in die met Rusland op dit gebied, maar bovenal extra onzekerheid creeert 
voor alle betrokken spelers. Dit ontmoedigt kopers van Amerikaanse satellieten 
die een Chinese of Russische lancering prefereren. 
Ook met Rusland en Ukraine zijn bilaterale overeenkomsten gesloten die prijs 
en capaciteit voorschrijven. De reden ligt ook hier in een bescherming van de 
Amerikaanse lanceerindustrie tegen de marktpraktijken van bedrijven uit "non-
market economies", maar, waar in het geval van China een politiek van 
"engagement" van de Administratie een belangrijke reden was om China's 
lanceermaatschappij - gecontroleerd - toe te laten, speelden in het geval van 
Rusland en Ukraine vooral non-proliferatie overwegingen een rol, nl. bezorgd-
heid over de mogelijkheid dat ongebruikt blijvende lanceertechnologie door 
de betrokken landen om financiele redenen aan terrorisme-ondersteunende 
landen zou worden verkocht. 
Ook hier zien we derhalve een verweving van handelspolitieke en veiligheids-
afwegingen. 
De capaciteitslimieten in de bovenstaande bilaterale overeenkomsten zijn 
inmiddels onder druk van zowel de Amerikaanse satellietbouwers als van de 
Amerikaanse partners van de Russische en Ukrainse lanceerbedrijven aanmer-
kelijk verruimd, maar of deze overeenkomsten, in overeenstemming met een 
beleidsvoornemen van President Clinton in 1996, inderdaad in 2000/2001 niet 
meer verlengd worden, mag in het licht van de inmiddels onder invloed van 
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het Congres verscherpte aandacht voor de negatieve aspecten van buitenlandse 
lanceringen van Amerikaanse satellieten, betwijfeld worden. En overigens 
blijven ook dan de exportcontroles gewoon bestaan. 
11. 
De relaties met Europa zijn van een geheel andere orde. Hier gaat het vooral 
om een volwaardige 'market-economy' -concurrent, die bovendien in politiek 
en militair opzicht een bondgenoot van de V. S. is, en in principe dezelfde 
algemene veiligheidsdoelstellingen heeft. 
De Europese landen zijn vrijwel alle lid van de NAVO, en aangesloten bij 
zowel MTCR als het Wassenaar Arrangement. Dit impliceert dat voomamelijk 
handelspolitieke overwegingen in de relatie tussen de beide partners op dit 
gebied een rol spelen. 
De Europees-Amerikaanse discussies betroffen dan ook vooral kwesties als 
subsidiering van de lanceerindustrie aan beide zijden, de wens aan Ameri-
kaanse kant om deze en andere 'fair competition' verstorende gedragingen aan 
banden te leggen in overeen te komen gedragsregels ("rules of the road") en 
de klacht aan Europese zijde dat de Amerikaanse overheidssatellietenlanceer-
markt ( een woord waarmee in het Scrabble-spel een aanzienlijk aantal punten 
kan worden behaald) op grond van het "fly U.S." beleid geheel aan Ameri-
kaanse lanceerbedrijven is voorbehouden. 
Daar er ook aan Europese kant een soortgelijke policy bestaat ten behoeve van 
de Ariane, is het interessant te bezien in hoeverre de combinatie van deze twee 
regelingen, en/of een van beide afzonderlijk, een additionele regulatory 
impediment oplevert. De conclusie lijkt gerechtvaardigd dat beide deze kwalifi-
catie verdienen, zij het dat zowel het (juridisch) dwingender karakter als de 
daarop gebaseerde praktijk van de Amerikaanse regeling, gevoegd aan de 
aanzienlijk grotere omvang van de desbetreffende markt inderdaad tot een de 
facto aanmerkelijk grotere belemmering van de vrije concurrentie in de totale 
lanceermarkt leidt dan haar Europese tegenhanger veroorzaakt. Dit laatste is 
zowel door de European Space Agency als door de Europese Commissie al 
enkele malen in hun respectieve contacten met de Amerikaanse overheid als 
een punt van zorg opgebracht. Wel dient hierbij vermeld te worden dat het 
militaire deel van deze overheidsmarkt (militaire communicatie-, navigatie- en 
verkenningssatellieten) een onweersproken national security karakter heeft, en 
zich dus begrijpelijkerwijs minder leent voor een behandeling gebaseerd op 
uitsluitend handelsoverwegingen. 
12. 
Het wordt in dit stadium van de discussie tijd nader aandacht te schenken aan 
het soort regime dat de betrokken partijen idealiter voor ogen staat. Daarbij 
nemen we als uitgangspunt de door Clinton in 1996 in het vooruitzicht gestelde 
"free and fair trade in international launch services". Het is duidelijk dat het 
huidige regime die kwalificatie, ook in Amerikaanse ogen, niet verdient. Maar 
welke ingredienten zijn nodig om die beoogde situatie te bereiken. Het concept 
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als zodanig geeft geen duidelijkheid, maar als we de visies van de verschillende 
partijen in en buiten de V.S. de revue laten passeren, krijgen we een aantal 
verlanglijstjes die wel inzicht geven in de minimale voorwaarden waaraan 
voldaan moet worden om deze handel "free and fair" te maken. 
Het zal niet verrassen dat de satellietfabrikanten in Amerika grote problemen 
hebben met de huidige situatie: buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven vormen een 
onzekere schakel in hun contractuele relaties met hun klanten, de kopers en 
gebruikers van satellieten. Dit dwingt eerstgenoemden om de Amerikaanse 
lanceerindustrie te gebruiken en aan te prijzen ook in die situaties waarin de 
buitenlandse klant duidelijk een andere voorkeur heeft. Dat leidt tot verlies van 
deze klanten aan de Europese satelliet industrie, die minder gehandicapt wordt 
in haar relaties met China en Rusland door van intensiteit en politieke prioriteit 
wisselende export controles. De oplossing voor de Amerikaanse industrie lijkt 
simpel, nl. een zo grote keuze aan concurrerende Amerikaanse lanceer-
bedrijven dat de buitenlandse lanceerindustrie niet meer nodig is. Dat is ook 
de duidelijke voorkeur van het Congres, maar betekent wel het verlies van die 
klanten die aan een niet-Amerikaans lanceerbedrijf om wat voor reden dan ook 
de voorkeur geven. En voorlopig is de Amerikaanse lanceerindustrie onvol-
doende geequipeerd om deze rol te spelen. De Amerikaanse satellietenindustrie 
zal dus - moeten - blijven pleiten voor een aanmerkelijk minder door nationale 
veiligheid en buitenlandse politiek gedomineerd exportbeleid m.b.t. commer-
ciele communicatiesatellieten. 
De lanceerbedrijven van de V.S. hebben een uitstekende uitgangspositie in de 
concurrentiestrijd met hun buitenlandse collega's. De overheid draagt door 
middel van militaire en civiele lanceer- en ontwikkelingscontracten voor 
tniljarden dollars bij aan de kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve uitbouw van hun 
huidige en toekomstige 'fatnilies' van lanceervoertuigen. Daarnaast hebben zij 
allianties gesloten met Russische bedrijven waardoor hun totale aanbod van 
lanceerdiensten nog is toegenomen. De bovenvermelde ontwikkelingen spelen 
hen bovendien in de kaart. Deze lanceerbedrijven lijken gebaat bij de status 
quo. 
Dat de Russische, Chinese en Ukrai'nse lanceerbedrijven op dit moment niet 
volledig kunnen meespelen in de concurrentie, en daar ontevreden over zijn 
is al uitgebreid gereleveerd: de beperkende condities waaronder zij opereren 
verdwijnen maar gedeeltelijk als de met de V.S. gesloten overeenkomsten niet 
meer worden verlengd. In het politieke intra-Amerikaanse spel trekken zij 
voorlopig aan het kortste eind, hoezeer dat ook strijdig is met de belangen van 
de Amerikaanse satellietenmakers. 
Arianespace is een commercieel zeer succesvol bedrijf dat echter in verge-
lijking met haar Amerikaanse collega' s een belangrijke 'government market 
backbone' mist en "free en fair trade" pas aanwezig acht als zij in de Ameri-
kaanse overheidsmarkt een graantje mag meepikken. 
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13. 
Blijven over, afgezien van de Amerikaanse particuliere spaceports die voor hun 
commerciele succes zowel autochtone als buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven willen 
accommoderen, de Administratie en het Congres. 
Wij beperken ons hier tot een specifiek nieuw aspect, nl. de houding van de 
Administratie tegenover de GATS, de General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices. Lanceren is een vorm van dienstverlening, van handel in diensten, en 
valt als zodanig automatisch onder de algemene beginselen van de GATS. 
Daartoe hoort o. a. het most-favoured-nation (MFN) principe, dat een ongelijke 
behandeling van buitenlandse handelspartners verbiedt. Als een land een 
specifieke marktsector, zoals zijn lanceermarkt, expliciet openstelt voor 
buitenlandse bedrijven worden ook andere GATS regels van kracht, zoals het 
national treatment principe dat discriminatie tussen eigen en buitenlandse 
ondememingen verbiedt. 
Het zal, gegeven het bovenuiteengezette beleid van de Amerikaanse overheid, 
niet verbazen dat laatstgenoemde van de geboden gelegenheid gebruik heeft 
gemaakt om, onder verwijzing naar "kwantitatieve restricties en prijsdisciplines 
in bepaalde bilaterale overeenkomsten m.b.t. de handel in lanceerdiensten" de 
toepassing van MFN op "space transportation" uit te sluiten. 
Ook een suggestie van Europese zijde, gedaan tijdens de Uruguay ronde, om 
d.m.v. desbetreffende "commitments" de lanceermarkten over en weer te 
openen, en daarmee alle GATS principes op de handel in lanceerdiensten van 
toepassing te maken, werd niet opgevolgd. Naast de GATS is nog een andere 
overeenkomst binnen WTO kader relevant, nl. de Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA), een zgn. Plurilateral Trade Agreement waar niet automa-
tisch alle WTO leden partij bij zijn. Deze overeenkomst regelt de toegang tot 
overheidsmarkten (die altijd buiten GATT/GATS is gehouden). Ook hier heeft 
de Amerikaanse overheid, trouw aan haar 'fly U.S.' beleid, uitdrukkelijk 
lanceerdiensten van de werking van de overeenkomst uitgesloten. 
Daarmee weerspiegelt de Amerikaanse positie in multilaterale handelsliberalisa-
tiebesprekingen in WTO-verband haar nationale beleid. Dit geeft meteen een 
redelijke indicatie van de mate van bereidheid van de Amerikaanse overheid 
om de handel in lanceerdiensten in multilateraal verband te liberaliseren. 
De Administratie lijkt voor afzienbare tijd tevreden te zijn met de regulatoire 
status quo. Het concept van "free and fair trade" mist daardoor de facto de 
marktgerichte dynamiek die het lijkt te beloven. 
14. 
De positie van het Congres is al eerder ter sprake gekomen. Hier is het vooral 
van belang een zekere tweeslachtigheid te constateren. Enerzijds heeft het 
Congres door de jaren heen de Amerikaanse 'aerospace industry' gesteund met 
wetgeving die hen de wapens gaf om intemationaal te concurreren. Dit heeft 
zowel de satellietbouwers als de lanceerbedrijven geen windeieren gelegd. 
Anderzijds is het Congres - vooral de laatste 10 jaar - vlot geweest in het 
opleggen van sancties aan landen wier gedrag niet in overeenstemming was 
met de normen die dit orgaan wenselijk achtte. Dat deze sancties (vaak op het 
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gebied van de bilaterale handel) herhaaldelijk het buitenlands beleid van de 
President doorkruisten en bovendien, door een gebrek aan steun van buiten-
landse bondgenoten, ineffectief en schadelijk voor de eigen industrie bleken, 
heeft het Congres tot op heden niet merkbaar tot een ander beleid gebracht. 
Daarbij spelen in de relatie tussen het huidige Congres en President Clinton 
ongetwijfeld elementen van partijpolitieke opportuniteit een extra verstorende 
en complicerende rol. 
Dat tenslotte, in het Congres, China de rol van 'evil empire' van Rusland heeft 
overgenomen, blijkt uit de meest recente ontwikkelingen, inclusief nieuwe op 
China gerichte sanctiewetgeving. Hoewel de V.S.-China relaties uiteindelijk 
door een nucleaire spionage affaire onder druk zijn komen te staan, lag de 
oorsprong van het conflict op voor ons inmiddels vertrouwd terrein, nl. de -
mislukte - Chinese lanceringen van Amerikaanse satellieten. Het vermoeden 
dat de Amerikaanse satellietbedrijven Loral en Hughes, die samen met de 
Chinezen naar de oorzaak van deze mislukkingen hadden gekeken, daarbij 
know how, bruikbaar voor de verbetering van de Chinese Long March raket -
en dus ook van militaire raketten - , hadden overgedragen, leidde tot een 
diepgaand onderzoek door een Commissie van het Congres (de Cox Commis-
sie) en, nog voor het onderzoek was afgerond, tot wetgeving die het lanceren 
van Amerikaanse satellieten door de Chinezen aan zeer stringente, voorname-
lijk handelspolitieke, condities onderwierp. 
Deze Strom Thurmond Act, door Clinton met grote tegenzin ondertekend, droeg 
bovendien de autoriteit voor het verlenen van export vergunningen voor 
commerciele communicatiesatellieten weer over aan het State Department, en 
leidde tot nieuwe regelingen die het ook andere landen moeilijker maakt om 
op dit 'high tech' gebied zaken met de V.S. te doen. In feite betreft het hier 
bijna xenofobische en in ieder geval vrij protectionistische wetgeving die niet 
alleen in China, maar ook bij Amerika's trouwste handelspartners en NATO 
bondgenoten, tot verontrusting heeft geleid. 
Daarmee heeft het Congres, met een beroep op nationale veiligheid, deze 
handel verder gerestricteerd en verpolitiekt, en daarmee het odium op zich 
geladen een tegenstander te zijn van liberalisatie van de intemationale handel 
in lanceerdiensten. In feite was de boodschap van het Congres aan de Admi-
nistratie drievoudig: 1. U heeft de belangen van de satellietfabrikanten zwaar-
der laten wegen dan belangen van nationale veiligheid toelieten; 2. U heeft de 
handelsbelangen met China zwaarder laten wegen dan uit het oogpunt van 
nationale veiligheid acceptabel was; en 3. U moet er voor zorgen dat Ameri-
kaanse satellieten alleen door Amerikaanse bedrijven worden gelanceerd. 
15. 
We staan kort stil bij de mogelijkheid dat een van de betrokken partijen verhaal 
zou willen zoeken bij de Amerikaanse overheid vanwege schade veroorzaakt, 
of winst gederfd, door de bovenvermelde wetgeving, beleid of praktijken, 
bijvoorbeeld omdat een satelliet niet verkocht of niet geleverd kon worden, een 
buitenlandse lancering niet door ging of toegang tot de markt geweigerd werd. 
Een kort onderzoek toont aan dat de Amerikaanse bedrijven zich zeer bewust 
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zijn van het 'sensitive' karakter van de handel in satellieten en raketten, van 
het primaat van de President om, in het belang van 'national security and 
foreign policy', in contractsrelaties te intervenieren en van de exportwetten en 
voorschriften, die verwijzingen naar dat primaat bevatten. Contracten van deze 
bedrijven met buitenlandse afnemers zullen daarom altijd een zgn. 'excusable 
delays' clausule bevatten, die aansprakelijkheid voor schade uitsluit ingeval 
een contract niet of te laat wordt uitgevoerd en de oorzaak ligt in daden van 
"any governmental authority (in its sovereign or contractual capacities), 
including inability to obtain any necessary export licenses." 
Een andere vraag is of het ruimterecht enige steun geeft aan de stelling dat de 
V.S. of enig ander ruimtevaartbedrijvend land verplicht is om toegang tot haar 
markt te geven of samenwerking op ruimtevaart-, en specifiek lanceer(techno-
logie-), gebied met andere landen die dat wensen aan te gaan. Als basis voor 
die claim zou artikel 1 van het Ruimteverdrag van 1967 moeten dienen. Dit 
artikel stelt dat het onderzoek en gebruik van de ruimte moet worden verricht 
"for the benefit and in the interests of all countries .. " Met name de ontwikke-
lingslanden hebben het standpunt uitgedragen dat dit artikel verplicht tot 
samenwerking en het delen/overdragen van knowhow. De doctrine verwerpt 
echter deze interpretatie als te excessief en te zeer ingrijpend in het soevereine 
recht van staten om zelf bun partners uit te zoeken, en wordt daarin gesterkt 
door een in 1996 door de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties 
aanvaarde Verklaring, de Outer Space Benefits Declaration, waarin het recht 
van de lidstaten wordt bevestigd om op het gebied van ruimtevaartsamen-
werking met andere staten zelf de inhoud en strekking en alle andere aspecten 
daarvan te bepalen. 
Daarmee lijkt de conclusie gewettigd dat het huidige intemationale regime een 
gegeven is, waar slechts in -nationale en intemationale - politieke zin aan 
'gesleuteld' kan worden. 
16. 
De vraag die wij ons ten slotte moeten stellen is of de huidige situatie, een 
gereguleerde, gerestricteerde en sterk door elementen van (vooral Ameri-
kaanse) national security en foreign policy gedomineerde intemationale markt 
van commerciele lanceerdiensten, alle betrokken belangen in aanmerking 
nemend, een acceptabele is. 
We gaan daarvoor terug naar de rol van de V.S. als 'global security guard', 
en stellen vast dat de vrienden en bondgenoten van de V. S. deze rol in principe 
ondersteunen, voorzover bepaalde grenzen niet overschreden worden. Er zijn 
in ieder geval twee situaties denkbaar waarin controle- of sanctiemaatregelen 
van de V. S. in haar bovenvermelde rol niet zonder meer ondersteuning krijgen. 
Ten eerste, wanneer er geen overeenstemming bestaat over de soort of mate 
van gevaar (bijv. verkoop van computers aan Pakistan), de identiteit en de 
mate van 'schurkachtigheid' van het door maatregelen te treffen land (bijv. 
Cuba) of de zin en zwaarte van de maatregelen (bijv. beperkingen op de 
satellietenexport, t. b. v. lancering, naar China). 
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Een tweede situatie waarin een verminderd respect (en steun) voor V.S. 
maatregelen te verwachten valt is die waarin deze maatregelen gebaseerd zijn 
op andere dan 'security' achtergronden of doelen, en/of deze maatregelen 
ernstige en ongewenste consequenties of bijeffecten hebben. De laatste variant 
komt bier nogmaals aan bod. 
De Amerikaanse overheid oefent strikte controles uit op (de handel in) militaire 
draagraketten (missiles) en rakettechnologie om te voorkomen dat steeds meer 
landen de capaciteit ontwikkelen om nucleaire en andere massavernietigings-
wapens te lanceren. Dat ('missile non-proliferation') is op zich een respectabel 
doel. Maar die strikte controles maken het tegelijkertijd ook onmogelijk voor 
landen, die lanceeractiviteiten willen ontplooien voor uitsluitend vreedzame 
doeleinden, om draagraketten/lanceervoertuigen en I of de betreffende techno-
logie te verwerven. 
De V.S. rechtvaardigt haar beleid om aan dergelijke landen, ook als ze geen 
militaire raketprogramma hebben, lanceertechnologie te ontzeggen met het 
argument dat het z6 moeilijk is om van lanceren een commercieel succes te 
maken dat het risico groot is dat de betreffende knowhow alsnog door de 
ontvangers militair wordt aangewend of verkocht wordt aan derde landen met 
'missile' aspiraties. En indien dergelijke landen wel een militaire raketindustrie 
hebben zullen ze, volgens de V.S., de verleiding niet kunnen weerstaan om 
civiele lanceertechnologie voor hun militaire programma's te gebruiken. 
Deze redenering heeft iets arrogants: immers, hij suggereert dat, in principe, 
geen enkelland met lanceertechnologie te vertrouwen is. 
En het resultaat is dat er op dit belangrijke deelgebied van de ruimtevaart 
praktisch geen internationale samenwerking bestaat, dat het aantal en de 
varieteit van lanceerbedrijven wereldwijd bevroren is, en dat van innovatie 
buiten de V.S. nauwelijks sprake is. 
De Amerikaanse overheid oefent ook strikte controles uit op de export van 
communicatiesatellieten, inclusief belangrijke onderdelen en technologie, om 
te voorkomen dat dergelijke geavanceerde apparatuur en knowhow in handen 
komen van (het militaire establishment van) landen die daarmee een - extra -
gevaar voor de regionale of wereldvrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit zouden 
kunnen vormen. Maar deze controles worden ook gebruikt om toegang tot de 
lanceermarkt te beperken en daaraan prijs- en capaciteitscondities te verbinden. 
Daarmee reguleert de V.S. unilateraal de internationale concurrentie op dit 
gebied. 
Hoewel de desbetreffende bilaterale overeenkomsten in de loop der tijd libe-
raler zijn geworden laat de 'China affaire' zien dat de combinatie van de op 
zich al moeilijk verenigbare concepten van (nationale) veiligheid en (vrije) 
(internationale) handel in de V .S., onder invloed van partijpolitieke opportuni-
teit en de altijd aanwezige dreiging van sancties, een klimaat heeft gecreeerd 
dat weinig bevorderlijk is voor de ontwikkeling van de internationale handel 
in lanceerdiensten, een situatie waarvan niet alleen de Amerikaanse satellieten-
bouwers en exploitanten maar vooral ook de niet-Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven 
het slachtoffer zijn. 
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Het gecombineerde effect van de bovenstaande fenomenen is dat de Ameri-
kaanse overheid, met een beroep op nationale en intemationale veiligheid 
wetten heeft aangenomen, beleid heeft gevoerd en acties heeft ondemomen die 
- gedeeltelijk bedoeld, gedeeltelijk onbedoeld - hebben geleid tot een belemme-
ring van de intemationale ontwikkeling, innovatie en concurrentie op het 
gebied van lanceertechnologie en het aanbieden van lanceerdiensten. 
17. 
Men zou kunnen stellen dat dit gesignaleerde negatieve effect niet gedramati-
seerd moet worden, om twee redenen. Ten eerste, omdat het doel, nationale/-
intemationale veiligheid en stabiliteit nu eenmaal belangrijker is dan onbelem-
merde technologische ontwikkeling en intemationale handel en concurrentie. 
ten tweede omdat er, vooral in de V.S. maar ook in (concurrerend) Europa, 
een zodanig veelbelovende technologische ontwikkeling plaatsvindt dat aan alle 
huidige en toekomstige lanceerwensen zonder probleem voldaan kan worden, 
en de bovenvermelde belemmeringen daarom slechts een marginale invloed 
hebben op de ontwikkeling, innovatie en concurrentie op lanceergebied en dus 
op de ontwikkeling van het onderzoek en gebruik van de ruimte. 
Het eerste argument veronderstelt dat nationale/intemationale veiligheid altijd 
prioriteit heeft en inderdaad de facto gediend is door de wettelijke maatregelen, 
beleidsdaden en feitelijke acties van de Amerikaanse overheid, m.a.w. dat een 
zorgvuldige afweging van doel en middelen heeft plaatsgevonden en het 
resultaat daarvan een positief saldo oplevert. Dit is niet bewezen en ook 
moeilijk te bewijzen. 
En niet alleen het Amerikaanse 'veiligheids-establishment' en representanten 
van V.S. handel, industrie en wetenschap, maar ook de vrienden en bond-
genoten van de V.S. zullen daarover van mening verschillen. 
Het tweede argument is van cruciaal belang voor de toekomst van de intema-
tionale lanceerindustrie en haar klanten. Het veronderstelt namelijk dat er, 
gezien de capaciteiten en prestaties van de bestaande lanceerbedrijven, geen 
behoefte is aan nieuwe 'spelers' en meer concurrentie; anders, wellicht dema-
gogische, gezegd, dat de gezamenlijke wetenschappelijke/technologische kennis 
van de rest van de wereld beschouwd kan worden als onnodig voor de ontwik-
keling van innovatieve, betrouwbaardere, en goedkopere lanceersystemen; 
kortom, een overbodige luxe. Die veronderstelling is niet van arrogantie 
ontbloot, maar het is de -ook vanuit commercieel-defensief oogpunt- begrijpe-
lijke arrogantie van de lanceer'haves'. 
Een belangrijke reden om die veronderstelling ter discussie te stellen ligt in 
het feit dat de lanceerindustriediensten levert en dat het veeleer de klant is die 
bepaalt of de gewenste diensten naar tevredenheid geleverd worden en die al 
of niet het vertrouwen heeft dat de bestaande lanceerbedrijven ook aan bun 
toekomstige behoeftes zullen kunnen voldoen. En hoe ( economisch) machtiger 
de klant is, des te relevanter is zijn mening en des te dwingender zijn eisen-
pakket. 
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18. 
Zoals inmiddels bekend werken de bestaande lanceerbedrijven niet alleen voor 
nationale overheden (militaire en civiele telecommunicatie, navigatie en 
meteorologische satellieten), maar bedienen ze ook de (mede door internatio-
nale liberalisatie) dramatisch groeiende, wereldwijd opererende telecommuni-
catie-industrie, de 'global information super highway' in statu nascendi (die 
in 1997 al een waarde van USD 550 miljard vertegenwoordigde en in hetjaar 
2000 zo'n USD 1 biljoen ($1 trillion) waard zal zijn), waarvan satellieten-
communicatie een essentieel onderdeel uitmaakt. 1 
Daarnaast zal ook bijv. het Global Positioning System van het Amerikaanse 
ministerie van Defensie meer en meer gebruikt worden door de luchtvaart, 
auto, scheepvaart en andere sectoren van de particuliere (consumenten) indu-
strie, leidend tot een verwachte groei van het gebruik met meer dan 500 
procent (tussen 1996 en 2000). En de olie- , gas-, mijnbouw-, landbouw-, en 
kartering industrie maakt een toenemend gebruik van gespecialiseerde en 
verfijnde 'remote sensing' producten. 
Deze economisch sterke en machtige dienstenindustrieen, zijn afhankelijk 
geworden van een goed functionerende 'space infrastructure', d.w.z. satel-
lieten, inclusief grondstations, en ruimte transport, waaronder de draagraketten 
en de lanceerbases en faciliteiten (spaceports). Het lanceerdeel, dat ongeveer 
10 a 15 procent van de waarde van de totale ruimteinfrastructuur vertegen-
woordigt, is een cruciale schakel die echter qua omzet in het niet valt bij de 
'space infrastructure'- afhankelijke industrieen die zij dient. 
19. 
Zowel de overheden als de particuliere klanten van de lanceerbedrijven hebben 
zich bij herhaling beklaagd over de beschikbare lanceerdiensten die zij, 
ondanks onderlinge verschillen in kwaliteit van de desbetreffende bedrijven, 
geregeld en tot op de dag van vandaag beschrijven als onbetrouwbaar, in-
flexibel en veel te duur. 
Dat is ook nu nog het geval: zo kreeg de V.S. in een betrekkelijk korte periode 
van 9 maanden tot mei 1999 zes belangrijke lanceermislukkingen te verwerken, 
een schadepost van totaal 3. 5 miljard dollar en een ernstige tegenslag voor de 
getroffen particuliere en overheidsprogramma' s. 2 
En, voor wat betreft de lanceerkosten, is NASA het in ieder geval ook met de 
kwalificatie "te duur" eens, getuige haar nog niet zo lang geleden geformu-
leerde doelstelling om de kosten van het lanceren in een lage aardbaan (LEO) 
l. Zie State of the Space Industry - 1997 Outlook, uitgegeven door Space Vest, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, Space Publications en het Centre for Wireless Communications, pp 41, 42 
2. New York Times (12 mei 1999), p.1 ("Series of rocket failures unnerves U.S. space 
launching industry"). 
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terug te brengen van de huidige USD 10,000 per pond (lb), tot USD 1,000 per 
pond in 2007, en tot USD 100 per pond in het jaar 2022. 3 
Het zal duidelijk zijn dat, ondanks de ruime aanwezigheid van Amerikaanse 
knowhow en expertise, aanvullende inspanningen van niet-Amerikaanse 
lanceerindustrieen, zowel bestaande als nieuwe, allesbehalve een overbodige 
luxe kunnen worden genoemd. 
20. 
Het bovenstaande brengt ons tot de volgende conclusies en aanbevelingen: 
De commercieel/financiele belangen en het nationaal en intemationaal econo-
misch belang van bovengenoemde Amerikaanse en intemationale 'klanten' zijn 
zoveel groter dan die van de hen (be-)dienende lanceerbedrijven dat de volgen-
de suggesties gerechtvaardigd zijn. 
(i) De ontwikkeling van de intemationale lanceerindustrie dient niet langer 
kunstmatig te worden beperkt tot of geoligopoliseerd door de lanceerbedrijven 
van het kleine aantal bestaande lanceer-'landen' of afhankelijk blijven van op 
nationale veiligheid geinspireerde maar in de praktijk vooral nationalistische 
wetgeving, beleid of praktijken die ook andere dan veiligheidsbelangen en 
zorgen adresseren. 
(ii) In het 'handel versus nationale veiligheid'conflict dat met deze suggestie 
onopgelost blijft is het, zolang de Amerikaanse overheid geen aanstalten maakt 
duidelijke 'pro-handel' initiatieven te nemen, de verantwoordelijkheid van de 
Amerikaanse telecomindustrie om de overheid (Administratie en Congres) 
ervan te overtuigen uiterste terughoudendheid te betrachten bij het gebruik van 
het argument van 'nationale' (of intemationale) veiligheid om (a) bona fide 
buitenlandse lanceer- 'have-nots' hulp in het verwerven van lanceerknowhow 
of in het opbouwen van een lanceerbedrijf te onthouden, (b) Amerikaanse 
satellietbouwers te verbieden bij te dragen aan de veiligheid van buitenlandse 
lanceerbedrijven mede t. b. v. de Amerikaanse en buitenlandse (telecom-) 
klanten van die lanceerbedrijven en/ of© het gebruik van bestaande buitenlandse 
lanceerbedrijven te ontmoedigen door prijs en capaciteitsbeperkingen en/of de 
dreiging van strenge toepassing van export controles of sancties. 
(iii) Gezien het intemationale en wereldomspannende karakter van de satelliet-
constellaties en de daarmee opererende internationale communicatieconglo-
meraten, ligt het voor de hand dat deze laatste, samen met hun Amerikaanse 
collega's in intemationaal verband soortgelijke druk uitoefenen op de Ameri-
kaanse overheid. 
3. Zie NASA 's aeronautics/space goals, Aviation Week & Space Technology (19 okt 1998), 
p.40 
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Daarbij kan niet onvermeld blijven het sterk groeiend belang van hun gezamen-
lijke industrie voor de wereldeconomie, o.a. gestimuleerd door de liberalisatie 
van wereldtelecommunicatiediensten, in gang gezet middels WTO afspraken 
die door de V.S. zijn geinitieerd. 
(iv) In dat verband zouden zij, als een eerste stap, moeten bevorderen dat de 
Amerikaanse overheid buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven in staat stelt gebruik te 
maken van de veilige en goed-geequipeerde (particuliere) Amerikaanse lanceer-
bases en faciliteiten onder gelijke voorwaarden als de Amerikaanse lanceer-
bedrijven. (Soortgelijke aanbiedingen van de kant van o.a. Brazilie en Austra-
lie, hoewel niet geheel vergelijkbaar, hebben op dat punt al een precedent 
geschapen). Een dergelijke 'national treatment' regeling zou gerealiseerd 
kunnen worden door middel van een Amerikaans 'commitment' om lanceer-
diensten onder de werking van de GATS te brengen of, in eerste instantie, 
door middel van een andersoortig multilateraal werkend instrument; 
Een volgende, door genoemde industrieen te bepleiten, stap zou kunnen zijn 
het openen van de Amerikaanse lanceermarkt voor civiele, dus niet veiligheids-
gevoelige, overheidssatellieten voor buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven, middels een 
daartoe strekkende aanpassing van de "launch services"- uitsluiting van de 
GP A overeenkomst of, in eerste instantie, door middel van een andersoortig 
multilateraal werkend instrument van beperktere strekking (m.a.w. een begin 
van versoepeling van de 'fly America' regels). 
( v) De uitdrukking "de WTO zou moeten ... " wordt hi er niet gebruikt, en met 
reden. Enerzijds kunnen een aantal goede redenen voor een bemoeienis van 
de WTO niet ontkend worden. Zo zijn de lanceerdiensten niet in dezelfde mate 
geliberaliseerd als de industrieen die zij dienen. Dat kan een emstige belemme-
ring gaan opleveren voor de middels de WTO Basic Telecom Agreement in 
gang gezette liberalisatie van intemationale telecommunicatiediensten. Op zich 
is dat al een goede, principiele en praktische, reden om bij de nieuwe WTO 
GATS ronde die in november 1999 van start gaat een serieuze poging te doen 
tot enige liberalisatie van lanceerdiensten. Vooral de V.S. zou deze verant-
woordelijkheid moeten voelen nu zij zich met zoveel succes ingespannen heeft 
om haar 'free competition and fair trade' beginselen in middels bovenvermelde 
multilaterale overeenkomst intemationaal geaccepteerd te krijgen, en zij deze 
'gospel' nog steeds zo energiek verspreidt. 4 
4. De voorzitter van de Amerikaanse FCC bracht in een statement voor een commissie van het 
Congres over zijn agenda voor 1999 o.a. de volgende agendapunten op: " .. promote 
competition in all sectors of the marketplace .. continue to de regulate ... ensure broad access to 
communications services and technologies .. foster innovation .. we will advance these concepts 
worldwide, serving as an example and advocate of telecommunications worldwide ... and 
agressively work on the worldwide adoption of the WTO Agreement for Basic Communica-
tions." (cursiv. toegevoegd), zie statement William Kennard voor de Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Senate Committee on Appropriations (15 maart 
1999) <http://www. fcc.gov /Speeches/Kennard/Statements/stwek917 .html > . 
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Een additionele en belangrijke reden om een sterke voorkeur voor een WTO 
benadering te kiezen ligt in het juridisch bindende karakter van het resulterende 
verdrag, dat de betrokken Amerikaanse en buitenlandse spelers die voorspel-
baarheid en stabiliteit zou brengen die zij nu zo node missen. 
Aan de andere kant is het belangrijk te constateren dat het hier niet gaat om 
wat de WTO zou moeten of kunnen, maar wat de lidstaten bereid zijn via de 
WTO te doen. M.a.w. de politieke wil van de individuele lidstaten, en vooral 
van de V.S., bepaalt de kans op verandering, en de WTO kan daarbij het 
geprefereerde middel zijn. 
Dit brengt ons weer terug bij de 'nationale veiligheid versus internationale 
handel' problematiek en bij de bereidheid van de V.S. Administratie en het 
Congres om de handel meer ruimte te geven door het wijzigen van de huidige 
wetten, beleid en praktijk. 
(vi) Zowel de nationale veiligheid als de internationale handel zijn gebaat bij 
een strikt onderscheid tussen maatregelen die realistische en serieuze nationale 
veiligheidsbelangen betreffen en maatregelen die niet tot die categorie behoren. 
Duidelijke voorbeelden van laatstgenoemde categorie zijn: 
- de bilaterale overeenkomsten met China, Rusland en Ukraine voorzover deze 
markttoegang, prijzen en andere aspecten van marktgedrag regelen; 
- overheidsbeleid dat het gebruik van federale of particuliere lanceerbases of 
faciliteiten door buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven (voor commerciele lanceringen) 
verbieden of beperken. 
Tot dezelfde categorie behoren: 
- 'fly U.S.' wetten en voorschriften voorzover deze van toepassing zijn op 
civiele overheidssatellieten en bijv. NATO-leden en belangrijke niet-NATO 
partners de toegang tot deze markt verbieden; 
- de behandeling van commerciele communicatiesatellieten als wapens (conform 
de Strom Thurmond wet van 1998), wanneer het gaat om export van deze 
satellieten naar bevriende landen; 
- (Strom Thurmond) controles op de lancering van Amerikaanse commerciele 
communicatiesatellieten door buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven wanneer deze 
laatste onder verantwoordelijkheid en jurisdictie van NATO-leden of belang-
rijke niet-NATO partners vallen; 
- (Strom Thurmond) controles op de lancering van commerciele communicatie-
satellieten door China, voorzover aan de exportvergunningen condities worden 
gehecht die een commercieel, economisch, handels-, of ander niet-veiligheids-
karakter hebben. 
Van een enigszins ander karakter, maar niettemin nog in dezelfde categorie 
vallend vanwege het betrekkelijk geringe nationale veiligheidsgehalte van de 
betreffende maatregelen, zijn nog de volgende: 
- maatregelen die het een Amerikaanse satellietenbouwer, voorzien van een 
vergunning om deze satelliet door een buitenlandse maatschappij te laten 
lanceren, verbieden of moeilijk maken om zodanige gegevens uit te wisselen 
420 
Samenvatting in het Nederlands - Summary in Dutch 
met het lanceerbedrijf dat de kansen op een succesvolle lancering van de 
Amerikaanse satelliet vergroot worden; 
- maatregelen die het Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven verbieden of moeilijk 
maken kwaliteitscontrole en verbeteringsgesprekken te voeren met hun buiten-
landse partners in joint ventures die gebruik maken van buitenlandse lanceer-
voertuigen en -technologie. 
Vanzelfsprekend is de overdracht van raket- en lanceertechnologie aan terro-
ristische landen of landen die anderszins een bedreiging voor de wereldvrede 
en veiligheid vormen, als zodanig een reden tot ernstige bezorgdheid vanuit 
het oogpunt van die vrede en veiligheid. Maar op de schaal van non-prolifera-
tiebezorgdheid is er een groot verschil tussen dit geval en, bijv. samenwerking 
op het gebied van lanceertechnologie tussen een Amerikaans lanceerbedrijf en 
zijn collega uit een ander NATO-land. 
Zowel de MTCR als het desbetreffende Amerikaanse beleid benadrukken dat 
bona fide vreedzame nationale ruimtevaartprogramma's of internationale 
samenwerking m.b.t. zulke programma's niet belemmerd moeten worden door 
MTCR-gerelateerde controles, zolang deze samenwerking niet kan worden 
gebruikt voor - of kan bijdragen tot systemen waarmee massavernietigings-
wapens worden overgebracht. 
De V.S. heeft echter in 1996 een nationaal criterium toegevoegd dat niet alleen 
paternalistisch aandoet, maar bovendien in dit kader een wat twijfelachtige 
relevantie heeft: 
"For MTCR countries we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs which 
raise questions from a proliferation and economic standpoint." (cursiv. toegevoegd)5 
In het licht van het eerder gesignaleerde gebrek aan nieuwe, ambitieuze en 
innovatieve lanceerbedrijven buiten de V. S. lijkt de gecursiveerde toevoeging 
misplaatst en, als voorbeeld van een maatregel met een beperkt 'national 
security' gehalte, rijp voor heroverweging. 
(vii) Het bovenstaande dient niet gelnterpreteerd te worden als een poging om 
ernstige zorgen van de Amerikaanse overheid op dit gebied te bagatelliseren 
of the diskwalificeren, maar veel meer als een poging (en aansporing) om het 
kaf van het koren te scheiden. 
Dit dient twee doelen. 
Ten eerste, om de telecomindustrie en de andere gebruikers van lanceerdien-
sten een aanknopingspunt te geven voor het ter discussie stellen van die 
overheidsmaatregelen die voor liberalisatie in aanmerking komen, en vanuit 
het oogpunt van nationale veiligheid ook zonder bezwaar daarvoor in aanmer-
king kunnen komen. 
5. Clinton's National Space Policy (19 sep 1996) ("Non-proliferation, export controls, and 
technology transfer") <http://www .pub. whitehouse.gov .. etc > . 
421 
Samenvatting in het Nederlands - Summary in Dutch 
Ten tweede, om de kans dat nationale maatregelen die zich specifiek en alleen 
richten op echte en serieuze nationale veiligheidszorgen, verdiende ondersteu-
ning krijgen van Amerika's bondgenoten. Want, hoe hotter, grover of 'vervuil-
der' (door andere dan veiligheidsoverwegingen, aspecten of consequenties) 
deze nationale controles zijn, des te minder intemationale steun voor de 
handhaving daarvan verwacht mag worden. 
En, waar andere leden van het Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR en NATO, 
maar ook niet-leden van deze arrangementen zowel satellieten als lanceertech-
nologie bezitten en belangrijke economische, wetenschappelijke, technische of 
politieke voordelen zien in het samenwerken met andere landen op deze 
gebieden, zonder noodzakelijkerwijs de 'security' zorgen van de V .S. te delen, 
is er alle reden voor de Amerikaanse autoriteiten om met grote toewijding en 
precisie alleen die landen, doelen en projecten voor controle of sanctiemaat-
regelen te selecteren die waardering en steun van Amerika's vrienden en 
bondgenoten rechtvaardigen. 
Deze- lobby- inspanningen zouden er toe moeten leiden dat het V.S. - beleid 
van "draag geen strategische high tech goederen en knowhow over aan enig 
ander land, tenzij .. " gewijzigd wordt in "bevorder intemationale lanceersamen-
werking en concurrentie, tenzij .. " 
Uiteindelijk zal dat het juiste kader scheppen voor een verantwoorde liberalise-
ring van de intemationale handel in lanceerdiensten. 
(viii) Een vergelijking met het beleid van de U.S. ten aanzien van (liberalise-
ring van) de intemationale luchtvaart is in dit stadium wellicht zinvol. W elis-
waar is de betreffende transportactiviteit, anders dan de het vrij gebruik van 
de ruimte, bilateraal gereguleerd op basis van het principe van staatssoevereini-
teit over het nationale luchtruim, maar de handel in lanceerdiensten heeft in 
ieder geval vanuit Amerikaans perspectief met luchtvaart o. a. gemeen dat de 
U.S. overheid soevereine controle uitoefent over buitenlandse toegang tot de 
Amerikaanse markt (van -te lanceren- satellieten en -te verkopen- draagraketten 
en de daarbij horende technologie), en op basis daarvan invloed heeft op het 
operationele en commerciele wel en wee van buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven. 
Tot enige jaren geleden was intemationale markttoegang voor luchtvaartmaat-
schappijen alleen bereikbaar middels bilaterale, intergouvemementele onder-
handelingen die vrijwel zonder uitzondering gebaseerd waren op protectionisti-
sche principes zoals quid pro quo ofuitwisseling van 'equal economic benefits' 
(equal capacity), hetgeen in de praktijk meestal leidde tot een over en weer 
gunnen van toegang tot elkaars luchttransport markt op een niveau of in een 
mate die bepaald werd door de zwakste of minst geinteresseerde partij. W aar 
laatstgenoemde partij in de praktijk vaak het minst dynamisch, minst innovatief 
en ( ook) in eigen ogen het minst op de krachten van de vrije markt voorbereid 
was, resulteerde dit regime in een systeem van restrictieve bilaterale luchtvaart-
verdragen die de concurrentie sterk beperkten en de klant op het gebied van 
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kwantiteit, kwaliteit en prijs van het beschikbare luchttransportproduct te kort 
deden. 
De V.S. was het eerste land met een aanzienlijke luchtvaartmarkt die, eerst 
intern maar later ook internationaal, de luchtvaart 'dereguleerde' door protecti-
onistische en dirigistische regels en voorschriften in de nationale wetgeving 
en de internationale bilaterale verdragen zoveel mogelijk te vervangen door 
een regime waarin de industrie werd blootgesteld aan het -hardvochtiger-
klimaat van vrije(re) concurrentie en de krachten van de markt. Dit heeft een 
fundamentele verandering gebracht in zowel de samenstelling als het gedrag 
van de Amerikaanse en internationale luchtvaartindustrie. 
(ix) De overwegingen die aan Amerikaanse zijde ten grondslag lagen aan de 
nieuwe benadering van deze 'service industry' bevatten wellicht lessen voor 
(de liberalisering van) de lanceerindustrie. 
Het basisprincipe was van economische aard, namelijk de Amerikaanse vrije-
handel-/vrijemarktfilosofie ("let the market, the customer decide") die geacht 
wordt die bedrijven de beste overlevingskansen te bieden die in vrije concur-
rentie (met minimale overheidsbemoeienis) met andere bedrijven de klant 
consequent het beste product tegen de laagste prijs bieden. 
Intemationaal paste de Amerikaanse overheid dit principe niet toe op de 
luchtvaart dan nadat 
ze zich ervan vergewist had dat (a) de Amerikaanse luchtvaartmaatschappijen 
volwassen en sterk genoeg waren om vrije concurrentie te overleven, (b) deze 
bedrijven, in vergelijking met de betreffende buitenlandse luchtvaartmaatschap-
pijen, ook aanmerkelijke voordelen zouden halen uit het openen van de toegang 
tot elkaars luchtvervoersmarkten, en ( c )de nationale economie er wel bij zou 
varen. Op basis van de positieve uitkomst van deze evaluatie concludeerde de 
Amerikaanse overheid dat er geen reden (meer) was om de Amerikaanse (en 
internationale) luchtvaartindustrie een substantieel andere behandeling te geven 
dan de levensmiddelenindustrie, computer- of reisindustrie of banken, en 
besloot zij, tegen de zin van de Amerikaanse luchtvaartmaatschappijen, de 
deregulering/liberalisering van de luchtvaart internationaal te bevorderen. 
Wanneer men de bovenstaande overwegingen en afwegingen toepast op de 
handel in lanceerdiensten, kan worden gesteld, dat de Amerikaanse lanceerbe-
drijven voldoende 'fit, willing and able' zijn om in vrije concurrentie met 
buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven te overleven. Voorts hebben wij al eerder gesteld 
dat- op basis van dezelfde economische rationale die heeft geleid tot aanvaar-
ding van de GATT en GATS principes en van bijvoorbeeld de creatie van de 
Europese interne markt en van de NAFT A, en versterkt door de positieve 
ervaringen opgedaan met de deregulering en liberalisering van de luchtvaart -
vrij(re) concurrentie in de internationale lanceerindustrie een positieve impuls 
zal geven aan de belangrijke groeiindustrieen die van space hardware (en dus 
van het lanceren daarvan) afhankelijk zijn, en zo de groei van de betrokken 
regionale en nationale economieen, en ( dus ook) de wereldeconomie, zal 
bevorderen. 
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(x) Op grond van de bovenstaande parallellen met de luchtvaart zou men al 
kunnen concluderen dat de Amerikaanse overheid een begin met deze liberali-
sering zou moeten maken, zij het dat een derde punt van (mogelijke) intern-
Amerikaanse afweging daartoe geen steun lijkt te bieden: het feit dat de bij 
liberalisering voor Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven beschikbaar komende buiten-
landse markten qua omvang verre achterblijven bij wat hun buitenlandse 
concurrenten aan commerciele mogelijkheden verwerven als de Amerikaanse 
markt geheel of gedeeltelijk wordt opengesteld; maakt het te begrijpen dat een 
'ruil' van qua omvang en waarde zo dramatisch verschillende overheidslanceer-
markten (want daar gaat het voornamelijk om) voor de Amerikaanse lanceerbe-
drijven geen reden tot het enthousiast omarmen van dereguleringsplannen van 
hun overheid zal zijn. 
Daar passen echter een aantal kanttekeningen bij: 
- als de Amerikaanse overheid het luchtvaartprecedent volgt, hecht zij meer 
waarde aan de toepassing van vrije markt principes en de voordelen die dit 
op de tangere termijn biedt voor de nationale economie dan aan een korte 
termijn quid-pro-quo voor haar lanceerindustrie; 
- ook in de luchtvaart kwamen de voordelen van de internationalisering van 
de Amerikaanse deregulering in eerste instantie meer ten goede aan buiten-
landse luchtvaartmaatschappijen die toegang kregen tot de (omvang-)rijke 
Amerikaanse luchtvervoersmarkt dan aan Amerikaanse maatschappijen die 
toegang kregen tot de buitenlandse markten (vandaar ook het aanvankelijk 
verzet van die laatste maatschappijen tegen 'American style' deregulering); 
- het relatieve belang, in omvang en waarde, van de Amerikaanse overheids-
lanceermarkt is langzaam maar zeker aan het teruglopen in vergelijking met 
de particuliere lanceermarkt (waar de Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven inlopen 
op -vooral- Arianespace); 
- de Amerikaanse lanceerbedrijven zijn onderdeel van en hebben aandelen in 
lucht- en ruimtevaart ('aerospace') en telecommunicatie conglomeraten, die 
zelf, als klanten, de voordelen (moeten) zien van additionele concurrentie 
en innovatie in de internationale lanceermarkt. 
(xi) Met volledige erkenning van de Amerikaanse rol als 'global security 
guard' en haar verantwoordelijkheid voor- en bezorgdheid over 'national 
security', concluderen wij dat de tijd rijp is voor het zetten van de eerste 
Amerikaanse stappen op het pad van de liberalisatie van de internationale 
handel in lanceerdiensten langs de bovenuiteengezette lijnen. Het zullen, zoals 
gezegd, met name de bovenvermelde 'space hardware'- afhankelijke communi-
catie - en andere industrieen zijn die, als meest onmiddellijk door de huidige 
regelgeving, beleid en praktijken van de Amerikaanse overheid geaffecteerde 
spelers, het voortouw moeten nemen om de Amerikaanse overheid, en vooral 
het Congres, te overtuigen van het nut en de noodzaak van deze liberalisatie. 
Telecommunicatie en informatie technologie zijn, volgens de auteur Naisbitt, 
twee van de drie "paradigm industries" die de stuwende kracht zullen vormen 
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achter de door (handel in) diensten gedomineerde economieen van de 21 e 
eeuw. 6 
Er is, ook uit dien hoofde, alle reden om met prioriteit, in zowel nationale als 
intemationale fora, een analyse te maken van de effecten van de huidige 
nationale en intemationale regelgeving en praktijk zoals in deze studie be-
schreven op de ontwikkeling van de lanceerindustrie en daardoor op de 
ontwikkeling van deze 'paradigm industries', een en ander gekoppeld aan een 
inschatting/raming van de gevolgen voor de ontwikkeling van deze industrieen 
wanneer een liberalisatie van deze regelgeving inderdaad plaats vindt. 
(xii) Hoewel bovenstaande argumenten, van voomamelijk economische en 
handelspolitieke aard, op zich een voldoende rechtvaardiging zouden kunnen 
leveren voor de V.S. om, o.a. uit verlicht eigenbelang, de liberalisering van 
de intemationale lanceerindustrie in gang te zetten, zijn er nog twee additionele 
argumenten die tot een heroverweging van de huidige restrictieve beleidsprak-
tijken zouden kunnen leiden: 
a. in de openingsparagrafen van dit hoofdstuk werd al gesteld dat, naarmate 
andere landen niet alleen begrip tonen voor het doel van V.S. maatregelen ter 
bevordering van 'global security', maar het ook eens zijn met de (mate en 
soort van) bedreiging daarvan en de identiteit van de 'bedreigers', deze landen 
de V.S. zullen volgen of steunen in de te treffen maatregelen, zoals gemeen-
schappelijke export controles en/of sancties. Een andere kant van die stelling 
is dat een verminderd respect (en steun) voor dergelijke V.S. maatregelen te 
verwachten valt wanneer deze gebaseerd zijn op andere dan 'security' over-
wegingen of gericht zijn op niet-'security' doelen en/of deze maatregelen 
emstige/ongewenste consequenties of bijeffecten hebben. 
Voor een grotere effectiviteit van dergelijke maatregelen door multilateralisatie 
is dus zowel een strenge selectie van 'security' doelen en middelen als een 
zoveel mogelijk los koppelen van 'security' van andere overwegingen en 
doelen geboden. 
Dat zou meer ruimte bieden voor liberalisatie van de intemationale lanceer-
industrie door middel van samenwerking met, zowel bestaande als nieuwe, 
buitenlandse lanceerbedrijven; 
6. John Naisbitt is auteur van Megatrends 2000 en Global Paradox. De derde 'paradigm 
industry' is volgens dezelfde auteur de reis- en tourisme industry, zoals de World Travel and 
Tourism Council (WTTC) met tevredenheid aanhaalt in zijn publicatie Millennium Vision. 
De WTTC is een wereldomspannende coalitie van ongeveer lOO CEO's uit alle sectoren van 
de re is en tourisme industry, incl. alle vormen van transport. De organisatie heeft een solide 
reputatie opgebouwd op het gebied van de bevordering van Iiberalisatie van de internationale 
luchtvaart en van telecommunicatie door middel van, vooral op economische analyses 
gefundeerde, pleidooien en acties gericht op het slechten van handelsbarrieres en het 
afschaffen van protectionistische regels en praktijken, zie <http://www.wttc.org> passim. 
De WTTC zou een interessante bondgenoot kunnen zijn van de eerdergenoemde telecom-
municatie- en andere 'space hardware-afhankelijke' industrieen bij het bevorderen en 
bepleiten van liberalisatie van de intemationale satellieten lanceerindustrie. 
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b. Laatstgenoemde samenwerking heeft nog twee andere aspecten: 
Ten eerste: de geschiedenis van (de effecten van) de V.S. weerstand tegen de 
overdracht van lanceertechnologie aan het buitenland heeft getoond dat het op 
z' n minst twijfelachtig is of hierdoor de ontwikkeling van civiele en/ of militaire 
lanceersystemen in de desbetreffende landen effectief en ook op de langere 
termijn wordt voorkomen. Europa, Japan, India en Brazilie zijn, zoals we 
gezien hebben, voorbeelden van landen die door de Amerikaanse houding 
veeleer gesterkt werden in hun overtuiging 'to go it alone', eventueel met de 
assistentie van minder beginselvaste (of bezorgde) landen. Men kan zich 
afvragen of deze historie niet geleerd heeft dat een, in een civiel ruimtevaart-
samenwerkingsprogramma ingebedde, gecontroleerde overdracht van lanceer-
technologie en/of hardware, een uiteindelijk effectievere methode is om 
'missile' -proliferatie- zorgen te adresseren en de wereld veiliger te maken; 
Ten tweede: waar het restrictieve Amerikaanse beleid de tegenstelling tussen 
ruimte (lanceer) 'haves' en 'have-nots' handhaaft en daarmee de technologische 
en economische 'gap' tussen deze groepen verdiept, kan men aan dat beleid 
ook een vrede-, veiligheid- en stabiliteitsbedreigende werking toeschrijven. Dat 
raakt niet alleen het Amerikaanse economische, politieke en veiligheidsbelang, 
maar de belangen van de he le internationale gemeenschap. 
De in het vorige hoofdstuk geciteerde bepalingen van het Ruimteverdrag van 
1967 en de daarop gebaseerde Space Benefits Declaration van 1996 roepen om 
die reden met klem op tot internationale samenwerking op het gebied van het 
onderzoek en gebruik van de ruimte. In feite is dat het centrale thema, de geest 
van het ruimterecht als lex specialis van het internationale recht, en is een 
beleid dat samenwerking op een deelgebied van de ruimtevaart vrijwel geheel 
uitsluit in strijd met die geest. 
Daarmee lijkt het kader aanwezig voor een door de U.S. - op basis van 
aangepaste wetgeving, beleid en praktijken- gecreeerd internationaal regime 
dat de titel 'free and fair trade in launch services' verdient zonder toevoeging 
van het epitheton omans 'a l' Americaine'. 
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a fortiori 






































with greater reason 
= American-style 
= among other (things) 
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty) 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
concerned with a particular end/purpose or 
formed/ used for a specific or immediate 
problem/need 
= Arms Export Control Act 
Air Force Base 
Aerospace Industries Association (of America) 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications 
= article 
articles 
= Associate Administrator of Commercial Space 
Transportation 
Aviation Week & Space Technology 
in good faith 
Bureau of Export Administration 
casu quo, alternatively 
reservation, qualification 
Congressional Budget Office 
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Cape Canaveral Air (Force) Station 
Cooperation Forum on Export Controls 
Commerce/ Commodities Control List 
Canadian Defence Industries Association 
Chief Executive Officer 
Code of Federal Regulations 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation 
Chapter 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Claims Court 
Common Market Law Reports 
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales 
= Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls 
Colloquium 
= Communications Satellite Corporation 
Commercial Space Transportation Advisory 
Committee 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
Cong. Congress 
coo Chief Operating Officer 
COPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
CPC Central Product Classification 
CRC Coleman Research Corporation 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSLA = Commercial Space Launch Act 
cum (combined) with, including 
CYSA Cape York Space Agency 
D Democrat 
DASA DaimlerChrysler Aerospace 
de facto in fact 
de iure in law 
Dept of State Bull Department of State Bulletin 
DFH Dong Fang Hong (the East is red) 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOS Department of State 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DTC = Defense Trade Controls 
DTSA Defense Technology Security Administration 
E. C. European Commision 
e.g. exempli gratia, for example 
e.i.f. entry into force 
E.O. Executive Order 
EAA Export Administration Act 
EAR Export Administration Regulations 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECSL European Centre for Space Law 
EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
ELDO European Launcher Development Organisation 
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 
emph. add. emphasis added 
EPCI Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESC European Space Conference 
ESRO = European Space Research Organisation 
et seq. and following (provisions) 
EU European Union 
F(ed). R(eg). Federal Regulations 
FAA 1958 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR's = Federal Aviation Regulations 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands- Summary in Dutch 
FCC = Federal Communications Commission 
PEER Far Eastern Economic Review 
FY Fiscal Year 
G-7 Group of 7 (most) industrialized countries 
GAO = General Accounting Office 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GD General Dynamics 
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit 
GPA (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement 
GPO Government Printing Office 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSLV = Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle 
GTO = Geostationary Transfer Orbit 
GWIC Great Wall Industry Corporation 
H.R. House of Representatives 
HEOS Highly Eccentric Orbit Satellite 
HSR History Study Report 
(I)IL (International) Industrial List 
i.a., inter alia among other things 
i.e. = id est, that is (to say) 
I.L.M. = International Legal Materials 
ibid. ibidem, inion the same place 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICSU = International Council of Scientific Unions 
id. idem, the same (source) 
IGY International Geophysical Year 
IHT International Herald Tribune 
IISL International lustitute of Space Law 
ILS International Launch Services 
in intemationalibus in international affairs 
in statu nascendi = in state of being born, in state of development 
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty) 
infra below 
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organisation 
INR Intelligence and Research Bureau 
INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organisation 
IR(B)M Intermediate-Range (Ballistic) Missile 
IRS Indian Remote-sensing Satellite 
ISRO = Indian Space Research Organisation 
ISS International Space Station 
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
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= Journal of Air Law and Commerce 
Journal of Space Law 
Joint Endeavor Agreement 
juncto, (taken, read) together with, in combination 
with 
Kennedy Space center 
= Law 
Low Earth Orbit 
special law 
Lockheed Khrunichev Energia International 
Lockheed Martin 
Long March 
Me Donnell Douglas 
= Memorandum of Agreement 
= Memorandum of Consultations 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Major Defense Equipment 
Medium Earth Orbit 
Most Favoured Nation 
Manufacturing License Agreement 
Martin Marietta (Corporation) 
Missile Technology Control Act 
Missile Technology Control Regime 
Million theoretical operations per second 
National Advisory Comittee for Aeronautics 
National Air Intelligence Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
National Space Development Agency 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Netherlands 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
willy-nilly 
North American Air Defense 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
National Security Agency 
National Security Action Memorandum 
National Security Council 
National Security Decision Directive 
Nuclear Suppliers Group 
National Space Policy Directive 
National Space Transportation System 
New York Times 
Samenvatting in het Nederlands - Summary in Dutch 
OCST = Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
ODTC = Office of Defense Trade Controls 
OMB = Office of Management and Budget 
osc = Orbital Sciences Corporation 
OSP Orbital-Suborbital Program 
OST Outer Space Treaty (of 1967) 
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 
OTA Office of Technology Assessment 
P(ub). L. = Public Law 
para. paragraph 
passim in various places, here and there 
PKM = Perigee Kick Motor 
PLA People's Liberation Army 
PM = Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
PRC People's Republic of China 
Proceed. Proceedings 
PSLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle 
publ publication, published 
Q. Quarter 
quid-pro-quo = something for something 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
RPV = Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
R&D Research and Development 
RSC Rocket System Corporation 
res communis omnium = a good belonging to all/everybody 
RKA Russian Space Agency 
R Republican 
Sec. Section 
SEI Space Exploration Initiative 
SELVS Small Expendable Launch Vehicle Services 
SES Societe Europeenne des Satellites 
Sess. Session 
SIA = Satellite Industry Association 
SIG (Space) Senior Inter-Agency Group on Space 
SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile 
SME Significant Military Equipment 
SRM Short( er)-Range Missile 
SSI = Space Services Inc. 
SSTO Single-Stage-To-Orbit 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Stat. Statutes 
status quo the existing state 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
STS Space Transportation System 
su = Soviet Union 
supra = above 
TAA = Technical Assistance Agreement 
TAA Trade Agreement Act 
TCI Trans-Space Carriers Inc. 
TIAS Treaties and other International Acts Series 
TPCC Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee 
TPSC Trade Policy Staff Committee 
Trb Tractatenblad 
TTCP Technology Transfer Control Plan 
U.S. = United States 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 
ULV Unmanned Launch Vehicle 
UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
unpub. unpublished 
USA United Space Alliance 
USAF United States Air Force 
USBI U.S. Space Boosters, Inc. 
use United States Code 
USG United States Government 
USML United States Munitions List 
UST United States Treaty Series 
USTR United States Trade Representatives 
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 
VCSFA Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority 
viz. videlicet, namely 
VLS Veiculo Lancador de Satellites 
WA Wassenaar Arrangement 
Weekly Comp. Pres. 
Does. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
WEU Western European Union 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WSJ Wall Street Journal 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council 
ZLW = Zeitschrift fiir Luft- und W eltraumrecht 
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MEMBERSHIP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
MULTILATERAL REGIMES 




Belgium X X X X X 
Canada X X X 
Denmark X X X X X 
France X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X 
Greece X X X X 
Iceland X X 
Italy X X X X X 
Luxembourg X X X X 
Netherlands X X X X X 
Norway X X X X 
Portugal X X X X 
Spain X X X X X 
Turkey X X X 
U.K. X X X X X 
U.S. X X X 
Hungary X X X 
Poland X X X 
Tsjechia X X X 
Australia X X X 
Egypt X 
Israel X 
Japan X X X 
Rep. of Korea X X 
New Zealand X X X 
Jordan X 
Argentina X X X 
Austria X X X X 
Brazil X 
Finland X X X X 
Ireland X X X X 
Russia X X 
South Africa X 
Sweden X X X X 
Switzerland X X X 
Romania X 
Bulgaria X 
Slovak Rep. X 
Ukraine X X 
*See ITAR, Amendment of March 15, 1999, Ch. 4, (text to) notes 46 and 47. 
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Payload Operator L M Manufacturer Use 
lunar Prospector NASA Lockheed Martm 
Skynet 40 British Defense Mimstry Matra Marcon1 
STS 89 NASA Rockwelllntematlonal 
Commumcat1ons $45-55 M S S 
Crewed S S 
OffeQ 4 lsrae! Space Agency Israel A1rcraft lnd. {lA!) Remote Sensmg 
1 Soyuz TM-27 RKK Energ1a RKK Energ1a Crewed 
I 
SM JI9S.01 DoO Unknown !ntell!gence 
• Brazilsat 83 Embrate! Hugnes Commumcattons 
• lnmarsat 3 FS !nmarsat Lockheed Mart!n Commumcat1ons 
Geosat Follow-On DoD Ball Aerospace Remote Sensmg 
f• Celestis 2 Ce!estiS Celestls Other 






CCAS 1· Gl~balstars 1-4 Globalstar, Inc. Space SystemSILoral Commumcatlons 
Saikonur 1 • Spm 2 Sovmformsputmk Centra! Spec; all zed Remote Sensmg 
s s 
s s 
VAFB l•!ridiums 50.52-56 Iridium. Inc. ~=~~du~;:~,;;sSKBJ CommumcatJons s s: 
TanegashJma I' COMETS 1 NASOA Toshiba Commumcatlons 


































\• Teledesic T1 Teledes1c Orbital lOSC! Commun1cabons 
, .. lnteJsat 8A F6 New Skies Satellites Lockheed Martm Commumcations $90-105 S S 
1* Hot Bird 4 Eutelsat Matra Marconi Commumcatlons $60-75 M S S I Progress M-38 RKK Energ1a RKK Energ1a Mir Re-supply S S 
'j GBS 8 DoD Hughes Commumcations $62-85 M S S 
SPOT 4 CNES Matra Marconi Remote Sensmg S S 
I•Jndiums 51,61 lridJurn, Inc. LOCkheed Martm Communications $20~25 M S S 
l"lridiums 55. 57-60 Iridium, Inc. Lockheed Marttn Commumcattons $45-55 M S S 
I 
TRACE NASA NASA SC!entrfic S S 
•Jnd1ums 62-68 lnd1um, !ne Lockheed Martm Commumcatlons $75-95 M S S 
I STS 90 NASA Rockwelllntemanonal Crewed S S 
!" Globalstars sa 1415 Globalstar. !ne Space SystemsJLoral Communications $45-55 M S S 
I• BSAT 1 B Broadcast Satellite Sys. Hugnes Communications $70-85 M S S 
!• Nilesat 101 Egypt RadiofTV Umon Matra Marcom Commumcations 
! Kosmos 2350 Russian MoD Unknown Military 
!•lridiums 69.71 lnd1urn. Inc. Lockheed Martin I Kosmos 2351 Russia NPO Lavochkm 
1• EchoStar 4 EchoStar Satellrte Corp. lockheed Martin 
I USA 139 DaD Unknown 
I NOAA 15 NOAA Lockheed Martin 
I Progress M-39 RKK Energ1a RKK Energ1a 
j• lridiums 70, 72~75 Iridium. Inc. lockheed Martin 
! Ch1naStar 1A Ch1nese Comm Mimstry Loekheeel Martin 
! STS 91 NASA RockwelllntemaMnal 
!· Thor 3 Telenor A.S, Hughes 
j Kosmos 2352-57 
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Berlin Techmcal Univ, 
VNII Elektromekhaniki 
Surrey Sat. Tech. Ltd. 
OHB System 
That MicroSatellite Cc... Surrey Sat. Tech. Ltd. 
ElectroOobcs Sys.iRKA Unknown 
s s 
Communicanons $20-25 M S S 
Classified s s 
Communications $i5~95 M S S 
ClasSified S S 
Meteorological S S 
Mir Re-supply S S 
CommunicaMns $45-55 M S S 
Commumcations S S 
Crewed S S 
Commumcanons 
Commumcatlons 
$45-55 M S S 
p s 
Commumcabons $90-105 M S S 















11·:;:~ TechSat2 Asher Space Res. inst. Techmon Tech.lnstrtute Development 
v Denotes commert:~allaunch. defined as a launch that 1s internationally comoetea or Whose pnmary payload is commeroal m nature. 
Denotes FAA-Iicensed launch. 
Denotes a commeraal payload. defined as a spacecraft whiCh serves a cornmerCJal function or is operated by a commerCial entity. 
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Shuttle Discovery KSC 
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j1116198 v t Delta 2 7920 VAFB 
j11/20/98 Proton Baikonur 
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12/30198 Proton Ba1konur 
1998 Worldwide Orbital Launch Events 
Payload Operator Manufacturer 
Sinosat 1 EuraSoace/Sinosatcam Aerospat1ale 
l Kosmos 2360 Russ1an MoO NPO Yuznnoye 
I• Orbcomms 13-20 Orbcomm Orbital (OSC) 
I USA 1998·08 DoD Unknown 
! Soyuz TM·28 RKK Energia RKK Energ10 
i •tridiums 76, 78 lndium. Inc. Lockheed Martin 
i'" ST 1 Singapore Tetecom Matra Marcon1 
! • Galaxy 10 PanAmSat Hughes 
j • Astra 2A SES Hughes 
1 Kwangmyongsong North Korea Unknown 
l·lridiums 77, 79·82 lriaium.lnc. Lockheed Martm 
! • ~~~~:~~rs 5. 7, 9· Globalstar. !ne. Space SystemsJLorai 
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.. PAS 7 PanAmSat Space SystemSILora/ 
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Molniya H-1998 Russia PTT NPD PM 
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I
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• Sirius 3 Nordiska Sat (NSAB) Hughes 
1
• Hot Bird 5 Eutelsat Matra Marcon1 

















Commumcat1ons i i ~ S 
Intelligence ! ! ; S 
Commumcabons i $12·15 M IS S 
Classtfied ~ ! F F 
Crowed , jS S 
Commumcabons i S20·25 M I S S 
Communications I $70-85 M I S S 
Communications i S75~90 M j F 
Commumcattons 1 $75~95 M 1 S S 
Unknown IF 
Commumcat1ons ! $45~55 M I S S 
Comnications I $30.40 M I F F 
Commumcatlons ~ $80°95 M / S S 
Commumcauons I $12-15 M! s s 
Commumcations l ! S S 
Development j I S S 
Commumcations IS90-110 M! S S 
Commumcatlons l ; 
Commumcations 1$90-105 Mj S S 
Communications l $62-85 M 1 S S 
Development / S S 
Test , l 
Commumcatlens { $10-14 M j S S 
Development ' ! S S 
' 
!s s 
Sedsat-1 NASA Univ Alabama Huntsvllle Commumcabons ~ 
Progress M-40 RKK Energia RKK Energ1a Mir Re-supply 1 
i Sputnik 41 AMSAT France AMSAT France CommumcatJons ~ j 
!· AfriStar 1 WorldSpace.lnc. Alcatel Espace Communications JS90-110 M! S S 
) • GE 5 GE Amencom Aerospabale Commumcations ) / 
J STS 95 NASA Rockwell lntemattonal Crewed I l S S I Spartan 201·04R NASA NASA Scientific 
! PANSAT 1 Naval Postgrad. School Naval Postgrad. School Communtcatlons j j 
'• PAS 8 PanAmSat Space Systemstloral Commumcatlons j $75-95 M 1 S S I· lndiums 83-87 Iridium, Inc. Lockheed Martin Communications j $45-55 M j S S 
l Zarya International Khrunichev Space Station j i S S 
J .. Bonum 1 Media Most Hughes Commumcattons 1 $45-55 M I S S 
/ STS 88 NASA Rockwell lntemanonal Crewed 
1 I S s 
I MightySat 1 DaD Orllrtal (DSC) Development J, SAC A NASA Bariloche Development 1 I Unity NASA NASA Space Station i ! 
I
• SatMex 5 Telecomm Mex1co Hughes Commumcatlons I $75-90 M I S S 
SWAS Sm1thsontan Astro. Obs. NASA Setentific 1 S S 
I Nadezhda 5 Russta NPO PM Navsgatton !I S S 
'
1, Astnd 2 Swedish Natl Space Sfd Swedssh Space Corp. SCientific 
Mars Climale Olbiter NASA LOCI<heed Martm Scientific I I S S 
i "lridtums 92, 93 Iridium, Inc. Lockheed Martin Commumcatlons ! $20-25 M j S S 
I" PAS 68 PanAmSat Hughes con:mu~tcanons 1 $75-90 M I s s 
l Kosmos 2361 Russia NPO Lavoehkin Navtganon i 1 S S 
J t<osmos 2362-64 Russian MoD NPO PM NavtgatJon ' ! S S 
v Denotes commercial launch, defined as a launcn that is internationally competed or wnose pnmary payload ts commerctal tn nature. 
t Denotes FAA--Iicensed launch. 
" Denotes a commerctal payloact. defined as a spacecraft which serves a commercial function or !S operated by a commerctal entity. 
UM refers to the outcome of the launch and rmss1on: S = success. P = partial success. F = failure. 
Commercial space transportation: 1998 Year in review, F AA Associate Administrator for 




1957 Oct 4 Sputnik 1 launched from Baikonur cosmodrome, 
Kazakhstan 
1958 Oct 1 Birth of NASA 
1961 Apr 12 Yuri Gagarin launched from Baikonur 
May 21 President Kennedy announces the Apollo program 
1967 Oct 4 Sputnik's 10 year anniversary 
Attendance space law lectures Leiden University 
(Goedhuis) 
1969 Jul 20 Lunar landing Apollo 11 
1972 Jan President Nixon's decision to develop U.S. space 
transportation system (STS) 'Space Shuttle' program 
Apr 16 Launch Apollo 17 (sixth and final lunar landing) 
Oct 9 U.S. Launch Assurance Policy 
1973 Jul 31 ESC decision to develop Ariane launcher 
Sep 21 Ariane Development Arrangement (concluded by 
ESRO/certain Eur governments) 
1975 Jul 15 Apollo-Soyuz link-up 
1978 Oct 10 Civil and further national space policy, Presidential 
Directive/ NSC - 42 
1979 Dec 24 First launch of Ariane (L01) 
1980 Jan 14 Ariane Production Declaration 
Mar 26 Formation of Arianespace 
Oct 30 ESA (formal birthdate) 
1981 Jan President Reagan takes office 
Apr 12 First flight of Space Shuttle (Columbia-STS 1) 
Nov 2 Arianespace first commercial launch contract 
signed with GTE Spacenet (U.S.) 
1982 Jul 4 National space policy, Presidential Directive/ NSC - 42, 
incl. establishment Senior Agency Group on Space, 
"SIG-Space" 
Return to earth of Space Shuttle Columbia (4th flight): 
shuttle declared operational 
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Space chronology 
1983 Mar 29 Launch of SDI program (Pres. Reagan's "Star Wars" 
speech) 
May 16 Commercialization of expendable launch vehicles, 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 94 
1984 Jan 25 Pres. Reagan announces Space Station program (State of 
the Union) 
Feb 24 Commercial expendable launch vehicle activities, 
Executive Order 12,465 designating DOT as launch lead 
agency 
Establishment DOT Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation (OCST) 
May 25 Transpace Carriers Inc. (TCI) Sec. 301, Trade Act 
1974, complaint against Arianespace 
Oct 30 Commercial Space Launch Act 
1985 Jan 2 Application of SSI (with OCST) for approval of 60 
launches of human 'cremains' 
Feb 13 OCST approval of SSI application 
Jul 17 Determination under Section 301 [re TCI complaint], 
Memorandum for the United States Trade 
Representative, The White House 
Jul 30 Shuttle pricing for foreign and commercial users, NSDD 
181 
1986 Jan 28 Explosion Space Shuttle Challenger (STS-25) 
Pres. Reagan's announcement of National Aerospace 
Plane program (State of the Union) 
Dec 27 U.S. launch strategy, NSDD 254 (based on Presidential 
Directive Aug 1986) 
1987 Nov ESA member countries approve Ariane 5 development 
1988 Jan 5 Presidential Directive on National Space Policy (Reagan) 
Feb 11 The President's space policy and commercial space 
initiative to begin the next century, Fact Sheet, the 
White House Office of the Press Secretary (based on 
NSDD Jan 5, 1988) 
Feb 12 Model expendable launch vehicle commercialization 
agreement, Dept of the Air Force 
Jul 26 The Community and space, communication from the 
European Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament 
Sep 9 Administration's decision to grant license for 




27,28 Cong. Hearings on AUSSAT & Asiasat launches with 
Chin. Long March 
Sep 29 Resumption of shuttle flights (STS-26) 
1989 Jan 26 U.S. -Chinese launch trade agreement (M.o.U) 
Mar 16 Approval export licenses Asiasat & AUSSAT: entry into 
force U.S.-Chinese M.o. U. 
Jun 4 Tiananmen Square, Beijing 
Nov 2 National space policy, Presidential Directive (Bush) 
1990 Jan Establishment within State Dept of the Center for 
Defense Trade 
Sep 5 Commercial space launch policy, Presidential Directive 
(Bush) 
U.S. Missile Technology Control Act 
Launch Services Purchase Act 
Nov 16 Executive Order 12735 on chemical and biological 
weapons proliferation, incl. directive for additional 
export control measures 
1991 Feb 12 U.S. commercial space policy guidelines, White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
Mar 9 National Space Policy Directive 6: Space Exploration 
Initiative (Bush) 
Apr 30 Approval exports AUSSAT & Freja satellites to China 
for Long March launch 
1992 Renewal Ariane Production Declaration of 1980 
May 6 US sanctions ISRO & Glavkosmos 
May 18 1 OOth Arianespace launch contract 
Sep 23 The European Community and space, communication 
from the European Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament 
Oct 23 ESA Council resolution on European space policy on 
launch services 
1993 Jul 22 EC - Russia launch trade agreement (proposed text) 
Sep 2 Signing of US-Russia launch trade agreement and 
missile export control agreement 
Sep 27 Space launch and missile exports, Presidential Decision 
Directive ("non-proliferation and export control policy") 
(Clinton) 
1994 Feb 4 Launch of Japanese H-2 rocket 
Mar 31 Demise of COCOM 
Aug 5 National Space Transportation Policy (Clinton) 
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Nov 15 GATS decision European Court of Justice 
1995 Mar 13 New launch trade agreement US-China 
Jun Lockheed Martin & Khrunichev form International 
Launch Services (ILS) to market Proton & Atlas 
Dec 14 US-Ukraine launch trade agreement 
Dec 19 28 countries, incl. the former COCOM members and 
Russia conclude new multilateral export control 
arrangement (Wassenaar) 
1996 Jan 30 New US-Russia launch trade agreement 
Jun 4 Failure Ariane 5 maiden flight 
Jul 17 Starsem agreement signed in Moscow by French & 
Russian governments 
Sep 19 National Space Policy (Clinton) 
Oct 1 United Space Alliance (Lockheed Martin + Rockwell 
lnt'l) assume responsibility for day-to-day space shuttle 
processing 
Dec 4 The European Union and Space: Fostering applications, 
markets and industrial competitiveness, Communication 
from the Eur. Commission to the Council and the Eur. 
Parliament 
1997 Apr 2 Total objects in earth orbit 8.546. of which 2.313 
satellites and 6.233 debris (US Space Command 
Sep 23 1 OOth Ariane launch 
1998 Oct 17 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act 
Oct 28 Commercial Space Act 
1999 Feb 22 U.S. Government disapproves sale of Hughes 
commercial communications satellite to APMT 
Mar 15 Transfer of commercial communications satellites from 
CCLto USML 
E.i.f. of ITAR amendments 
Sep 30 Oral defense "The international trade in launch services, 
the effects of U.S. laws policies and practices on its 
development', Leiden University 
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- Born in Zeist, the Netherlands 
- Law studies, Leiden University 
- Assistant legal advisor, Air Staff, Royal Dutch Air 
Force, The Hague 
- Post-graduate studies air and space law, McGill 
University, Montreal 
- LL.M. 
- KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Foreign Relations and 
Cooperation Bureau 
- 1990-1997 Vice president foreign relations 
- Adjunct Professor of Law, McGill University, 
Institute of Air and Space Law 
- Member, Board of Directors, International Institute 
of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, Leiden 
University 
- Member, Board of Editors Air and Space Law 
(Kluwer Law International) 
- Air Transport Expert for Mediation/Dispute 
Resolution, ICAO, Montreal 
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